Stoneman Douglas High School: Lessons Learned G. Michael Verden Founder and CEO The Lake Forest Group
G. . Mic ichael Verden Education • Undergraduate – BS, Criminal Justice, Western Illinois University • Graduate – MS, Criminology, Indiana State University Experience – 35 years in Law Enforcement and Security • Police Officer – Skokie, Illinois • Federal Agent – U.S. Secret Service assigned to protect President and First Lady • Director of Security – National Basketball Association • Chicago Security Representative – National Football League • Founder and CEO – The Lake Forest Group Background • National – corporate, healthcare, gaming, sports, HNW, cannabis, and education • International – assessments, training, policies, and procedures • Media – on- air contributor to Chicago’s Fox 32 News and WGN Morning News
Agenda • Commission Report • Columbine and Sandy Hook Commissions • Incident Summary • Incident Timeline • Law Enforcement Response • Command and Control • Deputy Scot Peterson • Key Findings • Aftereffects • Questions and Answers
Presentation Resources This presentation was created through the following resources: • Florida Department of Education • Florida Department of Children and Families • Florida Department of Juvenile Justice • Florida Agency for Health Care Administration • Florida Department of Law Enforcement – Office of Executive Investigations interviews
Presentation Resources This presentation was created through the following resources: • Broward County Sheriff’s Office criminal case file and body-worn cameras • Coral Springs Police Department police reports • Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission investigators interviews • After-action reports, cell phone records, crime scene photos, school records/maps, surveillance video, cell phone videos, 911 calls, and radio traffic
Commission Report Scope • 911 system, radio, and other communications systems in law enforcement policies • Law enforcement response including command and control • Access to information and data sharing among agencies, medical response and aid rendered to victims • Behavioral health services, school-based, community- based and private provider mental health systems in Florida and Broward County also reviewed
Commission Report Chapters • Chapter 1 - historical overview of targeted K-12 active assailant attacks over the past 20 years • Chapter 2 - timeline of events because of inaccurate reports through social media, electronic, and print media sources, and false information by word-of-mouth • Chapters 3 to 14 - physical site security; school staff’s response; school safety and security policies and training; SRO response; off-campus law enforcement response; medical response; 911 system and radio communications; behavioral threat assessments; site security assessments; mental health; and interdisciplinary data sharing
Columbine Commission • First responder active deployment instead of waiting, including training, equipping and interoperable communication to facilitate rapid deployment. • Utilizing “incident command” and multi -agency preplanning and practice. • Programs to prevent school violence including parental involvement and information sharing among agencies. • Threat assessment teams and an anonymous tip telephone line. • Information related to juveniles should be shared among law enforcement, schools, and mental health agencies. • Train and equip SWAT members as EMTs.
Sandy Hook Commission • Classroom and safe haven areas that lock from the inside • Exterior doors capable of a full perimeter shutdown • Keys in the hands of substitute teachers • Up-to-date roster of all persons at the school • Safety and security training for all administrators, teachers, and staff • Classrooms and densely occupied spaces set in areas remote from school entry points • An individual assigned to ensure all Safe School Design Standards are met
Stoneman Douglas High School
In Incident Summary ry • On February 14, 2018, 14 students and three staff at the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida were fatally shot and 17 others were wounded. • The gunman was a former student, a troubled child and young adult who displayed aggressive and violent tendencies as early as three years old and who struggled in academics and attended several schools. • Disturbing posts on YouTube and Instagram were reported to FBI Public Access Line (PAL).
In Incident Summary ry • At 2:19 p.m. on February 14, 2018, subject exited an Uber ride-sharing service armed with a rifle and several hundred rounds of ammunition concealed in a rifle bag. • He entered the school through an unstaffed gate opened for school dismissal and made his way toward Building 12 on the north side of campus. • He entered the east side of Building 12 through an unlocked and unstaffed door.
In Incident Summary ry • He made his way through all three floors, firing into classrooms and hallways and killing or wounding 34 individuals. • He exited Building 12 and ran across campus, blending in with students evacuating. • Subject was apprehended approximately 1 hour and 16 minutes after the first shots and charged with 17 counts of premeditated murder and 17 counts of attempted murder.
The Shooter Enters the Campus North 2:19:54 p.m.
The Shooter Enters the Campus
The Shooter Enters the Campus
The Shooter Enters the Building 2:21:16 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 1:22
First Floor of f Building 12 2:21:23 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 1:29
Encountering the Shooter 2:21:23 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 1:29
Campus Monitor David Taylor 2:21:38 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 1:44
Broward County Sherriff f Deputy Scot Peterson 2:22:39 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 2:45
Campus Monitor Chris Hixon North 2:22:51 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 2:57
Monitor Medina and BCSO Peterson 2:22:51 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 2:57
First Floor of f Building 12 1216 1214 Peterson North 2:23:17 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 3:23
Second Floor of f Building 12 2:23:36 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 3:42
Second Floor of f Building 12 Peterson North 2:23:36 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 3:42
Shutting Down In Intersections North 2:23:48 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 3:54
Radio Communication of f Shots Fired North 2:24:42 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 4:48
Code Red Announced North 2:24:54 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 5:00
Third Floor of f Building 12 Teacher Lounge North 2:25:12 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 5:18
Protected by Hurricane Glass 2:25:35 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 5:41
Teacher Saves Students 2:25:30 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 5:36
Four More Broward Deputies Arrive North 2:26:07 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 6:13
In Incident Command North 2:27:03 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 7:09
Subje ject Exits Building 12 North 2:27:54 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 8:00
Subje ject Escapes the Campus 2:28:00 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 8:06
Broward Sheriff’s Captain Jan Jordan North 2:29:35 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 9:41
4 Coral Springs Officers Enter Bldg. . 12 North 2:32:42 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 12:48
4 Coral Springs Officers Enter Bldg. . 12 2:32:42 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 12:48
More Officers Enter Building 12 North 2:36:00 PM Time since gunman's arrival: 16:06
Law Enforcement Response • Several deputies did not properly respond to gunshots, many other deputies responded in the proper manner to the scene, seeking out the shooter, providing medical aid and evacuating victims. • Sporadic functioning of BSO’s radios hindered their response. Also, the school structure hindered radio functionality. • Absence of a BSO policy requiring to wear ballistic vests while on- duty unnecessarily delayed their preparedness to respond. • Several BSO deputies did not immediately move toward the gunshots and instead secured the perimeter.
Law Enforcement Response • 911 system and radios caused unnecessary delays. • City officials, school board members, county commissioners and other politicians were unnecessarily present at the command post and interfered with command-and-control operations. • Not having live and real-time direct access to the school camera systems severely affected law enforcement efforts to locate subject and delayed victim rescue efforts. • Coral Springs Police officers praised their training as preparing them for a proper response. Each officer knew the active shooter training they received annually helped in identifying the proper response.
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