Trading in Johannesburg, Living in Manicaland: tracking a Zimbabwean - - PDF document

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Trading in Johannesburg, Living in Manicaland: tracking a Zimbabwean circular migrant Le commerce à Johannesburg, Vivre à Manicaland: le suivi d'un migrant circulaire du Zimbabwe

Stephen Rule, Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa (HSRC), South Africa Abstract The 2011 Census in South Africa documented more than 2-million foreign-born residents, large proportions

• riginating from Zimbabwe (28%) or Mozambique (17%), with other major sources being Nigeria, India,

China, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Most migrants are aged between 20 and 40 years (StatsSA, 2013) and many are affected by xenophobic hostility, especially those operating small businesses in urban townships and low-income settlements (Masuku, 2006; HSRC, 2008). The paper aims to elucidate the circular migration trajectory of a Johannesburg-based survivalist entrepreneur, male and aged 30 years, with a home and family in Manicaland Province, Zimbabwe. He has been a personal acquaintance for several years and has given me permission to research and share his story anonymously. The applicability of some theoretical approaches (Ravenstein, 1889; Boles, 2002; Mabogunje, 1970; Zelinsky, 1971; Kaufman et al, 2004; Potts, 2010; Worby, 2010; Morawska, 2012; Gavelstad, 2013) in explaining his migration decisions and experiences is assessed. Challenges have included the economic costs of regular travel; family obligations and extended periods of separation; bureaucratic hurdles; and a negative host community. Factors conducive to migratory inertia In order to achieve the goal of transferring oneself either temporarily, permanently or intermittently, with regular trips between origin and destination, to escape the poverty trap, and to pursue better life

• pportunities, a range of hurdles must be overcome. The first of these comprise economic barriers in terms
• f the immediate distance and cost of making the trip, and the second is the initial cost of survival in the

receiving country. Third, are the social barriers in the form of family or community support for the trip at the point of origin, and the availability of buy-in. Fourth, are the bureaucratic hurdles of obtaining the correct documentation to be able to leave the country of origin and to enter the destination country. Fifth, capacity and perseverance in dealing with potentially hostile or negative responses from the host community into which one migrates is a critical success factor for settling. For many migrants, the trajectory is not once-off and in one direction. Patterns of circular migration exist within and between countries, especially between rural origins and urban or metropolitan destinations, over lengthy periods. Ties with rural home communities are retained and persist reciprocally, with migrants earning hard income and remitting payments or physically returning to their families, who in turn maintain the nurturing and educational roles for the next generation. In respect of internal rural-urban migration in South Africa, the fragmentation of households over the last century as a consequence of circular or “oscillating” (Spiegel et al, 1996) migration is often a “carefully calibrated means for survival” (Hall, 2016:3) of an extended family. It constitutes an intentional strategy, formulated as a means to “maximise household income, minimise economic risk, and increase exposure to social resources” (Collinson et al, 2006: 195). Migrant entrepreneurs in South Africa Figures from the 2011 Census suggest that 3,3% or about 1,7 million of the country’s 51,7 million people were born outside of South Africa, a small proportion of the global estimate of 175 million people who lived

• utside of their country of birth (Kok, 2006). According to AfricaCheck, data collated by the World Bank and

the UN, suggests a migrant population of about 1,86 million people. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) estimates that the total migrant population (legal and irregular) rose from 2% of population in 2000 to over 5, 5% in 2015, which aligns with the census projections (Republic of South Africa, 2016, 26). In Gauteng, the wealthiest and most populous province, almost half of the more than one million net migrants during the period 2001-11 originated outside of South Africa, as were approximately one-third of the 300 000 migrants arriving in the Western Cape during this period (Ziehl, 2016). Faced with barriers to formal employment and social benefits, foreign migrants have a high propensity to utilise their entrepreneurial skills as informal traders. One in seven (14%) of respondents to a survey of street traders in Johannesburg during 1995 were non-South Africans (Jennings et al, 1995a; Jennings et al,

2 1995b), a trend corroborated by later studies (Rogerson, 1997; Peberdy, 2000). The largest proportions of foreign street traders in the Peberdy (2000) study were found to be males aged between 20 and 29 years with origins in Zimbabwe, Malawi, Kenya, Mozambique or Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)). Almost half indicated that they had become street traders as a means of earning income or simply

