Sunspot Equilibrium Karl Shell Cornell University - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Sunspot Equilibrium Karl Shell Cornell University - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Sunspot Equilibrium Karl Shell Cornell University www.karlshell.com Benhabib-Farmer NBER Conference Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Thursday Evening, May 14, 2015 Early History of Sunspots at Penn Dave Cass Karl Shell Costas


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Sunspot Equilibrium

Karl Shell Cornell University www.karlshell.com

Benhabib-Farmer NBER Conference Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco

Thursday Evening, May 14, 2015

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Early History of Sunspots at Penn

◮ Dave Cass ◮ Karl Shell ◮ Costas Azariadis ◮ Roger Farmer ◮ Yves Balasko

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Mea Culpa

◮ Totally unfair spoof of Jevons (1884)

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Mea Culpa

◮ Totally unfair spoof of Jevons (1884) ◮ Granger, Schuster

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Mea Culpa

◮ Totally unfair spoof of Jevons (1884) ◮ Granger, Schuster ◮ Cass-Shell Sunspots ≡ Extrinsic Randomizing Device

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Mea Culpa

◮ Totally unfair spoof of Jevons (1884) ◮ Granger, Schuster ◮ Cass-Shell Sunspots ≡ Extrinsic Randomizing Device ◮ Unfair to extrinsic uncertainty: too cute for central banks

Stanley Fischer

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Mea Culpa

◮ Totally unfair spoof of Jevons (1884) ◮ Granger, Schuster ◮ Cass-Shell Sunspots ≡ Extrinsic Randomizing Device ◮ Unfair to extrinsic uncertainty: too cute for central banks

Stanley Fischer

◮ Excess Volatility (Shiller)

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Fundamentals Outcomes Economy

Gain = Volatility of Outcome Volatility of Fundamentals = + in SSE

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How was SSE received by the profession?

◮ Saltwater was non-positive : too much math.

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How was SSE received by the profession?

◮ Saltwater was non-positive : too much math. ◮ Freshwater was non-positive : SSE might call for active

government policies. Quantity Theory. REH.

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How was SSE received by the profession?

◮ Saltwater was non-positive : too much math. ◮ Freshwater was non-positive : SSE might call for active

government policies. Quantity Theory. REH.

◮ Game theorists : SSE treatment of expectations is natural.

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How was SSE received by the profession?

◮ Saltwater was non-positive : too much math. ◮ Freshwater was non-positive : SSE might call for active

government policies. Quantity Theory. REH.

◮ Game theorists : SSE treatment of expectations is natural. ◮ Some fellow travelers. Used other names such as self-fulfilling

prophesies, animal spirits, multiple equilibria, sentiments,... .

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How was SSE received by the profession?

◮ Saltwater was non-positive : too much math. ◮ Freshwater was non-positive : SSE might call for active

government policies. Quantity Theory. REH.

◮ Game theorists : SSE treatment of expectations is natural. ◮ Some fellow travelers. Used other names such as self-fulfilling

prophesies, animal spirits, multiple equilibria, sentiments,... .

◮ SSE combines ideas from micro, macro, and game theory

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What are SSE?

◮ Expectations can be individually rational while not necessarily

socially rational

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What are SSE?

◮ Expectations can be individually rational while not necessarily

socially rational

◮ Beliefs about the beliefs of others,... . Best to model

”others”.

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What are SSE?

◮ Expectations can be individually rational while not necessarily

socially rational

◮ Beliefs about the beliefs of others,... . Best to model

”others”.

◮ Not necessarily public randomizing device

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What are SSE?

◮ Expectations can be individually rational while not necessarily

socially rational

◮ Beliefs about the beliefs of others,... . Best to model

”others”.

◮ Not necessarily public randomizing device ◮ Rational expectations, but not necessarily co-ordinated on

solution to planning problem

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SLIDE 18

What are SSE?

◮ Expectations can be individually rational while not necessarily

socially rational

◮ Beliefs about the beliefs of others,... . Best to model

”others”.

◮ Not necessarily public randomizing device ◮ Rational expectations, but not necessarily co-ordinated on

solution to planning problem

◮ Not merely randomizations over certainty equilibria (more

later)

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Economies that generate SSE

◮ Overlapping Generations

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Economies that generate SSE

◮ Overlapping Generations

◮ Double infinity and bubbles

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Economies that generate SSE

◮ Overlapping Generations

◮ Double infinity and bubbles ◮ Restricted participation

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Economies that generate SSE

◮ Overlapping Generations

◮ Double infinity and bubbles ◮ Restricted participation ◮ Incomplete Financial markets

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Economies that generate SSE

◮ Overlapping Generations

◮ Double infinity and bubbles ◮ Restricted participation ◮ Incomplete Financial markets

◮ Imperfect competition

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Economies that generate SSE

◮ Overlapping Generations

◮ Double infinity and bubbles ◮ Restricted participation ◮ Incomplete Financial markets

