Secure upgrade of hardware security modules in bank networks - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Secure upgrade of hardware security modules in bank networks - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Secure upgrade of hardware security modules in bank networks Riccardo Focardi 1 Flaminia Luccio 1 1 Universit` a Ca Foscari di Venezia, Italy { focardi,luccio } @dsi.unive.it ARSPA-WITS10 Paphos, Cyprus March 27-28, 2010 Work

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Secure upgrade of hardware security modules in bank networks∗

Riccardo Focardi1 Flaminia Luccio1

1Universit`

a Ca’ Foscari di Venezia, Italy {focardi,luccio}@dsi.unive.it

ARSPA-WITS’10 Paphos, Cyprus March 27-28, 2010

∗Work partially supported by:

Miur’07 Project SOFT: “Security Oriented Formal Techniques” ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 1 / 17

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PIN processing APIs Overview

PIN processing infrastructure

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 2 / 17

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PIN processing APIs Overview

PIN processing infrastructure

PIN

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 2 / 17

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SLIDE 4

PIN processing APIs Overview

PIN processing infrastructure

PIN PIN PIN PIN PIN Accept Refuse

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 2 / 17

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PIN processing APIs Overview

PIN processing infrastructure

PIN PIN PIN PIN PIN Accept Refuse {PIN}k1 {PIN}k2 {PIN}k3 {PIN}k4

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 2 / 17

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SLIDE 6

PIN processing APIs Overview

PIN processing infrastructure

PIN Accept Refuse {PIN}k1 {PIN}k2 {PIN}k3 {PIN}k4

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 2 / 17

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SLIDE 7

PIN processing APIs Overview

Hardware Security Module (HSM)

Tamper resistant Security API for

Managing cryptographic keys Decrypting/re-encrypting the PIN Checking the validity of the PIN

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 3 / 17

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SLIDE 8

PIN processing APIs Overview

Hardware Security Module (HSM)

Tamper resistant Security API for

Managing cryptographic keys Decrypting/re-encrypting the PIN Checking the validity of the PIN

... but still, attacks are possible

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 3 / 17

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SLIDE 9

PIN processing APIs Overview

Hardware Security Module (HSM)

Tamper resistant Security API for

Managing cryptographic keys Decrypting/re-encrypting the PIN Checking the validity of the PIN

... but still, attacks are possible Our goal: propose ‘cheap’ HSM upgrading strategies

1 securing subnetworks while keeping service up 2 trade-off between hardware and manpower cost ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 3 / 17

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SLIDE 10

PIN processing APIs An attack on PIN verification

The PIN verification API

Encrypted PIN Block : contains the PIN at the ATM PIN V( EPB , vdata,len,dectab,offset ) Data for computing the user PIN Returns the equality of the two PINs

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 4 / 17

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SLIDE 11

PIN processing APIs An attack on PIN verification

The PIN verification API

Encrypted PIN Block : contains the PIN at the ATM PIN V( EPB , vdata,len,dectab,offset ) Data for computing the user PIN Returns the equality of the two PINs Example: PIN V({4104, r}k,vdata,4,0123456789012345,4732)

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 4 / 17

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SLIDE 12

PIN processing APIs An attack on PIN verification

The PIN verification API

Encrypted PIN Block : contains the PIN at the ATM PIN V( EPB , vdata,len,dectab,offset ) Data for computing the user PIN Returns the equality of the two PINs Example: PIN V({4104, r}k,vdata,4,0123456789012345,4732)

1

deck({4104, r}k) = 4104, r

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 4 / 17

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SLIDE 13

PIN processing APIs An attack on PIN verification

The PIN verification API

Encrypted PIN Block : contains the PIN at the ATM PIN V( EPB , vdata,len,dectab,offset ) Data for computing the user PIN Returns the equality of the two PINs Example: PIN V({4104, r}k,vdata,4,0123456789012345,4732)

1

deck({4104, r}k) = 4104, r 4104

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 4 / 17

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PIN processing APIs An attack on PIN verification

