An Independent Transmission System and Market Operator (ITSMO) in SA - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

an independent transmission system and market operator
SMART_READER_LITE
LIVE PREVIEW

An Independent Transmission System and Market Operator (ITSMO) in SA - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

An Independent Transmission System and Market Operator (ITSMO) in SA A dialogue hosted by Nedbank, EE Business Intelligence and JCSE at Wits University With opening keynote address by Public Enterprises Minister Hon. Pravin Gordhan DATE: Thursday


slide-1
SLIDE 1

An Independent Transmission System and Market Operator (ITSMO) in SA

A dialogue hosted by Nedbank, EE Business Intelligence and JCSE at Wits University

With opening keynote address by Public Enterprises Minister Hon. Pravin Gordhan DATE: Thursday 15 October 2020 TIME: 12h00 to 14h30

slide-2
SLIDE 2

Opening keynote by

  • Hon. Pravin Gordhan

Minister of Public Fnterprises

An Independent Transmission System and Market Operator (ITSMO) in SA

slide-3
SLIDE 3

Presentation 1 by Mr Andre de Ruyter CEO of Eskom

An Independent Transmission System and Market Operator (ITSMO) in SA

slide-4
SLIDE 4

Perspectives on the Independent Transmission and System Operator as an enabler for generation investment

André de Ruyter Eskom Group Chief Executive 15 October 2020 Nedbank/ EE/ JCSE Energy dialogue

slide-5
SLIDE 5

Approximately 10 000 MW will be retired in the next 10 years resulting in additional strain on the system and the need for new generating capacity

5 Source: Generation shut down dates/ rates

600 2030 2020 2024 2023 2021 2022 2025 950 2026 400 2027 2028 2.000 2029 800 600 1.500 400 1.000 700 1.100

New generation capacity must be brought on line to replace retired assets

Shutdown rates per year (based on 50 year life) MW Hendrina Komati Kriel Grootvlei Arnot Camden Matla

slide-6
SLIDE 6

While DMRE Bid Window 5 is welcomed, more capacity is needed to bridge the gap, even assuming no market growth

6

MW Peak demand

6

Options for new capacity Capacity conundrum PV Wind New coal Nuclear 18-24 months 24-36 months 10-12 years 12-15 years ➢ If demand reaches 34 000 MW, we will be constantly short of capacity ➢ DMRE gazetted Bid Window 5 will help to close the existing gap ➢ However, more capacity is required in the short term to replace retired capacity Technology Average build time ➢ New build timelines and LCOE limit the viable technology options to meet required generation capacity ➢ Renewable energy has load factor of 25% - 30%, so much more capacity has to be installed 28,000 10,000 11,000 2,000 Installed capacity UCLF 5,000 Other PCLF 46,000 Reliable supply 34,000 LCOE1 2020 (c/kWh) 70.6 117 128.5 62.0

Source: Integrated Resource Plan (2019 ); EPRI ( 2017 NREL Annual Technology Baseline ( 2019 ); 1 CSIR, 2020 Systems analysis to support increasingly ambitious CO 2 emissions scenarios in the South African electricity system, system,” Technical Report, July 2020 1 LCOE is approximate

MW to retire 16,000 16,000 MW gap by 2030

slide-7
SLIDE 7

7 Source: DEA/CSIR Wind & Solar, EIA & Applications

New RE will be built where the sun shines and the wind blows

1) Allocate RE to where available network capacity already exists to save on costs and time 2) Where applicable, upgrade and increase existing substation transformer capacities for IPP connections 3) Establish new infrastructure (substation and lines) to meet the IRP 2019 requirements in areas of interest with limited network capacity 1 2 3

Using existing transmission by repurposing old power stations will be done, but won’t fill the gap

slide-8
SLIDE 8

The expansion of the Transmission grid will require significant funding support and project capacity

8

20,0 3,0 79,0 1,7 Definition phase 30,0 Concept phase 4,8 Execution phase 129,0 9,5 Total 24,8 80,7 33,0 138,5 Insights Transmission TDP PCLM summary 2020

Expansion Refurbishment # of expansion projects

65 52 48 165

X # of refurb projects X

204 43 358 605

Rbn

▪ Based on the network requirements, 4689km of power lines is expected from 2021 -2025 ▪ A further 3567km of power lines will be built from 2026- 2030 ▪ However, based on re- phasing and deferrals to beyond FY25 and due to Capex cuts, only 25% of required lines can be built in the next 5 years, and 62% in the following 5 years ▪ Capex cuts and shifting out projects creates an unsustainable Transmission environment due to: ▪ Unachievable line and transformer build rates ▪ Collapsing supply chain ▪ Increase in construction costs

Source: TDP 2020

slide-9
SLIDE 9

Transition Finance Investment in green infrastructure / economies Divestment Pressure Green Finance Divestment from fossil fuel infrastructure / economies 2020 $