• surviving. Most transported saleable goods (mainly curios, wooden or stone carvings) to Johannesburg from

their home countries. Additionally, more than half took clothes, electronic goods, groceries or other items with a modal value of about R2500 back to sell at home more than eight times per year. Reasons for migrating specifically to South Africa were tourist industry opportunities (27%), strength of the economy (24%), and other attractions (17%) such as the new democratic order and ‘lack of corruption’. Border challenges were the experience of almost two-thirds (63%) of those interviewed in the Peberdy (2000) study, who said “some resented the haggling with customs officials at the border, as well as the inconsistency, bribery and overcharging” (Peberdy, 2000, 217). More recently, studies on migrants in South Africa have focussed on the xenophobic environment (Nyamnjoh, 2006; Morris, 2008; Charman & Piper, 2012; Piper & Yu, 2015; McMichael, 2015; Gordon, 2016) with which foreign traders and other migrants are forced to contend. South Africans are often suspicious of and antagonistic towards migrants from Asian or other African countries. Additionally, current migration policy and legislation is less than conducive to migrant arrivals in the country. Case study This paper focuses on an individual circular migrant entrepreneur who has overcome the international hurdles and currently operates a business in Johannesburg. I have personally befriended him during the last five years and have informally collected data from conversations as well as by means of social media, using WhatsApp and Facebook messenger. He agreed to my use of the material for this research. His identity remains confidential for normal ethical reasons. This man is 30 years old and he originates from Chigodora in eastern Zimbabwe. I name him ‘Tariro’ for the purposes of this analysis. With his wife and 3-year old son, he rents rooms in Mutare, where he stays when not on visits to Johannesburg. Tariro has a younger half-brother who is dependent on him, both parents having died. Toriro completed O-levels in four subjects at secondary school with some financial assistance from an international NGO. As a child, his grandfather taught him the skill of carving realistic-looking zebra, lion and other animals from local timber. A friend who purchased some of his creations, encouraged Tariro to expand his hobby into a business and Tariro to this end, started visiting Johannesburg in 2010. While in Johannesburg, he shares a flat in the CBD- Joubert Park area, located in one of the six central Johannesburg wards where at the time of the 2011 Census, more than 20% of residents were non-South African born. His flatmates are three other men from Zimbabwe, each paying a R200 share towards the R600 monthly rental to a Malawian landlord. He spends 14 days at a time in Johannesburg, each day marketing his animals as well as wooden bowls, along the main shopping streets of some wealthy northern suburbs of Johannesburg, especially Melville, Greenside and Parkhurst, to which he travels by local minibus taxi.

Figure 1: Zimbabwean circular migrant entrepreneurs in Johannesburg

3 He commutes by means of one of the four bus options available between Johannesburg and Mutare, his particular choice costs R400 for a one-way trip (up from R250 in 2010), and offers a bonus of a free trip after every ten paid trips. He is not charged extra fare for his large loads of wooden crafts, as many as 90 pieces, which he sells in the range of R120 to R200, and the animals in the range of R80 to R120. However, the import customs duty amounts to R1 per kilogram of merchandise. At the end of each trip, Toriro makes purchases of sugar, salt and cooking oil, which cost about half of the price that is payable in Zimbabwe. He returns with the balance of his earnings and converts the South African Rand currency to Zimbabwean Bond notes, which are linked to the value of US Dollars. The rest of this paper interrogates the extent to which his demographics and migration trajectories correlate with theoretical expectations. Migrant population estimates

Table 1: Estimates of main origins of international migrants in South Africa

Country 2011 Census 2016 Community Survey 2015 DESA Estimate Zimbabwe 672308 574047 475406 Mozambique 393231 293405 449710 Lesotho 160806 160749 350611 Malawi 86606 78796 76605 United Kingdom 81720 56412 318536 Swaziland 36377 38038 91232 Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 25630 31504 70077 Namibia 40575 30701 133282 Nigeria 26341 30314 17753 Elsewhere 649815 284575 1159288 Total 2173409 1578541 3142500 Sources: extrapolated from StatsSA, 2015 & 2016; Meny-Gibert & Chiumia, 2016. Crush et al (2017: 16) identify two of the four major migrant corridors into the country as coming from Zimbabwe:

• 1. Zimbabwe (Harare) through Beit Bridge to farms in Limpopo, to Gauteng (Johannesburg) and to the

Western Cape (Cape Town);