The PIN verification API

Encrypted PIN Block : contains the PIN at the ATM PIN V( EPB , vdata,len,dectab,offset ) Data for computing the user PIN Returns the equality of the two PINs Example: PIN V({4104, r}k,vdata,4,0123456789012345,4732)

1

deck({4104, r}k) = 4104, r 4104

2

encpdk(vdata) = A47295FDE32A48B1

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 4 / 17

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PIN processing APIs An attack on PIN verification

The PIN verification API

Encrypted PIN Block : contains the PIN at the ATM PIN V( EPB , vdata,len,dectab,offset ) Data for computing the user PIN Returns the equality of the two PINs Example: PIN V({4104, r}k,vdata,4,0123456789012345,4732)

1

deck({4104, r}k) = 4104, r 4104

2

encpdk(vdata) = A47295FDE32A48B1

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 4 / 17

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SLIDE 16

PIN processing APIs An attack on PIN verification

The PIN verification API

Encrypted PIN Block : contains the PIN at the ATM PIN V( EPB , vdata,len,dectab,offset ) Data for computing the user PIN Returns the equality of the two PINs Example: PIN V({4104, r}k,vdata,4,0123456789012345,4732)

1

deck({4104, r}k) = 4104, r 4104

2

encpdk(vdata) = A47295FDE32A48B1 0472

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 4 / 17

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SLIDE 17

PIN processing APIs An attack on PIN verification

The PIN verification API

Encrypted PIN Block : contains the PIN at the ATM PIN V( EPB , vdata,len,dectab,offset ) Data for computing the user PIN Returns the equality of the two PINs Example: PIN V({4104, r}k,vdata,4,0123456789012345,4732)

1

deck({4104, r}k) = 4104, r 4104

2

encpdk(vdata) = A47295FDE32A48B1 0472 ⊕ 4732 mod 10 = 4104

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 4 / 17

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SLIDE 18

PIN processing APIs An attack on PIN verification

The PIN verification API

Encrypted PIN Block : contains the PIN at the ATM PIN V( EPB , vdata,len,dectab,offset ) Data for computing the user PIN Returns the equality of the two PINs Example: PIN V({4104, r}k,vdata,4,0123456789012345,4732)

1

deck({4104, r}k) = 4104, r 4104

2

encpdk(vdata) = A47295FDE32A48B1 0472 ⊕ 4732 mod 10 = 4104

3 The two values coincide: PIN V returns ‘true’ ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 4 / 17

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PIN processing APIs An attack on PIN verification

The ‘decimalization’ attack on PIN V [Bond, Zielinski ’03]

PIN V({4104, r}k,vdata,4,0123456789012345,4732)

1

deck({4104, r}k) = 4104, r 4104

2

encpdk(vdata) = A47295FDE32A48B1 0472 ⊕ 4732 mod 10 = 4104

3 PIN V returns ‘true’ ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 5 / 17

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SLIDE 20

PIN processing APIs An attack on PIN verification

The ‘decimalization’ attack on PIN V [Bond, Zielinski ’03]

PIN V({4104, r}k,vdata,4,0123456789012345,4732)

1

deck({4104, r}k) = 4104, r 4104

2

encpdk(vdata) = A47295FDE32A48B1 0472 ⊕ 4732 mod 10 = 4104

3 PIN V returns ‘true’ ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 5 / 17

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SLIDE 21

PIN processing APIs An attack on PIN verification

The ‘decimalization’ attack on PIN V [Bond, Zielinski ’03]

PIN V({4104, r}k,vdata,4,1123456789112345,4732)

1

deck({4104, r}k) = 4104, r 4104

2

encpdk(vdata) = A47295FDE32A48B1 0472 ⊕ 4732 mod 10 = 4104

3 PIN V returns ‘true’ ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 5 / 17

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SLIDE 22

PIN processing APIs An attack on PIN verification

The ‘decimalization’ attack on PIN V [Bond, Zielinski ’03]

PIN V({4104, r}k,vdata,4,1123456789112345,4732)

