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The Tor Project, Inc. Our mission is to be the global resource for - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Aug 14, 2023 163 likes •881 views

The Tor Project, Inc. Our mission is to be the global resource for technology, advocacy, research and education in the ongoing pursuit of freedom of speech, privacy rights online, and censorship circumvention. 1 What is Tor? Online anonymity

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The Tor Project, Inc.

Our mission is to be the global resource for technology, advocacy, research and education in the ongoing pursuit of freedom

  • f speech, privacy rights online, and

censorship circumvention.

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What is Tor?

Online anonymity 1) open source software, 2) network, 3) protocol Community of researchers, developers, users, and relay operators Funding from US DoD, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Voice of America, Google, NLnet, Human Rights Watch, NSF, US State Dept, SIDA, Knight Foundation, ...

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U.S. 501(c)(3) non-profit

  • rganization dedicated to

the research and development of tools for

  • nline anonymity and

privacy

The Tor Project, Inc.

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Estimated ~800,000? daily Tor users

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Threat model: what can the attacker do?

Alice Anonymity network Bob watch (or be!) Bob! watch Alice! Control part of the network!

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Anonymity isn't encryption: Encryption just protects contents.

Alice Bob “Hi, Bob!” “Hi, Bob!” <gibberish> attacker

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Anonymity isn't just wishful thinking...

“You can't prove it was me!” “Promise you won't look!” “Promise you won't remember!” “Promise you won't tell!” “I didn't write my name on it!” “Isn't the Internet already anonymous?”

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Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups.

Anonymity

Private citizens “It's privacy!”

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Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups.

Anonymity

Private citizens Businesses “It's network security!” “It's privacy!”

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Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups.

Anonymity

Private citizens Governments Businesses “It's traffic-analysis resistance!” “It's network security!” “It's privacy!”

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Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups.

Anonymity

Private citizens Governments Businesses “It's traffic-analysis resistance!” “It's network security!” “It's privacy!” Human rights activists “It's reachability!”

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The simplest designs use a single relay to hide connections.

Bob2 Bob1 Bob3 Alice2 Alice1 Alice3 Relay E(Bob3,“X”) E(Bob1, “Y”) E ( B

  • b

2 , “ Z ” ) “Y” “Z” “X”

(example: some commercial proxy providers)

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But a single relay (or eavesdropper!) is a single point of failure.

Bob2 Bob1 Bob3 Alice2 Alice1 Alice3 Evil Relay E(Bob3,“X”) E(Bob1, “Y”) E ( B

  • b

2 , “ Z ” ) “Y” “Z” “X”

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... or a single point of bypass.

Bob2 Bob1 Bob3 Alice2 Alice1 Alice3 Irrelevant Relay E(Bob3,“X”) E(Bob1, “Y”) E ( B

  • b

2 , “ Z ” ) “Y” “Z” “X”

Timing analysis bridges all connections through relay ⇒ An attractive fat target

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So, add multiple relays so that no single one can betray Alice.

Bob Alice R1 R2 R3 R4 R5

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Alice makes a session key with R1 ...And then tunnels to R2...and to R3

Bob Alice R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 Bob2

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Tor Controller Interface

  • stem
  • pytorctl
  • jtorctl
  • txtorcon
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Tor specs

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freehaven.net/anonbib/

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Tor network simulators

  • Shadow
  • ExperimenTor
  • Chutney
  • Puppetor
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Attackers can block users from connecting to the Tor network

1) By blocking the directory authorities 2) By blocking all the relay IP addresses in the directory, or the addresses of other Tor services 3) By filtering based on Tor's network fingerprint 4) By preventing users from finding the Tor software (usually by blocking website)

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Relay versus Discovery

There are two pieces to all these “proxying” schemes: a relay component: building circuits, sending traffic over them, getting the crypto right a discovery component: learning what relays are available

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What we're up against

Govt firewalls used to be stateless. Now they're buying fancier hardware. Burma vs Iran vs China New filtering techniques spread by commercial (American) companies :(

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Modularity

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Pluggable transports

  • Flashproxy (Stanford), websocket
  • FTEProxy (Portland St), http via regex
  • Stegotorus (SRI/CMU), http
  • Skypemorph (Waterloo), Skype video
  • uProxy (Google), webrtc
  • Lantern (BNS), social network based
  • ScrambleSuit (Karlstad), obfs-based
  • Telex (Michigan/Waterloo), traffic divert
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Tor's safety comes from diversity

  • #1: Diversity of relays. The more relays

we have and the more diverse they are, the fewer attackers are in a position to do traffic confirmation. (Research problem: measuring diversity over time)

  • #2: Diversity of users and reasons to use
  • it. 50000 users in Iran means almost all of

them are normal citizens.

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Tor's anonymity comes from...

  • The first 100,000 users (user diversity)
  • The last 1,000,000 users (end-to-end

correlation resistance)

  • The first 1,000 relays (location diversity)
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Only a piece of the puzzle

Assume the users aren't attacked by their hardware and software No spyware installed, no cameras watching their screens, etc Users can fetch a genuine copy of Tor?

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“Still the King of high secure, low latency Internet Anonymity” Contenders for the throne:

  • None
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NSA/GCHQ programs that affect Tor

  • Quick Ant (QFD), Quantum Insert, Foxacid
  • Quantum for cookie tests (good thing we

moved away from Torbutton's “toggle”)

  • Remember, they can do these things even

more easily to non-Tor users

  • At least they can't target specific Tor users

(until they identify themselves)

  • “Don't worry, we never attack Americans” (!)
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Perception

  • DoJ's aborted study finding 3% bad

content on the Tor network

  • How do you compare one Snowden leak to

ten true reviews on Yelp?

  • BBC's Silk Road articles telling people

how to buy drugs safely

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High-profile hidden services

The media has promoted a few hot topics:

  • WikiLeaks (~2010)
  • Farmer's market (pre-2013)
  • Freedom Hosting (2013)
  • Silk Road (2013)

There are many more (eg: many GlobaLeaks deployments, etc) which aren't well known by the media (yet).

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So what should Tor's role in the world be?

  • Can't be solely technical (anymore, if it

ever could have been)

  • But technical is what we're best at (at least,

historically)

  • Remember how important diversity of

users is

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Three ways to destroy Tor

  • 1) Legal / policy attacks
  • 2) Make ISPs hate hosting exit relays
  • 3) Make services hate Tor connections

– Yelp, Wikipedia, Google, Skype, …

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Botnet

  • Some jerk in the Ukraine signed up 5

million bots as Tor clients (not relays)

  • Our scalability work paid off!
  • Good thing it wasn't malicious.
  • Ultimately it didn't work: everybody

noticed, and Microsoft has been cleaning up the bots

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Number of daily Tor users

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So what's next?

  • “Tor: endorsed by Egyptian activists,

Wikileaks, NSA, GCHQ, Chelsea Manning, Snowden, ...”

  • Different communities like Tor for

different reasons.

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Tor Browser Bundle 3.x

  • Deterministic Builds
  • “Tor launcher” extension, no Vidalia
  • Asks if you want bridges first
  • Local homepage, so much faster startup
  • Security slider (for e.g. JavaScript)
  • Privacy fixes, e.g. font enumeration
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Orbot

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Tails LiveCD

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“Core” Tor tasks

  • Core Tor (specs, design, hidden services)
  • Tor Browser Bundle, deterministic builds
  • Metrics and measurements
  • Bridges and pluggable transports
  • Helping the research community
  • Outreach and education