Teaming of Conventional Submarines and XLUUV W. H. Wehner 1 , Dr. C. - - PDF document

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Teaming of Conventional Submarines and XLUUV W. H. Wehner 1 , Dr. C. - - PDF document

UDT 2020 Teaming of Conventional Submarines and XLUUV / Extra-Large Unmanned Platforms UDT Extended Abstract Teaming of Conventional Submarines and XLUUV W. H. Wehner 1 , Dr. C. Fruehling 2 , Dr. B. Lehmann 3 , Dr. T. Wiegang 4 , N. Paul 5 1 Head


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UDT 2020 UDT Extended Abstract Teaming of Conventional Submarines and XLUUV / Extra-Large Unmanned Platforms

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Teaming of Conventional Submarines and XLUUV

  • W. H. Wehner1, Dr. C. Fruehling2, Dr. B. Lehmann3, Dr. T. Wiegang4, N. Paul5

1Head of Product Architecture Submarines, thyssenkrupp Marine Systems, Kiel, Germany 2Head of Design Concepts Submarines, thyssenkrupp Marine Systems, Kiel, Germany 3Head of Automation and Autonomy, ATLAS ELEKTRONIK, Bremen, Germany 4Senior Systems Engineer, ATLAS ELEKTRONIK, Bremen, Germany 5Product Manager Submarine Systems, ATLAS ELEKTRONIK UK, Dorchester, UK

Abstract — In the advent of large and capable unmanned systems in the surface and underwater domain, users need

  • perational concepts to operate manned and unmanned assets in teams. Particularly in the submarine domain, extra-

large unmanned underwater vehicles (XLUUV) may act as a force multiplier to establish information superiority across larger areas or protect the valuable manned submarines. Staying stealth and covert is a key driver for manned

  • submarines. The authors show, what systems and features future-proof submarines will have in order to operate with

unmanned maritime vehicles. Sensitive communications between the assets is of utmost importance. thyssenkrupp Marine Systems sets standards with implementing NATO’s digital underwater acoustic communication protocol JANUS (STANAG 4748) and IFS (STANAG 1481) into their submarine’s sensor suite and processing. Exemplary scenarios describe the benefits and possible drawbacks of teamed operation. The authors present modes of communication as well as thoughts on the logistics of bringing the XLUUV into the theatre and back to port. The status and outlook on underwater vehicle autonomy gives the audience a realistic view on the vehicles capabilities. In addition, the paper presents ideas for retrofitting the hard- and software needed for manned/unmanned teaming with already existing platforms. The paper provides illustrative concept designs for thyssenkrupp Marine Systems future class of

  • XLUUVs. It focusses on the XLUUV platform and why and how to make the XLUUV as stealthy as the submarine.

thyssenkrupp’s approach will assure flexibility of future submarine designs across their life cycle when they can be supplemented by XLUUV. The paper discusses the interactions in both design and operation of manned and unmanned

  • assets. An outlook presents the roadmap of next steps and ways for military users to shape the development.

1 Introduction

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipisici elit, sed eiusmod tempor incidunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquid ex ea commodi consequat. Quis aute iure reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint obcaecat cupiditat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum. “At the core of future military advantage will be the effective integration of humans and machines into war fighting systems that outperform our opponents.” [1] This paper does not cover lethal autonomous weapon system (LAWS). It covers integration of conventional submarines with non-organic UUV. This means that the UUV is not launched, carried, refuelled or the like from the submarine. Numerous programs around the world indicate a potential benefit of using unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV) for anti-submarine warfare [2]. The needed vehicles are most likely large and classified as extra-large unmanned underwater vehicles (XLUUV). Availability of unmanned platforms for the tasks is

  • limited. The last few years showed programs in the US

with significant funding and recently in the UK [3], [4], [5]. Little is known about efforts in more restrictive countries like China and Russia. Sporadic information like showing an XLUUV at the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China indicates that they too see benefits in this technology. [6]

  • Fig. 1. BLOCKER. [7]

2 Scenario

Anti-Submarine Warfare has returned in focus of most Navies in the last years, after a long period of negligence and submarine dominance in the underwater domain, as a result of the end of Cold War. The new ASW initiative is strongly enhanced by new emerging technologies like multi-static low frequency active sonar (LFA). In post- cold war

  • perations,

manned submarines were increasingly used for information gathering. Having

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UDT 2020 UDT Extended Abstract

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flexible and loitering UUV capability for ISR tasks might be charming. Depending on time-criticality of the information, thought has to be put into data analysis and communication capability of the unmanned asset. UUV can be used for dull tasks like protection of critical infrastructure (like sea cables) [8] [7].

  • Fig. x. Scenario sketch.
  • Fig. x. Scenario assumptions – restricted own capabilities.
  • Fig. x. Scenario assumptions – location.