1

deck({4104, r}k) = 4104, r 4104

2

encpdk(vdata) = A47295FDE32A48B1 0472 ⊕ 4732 mod 10 = 4104

3 PIN V returns ‘true’ ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 5 / 17

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SLIDE 23

PIN processing APIs An attack on PIN verification

The ‘decimalization’ attack on PIN V [Bond, Zielinski ’03]

PIN V({4104, r}k,vdata,4,1123456789112345,4732)

1

deck({4104, r}k) = 4104, r 4104

2

encpdk(vdata) = A47295FDE32A48B1 1472 ⊕ 4732 mod 10 = 4104

3 PIN V returns ‘true’ ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 5 / 17

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SLIDE 24

PIN processing APIs An attack on PIN verification

The ‘decimalization’ attack on PIN V [Bond, Zielinski ’03]

PIN V({4104, r}k,vdata,4,1123456789112345,4732)

1

deck({4104, r}k) = 4104, r 4104

2

encpdk(vdata) = A47295FDE32A48B1 1472 ⊕ 4732 mod 10 = 4104

3 PIN V returns ‘true’ ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 5 / 17

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SLIDE 25

PIN processing APIs An attack on PIN verification

The ‘decimalization’ attack on PIN V [Bond, Zielinski ’03]

PIN V({4104, r}k,vdata,4,1123456789112345,4732)

1

deck({4104, r}k) = 4104, r 4104

2

encpdk(vdata) = A47295FDE32A48B1 1472 ⊕ 4732 mod 10 = 5104

3 PIN V returns ‘true’ ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 5 / 17

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SLIDE 26

PIN processing APIs An attack on PIN verification

The ‘decimalization’ attack on PIN V [Bond, Zielinski ’03]

PIN V({4104, r}k,vdata,4,1123456789112345,4732)

1

deck({4104, r}k) = 4104, r 4104

2

encpdk(vdata) = A47295FDE32A48B1 1472 ⊕ 4732 mod 10 = 5104

3 PIN V returns ‘true’ ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 5 / 17

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SLIDE 27

PIN processing APIs An attack on PIN verification

The ‘decimalization’ attack on PIN V [Bond, Zielinski ’03]

PIN V({4104, r}k,vdata,4,1123456789112345,4732)

1

deck({4104, r}k) = 4104, r 4104

2

encpdk(vdata) = A47295FDE32A48B1 1472 ⊕ 4732 mod 10 = 5104

3 PIN V returns ‘false’ ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 5 / 17

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SLIDE 28

PIN processing APIs An attack on PIN verification

The ‘decimalization’ attack on PIN V [Bond, Zielinski ’03]

PIN V({4104, r}k,vdata,4,1123456789112345,4732)

1

deck({4104, r}k) = 4104, r 4104

2

encpdk(vdata) = A47295FDE32A48B1 1472 ⊕ 4732 mod 10 = 5104

3 PIN V returns ‘false’ ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 5 / 17

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SLIDE 29

PIN processing APIs An attack on PIN verification

The ‘decimalization’ attack on PIN V [Bond, Zielinski ’03]

PIN V({4104, r}k,vdata,4,1123456789112345,3732)

1

deck({4104, r}k) = 4104, r 4104

2

encpdk(vdata) = A47295FDE32A48B1 1472 ⊕ 3732 mod 10 = 5104

3 PIN V returns ‘false’ ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 5 / 17

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SLIDE 30

PIN processing APIs An attack on PIN verification

The ‘decimalization’ attack on PIN V [Bond, Zielinski ’03]

PIN V({4104, r}k,vdata,4,1123456789112345,3732)

1

deck({4104, r}k) = 4104, r 4104

2

encpdk(vdata) = A47295FDE32A48B1 1472 ⊕ 3732 mod 10 = 5104

3 PIN V returns ‘false’ ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 5 / 17

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SLIDE 31

PIN processing APIs An attack on PIN verification

The ‘decimalization’ attack on PIN V [Bond, Zielinski ’03]

