An Experience in Developing Common Certificate Policy
Shinichi Mineo (RIKEN)
International Symposium on Grid Computing 2008 9 April 2008, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan
An Experience in Developing Common Certificate Policy 9 April 2008, - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
International Symposium on Grid Computing 2008 An Experience in Developing Common Certificate Policy 9 April 2008, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan Shinichi Mineo (RIKEN) Outline MOTIVATION FEATURES OF RFC3647 A CASE IN NAREGI
International Symposium on Grid Computing 2008 9 April 2008, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan
EE EE A Uni v. NAREGI C A EE EE B Uni v. NAREGI C A
G r i d PKI
G r i d C om put i ng Pr
Pr
Pr
EE Pr
Pr
Pr
EE 学内用 学内用 A Uni v. C A EE 学内用 学内用 B Uni v. C A EE
C am pus PKI
Aut h, Si gn, Encr pt . Aut h, Si gn, Encr pt .
St udent , Facul t y Ser ver , Super C om put er St udent , Facul t y Ser ver , Super C om put er
W ebサ ー ハ ゙ W ebサ ー ハ ゙ NI I Pub C A W eb Sr v. W ebサ ー ハ ゙ W ebサ ー ハ ゙ S/M I M E S/M I M E O t her Pub C A S/M I M E W eb Sr v.
O penDom ai n PKI
S/M I M E S/M I M E S/M I M E Si gn, Encr pt . Fut ur e pl an
[3] RFC 2459, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Certificate and CRL Profile" [4] RFC3280, “Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile” [2] RFC 3647,”Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework” [1] RFC 2527, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework" [7] Authentication Profile for Classic X.509 Public Key Certification Authorities with secured infrastructure Version 4.1 (4.0) [6] Global Grid Forum Certificate Policy Model [5] RFC3820, “Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Proxy Certificate Profile” [8] GWD-C Grid Certificate Profile [10] Guidelines for auditing Grid CAs [9] Asia Pacific Grid Minimum CA Requirements
NOTE) Arrows show relations of conformity to each other
RFC 25 I G TF C l assi cAP C P C PS
1 I ntroducti
1 1
1. 1 O vervi ew
1. 1 2 4. 2 レ レ
1. 2 D ocum ent Nam e and I ndenti f i cati
1. 2 4. 2 レ レ
1. 3 PKI Parti ci pants
1. 3
1. 3. 1 C er t i f i cati
authori ti es
1. 3. 1 2 レ レ
1. 3. 2 Regi strati
authori ti es
1. 3. 2 2 レ レ
1. 3. 3 Subscri bers
1. 3. 3 レ
1. 3. 4 Rel yi ng parti es
1. 3. 3 レ
1. 3. 5 O ther parti ci pants
N/A
1. 4 C ert i f i cate usage
1. 3. 4
1. 4. 1 Appropri ate C erti f i cate Uses
1. 3. 4 レ レ
1. 4. 2 Pr
bi tes C erti f i cate Uses
1. 3. 4
1. 5 Pol i cy Adm i ni strati
1. 4
1. 5. 1 O r gani zati
Adm i ni steri ng the D ocum ent
1. 4. 1 レ レ
1. 5. 2 C ontact Person
1. 4. 2 レ レ
1. 5. 3 Person D eterm i ni ng C PS Sui tabi l i t y f
the Pol i cy
1. 4. 3 レ レ
1. 5. 4 C PS Approval Procedures
8. 3 レ レ
1. 6 D ef i ni ti
and Acronym s
N/A レ レ
2 Publ i cati
and Reposi tory Responsi bi l i ti es
2. 1. 5, 2. 6
2. 1 Reposi tori es
2. 6. 4 6 レ レ
2. 2 Publ i cati
certi f i cati
i nf
2. 6. 1, 8. 2 4. 2 4. 3 4. 4 6 レ レ
2. 3 Ti m e
f requency
publ i cati
2. 6. 2, 8. 2 レ
2. 4 Access control s
reposi tori es
2. 6. 3 レ
RFC 3647 secti
RFC 25 I G TF C l assi cAP C P C PS
3 I dent i f i cati
and Authenti cati
( I &A)
3
3. 1 Nam i ng
3. 1
3. 1. 1 Type
Nam es
3. 1. 1 レ
3. 1. 2 Need f
Nam es t
M eani ngf ul
3. 1. 2 4. 3 レ
3. 1. 3 Anonym i t y
Pseudonym i ty
Subscri ber s
3. 1. 2
3. 1. 4 Rul es f
I nt er preti ng Vari
Nam e For m s
3. 1. 3
3. 1. 5 Uni queness
Nam es
3. 1. 4 3 レ
3. 1. 6 Recogni ti
Authent i cati
and Rol e
Tradem arks
3. 1. 5, 3. 1. 6
3. 2 I ni t i al I denti ty Val i dat i
3. 1 3. 1 レ
3. 2. 1 M ethod to Prove Possessi
Pri vate Key
3. 1. 7 3. 1 レ レ
3. 2. 2 Authenti cati
O rgani zati
I denti ty
3. 1. 8 レ
3. 2. 3 Authenti cati
I ndi vi dual I denti ty
3. 1. 9 3. 1 レ レ
3. 2. 4 Non-Veri f i ed Subscri ber I nf
m ati
N/A レ
3. 2. 5 Val i dati
Aut hori ty
3. 1. 9 レ
3. 2. 6 C r i t er i a f
I nteroper at i
4. 1 レ
3. 3 I &A f
Re-key Requests
3. 2, 3. 3
3. 3. 1 I dent i f i cati
and Authenti cati
f
Routi ne Re-Key
3. 2 3. 2 レ レ
3. 3. 2 I dent i f i cati
and Authenti cati
f
Re-Key Af ter Revocati
3. 3 レ
3. 4 I &A f
r evocat i
request s
3. 4 レ レ
RFC 3647 secti
The rest is omitted.
CertifatePolicies EXTENTI ON ::= { SYNTAX CeritificatePoliciesSyntax I DENTI FI ED BY id-ce-certificatePolicies } CertifiatePoliciesSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SI ZE( 1 ..MAX) OF PolicyI nform ation PolicyI nform ation ::= SEQUENCE { PolicyI dentifier CertpolicyI d, PolicyQalifiers PolicyQualifierI nfo} CertPolicyI d ::= OBJECT I DENTI FI ER PolicyQalifierI nfo ::= SET { pointerToCPS-Qualifier pointerToCPS, noticeToUser-Qualifier noticeToUser OPTI ONAL) } pointerToCPS ::= { POLI CY-QUALI FI ER-I D id-qt-cps QUALI FI ER-TYPE CPSuri } I d-qt-cps OBJECT I DENTI FI ER ::= { id-qt 1 } CPSuri ::= I A5 String
worth to commonly used in the Grid community accredited by ApGrid or IGTF.
Policies, a Grid CA can issue certificates of different policies, with which Grid service providers will be able to change authorization decisions according to their service policies.
need consensus on general conditions for Grid certificates.
SAML 2.0 profile of XACML v2.0
policy, which NAREGI is trying to develop and planning to use for the next generation CA operations.
Grid CAs and the regional PMAs, and contributes to the Grid community.
the open issues in public place such as CAOPs working group in OGF.
published by NAREGI project for open discussions.