Transition and Green financing is readily available in the local and foreign market for Eskom to utilise

9 NOTE: Funding of the transition is aimed at implementing a shift from fossil-fueled based power generation to cleaner power generation and acquiring funds from investors that will enable the execution of such a transition

Numerous counterparties have indicated interest to support the Eskom JET “As discussed, we are interested to support Eskom on this important agenda” “AFD is keen to accompany Eskom in the decommissioning and repurposing of some of its coal fired power stations…” ”…we would like to express our interest to support Eskom in the repurposing of such coal fired power stations… ”…setting a clear timeline of our joint work on this project would be beneficial for both NDB and Eskom to understand expectations of the parties… Shifting financing landscape

  • Dual focus in international

finance and climate action circles is divestment from fossil fuels and increased funding for renewables

slide-10
SLIDE 10

Such transition funding could also address the significant socio-economic challenges at a national level

10

Green energy can contribute improving investor attractiveness Repurposing coal plant means preserving socio- economic development Contribution to the Paris Agreement commitment Reduction in emissions improving air quality Job creation and upskilling due to higher localisation potential Create growth

  • pportunities

Contribute to reigniting local manufacture RE technologies have shorter lead times, lower cost and will add generation capacity

slide-11
SLIDE 11

Private investment in generation requires independence in transmission and market operation

Transmission Grid System Operator Market Operator Central Purchasing Agency

11

Potential bias in:

  • Grid maintenance

(preference for maintaining lines connecting Eskom generators)

  • Outage scheduling

(scheduling outages that favour Eskom plant)

  • Network access

(preference for Eskom generators / customers for new connections)

  • Resource allocation

(expanding network in areas supporting Eskom customers or generators) Potential bias in:

  • Dispatch instructions

(curtailing non-Eskom plant in order to minimise cost impacts

  • n Eskom generators)
  • Outage scheduling

(favouring Eskom generators in determining generator

  • utage plans)
  • Balancing decisions

(allowing Eskom plant to reduce capacity without penalty to avoid costs) Potential bias in:

  • Market access

(providing smooth access for Eskom generators and retailers to the market and limiting non- Eskom customers or generators)

  • Information access

(providing information to Eskom generators

  • r retailers to give an

advantage in the market) Potential bias in:

  • Procurement decisions

(providing Eskom generators priority in procurement of new capacity)

  • Risk allocation

(imposing additional risks for non-Eskom generators that are not in play for Eskom generators)

  • Capacity requirements

and allocation (potentially increasing capacity requirements to favour new Eskom build)

  • All these risks can be managed through ex-post regulation. Industrial Organisation theory,

however, strongly indicates that industry behaviour follows structure, and that implementing ex- post regulation is a second-best policy option to proper industry structure.

slide-12
SLIDE 12

Eskom has started divisionalisation, as the first step towards its restructured end state

12

  • Eskom end state structure has been clarified, with divisionalisation as initial step – entrenching transparency

and accountability to drive optimisation of the business capability

  • Repurposing of assets and disposals of non core assets is underway

Divisionalisation deliverables Eskom Timeline1 1 Establishment of divisional boards and MDs appointed Mar 2020 2 Completion of “Functional Separation” ▪ Transmission ▪ Generation & Distribution Mar 2021 Mar 2021 3 Completion of “ Legal Separation”2 ▪ Transmission ▪ Generation & Distribution Dec 2021 Dec 2022

Notes: 1. Eskom timeline aligned with DPE. 2. Commencement of Legal separation is after functional separation. A number of the processes required for legal separation are outside of Eskom’s control.

slide-13
SLIDE 13

J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M

Mobilise Programme Establish Governance Eskom Eskom Inter-Governmental Decision body Gov Business and Operating Development Business Model Eskom Operating Model Eskom Policy Framework Eskom Draft Policy Eskom Government Approved Policy Gov Rules Development Market Rules Esk/Gov Tariff Issues Esk/Gov CPA Rules Esk/Gov IPP Procurement and Long Term Planning Gov Government and NERSA Approval Gov Legislative Matters Detailed Review Gov Establish Legislation and Regulations Gov Regulatory Matters Design Regulatory Framework Gov Build Capacity NERSA Issue Licenses NERSA Operational Preparation Business Processes Eskom IT Support and Ring-Fencing Eskom Organisational Structures Eskom Business Transfer Create Shelf Company Eskom Asset Transfer ITSO Operations Transfer ITSO Staff Transfer ITSO Customer Transfer ITSO

Due Diligence

ITSO Who

Q3 20 Q4 20 Q1 21 Q2 21 Q3 21 Q4 21 Q1 22

Baseline Plan

Unconstrained - moving directly towards an ITSO

13 Eskom Activity Government/ NERSA Activity

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

  • Plan is subject to risk given

multiple external dependencies,

  • Assumes timeous resolution of

external dependencies,

  • Commencement of market
  • perations highly dependent on

key policy, legislative and regulatory issues.