◮ Imperfect competition ◮ Information frictions, asymmetric information

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Economies that generate SSE

◮ Overlapping Generations

◮ Double infinity and bubbles ◮ Restricted participation ◮ Incomplete Financial markets

◮ Imperfect competition ◮ Information frictions, asymmetric information ◮ Non-convex economies

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Economies that generate SSE

◮ Overlapping Generations

◮ Double infinity and bubbles ◮ Restricted participation ◮ Incomplete Financial markets

◮ Imperfect competition ◮ Information frictions, asymmetric information ◮ Non-convex economies ◮ Bank runs, panics, financial fragility

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Economies that generate SSE

◮ Overlapping Generations

◮ Double infinity and bubbles ◮ Restricted participation ◮ Incomplete Financial markets

◮ Imperfect competition ◮ Information frictions, asymmetric information ◮ Non-convex economies ◮ Bank runs, panics, financial fragility ◮ Political Economy

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Economies that generate SSE

◮ Overlapping Generations

◮ Double infinity and bubbles ◮ Restricted participation ◮ Incomplete Financial markets

◮ Imperfect competition ◮ Information frictions, asymmetric information ◮ Non-convex economies ◮ Bank runs, panics, financial fragility ◮ Political Economy

◮ Winners & Losers from volatility

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Economies that generate SSE

◮ Overlapping Generations

◮ Double infinity and bubbles ◮ Restricted participation ◮ Incomplete Financial markets

◮ Imperfect competition ◮ Information frictions, asymmetric information ◮ Non-convex economies ◮ Bank runs, panics, financial fragility ◮ Political Economy

◮ Winners & Losers from volatility ◮ Choice between money taxation and commodity taxation

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Money Taxation : Example of Source of SSE

◮ 1 commodity, l = 1, chocolates ◮ 3 guys, h = 1, 2, 3 ◮ money taxes τ = (τ1, τ2, τ3), dollars ◮ τ1 + τ2 + τ3 = 0, dollars ◮ endowments ω = (ω1, ω2, ω3) > 0, chocolates ◮ allocations x = (x1, x2, x3) > 0, chocolates

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Certainty Economy

◮ max uh(xh)

s.t. xh = ωh − Pmτh = ˜ ωh where Pm is the chocolate price of money

◮ x1 + x2 + x3 = ω1 + ω2 + ω3,

  • r

◮ x1 + x2 + x3 = ˜

ω1 + ˜ ω2 + ˜ ω3

◮ 0 ≤ Pm < ¯

Pm

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Certainty Economy: Example

◮ ω = (20, 10, 5) ◮ τ = (5, 0, −5) ◮ 0 ≤ Pm < 4 = ¯

Pm

◮ Equilibrium:

{x = (x1, x2, x3) ∈ R3

++|x1 = 20 − 5Pm, x2 = 10, x3 = 5 + 5Pm,

Pm ≥ 0}

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Sunspots Economy

◮ Extrinsic random variable:

s ∈ {α, β}, π(α) + π(β) = 1

◮ Information: ◮ τh (α) = τh (β) = τh, incomplete instruments ◮ ωh (α) = ωh (β) = ωh, extrinsic uncertainty

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Sunspots Economy: Example

◮ ω = (20, 10, 5) ◮ τ = (5, 0, −5) ◮ uh = log ◮ π(α) = 3/4, π(β) = 1/4 ◮ Pm(α) = 1, Pm(β) = 2 ◮ α is inflationary state, β is deflationary ◮ Mr 1 is taxed. He fears deflation. Mr 3 fears inflation. Mr 2 is

a banker. He can only gain from volatility.

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Sunspots Economy: Example

◮ (

ω1 (α) , ω1 (β)) = (15, 10)

◮ (

ω2 (α) , ω2 (β)) = (10, 10)

◮ (

ω3 (α) , ω3 (β)) = (10, 15)

x3 (α) = ω3 (α) = 10

x3 (β) = ω3 (β) = 15

◮ Therefore,

  • x1 (α) +

x2 (α) = 35 − 10 = 25

  • x1 (β) +

x2 (β) = 35 − 15 = 20

◮ TA-EB is a proper rectangle, 25 × 20.

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Ta

x- Adjusted Ed ge wo rt h Bo x

15 25 10 20

  • Mr. 1
  • Mr. 2

SSE Allocation Endowment

2 1 11

5 12 ) ( ) ( − = − β α p p

Slope =

Contract Curve Slope = 4/5

α

β

8 3 14

T 25 20 Ta
  • djusted
E
  • t
Bo
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◮ Not mere randomization over CE

x2(α) = 105 8 > 10 x2(β) = 20 − 111 2 = 81 2 < 10

◮ Mr 2 (”banker”) gains from volatility ◮ Mr 3 (”passive”) loses from volatility ◮ Mr 1 and Mr 2 in aggregate lose ◮ Hence Mr 1 is a loser