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A Practical Congestion Attack on Tor Using Long Paths Towards De-anonymizing Tor Nathan S. Evans 1 Christian Grothoff 1 Roger Dingledine 2 1 University of Denver, Denver CO 2 The Tor Project August, 12 2009 A Practical Congestion Attack on Tor

  1. A Practical Congestion Attack on Tor Using Long Paths Towards De-anonymizing Tor Nathan S. Evans 1 Christian Grothoff 1 Roger Dingledine 2 1 University of Denver, Denver CO 2 The Tor Project August, 12 2009

  2. A Practical Congestion Attack on Tor Using Long Paths Why attack Tor? Tor is the most popular and widely used free software P2P network used to achieve anonymity on the Internet: Tor has a large user base The project is well supported Generally assumed to give users strong anonymity Our results: All the Tor nodes involved in a circuit can be discovered, reducing Tor users level of anonymity and revealing a problem with Tor’s protocol De-anonymizing Tor

  3. A Practical Congestion Attack on Tor Using Long Paths Tor General Information Tor stands for “The onion router” Encrypts data multiple times and is decrypted as it travels through the network a layer at a time: like peeling an onion Tor is a P2P network of mixes Routes data through network along a “circuit” Data is encrypted as it passes through nodes (until the last hop) De-anonymizing Tor

  4. A Practical Congestion Attack on Tor Using Long Paths Routing Data is forwarded through the network Each node knows only the previous hop and the next hop Only the originator knows all the hops Number of hops is hard coded (currently set to three) Key security goal: No node in the path can discover the full path De-anonymizing Tor

  5. A Practical Congestion Attack on Tor Using Long Paths Routing Example Client Tor Node 1 Tor Node 2 Tor Node 3 Tor Node 4 Tor Node 5 Tor Node 6 Tor Node 7 Tor Node 8 Tor Node 9 Server De-anonymizing Tor

  6. A Practical Congestion Attack on Tor Using Long Paths Previous work Murdoch and Danezis wrote “Low Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor” Goal is to discover all the Tor routers involved in a given circuit Based on being able to tell the added load of one normal Tor connection Send a certain sequence down a tunnel, monitor each Tor router to see if it is involved Their attack worked reasonably well with the 13 Tor routers they used in 2005 (with 15% false negative rate) De-anonymizing Tor

  7. A Practical Congestion Attack on Tor Using Long Paths Problems With Previous Work Too inaccurate with today’s 1000+ routers Must identify all the separate routers in the circuit Attempting to measure small effects, large fluctuations that occur in actual current network give false positives We replicated their experiments, found method to be much less effective on today’s network De-anonymizing Tor

  8. A Practical Congestion Attack on Tor Using Long Paths M and D Results - With Attack Latency measurement graph xbotA with attack Control Run Attack Run Latency variance (in seconds) 1 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 Sample number De-anonymizing Tor

  9. A Practical Congestion Attack on Tor Using Long Paths M and D Results - Without Attack Latency measurement graph chaoscomputerclub42 no attack Control Run Attack Run 2 Latency variance (in seconds) 1 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 Sample number De-anonymizing Tor

  10. A Practical Congestion Attack on Tor Using Long Paths M and D Testing Used same statistical methods for correlation Used same source code for attacks In our tests, highest correlations seen with false positives Attack may be viable for some Tor nodes Improved statistical methods may improve false positives De-anonymizing Tor

  11. A Practical Congestion Attack on Tor Using Long Paths Our Basis for Deanonymization Target user is running Tor with privoxy with all the default settings Three design issues enable users to be deanonymized 1 No artificial delays induced on connections 2 Path length is set at a small finite number 3 Paths of arbitrary length through the network can be constructed De-anonymizing Tor

  12. A Practical Congestion Attack on Tor Using Long Paths Regular Path Example Client Tor Node 3 Tor Node 1 Tor Node 2 Server De-anonymizing Tor

  13. A Practical Congestion Attack on Tor Using Long Paths Circular Path Example 1/5 Client Tor Node 3 Tor Node 1 Tor Node 2 Server De-anonymizing Tor

  14. A Practical Congestion Attack on Tor Using Long Paths Circular Path Example 2/5 Client Tor Node 3 Tor Node 1 Tor Node 2 Server De-anonymizing Tor

  15. A Practical Congestion Attack on Tor Using Long Paths Circular Path Example 3/5 Client Tor Node 3 Tor Node 1 Tor Node 2 Server De-anonymizing Tor

  16. A Practical Congestion Attack on Tor Using Long Paths Circular Path Example 4/5 Client Tor Node 3 Tor Node 1 Tor Node 2 Server De-anonymizing Tor

  17. A Practical Congestion Attack on Tor Using Long Paths Circular Path Example 5/5 Client Tor Node 3 Tor Node 1 Tor Node 2 Server De-anonymizing Tor

  18. A Practical Congestion Attack on Tor Using Long Paths Attack Implementation Exit node “injects” JavaScript “ping” code into HTML response Client browses as usual, while JavaScript continues to “phone home” Exit node measures variance in latency While continuing to measure, attack strains possible first hop(s) If no significant variance observed, pick another node from candidates and start over Once sufficient change is observed in repeated measurements, initial node has been found De-anonymizing Tor