• 2. Southern Zimbabwe (Bulawayo) through Plumtree to Botswana (Francistown and Gaborone). Some
• nward migration occurs from Botswana to South Africa;
• 3. Southern Mozambique (rural and Maputo) through Ressano Garcia to farms in Mpumalanga, to

Gauteng (Johannesburg and Pretoria) and the gold and platinum mines;

• 4. Lesotho (rural and Maseru) through Maseru Bridge to farms and mines in the Free State, farms in

the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal and to Bloemfontein and Gauteng (Johannesburg) for domestic workers. Approximately 250000 of the Zimbabweans who live in South Africa (Eyewitness News, 2017; Immigration South Africa, 2017) possess a Zimbabwe Special Permit (ZSP), as do similarly large numbers of migrants from Lesotho (Lesotho Special Permit: LSP). These permits are under re-consideration by the government, which would prefer that migrants make use of the standard visa and work permit options. During the three and a half decades since Zimbabwe achieved independence from the United Kingdom, successive waves of Zimbabweans have migrated to South Africa to escape political and economic turmoil. The presence of several hundred thousand Zimbabweans in the country, many employed in professional and service industry jobs has generated large networks for interaction. The online newspaper ZIMSINSA.com (accessed 28.03.17), described as the Voice of Zimbabweans in Mzansi, is an example of the networking activity that occurs

4 amongst Zimbabwean expatriates. In the case of Toriro, he requests and is usually given permission to remain in South Africa for 14 days.

Figure 2: Zimbabwean passport showing frequent entries at Beit Bridge border post

The gravity model of migration The first theoretical model of migration was suggested in the 1880s in Scotland by Ravenstein (1885), whose research observation was that “..the deficiency of hands in one part of the country is supplied from other parts where population is redundant … [and] … the great body of our migrants only proceed a short distance … in the direction of the great centres of commerce and industry which absorb the migrants” (Ravenstein, 1885). His theory was based on Newton’s law of gravity, such that the larger the populations of towns, cities, regions or countries, and the closer their spatial proximity, the greater the volume of migration between

• them. A century of subsequent research (e.g. Stewart, 1941; Lee, 1966; Greenwood, 1985; Martínez-Zarzoso,

2013) led to the inclusion of push and pull factors at migrants’ places of origin and destination respectively; and the recognition of barriers other than physical distance. The relationship came to be expressed in an equation of the form Mij = (Pi*Pj)/(Dij)x], such that migrant flows were generally proportionate to the product of the populations at the place of origin and the destination, and inversely proportional to the distance between them. Inserting estimated values for national populations and geographical distances between South Africa and its major sources of migrants, and assuming that distance between Johannesburg and the capital city of each country is squared (i.e. x=2), it is evident that the differences between model and reality (Figures 1a and 1b) are significant1.

Figure 3a: Distribution of foreign arrivals, 2015 Figure 3b: Expected proportions (migration gravity laws)

Source: Republic of South Africa, 2017

1 Three amnesties to legalise the immigrant status of long-term mineworkers (1996); SADC nationals working in South Africa and with South African

spouses or dependants and more than five years residence in the country (1996); and for refugees from the Mozambican civil war (1999) (Migration News, 2000). Peberdy (2017) suggests that this resulted in around 200,000 Mozambicans being granted permanent residence. The implication is that their immigrant status might mask the large population of Mozambican-origin residents now domiciled in the country. 5% 1% 1% 1% 1% 5% 3% 10% 2% 2% 0% 11% 1% 22% 13% 22% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%

Elsewhere Other Asia Bangladesh China India Other Europe UK Other Africa Nigeria Namibia DRC Swaziland Malawi Lesotho Mozambique Zimbabwe

2% 2% 1% 3% 7% 0% 0% 15% 3% 1% 3% 4% 3% 5% 44% 5% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%

Elsewhere Other Asia Bangladesh China India Other Europe UK Other Africa Nigeria Namibia DRC Swaziland Malawi Lesotho Mozambique Zimbabwe

5 Thus, the proportion of migrants in South Africa who have origins in Zimbabwe is much larger than predicted by the model. It may be that imperatives of political and economic implosion in Zimbabwe as a “push” factor

• utweigh even the “pull” factor of South African propinquity.