slide-14
SLIDE 14

Baseline Plan: Key Dependencies

14

No Milestone Description

Inter-governmental decision body Establish an inter-governmental decision making body that will approve the proposed policy, market rules and general governance around the process Develop and approve Policy Approval of a detailed policy framework that will guide the form and rules of the market Develop and approve Rules Approval of the detailed Rules, Market Code, Pricing, Subsidies and Customer related matters Review of Legislative Requirements In line with the developed policy and rules, confirm the detailed legislative and regulatory requirements to be implemented Establish Legislation and Regulations As required, develop new

  • r

make changes to current legislation and regulations Design Regulatory Framework A revised regulatory framework to be developed by NERSA, aligned to the market rules and operations Establish Regulatory processes Sufficient capacity, skills and processes required to implement and regulate the new framework is NERSA and Eskom Issue Licenses Issue separate licenses to the different entities. Approve Contracts NERSA approval of the contracts between the Transmission Entity, IPP’s, Eskom Generation, Eskom Distribution and pro- forma customer contracts.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

slide-15
SLIDE 15

Accelerated plan: – Eskom TSO as Step 1

15 Preparation for Legal Separation Preparation for Eskom Based TSO Dec 2021 TBC Tx as Eskom Subsidiary ITSO Fully Operational Market Eskom Market Operator Policy, Legal and Regulatory issues Preparation for independent ITSO Dec 2022

▪ A phased approach will be more prudent to mitigate risk and delink dependencies ▪ Establish an Eskom subsidiary (TSO) as soon as possible

− Create a new legal entity and independent Board − Due diligence and transfer the assets − Formalised functional support contracts with Eskom Holdings − Engage labour and second staff prior to Sec 197 transfer

▪ Post creation of the subsidiary, finalise full

  • perational enablement of the Subsidiary

▪ Manage cost by sharing services ▪ Develop a fully operational market based within Eskom Holdings ▪ Legislative requirements will inform whether this market can be opened to external parties – participation may be voluntary ▪ Risks are mitigated as they are consolidated within Eskom Holdings ▪ In parallel, Government to initiate the development of policies, legislation, a regulatory framework, market rules etc. ▪ When the market rules are confirmed, make adjustments to the Eskom market in preparation for the ITSO ▪ Create the ITSO

Relinking Mar 2020

slide-16
SLIDE 16

Alternate Plan - States Defined

16

Eskom TSO (Phase 1) Eskom TSO (Phase 2) Independent TSO Create Eskom Subsidiary (Dec 21) Legal Status Capacitate Eskom Subsidiary (Dec 22) Create ITSO (TBC)

  • Eskom Subsidiary (TSO)
  • Eskom Subsidiary (TSO)
  • Independent governance (ITSO)

Market

  • Eskom internal
  • Eskom based market rules
  • Eskom Internal
  • External (based on legal

position)

  • Eskom based market rules
  • Fully operational external

Market

  • NERSA approved rules

Balance Sheet

  • Assets transferred - status quo
  • Loans estimated
  • Due diligence
  • Assets transferred - refined
  • Loans transferred & agreed
  • Assets transferred
  • Loans Transferred & agreed
  • Due diligence done prior

Operations: Processes and Systems

  • Reliance on Eskom systems and

processes (SLAs)

  • Initial MO systems in place
  • Limited reliance on Eskom,

further ring-fencing done

  • Sensitive systems secured
  • Service contracts for Eskom

enterprise systems Contracts and Pricing

  • Divisional contracts
  • Current Pricing
  • Divisional contracts–amended
  • Unbundled Pricing
  • External contracts
  • Unbundled Pricing
  • Fully ring-fenced processes and

systems

  • Segregated IT capability

Staff

  • Eskom staff seconded
  • Staff transferred (Sec 197)
  • Staff transferred (S197)

Regulatory / License

  • Eskom License
  • Current Regulatory framework
  • Eskom License
  • Current Regulatory framework
  • New License
  • Revised Regulatory framework
slide-17
SLIDE 17

Day Ahead (Energy) Balancing (Energy) DA Reserves (Capacity) Capacity Energy hedge

Network services (access, transport, metering)

Market Operator Ancillary Services SO

  • Multiple market platforms and pricing mechanisms must be developed to highlight different products and

services in the industry

  • A balancing mechanism or market will be required to encourage market participants to ensure that they remain

in balance in order not to undermine the system integrity

Eskom’s position on the ITSO includes the future markets and the role they will play in the Energy trading industry

