Stoneman Douglas High School: Lessons Learned G. Michael Verden - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Stoneman Douglas High School: Lessons Learned

• G. Michael Verden

Founder and CEO The Lake Forest Group

Education

• Undergraduate – BS, Criminal Justice,

Western Illinois University

• Graduate – MS, Criminology,

Indiana State University Experience – 35 years in Law Enforcement and Security

• Police Officer – Skokie, Illinois
• Federal Agent – U.S. Secret Service assigned to protect President and First Lady
• Director of Security – National Basketball Association
• Chicago Security Representative – National Football League
• Founder and CEO – The Lake Forest Group

Background

• National – corporate, healthcare, gaming, sports, HNW, cannabis, and education
• International – assessments, training, policies, and procedures
• Media – on-air contributor to Chicago’s Fox 32 News and WGN Morning News

G. . Mic ichael Verden

• Commission Report
• Columbine and Sandy Hook Commissions
• Incident Summary
• Incident Timeline
• Law Enforcement Response
• Command and Control
• Deputy Scot Peterson
• Key Findings
• Aftereffects
• Questions and Answers

Agenda

This presentation was created through the following resources:

• Florida Department of Education
• Florida Department of Children and Families
• Florida Department of Juvenile Justice
• Florida Agency for Health Care Administration
• Florida Department of Law Enforcement – Office of

Executive Investigations interviews

Presentation Resources

Presentation Resources

This presentation was created through the following resources:

• Broward County Sheriff’s Office criminal case file and

body-worn cameras

• Coral Springs Police Department police reports
• Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety

Commission investigators interviews

• After-action reports, cell phone records, crime scene

photos, school records/maps, surveillance video, cell phone videos, 911 calls, and radio traffic

• 911 system, radio, and other communications systems in

law enforcement policies

• Law enforcement response including command and

control

• Access to information and data sharing among agencies,

medical response and aid rendered to victims

• Behavioral health services, school-based, community-

based and private provider mental health systems in Florida and Broward County also reviewed

Commission Report Scope

Commission Report Chapters

• Chapter 1 - historical overview of targeted K-12 active

assailant attacks over the past 20 years

• Chapter 2 - timeline of events because of inaccurate

reports through social media, electronic, and print media sources, and false information by word-of-mouth

• Chapters 3 to 14 - physical site security; school staff’s

response; school safety and security policies and training; SRO response; off-campus law enforcement response; medical response; 911 system and radio communications; behavioral threat assessments; site security assessments; mental health; and interdisciplinary data sharing

Columbine Commission

• First responder active deployment instead of waiting,

including training, equipping and interoperable communication to facilitate rapid deployment.

• Utilizing “incident command” and multi-agency preplanning

and practice.

• Programs to prevent school violence including parental

involvement and information sharing among agencies.

• Threat assessment teams and an anonymous tip telephone

line.

• Information related to juveniles should be shared among law

enforcement, schools, and mental health agencies.

• Train and equip SWAT members as EMTs.

• Classroom and safe haven areas that lock from the inside
• Exterior doors capable of a full perimeter shutdown
• Keys in the hands of substitute teachers
• Up-to-date roster of all persons at the school
• Safety and security training for all administrators, teachers,

and staff

• Classrooms and densely occupied spaces set in areas

remote from school entry points

• An individual assigned to ensure all Safe School Design

Standards are met

Sandy Hook Commission

Stoneman Douglas High School

In Incident Summary ry

• On February 14, 2018, 14 students and three staff at the

Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida were fatally shot and 17 others were wounded.

• The gunman was a former student, a troubled child and

young adult who displayed aggressive and violent tendencies as early as three years old and who struggled in academics and attended several schools.

• Disturbing posts on YouTube and Instagram were reported

to FBI Public Access Line (PAL).

In Incident Summary ry

• At 2:19 p.m. on February 14, 2018, subject exited an Uber

ride-sharing service armed with a rifle and several hundred rounds of ammunition concealed in a rifle bag.

• He entered the school through an unstaffed gate opened

for school dismissal and made his way toward Building 12

• n the north side of campus.
• He entered the east side of Building 12 through an

unlocked and unstaffed door.

In Incident Summary ry

• He made his way through all three floors, firing into

classrooms and hallways and killing or wounding 34 individuals.

• He exited Building 12 and ran across campus, blending in

with students evacuating.