2.1 Operational environment

  • G. Ferri et. al highlight underwater domain challenges [9]

2.2 Boundary Conditions The scenario assumes opponent’s dominance in the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). Therefore there is no EMS bandwidth available for remote control or uni- /bidirectional communication. Fig. X reflects this assumption, as well as no availability of friendly surface and air assets. With these assumptions, one or multiple XLUUV would enable a friendly submarine to carry out ASW operations. 2.3 Operational interactions Fig X shows the roles of the individual assets as well as

  • perational advantages of the teaming. The teaming

supports the strength of the submarine as asymmetric asset, when the XLUUV acts as sound source and only uni- directional communication from XLUUV to submarine is

  • foreseen. The submarine can then detect and engage

enemy submarines without giving its position away.

  • Fig. x. Team roles within multi-static active ASW.

3 Technology

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipisici elit, sed eiusmod tempor incidunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquid ex ea commodi consequat. Quis aute iure reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint obcaecat cupiditat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum. 3.1 Communication and IFF Particularly when the UUV is not launched from the platform it is supposed to team with (non-organic), IFF (identification friend-foe) is of utmost importance. [10] This paper refers to the JANUS underwater communications standard, which is supported by thyssenkrupp Marine Systems. [11] 3.2 Stealth

  • C. Fruehling describes target echo strength (TES) reduced

submarine designs [12]. In figure n, a generic thyssenkrupp Marine Systems’ XLUUV is illustrated. Its inclined walls characterise the TES-reduced shape.

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An efficient approach for improving the concept’s immanent stealth is to minimise the overall submarine

  • size. This provides benefits both to the magnetic signature

and TES but for other signature types such e.g. flow noise as well. As XLUUV require neither crew facilities nor continuous pressure hulls for the crew to walk through, they can be build much more compact. 3.3 Autonomy The authors recognise “autonomy as the ability for a robot to choose actions or behaviours, on the basis of prior information or collected data (the experience), in order to achieve some goals.” [9] However, the vehicle has to compensate the human creativity and training in problem solving. Particularly when the static and varying physical characteristics of the underwater domain make nondeterministic approaches

  • necessary. Artificial intelligence (AI) or machine learning

is mentioned as a solution for this problem. Apart from enabling the dull, dirty, dangerous missions of unmanned assets, AI-based automation and autonomy shall enable both manned and unmanned assets for “machine-speed warfare” of the future. Non-deterministic approaches

  • ften

lack user

  • r

spectator’s trust. Transparency and guidelines on “ethical AI” will be needed for public support of AI-robot technology in democratic societies. The current EU and US guidelines reflect this. [13] [14] [15] There are no guidelines on “military AI” existing yet. Dr.

  • U. Franke urges for harmonisation efforts between

European partners in this topic [16]. S. Hall gives an

  • verview on current legislation of unmanned maritime
  • systems. [17]

4 Design Concepts

  • Fig. n. Desired features of the assets.

 Desired features translated in platform and payload requirements  Signature requirements play key role

  • Fig. n. Modular XLUUV concept - impression.

Table 2. XLUUV concept – indicative data. Length, Width, Height 17 m, 7 m, 2.8 m Mass 100 t Energy 6000 kWh Payload Acoustic transducers, towed array

  • Fig. n. XLUUV concept - benefits.

The comparison with manned submarines shows that significant reduction of both functional and cross- functional requirements is possible. Manned-unmanned teaming enables effective use of high value and training intensive manned assets. Both measures reduce CAPEX and OPEX significantly.

5 Outlook

How to move from bespoke concepts to operational capability? How far is the user willing to trust the machine? Apart from resource need and availability of technology, implementation of innovation in military organisations has to consider: organisational complexity, operational experience and culture. Even the navy most advanced in the field of UMS, the US Navy, has lots of operational question marks as CIMSEC’s topic week in 2019 shows [18]. NATO also recognizes barriers for integration of UMS and suggests a seven-step-process to speed up the integration of new capability. [19]

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The German Army asks “How does AI change the battlefield?” [20] thyssenkrupp Marine Systems recognizes these innovation domains and will therefore support navies on their way to effective and efficient operation of manned/unmanned

  • teams. Different measures are possible. E.g. rental of

vehicles with operators or forming user clubs of modular XLUUV with development of custom modules by research

  • rganisations, state-owned bodies or private enterprises
  • ther that the shipyard.
  • Fig. n. BLOCKER – using machine excellence right. (adapted

from [20])

6 Conclusion

The paper presents a scenario as well as a XLUUV concept with possible benefits in cost, flexibility etc. The design study of the XLUUV shown in chapter 4 allows for new ways of co-developing future platforms and their payloads. The teaming of submarines with such flexible XLUUVs will transform today’s submarines to mission-tailored, flexible and networked undersea capabilities. One can conclude that: 1. Manned / unmanned teaming is highly relevant for future submarine operations 2. thyssenkrupp submarines are future-proof by their acoustic comms capabilities 3. future thyssenkrupp submarines might add capability by implementing XLUUV The last part of the paper reflects that “the winner of the robotics revolution will not be who develops this technology first or even who has the best technology, but who figures out how to best use it.” [21]

