The Dynamics of Disability: Evidence from a Cohort of Back Pain Patients
Ellen Meara ellen.meara@dartmouth.edu Jonathan Skinner jon.skinner@dartmouth.edu
We are grateful to the Social Security Administration and to the NIA for financial support
The Dynamics of Disability: Evidence from a Cohort of Back Pain - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
The Dynamics of Disability: Evidence from a Cohort of Back Pain Patients Ellen Meara ellen.meara@dartmouth.edu Jonathan Skinner jon.skinner@dartmouth.edu We are grateful to the Social Security Administration and to the NIA for financial
Ellen Meara ellen.meara@dartmouth.edu Jonathan Skinner jon.skinner@dartmouth.edu
We are grateful to the Social Security Administration and to the NIA for financial support
All counts in thousands. Source: Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Program, 2009 (published 2010). *Excluding mental impairment.
Autor and Duggan, 2006, p. 85
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m m’
Universe of workers
Source: Croda and Skinner, 2010
Hypothesis Off-the-shelf m odel New m odel Higher benefits/ lower wages leads to more SSDI applicants Yes Low-wage (or low-education) workers healthier when they apply for SSDI Yes
m m’
Hypothesis Off-the-shelf m odel New m odel Higher benefits/ lower wages leads to more SSDI applicants Yes Low-wage (or low-education) workers healthier when they apply for SSDI Yes Secular growth in SSDI enrollment implies healthier enrollees (a.k.a. “cheaters”) Yes
Hypothesis Off-the-shelf m odel New m odel Higher benefits/ lower wages leads to more SSDI applicants Yes Low-wage (or low-education) workers healthier when they apply for SSDI Yes Secular growth in SSDI enrollment implies healthier enrollees Yes Strong independent effect of long-term market opportunities conditional on health Yes
(1)
Hypothesis Off-the-shelf m odel New m odel Higher benefits/ lower wages leads to more SSDI applicants Yes Yes Low-wage (or low-education) workers healthier when they apply for SSDI Yes Maybe Secular growth in SSDI enrollment implies healthier enrollees Yes Maybe Strong independent effect of long-term market opportunities conditional on health Yes No
(1)
(1)
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 < High School High School Some College College +
(1)
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 < High School High School Some College College +
People who applied for SSDI (N=94) People who didn’t (N =995)
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% < High School High School Some College College +
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% < High School High School Some College College +
year of enrollment dummies, & follow-up survey dummies.
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18
< High School High School Some College College
SF-36 physical composite score, SF-36 mental score, dummies for baseline presence of hypertension, heart disease, cancer, stroke, depression,
& whether patient got back surgery.
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18
< High School High School Some College College
SF-36 mental score, current smoker, obese (BMI>30).
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18
< High School High School Some College College
6 categories, lifting is very important for job, lifting is somewhat important in job
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18
health
< High School High School Some College College
Hypothesis Off-the-shelf m odel New m odel Higher benefits/ lower wages leads to more SSDI applicants Yes Yes Low-wage (or low-education) workers healthier when they apply for SSDI Yes No Secular growth in SSDI enrollment implies healthier enrollees Yes No Strong independent effect of long-term market opportunities conditional on health Yes No
(1)
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 < High School High School Some College College + < HS not app. HS not app. Some C not app. College + not app.