CPA

System

  • perator

SO manages balancing of supply and demand on the Integrated Power System SO will produce ancillary services (from generation and demand response and dispatch) resources to manage balance Market Operator MO does not take ownership of the energy traded on the platforms - risks are related to the systematic failure arising from non-payment and can be dealt with through appropriate prudential requirements MO receives revenue based on participation charges and/or brokerage fees for transactions. Central Purchasing Agency (CPA) CPA takes ownership of energy (and capacity) purchased under legacy contracts, stranded investments and subsidy

  • mechanisms. The CPA takes
  • n risk associated with the

price paid for energy and capacity relative to wholesale tariffs. The CPA is a transition mechanism to bridge from the current Single Buyer model to a competitive market Transmission Network Service Provider (TNSP) Transmission is responsible to provide network access for generators and consumers TNSP is responsible for expansion planning, maintenance and

  • perations of the

HV network

Source: Eskom Transmission

slide-18
SLIDE 18

Eskom and private sector can partner to achieve the goal

  • f affordable, reliable and clean power to all South Africans

18

The investment programme to support new build could be partnering with various stakeholders

  • Large share of the investment

programme could be carried out by Eskom; financed by DFIs and

  • ther lenders and subject to

performance guarantees linked to milestone deliverables.

  • Renewable acceleration will be

supported by partnership with independent power producers (IPP) that develop, construct,

  • perate and own facilities to

generate renewable power for sale to utilities and end users.

  • Public-private partnerships

(PPPs) to design, build, finance and maintain new facilities under long term contract with Eskom to be explored.

Division New build requirements Eskom IPP PPP Generation

Renewables acceleration Repurposing coal plants Repair & rehabilitation

Transmission

Strengthening & extension

Distribution

Network

Clear role Potential role – to be considered

Source: Team Analysis

slide-19
SLIDE 19

While no silver bullet exists, embarking on a collaborative approach remains key to attracting investment, mitigating risk and creating new jobs

19

  • Create an all-inclusive approach towards industrial policy that

includes incentives, upgrades of infrastructure, improving labour relations and the issue of high-cost, low-skill labour

  • Ensure that fiscal policy aligns adequately with industrial and

energy policy objectives

  • Accelerate and support Transmission separation to allow for

private entries into the generation market

  • Drive the Eskom Just Energy Transition strategy, including the

exploration of a transition transaction

  • Drive local manufacturing capability with the declaration of SEDZ,

SIDZ, and REDZ to boost local development, manufacturing and economic growth Collaboration efforts

slide-20
SLIDE 20

Presentation 2 by

  • Prof. Anton Eberhard

UCT Graduate School of Business

An Independent Transmission System and Market Operator (ITSMO) in SA

slide-21
SLIDE 21

Eskom Restructuring In Independent System and Market Operator

Prof Anton Eberhard

Power Futures Lab

Graduate School of Business University of Cape Town

3rd Nedbank EEBI JCSE Webinar 15 October 2020

slide-22
SLIDE 22

Eskom’s vertically-in integrated, monopoly ly str tructure is is obso sole lete

22

  • Previous century’s rationale for Eskom’s structure no-longer applies
  • Economies of scale in generation much diminished with incremental gas turbines, renewable energy and storage
  • Development of capital markets has facilitated private investment
  • Innovations in ICT create new coordination possibilities
  • Competition now possible in generation and supply
  • Eskom’s structure is uncommon and outdated in the world of today
  • Power sector reforms commenced in the 1980s in Chile, England, then OECD countries and since 1990s to global south
  • Standard reform model includes unbundling, private sector participation and competition
  • From vertical integration to single-buyer market to wholesale and retail competition
  • 106 countries have unbundled their utilities, including all the other BRICS countries
  • Eskom’s structure imposes massive costs on our economy
  • Absence of competition facilitates in-efficiencies, rent-seeking and corruption
  • Information asymmetry, no benchmarks, inadequate oversight, lack of transparency and accountability
  • Eskom is too big/ systemically important to fail; results in perverse incentives for management/labour
slide-23
SLIDE 23

Why Eskom’s restructuring is required

Operational benefits

  • Generation, transmission and

distribution are very different businesses: latter is customer facing, former is fixing old kit

  • Improved management and
  • perational focus and cost

transparency

  • Linked to refinancing: transmission

could return to investment grade and capital markets; generation business will need to be restructured

23

Transformation of the power market

  • An ITSMO establishes a transparent, fair

platform for competitive procurement of least-cost power

  • Removes Eskom’s conflict of interest of

being both a generator and single-buyer

  • Ring-fences financial contagion, eases

sovereign guarantees

  • Sets the industry on a new path, with

more diversification, competition and private sector investment

  • Eskom generation can develop new

business model

slide-24
SLIDE 24

Massive new power in investments needed

24

Load shedding is the worst ever IRP2019 requires extra 27,400MW by 2030

An ITSMO is critical for accelerating new power investments

GWh

slide-25
SLIDE 25

President Ramaphosa on Eskom’s monopoly

25

“All our energy eggs are in Eskom’s basket, if they fall, the economy breaks. We need more diversity in the electricity sector.”

