What could kill NSTIC? A Friendly Threat Assessment In Three Parts - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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What could kill NSTIC? A Friendly Threat Assessment In Three Parts - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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What could kill NSTIC? A Friendly Threat Assessment In Three Parts January 2013 Phil Wolff Strategy Director Personal Data Ecosystem Consortium phil@pde.cc. @evanwolf. Linkedin Download the whitepaper: http://pde.cc/nsticrisks High hopes for

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What could kill NSTIC?

A Friendly Threat Assessment In Three Parts

January 2013 Phil Wolff

Strategy Director Personal Data Ecosystem Consortium phil@pde.cc. @evanwolf. Linkedin Download the whitepaper: http://pde.cc/nsticrisks

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High hopes for an ID ecosystem

Can we get to an international digital identity system?

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High hopes for an ID ecosystem

Can we get to an International, User-Centric digital identity system that works across Industries? Cultures? Technologies? Governments? Regulatory schemes?

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High hopes for an ID ecosystem

This effort is driven in the United States under a 2004 program initiated by the National Strategy for Trusted Identity in Cyberspace through the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) of the US Department of Commerce.

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Our findings, in short:

a user experience that doesn’t work imbalance among the forces that hold an identity ecosystem together.

The two most serious threats to NSTIC’s success:

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A dozen of us met

  • to list and score threats to the NSTIC

Identity Ecosystem vision.

  • Internet Identity Workshop,

Mountain View, California – October 2012 – May 2011.

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We asked:

If NSTIC fails by 2016, what could have brought it down?

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HERE’S OUR HYPOTHETICAL 2016 POST-MORTEM OF NSTIC FAILURE SCENARIOS

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We spoke in the past-tense as if the failures had happened.

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We didn’t cooperate to build an ID

  • ecosystem. We should have played

well with others.

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We didn’t cooperate to build an ID

  • ecosystem. We should have played

well with others.

Took too long. Strung out by process problems. (Alternatives emerged.)

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We didn’t cooperate to build an ID

  • ecosystem. We should have played

well with others.

Industry failed to build it. (Capital and management didn’t prioritize.)

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We didn’t cooperate to build an ID

  • ecosystem. We should have played

well with others.

NSTIC community became balkanized. NSTIC community lost cohesion; didn’t listen to each other. (Little to no interop.)

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We didn’t cooperate to build an ID

  • ecosystem. We should have played

well with others.

The program was co-opted by a Big Brother government. (Not trustworthy internationally and for many purposes.)

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Just because it’s built doesn’t mean they’ll use it.

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Just because it’s built doesn’t mean they’ll use it.

Worked, but was not trusted. (Failed Brand).

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Just because it’s built doesn’t mean they’ll use it.

Was subverted and insecure. (Legitimately Untrusted).

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Just because it’s built doesn’t mean they’ll use it.

Enterprise didn’t adopt it. (Business case not well made.)

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Just because it’s built doesn’t mean they’ll use it.

After one failure, supporters abandoned the

  • project. “Burned once, twice shy.”

(Shallow, brittle commitment; low tolerance for failure.)

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Just because it’s built doesn’t mean they’ll use it.

The IE was an empty room. No critical mass

  • formed. There was an imbalance of supply

and demand. (Anchor tenants didn’t sign on. Institutions didn’t enroll millions of users or pull in industry ecosystems.)

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Just because it’s built doesn’t mean they’ll use it.

Citizens didn’t want trusted identity. (Poor market fit; lack of perceived benefit

  • ver alternatives.)
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We didn’t build the right things the right way.

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We didn’t build the right things the right way.

A local failure took down the whole identity ecosystem. (Failures of ecosystem trust, architecture, integration testing, and risk analysis.)

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We didn’t build the right things the right way.

The IdP/RP/Trust identity model was inferior to newer models. (Technology risk.)

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We didn’t build the right things the right way.

The IdP/RP/Trust identity model broke at scale or broke in diverse contexts. (Project design risk.)

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We didn’t build the right things the right way.

Miscommunication within the Identity Ecosystem contributed to its death. (Poor cooperation, weak community, high self-interest, low trust.)

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Failed User Experience.

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Failed User Experience.

UX was too hard.

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Failed User Experience.

Everything went wrong that could go wrong.

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We Built-In Structural Instability.

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We Built-In Structural Instability.

Along with user experience, structural instability was the big issue, according to the group…

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We Built-In Structural Instability.

  • Four pillars of the ecosystem must be

strong

  • Technology
  • Economics
  • Policy
  • Culture
  • Each relationship among them was

imbalanced.

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We Built-In Structural Instability.

Each of these pillars were operating on different tempos.

  • It was fast to iterate improved user

experiences but slow to socialize each round among public policy and enterprise lawyers, for example.

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We Built-In Structural Instability.

Motivations were misaligned.

  • Some companies, for example,

engineered tariffs for data sharing into their terms of service, cutting off public sector and NPOs from their customers.

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We Built-In Structural Instability.

Core ideas didn’t survive translation.

  • Several large Internet engineering

companies backed out of supporting IE infrastructure because the “Easy ID” brand became a running joke on sitcoms, SNL, and a biting meme on YouTube.

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We Built-In Structural Instability.

Liability was broken.

  • Tragic risks were taken with some

technologies and contracts by pushing exposure from those who enabled risk to those who didn’t.

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This session was in October 2012.

  • But wait, there’s more…
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  • 2. EIGHTEEN MONTHS E
  • 2. EIGHTEEN MONTHS EARLIER...

ARLIER...

