Public Key Infrastructure
Towards a reliable revocation status checking method
Keith Vella Licari keith@vellalicari.com Royal Holloway, University of London Weekend Conference 2013
Public Key Infrastructure Towards a reliable revocation status - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Public Key Infrastructure Towards a reliable revocation status checking method Royal Holloway, University of London Keith Vella Licari Weekend Conference 2013 keith@vellalicari.com Agenda About me Project approach Certificate
Keith Vella Licari keith@vellalicari.com Royal Holloway, University of London Weekend Conference 2013
Security threats Security mechanisms
CURTAIL
Security services
PROVIDE
Digital signature Data origin authentication Data integrity Tampering
Alice Mallory
Bob Alice Trent Bob
Certificate Certificate
Issuing bank Card holder Merchant
Card
1 2 3 4 1 Request card 2 Issue card 3 Transact with merchant 4 Verify card status Acquiring bank
Issuing CA Relying party Subscriber Relying party CA
Certificate
1 2 3 4 1 Request certificate 2 Issue certificate 3 Transact with relying party 4 Verify certificate status
5 Fund transfer
3 5 Issuing bank Card holder Merchant Acquiring bank Relying party Subscriber Issuing CA Relying party CA 2 1 4 1 Entity authentication 2 Validate certificate 3 Submit payment info 4 Request authorisation
CRL method OCSP method
Certificate CRL
Request
OCSP Request Data: Version: 1 (0x0) Requestor List: Certificate ID: Hash Algorithm: sha1 Issuer Name Hash: 39AF18B41C021F39109656FDC6D358EF74858B99 Issuer Key Hash: 4E43C81D76EF37537A4FF2586F94F338E2D5BDDF Serial Number: 77085914F9CB7A7FC924B84F755708CB Request Extensions: OCSP Nonce: 041075DD789343AFE0484E4D24B4329D6BF4
Response
WARNING: no nonce in response Response verify OK test-sspev.verisign.com: revoked This Update: Jul 11 08:21:17 2013 GMT Next Update: Oct 5 10:04:24 2013 GMT Reason: unspecified Revocation Time: Oct 30 22:20:23 2012 GMT
CRL OCSP Lightweight OCSP Can easily become large and unwieldy Ambiguous answer (good|revoked|unknown) Pre-produced responses Timeliness (delay until next update) Only definitive answers are digitally signed Only definitive answers are digitally signed Scalability (self-inflicted DDoS) Optional protection against replay attacks No protection against replay attacks
1 Relying party Certificate status service (DNS) 2 5 1 Extract serial number 2 Send status request 3 Lookup pre-produced response 4 Send response to requester
Security service/s Data origin authentication Data integrity
4 3 5 Verify signature 6 Read status in response 6
Design Performance Security Simplicity Status accuracy Protection against impersonation attacks Uniqueness of target certificate identifier Scalability Protection against manipulation Unambiguity of certificate status information Size of request Protection against replay attacks Completeness Size of response Protection against sniffing Extensibility Demand smoothness Auditability
1 Relying party Certificate status service (TLS) 3 2 1 Compute certificate identifier (fingerprint) 2 Construct URL (using fingerprint) 3 Establish TLS connection with responder 4 Send status request
Security service/s Entity authentication Confidentiality Data origin authentication Data integrity
6 5 5 Lookup pre-produced response 6 Send response to requester 4 7 Verify signature 8 Read status in response 8 7
Books/Papers
and deployment considerations
validating SSL certificates in non-browser software
expiration Standards