Tor, a quick overview Linus Nordberg <linus@torproject.org> - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

tor a quick overview
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Tor, a quick overview Linus Nordberg <linus@torproject.org> - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Tor, a quick overview Linus Nordberg <linus@torproject.org> The Tor Project https://torproject.org/ 1 What is Tor Online anonymity: 1. software, 2. network, 3. protocol Open source, freely available Community of researchers,


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Tor, a quick overview

Linus Nordberg <linus@torproject.org> The Tor Project https://torproject.org/

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What is Tor

  • Online anonymity: 1. software, 2. network, 3.

protocol

  • Open source, freely available
  • Community of researchers, developers, users

and relay operators

  • Funding from US DoD, Electronic Frontier

Foundation, Voice of America, Google, NLnet, Human Rights Watch and more

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  • 501(c)(3) non-profit
  • rganization dedicated

to the research and development of tools for online anonymity and privacy

The Tor Project, Inc.

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Estimated 400,000 daily tor users

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Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups

Anonymity?

Private citizens “It's privacy”

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Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups

Anonymity?

Private citizens Businesses “It's network security” “It's privacy”

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Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups

Anonymity?

Private citizens Businesses “It's network security” “It's privacy” Governments “It's traffic-analysis resistance!”

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Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups

Anonymity?

Private citizens Governments Businesses “It's traffic-analysis resistance!” “It's network security” “It's privacy” Blocked users “It's reachability!”

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Encryption alone doesn't protect against traffic-analysis

Alice Bob

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10 Sick Alice Web serarch Vårdguiden.se Netdoktor.se

Regular citizens don't want to be watched and tracked

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11 8-year-old Alice Web services

Regular citizens don't want to be watched and tracked

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12 Blogger Alice Blog site

Regular citizens don't want to be watched and tracked

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13 Employed Alice Web search Vårdguiden.se Netdoktor.se

Regular citizens don't want to be watched and tracked

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14 Consumer Alice Amazon.com Cdon.se Bokus.com Prisjakt.nu Pricerunner.se

Regular citizens don't want to be watched and tracked

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15 Alice Corp Competitor

Business need to keep trade secrets

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16 Alice Corp Web search Suppliers Customers Media

Business need to keep trade secrets

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17 Police Alice Suspected Bob

Law enforcement needs anonymity to get the job done

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18 Police Alice Bob, selling illegal drugs

Law enforcement needs anonymity to get the job done

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19 Police Alice Bob Corleone

Law enforcement needs anonymity to get the job done

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20 Witness Alice Police tip line

Law enforcement needs anonymity to get the job done

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21 Alice with protected identity Online news Internet shops Web forums

Law enforcement needs anonymity to get the job done

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22 Ambassador Alice abroad Foreign ministry at home

Governments need anonymity for their security

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23 Agent Alice Defence agency

Governments need anonymity for their security

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24 Alice the source Bob the journalist

Journalists and their sources need Tor for their personal safety

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25 Alice the journalisten Suspicious company

Journalists and their sources need Tor for their personal safety

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26 Censored Alice Filtered web site

Journalists and their sources need Tor for their personal safety

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27 Alice the dissident Surveiled web site

Journalists and their sources need Tor for their personal safety

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The simpler systems use only one relay

Bob2 Bob1 Bob3 Alice2 Alice1 Alice3 Relay E(Bob3,“X”) E(Bob1, “Y”) E ( B

  • b

2 , “ Z ” ) “Y” “Z” “X”

(For example relax.se, dold.se and ipredator.se)

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The simpler systems put all the eggs in the same basket

Bob2 Bob1 Bob3 Alice2 Alice1 Alice3 E(Bob3,“X”) E(Bob1, “Y”) E ( B

  • b

2 , “ Z ” ) “Y” “Z” “X”

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A single relay is also an attractive target

Bob2 Bob1 Bob3 Alice2 Alice1 Alice3 Relay E(Bob3,“X”) E(Bob1, “Y”) E ( B

  • b

2 , “ Z ” ) “Y” “Z” “X” Trafic and timing analysis will reveal which Alice is talking to which Bob.

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So, add multiple relays so that no single one can betray Alice

Bob Alice R1 R2 R3 R4 R5

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A corrupt first hop can tell that Alice is talking, but not to whom

Bob Alice R2 R3 R1 R4 R5

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A corrupt final hop can tell that somebody is talking to Bob, but not who

Bob Alice R1 R2 R3 R4 R5

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The first hop is protected by three layers of encryption, then each hop peels off one layer, onion routing

R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 Alice Bob1 Bob2

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