slide-26
SLIDE 26

President Ramaphosa on th the IT ITSMO

“Eskom is in crisis and the risks it poses to South Africa are great. It could severely damage our economic and social development

  • ambitions. We need to take bold and decisive action…….To

position South Africa’s power sector for the future, we shall immediately embark on a process for establishing three separate entities – Generation, Transmission, Distribution, under Eskom Holdings…..Of particular and immediate importance is the entity to manage an independent state-owned transmission grid combined with the system operator, and power planning, procurement and buying functions. It is imperative that we undertake these measures without delay…”

SONA 7 February 2019

26

20 months ago

slide-27
SLIDE 27

DPE Eskom Roadmap (1 (1)

27

“A new Transmission Entity will be established in the shortest time possible. This will enable the appointment of a new independent Board to oversee the governance and

  • perations of the Transmission Entity.”

Department of Public Enterprises (2019): Roadmap for Eskom in a reformed electricity supply industry – p31

a year ago

slide-28
SLIDE 28

DPE Eskom Roadmap (2 (2)

28

During the transitional period, the following important matters will be managed around the establishment of a separate Transmission Entity:

  • Establishment of new decision‐making and management structures

for the TE, including its own Board.

  • The migration of people, systems, assets and debt into the new TE, as

well as the enactment of appropriate legislation through Parliament to enable the TE to be taken out as a separate state-owned company.

  • Responsibility for power planning, procurement and contracting

functions will be combined with the transmission and system

  • peration.

Department of Public Enterprises (2019): Roadmap for Eskom in a reformed electricity supply industry – p18

a year ago

slide-29
SLIDE 29

IT ITSMO Restructuring Steps

29

Tx Eskom Holdings Generation SO/Buyer Dx IPPs Eskom IPPs Eskom Holdings Tx TSMO Eskom Generation Eskom Distribution

SO Planner Procurer Buyer

Divisionalisation (now) TSMO subsidiary (Dec 2021) ITSMO (when?)

IPPs Eskom Holdings Tx ITSMO Eskom Generation Eskom Distribution

SO Planner Procurer Buyer

We don’t have to define a power market end state yet : the ITSMO is a no-regret 1st step

slide-30
SLIDE 30

Preparing for th the fu futu ture

30

An ITSMO that enables a power system that is highly flexible, resilient and connected and optimizes resources

Source: EPRI

slide-31
SLIDE 31

DPE Eskom Roadmap: ti time for le leadership

31

“Restructuring or unbundling into separate subsidiaries under Eskom Holdings will allow management focus, improve efficiency, create greater transparency around performance, provide greater protection against corruption and rent‐seeking, and will give capital providers more visibility of the component parts of the sector, resulting in more investment comfort.”

Department of Public Enterprises (2019): Roadmap for Eskom in a reformed electricity supply industry – p16

Benefits of ITSMO recognized. Now we need to get it done!

slide-32
SLIDE 32

Thank you for your attention

Prof Anton Eberhard

Power Futures Lab University of Cape Town

@AntonEberhard www.gsb.uct.a.za/mir

slide-33
SLIDE 33

Presentation 3 by

  • Dr. Miriam Altman,

National Planning Commission

An Independent Transmission System and Market Operator (ITSMO) in SA

slide-34
SLIDE 34

An ITSMO: whereto and why?

3rd Nedbank EEBI JCSE webinar on: An Independent Transmission Grid System and Market Operator for SA 15 October 2020

  • Dr. Miriam Altman

Commissioner National Planning Commission Contact: info(at)miriamaltman(dot)com

slide-35
SLIDE 35

The NDP aspiration for the electricity sector

The goal is to have an electricity sector that enables sufficient and reliable supply, that is financially and environmentally sustainable, at a competitive cost of service to underpin employment and growth, and that delivers affordable, accessible electricity to all who live in South Africa

slide-36
SLIDE 36

ITSMO motivation in the NDP

  • The NDP 2030 is explicit on the requirement for the

system operations, planning, power procurement, purchasing and contracting functions within Eskom to be separated into an independent institution entirely (likely state-owned). It should be done in a way that ensures sustainability of the electricity supply sector, including that

  • f Eskom. This is re-asserted in the NPC’s 2019 Energy

Position Paper.

  • The NPC 2020 Position Paper on SOE performance argues

that where there are repeated failures in operational performance, or where fiscal and credit risk starts to

  • utweigh benefits, government has a duty to implement
  • rganisational reforms. Where chronic operational,

governance and financial underperformance continues, and organisational reforms are inadequate, structural reforms should be introduced. This means opening provision of the service or infrastructure to other economic actors besides the state and/or changing the structure of state ownership.