Tariro has the choice of several commercial bus services operating as frequently as every day between Mutare in Zimbabwe’s Manicaland Province and Park Station in central Johannesburg. The trip fare is R400 (US$30) plus extra for bulk baggage and the duration is approximately 16 hours over a road distance of 1094

• km. Tariro makes the bus trip to Johannesburg about once every month. He shares accommodation with

friends and his business partner in central Johannesburg for a week while selling his wooden crafts in the middle class suburbs north of the city. He then returns to Mutare to replenish his trading stock and pay the living expenses of his wife and 2-year old son. The theory of mobility transition The theory of mobility transition (Zelinsky, 1971) comprising five stages, extrapolated trends from the model

• f demographic transition, entailing the change over time from high rates of both fertility and mortality, to

lower rates of mortality and then fertility, first documented by Thompson in 1929 (Kirk, 1996). Thus, migration patterns evolve from almost zero movement in Stage 1 to a “stampede” from rural areas to urban centres in Stage 2. Stage 3, corresponding to “late transitional society” entails a decrease in rural-to-urban movement and an increase in urban-to-urban migration. Stages 4 and 5 are characterised by a more complex pattern of migration and circulation between urban and urban, as well as urban and rural localities, and ultimately some counter-urbanisation trends. Whereas the proportion of our planet’s human population that is living in urban areas increased from 34% in 1960 to 54% in 2015 (World Bank, 2015), this trend has been geographically uneven. The increase in urbanisation in South Africa during this 55-year period has been from 47% to 65%. This is lower than the 2015 average for the highly urbanised countries of North America (82%) and the European Union (75%), but higher than the means for sub-Saharan Africa (38%) and South Asia (33%). In particular, the 2015 level of urbanisation in Zimbabwe was 32% (World Bank, 2015a). Estimates of the number of Zimbabweans domiciled in South Africa vary widely between 1 million and 3 million (Forced Migration Programme, 2007; Muzondidya, 2010). An added dimension to the decades of rural-to-urban and circular migration patterns within Zimbabwe (Potts, 2010) emerged with the advent of democracy in South Africa. Economic, educational and other opportunities became available in much closer proximity than previously, and particularly attractive since the demise of democracy after the flawed national elections in 2000 (Raftopoulos, 2009; McGregor & Primorac, 2010). The migration of Zimbabweans to cities such as Johannesburg, places Zimbabwe somewhere between Stage 2 and Stage 3 of the Mobility Transition Model, with migrants opting to seek opportunities internationally rather than in the cities of Harare or Bulawayo. Migrant networks, motility and individual agency Migrant networks comprise systems of interpersonal linkages between families, friends, and community members in their places of origin and destination. These linkages are often complemented by organisations that assist migrants to undertake the migration process, or to establish businesses or secure employment (Mabogunje, 1970; Poros, 2011). Prominent amongst these are diaspora organisations, NGOs, religious and cultural organisations. Tariro has established such networks in Johannesburg and further afield in South

• Africa. Tariro conducts his street trading operations in the city in tandem with his cousin, and they have a

group of associates with origins in Zimbabwe. The concept of motility (Kaufman et al, 2004) entails a combination of spatial and social mobility, which has increased internationally and is related to access, competence and appropriation. The fluidification and compression of space as a consequence of electronic means of communication and reduced costs of travel have facilitated the options for traversing spatial and social barriers for migrants like Tariro.

6 Structural poverty As differently conceptualised by dependency theorists such as Frank and Wallerstein (Boles, 2002), structural poverty is obvious in the origin country of the entrepreneur in this study. The official level of unemployment in Zimbabwe is recorded by the World Bank (2014) as being 5.4%. Nonetheless, most workers in Zimbabwe are employed in the informal sector and only 11% have formal jobs (Africa Check, 2014), in comparison with South Africa’s official rate of 26.6% in July 2016 (Trading Economics, 2016). The GDP per capita in Zimbabwe is US$890, compared to that of US$5692 in South Africa, and the international mean of US$10,000 (World Bank, 2015b). The capital city of Zimbabwe (Harare) is ranked 133rd out of the 140 cities included in the Economist’s Liveability Index, with a score of 42.6. Johannesburg was 95th on the list. The index rates cities in respect of the availability of health care, educational resources, safety, infrastructure and the