PIN V({4104, r}k,vdata,4,1123456789112345,3732)

1

deck({4104, r}k) = 4104, r 4104

2

encpdk(vdata) = A47295FDE32A48B1 1472 ⊕ 3732 mod 10 = 4104

3 PIN V returns ‘false’ ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 5 / 17

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SLIDE 32

PIN processing APIs An attack on PIN verification

The ‘decimalization’ attack on PIN V [Bond, Zielinski ’03]

PIN V({4104, r}k,vdata,4,1123456789112345,3732)

1

deck({4104, r}k) = 4104, r 4104

2

encpdk(vdata) = A47295FDE32A48B1 1472 ⊕ 3732 mod 10 = 4104

3 PIN V returns ‘false’ ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 5 / 17

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SLIDE 33

PIN processing APIs An attack on PIN verification

The ‘decimalization’ attack on PIN V [Bond, Zielinski ’03]

PIN V({4104, r}k,vdata,4,1123456789112345,3732)

1

deck({4104, r}k) = 4104, r 4104

2

encpdk(vdata) = A47295FDE32A48B1 1472 ⊕ 3732 mod 10 = 4104

3 PIN V returns ‘true’ ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 5 / 17

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PIN processing APIs An attack on PIN verification

This kind of attack is practical

an average of 13.463 PIN V calls for a four-digit PIN [Focardi, Luccio, FUN’10] ... an insider might disclose thousands of PINs in a lunch-break! Verizon Breach Report 2008

“Were seeing entirely new attacks that a year ago were thought to be only academically possible” “What we see now is people going right to the source [..] and stealing the encrypted PIN blocks and using complex ways to un-encrypt the PIN blocks.” (Quotes from Wired Magazine interview with report author, Bryan Sartin)

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 6 / 17

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PIN processing APIs An attack on PIN verification

How to prevent the attack?

low-impact CVV-based fix [Focardi, Luccio, Steel, NORDSEC’09]

mitigates the attack (50000 times slower)

point-to-point MAC-based fix and type-based proof of security [Centenaro, Focardi, Luccio, Steel, ESORICS’09]

prevents the attack but requires modifying each HSM

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 7 / 17

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Upgrading HSMs The problem

HSM upgrade

replace old, flawed, functionalities with new, patched, APIs keep the service up: new and old HSMs should ‘talk’ IDEA: special borderline HSMs placed temporarily

supporting both old and new APIs (still flawed!) translating from/to upgraded and non-upgraded subnetworks

Upgraded Network Old Network ATM Issuing Bank

subject to API−level attacks ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 8 / 17

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Upgrading HSMs The problem

The HSM upgrading problem

initially non-upgraded tree network U technicians moving on the network and upgrading nodes technicians place borderline HSMs, when needed borderline HSMs can be moved when all the neighbouring nodes are upgraded HSM upgrading strategy A sequence of moves that upgrades an initially non-upgraded network HSM upgrading number uhn(T, U) The number of borderline HSMs needed to solve the HSM problem on a given tree T and with a given number U of technicians

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 9 / 17

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SLIDE 38

Upgrading HSMs Related problems

The Connected Monotone Decontamination problem [Barri` ere et al., SPAA’02]

initially contaminated tree network a set of agents moving on the network agents decontaminate nodes they traverse decontaminated nodes left unguarded are recontaminated Decontamination strategy A sequence of moves that clears an initially contaminated network Connected search number csn(T) The number of agents needed to solve the CMD problem on a given tree T

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 10 / 17

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Upgrading HSMs Related problems

The two problems are strictly related

Theorem Given a tree T, we have uhn(T, 1) ≤ csn(T) ≤ uhn(T, 1) + 1 Intuitively: Borderline HSMs as ‘still’ agents transported by the unique technician Agent moves simulated by the technician reaching a borderline HSM and moving it reuse known algorithms and generalize them to U technicians