  • Where there is a vertically integrated state-owned

monopoly, global and local research motivates for an ITSMO on the following basis:

  • The need for agility in response to business cycles

and to emerging technologies

  • The growing opportunity for flexible smaller

suppliers that can contribute to achievement of least cost and lower risk

  • A conflict of interest, whether perceived or real, in

the fair treatment of other industry players (IPPs) in planning, grid connection and operations relative to self-owned generation assets.

slide-37
SLIDE 37

Plausibility of success in pathway to competitive generation

Creating financially plausible conditions for IPP investment in current context

01

Creating plausible pathway for competition in generation, in context

  • f monopsony

02

slide-38
SLIDE 38
  • 1. Financial

plausibility

  • Can a vertically integrated Eskom act as a compelling source of

demand? Can Eskom and/or SA govt offer guarantees required to

  • vercome uncertainty?
  • Weight of debt and losses in Generation especially
  • Transmission requires investment but does not carry same burden
slide-39
SLIDE 39
  • 2. Behaviour

plausibility

  • Monopolies are not known to willingly break themselves up.
  • …..And Eskom is vertically integrated state-owned monopoly
  • What are plausible conditions to drive behaviour required for fair

competition in generation and in other services?

  • Competitive generation and offtake requires either strong regulation &

enforcement and/or change in market structure

slide-40
SLIDE 40

Ill Illuminated by Telkom experience….

  • All fixed line incumbents started as monopoly

utilities in context of simple technology involving post and telephony

  • Emerging environment is multi-technology

and competitive through value chain

  • Telkom’s effort to protect its rents was cause of its
  • wn failure
  • Telkom was pushed to separate its retail and

wholesale operations

  • 2008 court judgement allowing competition in

fibre roll out, put pressure on Telkom wholesale business

  • Competition commission case concluded in 2013

requiring accounting separation between wholesale and retail

  • This drew new leadership to see potential benefit

in taking this separation further. Unlikely it would have happened without significant legal push

  • initially. Now is self driven.
  • Management objectives shift to optimizing of

each business rather than protecting group interests

  • Fuller legal separation of retail and wholesale

needed to drive that optimisation

slide-41
SLIDE 41

Minimum conditions for success

Certainty in energy policy and energy mix. Control vs decisiveness Shareholder (state) commitment to a path Stability and quality of Eskom board and exec management, and right accountabilities Capacity in the state and in Eskom to “reform” Time. There is no quick fix. Recognise that this will take “3-5 years”.

slide-42
SLIDE 42

Reference papers

NPC papers referred to are available at www.nationalplanningcommission.org.za/publications_reports Specific links are:

  • NPC Position on Energy, NPC Economy Series, January 2019. Available at:

https://www.nationalplanningcommission.org.za/assets/Documents/Energy%20 Position%20Paper_.pdf

  • NPC Position Paper on the Contribution of SOEs to Vision 2030: Case studies of

Eskom, Transnet and PRASA. June 2020. Available at: https://www.nationalplanningcommission.org.za/assets/Documents/NPC%20Po sition%20Paper%20on%20The%20Contribution%20of%20SOEs%20to%20Vision %202030.pdf

  • Framework for the suitability of SOEs. Paper 2 of 4 in the NPC series on the role
  • f SOEs in achieving economic transformation and inclusive growth. Prepared by

Genesis Analytics for the NPC. Dec 2019.Available at: https://www.nationalplanningcommission.org.za/assets/Documents/The%20rol e%20of%20state-

  • wned%20enterprises%20in%20achieving%20economic%20transformation%20

and%20inclusive%20growth.%20Paper%202%20Framework%20for%20the%20s uitability%20of%20state-owned%20enterprises.pdf

slide-43
SLIDE 43

Presentation 4 by

  • Mr. Amith Singh,

Head, Energy Finance, Nedbank CIB

An Independent Transmission System and Market Operator (ITSMO) in SA

slide-44
SLIDE 44

OCTOBER 2020

AN INDEPENDENT TRANSMISSION GRID SYSTEM AND MARKET OPERATOR (ITSMO) IN SA

slide-45
SLIDE 45

CONFIDENTIAL | PAGE 45

AN INDEPENDENT TRANSMISSION GRID SYSTEM AND MARKET OPERATOR (ITSMO) IN SA

Importance of a Credit Enhanced Off-taker

In addition to providing the majority of South Africa’s generation capacity, Eskom is also the single buyer of power in South Africa. Eskom established the Single Buyers Office (“SBO”) as the purchasing arm of Eskom responsible for PPA’s between Eskom and IPP’s under the various IPP Programmes implemented in South Africa. However, in order for the PPA’s to be Bankable, the South African Government has provided the necessary credit support. Without this Government credit support the South African IPP Programme/Private Sector Investment will not be achievable in the Power sector. IPP IPP IPP Generation Private Sector Eskom ITSMO Bankable Distribution Customer “Independent” ITSMO Investors and Lenders need to have confidence in the creditworthiness of the off-taker (ITSMO) for the duration of the 20-year PPA’s. The factors below can provide private sector sponsors and lenders with the necessary credit comfort, particularly over the longer term: Independence & Governance: The ITSMO should be an independent entity and the influence that Eskom (the parent company) can exercise over the entity should be limited:

  • Mandate of the board is to look after South Africa’s power sector;
  • Promote free market principles;
  • Incorporate the principles of access of power to all South Africans;
  • Independent well governed Board ;
  • Transparency; and
  • Ability to manage strong payment collection culture without any influence.

Financial position: The ITSMO must be independent, have and maintain its own balance sheet (must be self funded) as well as have strong credit ratings. Until it has a proven track record, consideration should be given to credit enhancements from multilateral agencies to provide the initial credit support. These credit enhancements will be in place until a track record is established and a consistent investment grade rating is achieved. Transparency: The procurement process has to be transparent, fair, equitable and

  • competitive. There must be no prejudice in terms of the order of dispatch from the various

power producers.

slide-46
SLIDE 46

CONFIDENTIAL | PAGE 46

AN INDEPENDENT TRANSMISSION GRID SYSTEM AND MARKET OPERATOR (ITSMO) IN SA

Financing Considerations

Although Eskom is the buyer of Power under PPA’s with IPP’s – these projects are bankable through the Government guarantees in the Implementation Agreement. This framework where Government provides credit support to all IPP’s in the form of guaranteeing the payments of Eskom under the long-term PPA’s. Given South Africa’s current fiscus, this model is unattainable as Government is not in the position to support these payment obligations. A new model has to evolve.

Government Support and Capital Adequacy

The creation of an Independent System Operator in South Africa, is key to ensure the IPP model is sustainable and successful. The ITSMO must be adequately capitalized at the outset in order to ensure that the ISMO is able to utilise it’s

  • wn

balance sheet to support PPA’s. This may require Government support initially and , but as the ISMO builds reserves

  • ver

time the Government support may no longer be required.

Long Term Planning and Power Procurement

The Government has recently Gazetted the procurement of over 11 813MW’s of Power in line with the IRP2019. In

  • rder

for Financial Institutions, Project Sponsors and Developers to invest in the procurement of this Power, the “Buyer” under the PPA’s must be considered a “Bankable” and Credible Off-taker. The “Bankability” and credibility of the Off-taker over the long term is key to ensure competitive tariffs from IPP’s as competitive long term funding is required to reduce tariffs and promote a competitive Power sector.

Liquidity Support

The most commonly deployed credit enhancement option is requiring the

  • ff-taker, in this instance being the

ISMO, to procure and provide liquid security. Given the South African Government’s fiscus limitations and the inability to provide liquid security

  • ver the long term, the ITSMO will be

required to source Liquidity support to

  • n secure the PPA obligations of the

IPPPs. Alternative security providers could facilitate this such as credit insurance. The cost of which may be recovered in the PPA tariff.

slide-47
SLIDE 47

CONFIDENTIAL | PAGE 47

AN INDEPENDENT TRANSMISSION GRID SYSTEM AND MARKET OPERATOR (ITSMO) IN SA

Financing Considerations

Importance of Renewable Energy

Given the global commitment to the energy transition towards a sustainable energy future through Renewable Energy, it is imperative that the Renewable Energy book in the ITSMO is ring-fenced from

  • ther

generation technologies as this will assist in securing security from Multilateral agencies and DFI’s which will ensure the success and progression

  • f

future Renewable Energy IPP Programmes.

Multilateral Guarantees

It has become increasingly common for private investors and lenders to look for guarantees from multilateral agencies to mitigate their exposure to a project. Multilateral institutions play a major role in providing private investors with security structures such as Payment or Loan Guarantees.

Infrastructure Investment

An Independent Transmission System and Market Operator that is a credit- worthy entity with a proven track record and consistent investment grade credit ratings is key to facilitating raising debt for investment in grid infrastructure in South Africa.