• environment. Harare ranked closely with Damascus, Lagos, Kiev and Tripoli, in stark contrast to the top

ranked Melbourne, Vienna and Vancouver (The Economist, 2016). In terms of other quality of life indicators, Zimbabwe is ranked 131st out of 157 countries included in the World Happiness Report (Helliwell, Layard & Sachs, 2016) actually ahead of South Africa at 116. This index assesses aggregate responses to questions about life satisfaction and happiness. Zimbabwe’s annual inflation rate reached 89.7 Sextillion (1021) percent in November 2008 (Hanke 2009). The Zimbabwe Dollar was abandoned in 2009, and Zimbabwe has made used of the US Dollar and to a lesser extent, the Rand since then. The currency liquidity crisis resulting from a demand for US Dollars that far exceeded the supply, was followed by a government decision to issue Bond Notes backed by a loan from the African Export-Import Bank (Financial Times, 2016). The Zimbabwean diaspora – primarily based in the UK and South Africa- is reported to have remitted US$935 million to Zimbabwe during 2015, comprising close to half of the US$2-billion received, according to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (Fin24, 2016). Accordingly, Tariro reports frequent difficulty in being able to withdraw cash from banks in Zimbabwe and increasing reliance on his South African earnings. The role of the state in managing international migration Early post-democratisation policy included the Refugees Act (Act 130 of 1998), the 1999 White Paper on International Migration (Republic of South Africa, 1999) and the Immigration Act (Act 13 of 2002). Negative public sentiment has materialised in the form of public xenophobic violence (Charman & Piper, 2012; Landau, 2012) in the main cities during the last two decades. Marches by South Africans in solidarity with foreign victims have sometimes followed (Kirshner, 2012). Official intervention has manifested in structural violence such as a municipal “blitz” on street traders in general in Johannesburg in October 2013. However this was declared illegal by the Constitutional Court two months later (McMichael, 2015). In 2016, a Green Paper was published, arguing (2016, 24) that “current international migration policy must be replaced as it does not enable South Africa to adequately embrace global opportunities while safeguarding our sovereignty and ensuring public safety and national security”. The 1999 White Paper was dismissed as having failed to provide guidance for “pro-active management of international migration…. [and that it did not] … advance the national security and development agenda of the country” (p10). The White Paper was eventually published in July 2017 (Republic of South Africa, 2017) with recommendations for policy interventions that would utilise international migration in a strategic way in

• rder to achieve the goals of the National Development Plan (p.11). Specifically, the White Paper envisages

the proactive management of several issues, including admissions and departures; residency and naturalisation; international migrants with skills and capital; international migration within the African context; asylum seekers and refugees; the integration process for international migrants; and enforcement (pp.-vii). The current scenario for Tariro is to obtain a permit that lasts for “a few days”, however sometimes it is possible to pay an extra R100 and receive a permit for two weeks. He says: “All those who don’t have passports where asked to pay R100 at the exit way of South African side and also on Zim side they were

7 paying R320, It’s just an admission of guilty. So I found it much better to get yourself a passport. Otherwise for us people with valid passports there is nothing wrong” (sic). Embedded within the particularities of the enabling or constraining structural contexts within which the individual circular migration decisions are made and implemented (Morawska, 2012; Stones, 2012) by Tariro, the manifestation of his presence in Johannesburg asserts that the outcome was positive and that his

• ngoing economic endeavours are yielding the desired results at this juncture.

Table 2: Migrant Entrepreneur Profile

Age 30 Family circumstances Married, 1 child aged 3 years Place of origin Chigodora, Zimbabwe Distance to Johannesburg 1130km Travel time to Johannesburg Bus – 16 hours Years since first entry into SA January 2010 Base in SA Johannesburg Occupation in SA Retailer (wooden handcrafts) Monthly accommodation and living costs at home US$ 185 = R 2,500 rental Frequency of travel between origin and Johannesburg Monthly Cost of travel R800 return Reason for travelling to Johannesburg “to sell my stuff and try to get a living” … “because of the situation there, I had nothing to do in my life. No jobs in Zim”. “No business in Harare”. Border crossing Usually a permit for a few days, sometimes a R100 bribe will result in a 2-week permit Business operations Wooden craft selling in specific northern suburbs (95% white customers) and broiler chickens in Mutare Business partner Cousin Conclusions The Johannesburg entrepreneurial efforts of Tariro from Zimbabwe are predictable and in accordance with previous research and resultant theory. Using the gravity model of migration, Zimbabwe could be expected to be the fifth largest source of migrants to South Africa. There actual ranking of number 1 is thus higher than expected, but within the top five as predicted. In terms of the theory of mobility transition, the low levels of urbanisation in Zimbabwe (32%) place the country between Stage 2 and Stage 3, with migrants

• pting to seek opportunities internationally rather than in their main national city of Harare. Structural

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