7 References

[1] Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Joint Concept Note 1/18 - Human-Machine Teaming, Swindon: Ministry of Defence, 2018. [2] DARPA, “Distributed Agile Submarine Hunting (DASH) (Archived),” DARPA, [Online]. Available: https://www.darpa.mil/program/distributed-agile- submarine-hunting. [Accessed 26 February 2020]. [3] Boeing, [Online]. Available: https://www.boeing.com/defense/autonomous- systems/echo-voyager/index.page. [Accessed 29 August 2019]. [4] RAND Corporation, “Advancing Autonomous Systems - An Analysis of Current and Future Technology for Unmanned Maritime Vehicles,” Santa Monica, 2019. [5] Defence Sciency and Technology Laboratory, “Competition document: developing the Royal Navy’s autonomous underwater capability,” Defence Sciency and Technology Laboratory, 6 June 2019. [Online]. Available: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/comp etition-developing-the-royal-navys-autonomous- underwater-capability/competition-document- developing-the-royal-navys-autonomous- underwater-capability. [Accessed 26 February 2020]. [6] GlobalSecurity.org, “HSU001 unmanned submarine,” GlobalSecurity.org , 1 October 2019. [Online]. Available: https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/chin a/hsu001.htm. [Accessed 26 February 2020]. [7] J. Trevithick, “New Pentagon Map Shows Huge Scale Of Worrisome Russian and Chinese Naval Operations,” The Drive, 10 February 2020. [Online]. Available: https://www.thedrive.com/the- war-zone/32145/new-pentagon-map-shows-huge- scale-of-worrisome-russian-and-chinese-naval-

  • perations. [Accessed 25 February 2020].

[8] D. E. Sanger and E. Schmitt, “Russian Ships Near Data Cables Are Too Close for U.S. Comfort,” New York Times, 25 October 2015. [Online]. Available: https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/26/world/europ e/russian-presence-near-undersea-cables-concerns- us.html. [Accessed 25 February 2020]. [9] G. e. a. Ferri, “Cooperative robotic networks for underwater surveillance: an overview,” IET Radar, Sonar & Navigation, Volume 11, Issue 12, p. p. 1740 – 1761, December 2017. [10] S. Yoon, “Make Way for South Korea’s Underwater Drones,” The Diplomat, 19 February

  • 2020. [Online]. Available:

https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/make-way-for- south-koreas-underwater-drones/. [Accessed 25 February 2020]. [11] J. P. e. al, “The JANUS underwater communications standard,” in Underwater Communications and Networking (UComms), Sestri Levante, 2014. [12] C. Fruehling and T. George, “Stealth Design for Future Proof Submarines,” in Undersea Defence Technology, Rotterdam, 2020. [13] E. Commission, “Ethics guidelines for trustworthy AI,” European Commission, 8 April 2019. [Online]. Available: https://ec.europa.eu/digital- single-market/en/news/ethics-guidelines- trustworthy-ai. [Accessed 26 February 2020].

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[14] D. Vergun, “Defense Innovation Board Recommends AI Ethical Guidelines,” US Department of Defense , 19 November 2019. [Online]. Available: https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Art icle/2006646/defense-innovation-board- recommends-ai-ethical-guidelines/. [Accessed 26 February 2020]. [15] M. O'Brien, “Pentagon adopts new ethical principles for using AI in war,” AP, 24 February

  • 2020. [Online]. Available:

https://apnews.com/73df704904522f5a66a92bc5c4

  • df8846. [Accessed 26 February 2020].

[16] U. E. Franke, “Not smart enough: The poverty of European military thinking on artificial intelligence,” European Council on Foreign Relations, 18 December 2019. [Online]. Available: https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/not_sm art_enough_poverty_european_military_thinking_a rtificial_intelligence. [Accessed 26 February 2020]. [17] S. Hall, “New Eyes in the Deep – the rise of marine autonomous systems for civil and defence purposes, and a brief look at laws and regulations that apply to their use,” in International Conference on Marine Engineering and Technology Oman 2019, Muscat, 2019. [18] Center for International Maritime Security - CIMSEC, “Call for Articles: Unmanned Systems Program Office Launches CIMSEC Topic Week,” 19 März 2019. [Online]. Available: http://cimsec.org/call-for-articles-unmanned- systems-program-office-launches-cimsec-topic- week/39916. [Accessed 17 Dezember 2019]. [19] L. Alleslev, “NATO Anti-Submarine Warfare: Rebuilding Capability, Preparing for the Future,” Science and Technology Committee (STC), 2019. [20] Army Concepts and Capabilities Development Centre, Artificial Intelligence in Land Forces - A position paper developed by the German Army Concepts and Capabilities Development Centre, Cologne: Bundeswehr, 2019. [21] P. Scharre, “Part I: Range, Persistence and Daring,” in Robotics on the Battlefield, Center for a New American Security, 2014, p. 9. [22] P. Small (CAPT), “Call for Articles: Unmanned Systems Program Office Launches CIMSEC Topic Week,” 19 March 2019. [Online]. Available: http://cimsec.org/call-for-articles-unmanned- systems-program-office-launches-cimsec-topic-

  • week. [Accessed 3 June 2019].

[23] C. Fruehling, “thyssenkrupp Marine Systems’ Submarine Product Roadmap & Future Strategy,” in SubCon, Kiel, 2019. [24] Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence, “Maritime Unmanned Systems in

  • ASW. Collaborative ASW.,” NATO, Brussels,

2018.