Yodel: Strong Metadata Security for Real-Time Voice Calls David - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

yodel strong metadata security for real time voice calls
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Yodel: Strong Metadata Security for Real-Time Voice Calls David - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Yodel: Strong Metadata Security for Real-Time Voice Calls David Lazar , Yossi Gilad, Nickolai Zeldovich MIT CSAIL 1 Metadata is data that cant be encrypted src/dst msg size Chat Service sent time 2 What can you learn from


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Yodel: Strong Metadata Security for Real-Time Voice Calls

David Lazar, Yossi Gilad, Nickolai Zeldovich

  • 1

MIT CSAIL

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Metadata is data that can’t be encrypted

2

Chat Service src/dst msg size sent time

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What can you learn from metadata?

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Dan Guardian Erin NYT Alice Bob Carol Fred

Passive Network Adversary

Huawei Executive Saudi Dissident

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Security goal: hide who is talking to whom

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Active Network Adversary

?

?

?

Passive Network Adversary

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Performance goal: sub-second latency

5

× millions

< 1s

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Prior work doesn’t meet goals

Passive attacks Active attacks Performance Pung

[OSDI 2016]

Karaoke

[OSDI 2018]

Herd

[SIGCOMM 2015] Differential privacy 7s Trusted server

6

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Contributions

Yodel: the first system for real-time voice calls with

  • Strong protection against passive & active attacks
  • Distributed trust (any-trust or fractional trust)
  • Sub-second latency for 5M users with 100 servers

Two key insights

  • Self-healing circuits & Guarded circuit exchange

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Mixnets hide who sent which message

8

Server 1 Server 2 Server 3

x y

y x y

x y

x Onion-encrypted Message

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9

Server 1 Server 2 Server 3

Mixing is expensive: public key

  • peration for each message at every hop

gx gx gx gx gx gx gx gx gx

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Yodel’s mixnet: send public key onions to setup symmetric key circuits

Circuit setup onion

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11

Server 1 Server 2 Server 3

Circuit messaging

⨁ ⨁ ⨁ ⨁ ⨁ ⨁ ⨁ ⨁ ⨁

= circuit (symmetric key) onion

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12

Server 1 Server 2 Server 3

Challenge: attacker has many chances to learn shuffle of honest server!

! !

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Yodel’s key insight: self-healing circuits

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Server 1 Server 2 Server 3

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3

Users connect to circuits

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Yodel round steps

1

Users establish circuits = random string x y

2

Users exchange circuits x y

External Messaging Service

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Users send voice packets

Mixnet

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Evaluation

Does Yodel achieve low latency for large numbers of users? Does Yodel offer acceptable voice quality?

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Yodel achieves sub-second latency for 5M users

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0.6s 0.8s 1.0s 1.2s 1.4s 1.6s 2M 4M 6M 8M Voice packet latency Number of users 100 servers, US & EU

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  • Joanna and I had a short conversation over Yodel, with

5M other “users” actively using the system

  • She ran Yodel over her laptop speakers and recorded the

convo with her phone

  • (phone records her voice directly)
  • Some latency (~1s) is due to us waiting to not talk over

each other

Yodel achieves acceptable voice quality

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Pre-recorded demo

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Conclusion

Yodel: the first system for real-time voice calls with

  • Strong metadata privacy (against passive & active attacks)
  • Distributed trust (any-trust or fractional trust)
  • Sub-second latency for 5M users with 100 servers

Full paper and code coming soon:

  • vuvuzela.io
  • davidlazar.org