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 11 / 17

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Upgrading HSMs The strategy

The algorithm with 1 technician

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 12 / 17

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Upgrading HSMs The strategy

The algorithm with 1 technician

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 12 / 17

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Upgrading HSMs The strategy

The algorithm with 1 technician

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 12 / 17

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Upgrading HSMs The strategy

The algorithm with 1 technician

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 12 / 17

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Upgrading HSMs The strategy

The algorithm with 1 technician

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 12 / 17

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Upgrading HSMs The strategy

The algorithm with 1 technician

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 12 / 17

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Upgrading HSMs The strategy

The algorithm with 1 technician

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 12 / 17

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SLIDE 47

Upgrading HSMs The strategy

The algorithm with 1 technician

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 12 / 17

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Upgrading HSMs The strategy

The algorithm with 1 technician

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 12 / 17

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Upgrading HSMs The strategy

The algorithm with 1 technician

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 12 / 17

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Upgrading HSMs The strategy

The algorithm with 1 technician

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 12 / 17

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Upgrading HSMs The strategy

The algorithm with 1 technician

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 12 / 17

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Upgrading HSMs The strategy

The algorithm with 1 technician

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 12 / 17

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Upgrading HSMs The strategy

The algorithm with 1 technician

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 12 / 17

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Upgrading HSMs The strategy

The algorithm with 1 technician

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 12 / 17

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Upgrading HSMs The strategy

The algorithm with 1 technician

Two borderline HSMs needed

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 12 / 17

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Upgrading HSMs The strategy

The algorithm with 2 technicians

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 13 / 17

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Upgrading HSMs The strategy

The algorithm with 2 technicians

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 13 / 17

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Upgrading HSMs The strategy

The algorithm with 2 technicians

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 13 / 17

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Upgrading HSMs The strategy

The algorithm with 2 technicians

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 13 / 17

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Upgrading HSMs The strategy

The algorithm with 2 technicians

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 13 / 17

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Upgrading HSMs The strategy

The algorithm with 2 technicians

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 13 / 17

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Upgrading HSMs The strategy

The algorithm with 2 technicians

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 13 / 17

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Upgrading HSMs The strategy

The algorithm with 2 technicians

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 13 / 17

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Upgrading HSMs The strategy

The algorithm with 2 technicians

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 13 / 17

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Upgrading HSMs The strategy

The algorithm with 2 technicians

Only one borderline HSM needed!

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 13 / 17

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SLIDE 66

Upgrading HSMs trade-offs

Cost trade-off: an example

Let CH be the cost for one HSM and CU the cost for one technician 2CH + CU versus CH + 2CU Suppose CH = 10000e and CU = 5000e we obtain

25000e versus 20000e

In general, BCH + UCU where B is derived by applying the strategy

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 14 / 17

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SLIDE 67

Conclusion

Conclusion

strategy for HSM upgrading on tree networks trade-off between hardware and manpower cost Open problems placing HSMs on edges instead of nodes trade-off between cost and security

counting the number of secured paths

measuring the travelling cost

weighted graph independent distance matrix

extensions to more topologies

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 15 / 17

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SLIDE 68

Conclusion

References

  • L. Barri`

ere, P. Flocchini, P. Fraigniaud, and N. Santoro. Capture of an intruder by mobile agents. In proceedings of SPAA’02.

  • M. Bond and P. Zielinski.

Decimalization table attacks for PIN cracking. UCAM-CL-TR-560, Univ. Cambridge, Computer Lab., 2003.

  • M. Centenaro, R. Focardi, F.L. Luccio, G. Steel.

Type-Based Analysis of PIN Processing APIs In proceedings of ESORICS’09, September 2009.

  • R. Focardi, F.L. Luccio, G. Steel.

Blunting Differential Attacks on PIN Processing APIs In proceedings of NORDSEC’09, Obtober 2009.

  • R. Focardi, F.L. Luccio.

Cracking bank PINs by playing Mastermind to appear in FUN’10, June 2010, Ischia Island.

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 16 / 17

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SLIDE 69

The algorithm in detail 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

U=1 U=2

ARSPA-WITS’10 ()Secure upgrade of HSMs in bank networks 17 / 17