• Subject was apprehended approximately 1 hour and 16

minutes after the first shots and charged with 17 counts of premeditated murder and 17 counts of attempted murder.

The Shooter Enters the Campus North

2:19:54 p.m.

The Shooter Enters the Campus

The Shooter Enters the Campus

The Shooter Enters the Building

2:21:16 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 1:22

First Floor of f Building 12

2:21:23 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 1:29

Encountering the Shooter

2:21:23 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 1:29

Campus Monitor David Taylor

2:21:38 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 1:44

Broward County Sherriff f Deputy Scot Peterson

2:22:39 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 2:45

Campus Monitor Chris Hixon

2:22:51 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 2:57

North

Monitor Medina and BCSO Peterson

2:22:51 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 2:57

First Floor of f Building 12

2:23:17 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 3:23 1216 1214

North

Peterson

Second Floor of f Building 12

2:23:36 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 3:42

Second Floor of f Building 12

Peterson

North

2:23:36 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 3:42

Shutting Down In Intersections North

2:23:48 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 3:54

Radio Communication of f Shots Fired North

2:24:42 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 4:48

Code Red Announced North

2:24:54 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 5:00

Third Floor of f Building 12

Teacher Lounge

North

2:25:12 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 5:18

Protected by Hurricane Glass

2:25:35 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 5:41

Teacher Saves Students

2:25:30 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 5:36

Four More Broward Deputies Arrive North

2:26:07 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 6:13

In Incident Command North

2:27:03 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 7:09

Subje ject Exits Building 12

2:27:54 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 8:00

North

Subje ject Escapes the Campus

2:28:00 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 8:06

Broward Sheriff’s Captain Jan Jordan

2:29:35 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 9:41

North

4 Coral Springs Officers Enter Bldg. . 12 North

2:32:42 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 12:48

4 Coral Springs Officers Enter Bldg. . 12

2:32:42 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 12:48

More Officers Enter Building 12 North

2:36:00 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 16:06

Law Enforcement Response

• Several deputies did not properly respond to gunshots, many other

deputies responded in the proper manner to the scene, seeking out the shooter, providing medical aid and evacuating victims.

• Sporadic functioning of BSO’s radios hindered their response. Also,

the school structure hindered radio functionality.

• Absence of a BSO policy requiring to wear ballistic vests while on-

duty unnecessarily delayed their preparedness to respond.

• Several BSO deputies did not immediately move toward the

gunshots and instead secured the perimeter.

Law Enforcement Response

• 911 system and radios caused unnecessary delays.
• City officials, school board members, county commissioners and
• ther politicians were unnecessarily present at the command post

and interfered with command-and-control operations.

• Not having live and real-time direct access to the school camera

systems severely affected law enforcement efforts to locate subject and delayed victim rescue efforts.

• Coral Springs Police officers praised their training as preparing them

for a proper response. Each officer knew the active shooter training they received annually helped in identifying the proper response.

In Incident Command and Control

• First responding supervisor (i.e., BSO sergeant) did not assume

command and did not initiate radio transmissions until approximately 10 minutes after arriving on scene.

• BSO captain failed to timely establish an incident command post

(ICP) and was ineffective as the initial incident commander (IC).

• Confusion over location of the ICP, tactical operations center (TOC),

and staging area. After taking over as the IC, the BSO colonel remained at the TOC and not at the ICP, confusing as to who was IC.

• Law enforcement command post and fire department command post

were separate and they should have been unified.

• Broward County Sheriff’s Office Homicide Unit conducted an

interview on February 16—two days after the shooting.

• On February 20, 2018 Florida Department of Law Enforcement –

Office of Executive Investigations attempted to interview but attorney declined.

• Interviewed by The Washington Post and the Today show in June

2018.

• Issued a subpoena to appear before the Commission in November

2018 but attorney filed lawsuit challenging subpoena.

Broward County Sherriff f Deputy Scot Peterson

• Derelict in duty, failed to act consistently with training, fled to a

position of safety, willfully decided not to engage shooter.

• Knew gunshots were coming inside or immediate area of Building

12 and did not investigate the source of the gunshots.

• Law enforcement response hindered by erroneous directions

including to shut down nearby intersections and roads.

• Instructed deputies to stay at least 500 feet away which conflicts

with current law enforcement response to active shooter incidents.

• Responded to the area of Building 12 in one minute 39 seconds

after the first shots were fired.