  19. A Practical Congestion Attack on Tor Using Long Paths Attack Example Tor Node 1 - Unknown Node Malicious Client Client Tor Node 3 - Our Exit Node Tor Node 2 - Known High BW Tor Node 1 High BW Tor Node 2 Malicious Server Server De-anonymizing Tor

  20. A Practical Congestion Attack on Tor Using Long Paths Queue example 1 (3 circuits) A B C B5 B4 B3 B2 B1 A0 B0 C1 Output Queue t = 0 C0 De-anonymizing Tor

  21. A Practical Congestion Attack on Tor Using Long Paths Queue example 2 (3 circuits) A B C B5 B4 B3 B2 B1 B0 C1 Output Queue t = 1 t = 0 A0 C0 De-anonymizing Tor

  22. A Practical Congestion Attack on Tor Using Long Paths Queue example 3 (3 circuits) A B C B5 B4 B3 B2 B1 C1 Output Queue t = 2 t = 1 t = 0 B0 A0 C0 De-anonymizing Tor

  23. A Practical Congestion Attack on Tor Using Long Paths Queue example 4 (3 circuits) A B C B5 B4 B3 B2 B1 Output Queue t = 3 t = 2 t = 1 t = 0 C1 B0 A0 C0 De-anonymizing Tor

  24. A Practical Congestion Attack on Tor Using Long Paths Queue example 5 (3 circuits) A B C B5 B4 B3 B2 Output Queue t = 4 t = 3 t = 2 t = 1 t = 0 B1 C1 B0 A0 C0 De-anonymizing Tor

  25. A Practical Congestion Attack on Tor Using Long Paths Queue example 6 (3 circuits) A B C B5 B4 B3 Output Queue t = 5 t = 4 t = 3 t = 2 t = 1 t = 0 B2 B1 C1 B0 A0 C0 De-anonymizing Tor

  26. A Practical Congestion Attack on Tor Using Long Paths Queue example 7 (3 circuits) A B C B5 B4 Output Queue t = 6 t = 5 t = 4 t = 3 t = 2 t = 1 t = 0 B3 B2 B1 C1 B0 A0 C0 De-anonymizing Tor

  27. A Practical Congestion Attack on Tor Using Long Paths Queue example 8 (3 circuits) A B C B5 Output Queue t = 7 t = 6 t = 5 t = 4 t = 3 t = 2 t = 1 t = 0 B4 B3 B2 B1 C1 B0 A0 C0 De-anonymizing Tor

  28. A Practical Congestion Attack on Tor Using Long Paths Queue example 1 (15 circuits) A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O N6 D5 N5 O5 D4 E4 I4 N4 O4 A3 B3 C4 D3 E3 I3 L3 N3 O3 A2 B2 C3 D2 E2 I2 L2 N2 O2 A1 B1 C2 D1 E1 G1 H1 I1 J1 L1 M1 N1 O1 A0 B0 C1 D0 E0 G0 H0 I0 J0 K0 L0 M0 N0 O0 Output Queue t = 0 C0 De-anonymizing Tor

  29. A Practical Congestion Attack on Tor Using Long Paths Queue example 2 (15 circuits) A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O N6 N5 O5 D5 E4 I4 N4 O4 A3 B3 C4 D4 E3 I3 L3 N3 O3 A2 B2 C3 D3 E2 I2 L2 N2 O2 A1 B1 C2 D2 E1 G1 H1 I1 J1 L1 M1 N1 O1 A0 B0 C1 D1 E0 G0 H0 I0 J0 K0 L0 M0 N0 O0 Output Queue t = 1 t = 0 D0 C0 De-anonymizing Tor

  30. A Practical Congestion Attack on Tor Using Long Paths Queue example 3 (15 circuits) A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O N6 N5 O5 D5 I4 N4 O4 A3 B3 C4 D4 E4 I3 L3 N3 O3 A2 B2 C3 D3 E3 I2 L2 N2 O2 A1 B1 C2 D2 E2 G1 H1 I1 J1 L1 M1 N1 O1 A0 B0 C1 D1 E1 G0 H0 I0 J0 K0 L0 M0 N0 O0 Output Queue t = 2 t = 1 t = 0 E0 D0 C0 De-anonymizing Tor

  31. A Practical Congestion Attack on Tor Using Long Paths Queue example 4 (15 circuits) A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O N6 N5 O5 D5 I4 N4 O4 A3 B3 C4 D4 E4 I3 L3 N3 O3 A2 B2 C3 D3 E3 I2 L2 N2 O2 A1 B1 C2 D2 E2 H1 I1 J1 L1 M1 N1 O1 A0 B0 C1 D1 E1 G1 H0 I0 J0 K0 L0 M0 N0 O0 Output Queue t = 3 t = 2 t = 1 t = 0 G0 E0 D0 C0 De-anonymizing Tor

  32. A Practical Congestion Attack on Tor Using Long Paths Queue example 5 (15 circuits) A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O N6 N5 O5 D5 I4 N4 O4 A3 B3 C4 D4 E4 I3 L3 N3 O3 A2 B2 C3 D3 E3 I2 L2 N2 O2 A1 B1 C2 D2 E2 I1 J1 L1 M1 N1 O1 A0 B0 C1 D1 E1 G1 H1 I0 J0 K0 L0 M0 N0 O0 Output Queue t = 4 t = 3 t = 2 t = 1 t = 0 H0 G0 E0 D0 C0 De-anonymizing Tor

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