Further Key Financing Considerations

From a Financing perspective, it is clear that a Credit Enhanced ITSMO can facilitate Private Sector Investment which can significantly improve the Power sector in South Africa. The new ITSMO model is key to unlocking economic growth in South Africa through competitive energy pricing via the involvement of IPP’s and further ensuring energy security.

slide-48
SLIDE 48

CONFIDENTIAL | PAGE 48

AN INDEPENDENT TRANSMISSION GRID SYSTEM AND MARKET OPERATOR (ITSMO) IN SA

Wheeling Agreements

The term wheeling describes the transportation of power through the grid from the seller to the buyer. “Wheeling of energy shall be allowed, subject to the generator receiving its approvals from NERSA to sell to a third party and the signing of the network service provider’s Connection and Use-of-System Agreement”. Wheeling as a Value Add Electricity wheeling will allow generators, who are willing sellers to wheel their electricity to a willing buyer anywhere in the country at a price that is acceptable for both parties. Linking willing sellers to willing buyers is key to unleashing Embedded Generation in the Private sector as Corporate and Industrial companies invest in energy security and in renewable energy as part of their respective climate management strategy and reduction in carbon commitments . Wheeling also enables increased efficiency and value, as high solar-resource but low environmental and social impact areas can be utilised, allowing lower-cost, cleaner energy to be utilised when needed. With the spread of wheeling, renewable hubs can be created to decrease costs of electricity promoting economic growth and reducing reliance on power from the national grid. In order for Wheeling to be widely adopted in South Africa the rules for IPP’s and generators to use the grid must be fair, with the tariff system being open, widely accessible, equitable and properly regulated with all policies and regulations being published. There are a number of Mining companies as well as Large Industrial entities that are looking at alternative energy sources for a number of reasons including; increased power costs, reliability of power supply as well as the delivering a sustainable energy

  • future. Through wheeling agreements, Mines and Industrial companies can make use of Renewable Energy which will provide

price stability and energy security.

slide-49
SLIDE 49

CONFIDENTIAL | PAGE 49

AN INDEPENDENT TRANSMISSION GRID SYSTEM AND MARKET OPERATOR (ITSMO) IN SA

Types of Operating Models

Different Categories of Unbundling

Vertically Integrated Utility (“VIU”) Legal Unbundling (“LTSO”) Ownership Unbundling (“ITSO”)

Currently in the South African context, Eskom is considered a VIU as Generation, Transmission, Distribution as well as retail is housed under one state-owned utility. Transmission and System

  • perator

are housed in a separate subsidiary of the VIU. In terms of the “Roadmap for Eskom” a legal unbundling is the third and final phase

  • f the Eskom unbundling.

Transmission and System

  • perator

are housed in a separately owned company. As such, the ITSO is independent from any

  • ther players in the electricity market. The

ITSO however, may still be a state-owned entity. One of the primary reasons for separating transmission from other components of the electricity supply industry is to remove conflicts of interest that may occur in state-owned VIUs, where it is generating its own power while also being a single-buyer from independent power producers as is the case with Eskom. In many cases this has caused a departure from least-cost power planning and procurement. Reasons for Unbundling Establishing an independent transmission grid and system operator can facilitate competition by allowing the entry of privately funded generators. This makes sense where the incumbent VIU struggles to raise capital for new investments and where alternative power generators might be cost competitive. This is particularly important in the case of South Africa given Eskom’s significant debt burden and inability to raise capital together with a deteriorating coal fleet.

slide-50
SLIDE 50

AMITH SINGH

THANK YOU

HEAD | ENERGY FINANCE | NEDBANK CIB AMITHS@NEDBANK.CO.ZA

slide-51
SLIDE 51

CONFIDENTIAL | PAGE 51

DISCLAIMER

The proposal, presented by Nedbank, has been outlined for the benefit and information of the company or entity (the “Company”) to whom this proposal is submitted in good faith and who is deemed by Nedbank to have accepted responsibility for ensuring that the confidentiality of this proposal will be maintained at all times. This proposal may not be submitted in any manner or form to any party or utilised in any manner or form without the prior written consent of Nedbank. The information contained in this publication is confidential and is not intended to be, nor should it be construed as, "advice" as contemplated in the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act, 2002 or otherwise, or a direct or indirect invitation or inducement to any person to engage in investment activity relating to any securities or any derivative instrument or any other rights pertaining thereto of any company mentioned herein. The Company acknowledges that Nedbank does not assume responsibility to it or to any other person for loss or damage of any kind whatsoever arising as a result of the use or misuse by the Company of this proposal or for any opinion, advice, recommendation, representation or information, expressed or implied, contained herein, notwithstanding any negligence, default or lack of care by it or that such loss or damage was foreseeable. Use of this proposal All ideas, methods, designs, concepts or other works (“the works”) together with the proprietary rights existing in this proposal and all other related material belongs to and remains the absolute property of Nedbank and is to be used exclusively for the purposes of considering Nedbank’s proposal in relation to the transaction.

slide-52
SLIDE 52

An Independent Transmission System and Market Operator (ITSMO) in SA

COMFORT BREAK

Webinar will resume shortly

slide-53
SLIDE 53

An Independent Transmission System and Market Operator (ITSMO) in SA

A dialogue hosted by Nedbank, EE Business Intelligence and JCSE at Wits University

Thank you for your attendance and participation!