We did a similar exercise 18 months earlier in May 2011 with a similar group.

https://secure.flickr.com/photos/philwolff/5713880402/ cc-by Phil Wolff

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Key Risks (via 2011):

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Key Risks (via 2011):

Lack of adoption.

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Key Risks (via 2011):

Impatience for long learning curve.

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Key Risks (via 2011):

Usability failures. (early concern)

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Key Risks (via 2011):

Interop failures.

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Key Risks (via 2011):

Overscope.

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Key Risks (via 2011):

Security problems like phishing and malware drawn by money.

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Key Risks (via 2011):

Perversion of principles.

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Key Risks (via 2011):

Chicken vs. Egg problems.

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Key Risks (via 2011):

Short Attention Span and the Hype Cycle

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Key Risks (via 2011):

Regulatory blocks privacy laws antitrust concerns uncertainty about liability

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Key Risks (via 2011):

Waiting for Winners

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Key Risks (via 2011):

Dystopian Fear

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Key Risks (via 2011):

Over-promising by tech communities to policy communities

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Key Risks (via 2011):

  • Lack of adoption.
  • Impatience for long

learning curve.

  • Usability failures.
  • Interop failures.
  • Overscope.
  • Security problems like

phishing and malware drawn by money.

  • Perversion of principles.
  • Chicken vs. Egg problems.
  • Short Attention Span and

the Hype Cycle

  • Regulatory blocks

including privacy laws, antitrust concerns and uncertainty about liability

  • Waiting for Winners
  • Dystopian Fear
  • Over-promising by tech to

policy communities

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We had time, in the 2011 session, to brainstorm what might avoid or mitigate these threats.

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Action:

Small successes Build confidence

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Action:

Industry marketing, PR, Media/Voice Build public understanding

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Action:

Community user experience sharing (KM) Accelerate design

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Action:

Cultivate Engineering Focus Developer relations

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Action:

Governance driving Interop Testing Interop is a leadership challenge

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Action:

Clear/Graded Roadmap Short term plans, long term visions

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Action:

Electronic Authentication Guideline, NIST SP 800-63, and other threat comment Connect to existing NIST processes

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Action:

Security Council / Antiphishing Working Group Make security an explicit IESG activity

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Action:

Government Affairs activity Engage US and other governments

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Action:

OIX Risk Wiki Engage the OIX community

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WHA WHAT CHANGED T CHANGED BETWEEN THE TWO BETWEEN THE TWO SESSIONS? SESSIONS?

The fear of “failure to deliver” was still there.

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What changed between the two sessions?

  • 1. Outside forces like dystopian fear

among users, security failures, and regulatory challenges were less prominent or not mentioned.

  • 2. Drivers of failure expanded almost

exclusively to internal ones.

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What changed between the two sessions?

The primary concern: leadership

Once funding, staffing, and collaboration started: the identity ecosystem did not take charge and master the challenges as they emerged.

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Arbroath Cliffs Warning Notice CC-BY-NC Alan Parkinson

  • 3. Last minute update...
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Cuts are coming

  • US federal government is cutting

spending in 2013 as we prepare this paper in December 2012.

  • By cleaver if a “fiscal cliff avoiding”

budget is passed

  • By chainsaw if Congress and the

President fall over the “cliff.”

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Direct effects.

Nobody knows if this will directly affect NIST and the NIST staff managing the NSTIC project.

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Direct effects.

Could the stream of funding for NSTIC innovation grants dry up and will existing projects be halted?

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Direct effects.

Will NIST’s funding for the Identity Ecosystem’s Secretariat, that coordinates and supports the work of the IE, be sustained or cut?

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Direct effects.

In a trillion dollar budget, today’s spending

  • n NSTIC is a rounding error.
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Indirect effects.

We don’t know how cuts in federal spending will affect the program indirectly Participating organizations change behavior as they

  • lose government contracts,
  • experience greater risk, or
  • enjoy new opportunities.
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eGovernment as customer.

We also don’t know if the largest government agencies that would be among the first implementers of these open, user- centric, trust networks will stay in the game.

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eGovernment as customer.

Having huge customers as “anchor tenants” provides strong incentives for the private sector to invest and make the identity ecosystem work.

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eGovernment as customer.

Will spending cuts interfere with project continuity?

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eGovernment as customer.

Will key personnel stay engaged?

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Lots of unknowns.

  • And no strategy to respond to these risks

from the Identity Ecosystem Steering Group.

  • Yet.
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Our findings, in short:

A user experience that doesn’t work Imbalance among the forces that hold an identity ecosystem together.

The two most serious threats:

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What do you think is the biggest threat to making the dream

  • f an international user-centric digital

identity system that works across industries, technologies, governments, and regulatory schemes

come true?

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Further Reading and Resources

  • https://pensivepeter.wordpress.com/2012/10/23/death-

to-nstic-long-live-nstic/

  • https://skydrive.live.com/?

cid=9a70d9142ec4cc44&id=9A70D9142EC4CC44! 827&sff=1

  • PDEC White paper: What Could NSTIC?
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A word from our sponsors…

  • PDEC is a not-for-profit education, advocacy,

and research association, promoting the emergence of a user-centric personal data ecosystem where personal control of personal data is good for business and society.

  • Our consortium’s Startup Circle and individual

members are in North America, across Europe, Australia and New Zealand

  • We meet at local meetups and conferences

and hold seminars.

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Thanks

Phil Wolff

– phil@pde.cc – @evanwolf – +001.510-444.8234

PDEC, the Personal Data Ecosystem Consortium, is a “small data” NGO representing startups, individuals and others who believe personal control of personal data is good for people, business, and society