Broward County Sherriff f Deputy Scot Peterson

Key Findings – Physical Security

• Subject entered the campus through an unlocked and unstaffed

pedestrian gate opened for afternoon dismissal.

• First floor doors on the east and west sides remained unlocked

throughout the day and were unlocked at the time of the shooting.

• Storm-resistant glass on the third floor teacher’s lounge mitigated

the number of people shot because the rounds fragmented.

• Individual classroom door locks could only be locked from outside

the door. Teacher has to exit classroom and use a key to lock door.

• No window coverings to obstruct line-of-sight and provide

concealment.

Key Findings – Personnel

• School Resource Officer Deputy Scot Peterson and eight individuals

assigned to school security functions:

• School Security Specialist Kelvin Greenleaf
• Campus Monitors: Aaron Feis, Chris Hixon, Andrew Medina,

David Taylor, Elliott Bonner, Anna Ramos, and Brian Staubly

• Assistant Principal Denise Reed in charge the day of the shooting
• Assistant Principals Winfred Porter, Jeffrey Morford, Ivette

Figeroa, and Maximo Rosario had various roles and responsibilities during school emergencies.

Key Findings – Technical Security

• Fire alarm system fully integrated with rest of the buildings on

campus

• Each classroom equipped with a landline telephone and a public

address system (PA) system

• The classrooms lacked effective two-way communication systems

(very few school personnel had school-issued radios)

• School district does not allow law enforcement live, real-time

remote access to school campus video feed.

Key Findings – Policies and Procedures

• No written and trained on policies regarding Code Red and

lockdown procedures.

• Emergency Preparedness Manual and School Safety Plan did not

have active shooter or assailant procedures or protocol.

• Safe zone or hard corner is an area of the classroom that cannot be

seen by someone looking through a window(s).

• Bathrooms on the first and third floors of Building 12 were locked
• n the day of the shooting.
• Most school personnel were inadequately trained in how to
• perate the camera system. This lack of familiarity and training

adversely affected law enforcement response.

Key Findings – Policies and Procedures

• Student mental health and counseling records should be part of

each student’s school records and should follow them from school to school.

• School-based arrest diversion programs should limit the number of

referrals a student can receive, report all information to the Department of Juvenile Justice, and provide law enforcement with the discretion to make an arrest.

• Funding for school resource officers and guardians should be

increased, school districts should have more flexibility in spending money for security, and districts should be allowed to raise taxes.

• Code Red announcement could have been earlier than after the

subject finished shooting.

Key Findings – Training

• December 15, 2017 – Met with retired Secret Service Agent:
• Training on existing emergency codes, locking exterior gates not

staffed when open, providing substitutes teachers with ID badges, campus monitor in front of the school

• January 11, 2018 - Training on how to respond to a Code Red
• Keep doors locked, shut off all lights, cover door windows, move

students to a hard corner of the classroom, and remain quiet.

• No Code Red drills in the year preceding the shooting.
• Every school district in Florida must have a well–developed active

assailant response policy and be trained on it.

• Common mutual-aid radio channels that officers and deputies

could have used, but not trained how to access the channels.

Aft ftereffects of f the Tragedy

Two school security monitors were fired, and three assistant principals and a security specialist were reassigned. The Public Safety Commission Report determined Deputy Scot Peterson knew the shooter was inside Building 1200 but did not want to confront him. Peterson resigned and is collecting a pension of more than $100,000 a year. Charged with child neglect under a statute that applies to caregivers. Broward County Sheriff Scott Israel criticized by the families of some victims for not requiring deputies to confront active shooters. Israel said he had eliminated the policy requiring such action because he didn’t want deputies charging into “suicide missions.”

Aft ftereffects of f the Tragedy

After taking office, Gov. Ron DeSantis suspended Israel, accusing him of “neglect of duty” and “incompetence.” Subject is being held without bail on 17 counts of premeditated murder and other charges that could result in the death penalty. Defense lawyers have acknowledged that Subject was the killer and have focused on avoiding execution. Guardian Program allows teachers who volunteer—in addition to those now authorized—and are properly selected, thoroughly screened, and extensively trained to carry concealed firearms on campuses for self protection and the protection of other staff and students in response to an active assailant incident.

https://www.linkedin.com/in/gmichaelverden gmv@lakeforestgroup.com www.lakeforestgroup.com 312.515.8747

• G. Michael Verden

Founder and CEO The Lake Forest Group

Questions and Answers