SECTET SECTET Model driven Security of Service Oriented Systems y - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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SECTET SECTET Model driven Security of Service Oriented Systems y - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Japan-Austria Joint Workshop on ICT October 18-19 2010, Tokyo, Japan SECTET SECTET Model driven Security of Service Oriented Systems y y based on Security as a Service Basel Katt , Ruth Breu, Mukhtiar Memon and Michael


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Japan-Austria Joint Workshop on “ICT”

October 18-19 2010, Tokyo, Japan

SECTET SECTET‐

Model driven Security of Service Oriented Systems y y based on Security‐as‐a‐Service

Basel Katt, Ruth Breu, Mukhtiar Memon and Michael Hafner

Research Group Quality Engineering University of Innsbruck University of Innsbruck

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Quality Engineering

Selected Projects

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Quality Engineering Laura Bassi Lab Quality Engineering Laura Bassi Lab Living Models for Collaborative Systems

Industry Partners

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Agenda

  • Motivation

Service Oriented Systems  Service Oriented Systems  Challenges

  • Healthcare Scenario
  • SECTET : Model based configuration of Service Oriented Systems

 Model Driven Security (MDS)  Security as a Service (SeAAS) Architecture

  • Conclusion

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Service Oriented Systems

  • Independent partners offer and call services
  • Collaboration across enterprises and systems

Collaboration across enterprises and systems

  • New generation of cooperative applications

 Electronic health record, traffic management, energy trading, etc. , g , gy g,

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Challenges

  • Collaborative systems based on SOA

Dynamically composed language and technology independent  Dynamically composed, language and technology independent  Agile and dynamically evolving systems

  • Standards only address basic security requirements

y y q

 Solve these requirements at a low technical level

  • Security enforcement at the service end points

 Places significant processing burden on service nodes  Renders maintenance and management cumbersome

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Goals

  • The gap between domain experts and software engineers
  • Maintainability and configurabl ity“ of security services
  • Maintainability and configurabl„ity“ of security services

 Ability to re‐configure after deployment due to requirement changes or mechanisms‘ updates  Support of multiple security architectures for each requirement

  • Enforcement

 Enforcing complex security requirements  Consistent enforcement of security policies in enterprise‐level solutions

  • Performance
  • Performance

 Security services involve performance costly functions

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Example – Distributed Electronic Health Record (EHR)

Health Network Tyrol

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Health Network Tyrol

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Example – Healthcare Scenario

  • EHR represents a consolidated virtual medical record

Distributed across various care providers  Distributed across various care providers

1 General Practitioner

Patient Records Electronic Health Record

2 Public Healthcare Provider A

Virtual Electronic Health Record

Patient Records Referral Diagnosis

4 3 3rd Party Patient

Patient Electronic Medical Record

5 3 Party Institution Specialist

Patient Records Radiography

Private Healthcare Provider B

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Provider

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Example – Healthcare Scenario

  • Inter‐organizational workflows

 Services that can be offered or Services that can be offered or called by each partner  Functional interaction between diff k h ld ( l ) different stakeholders (roles)

  • Security requirements

 Non‐repudiation and Non repudiation and authentication

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SECTET – Model‐Based Configuration of Service Oriented Systems

Security Requirements

  • 1. MDS:

Models configure services Business Security Policies (UML Diagrams) g

  • f a security architecture
  • 2. SeAAS:

Security architecture is based on security as a service paradigm p g

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SECTET Methodology – Model Driven Security (MDS)

Traditional MDS approach SECTET MDS approach

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SECTET Model Driven Security Process

  • Two procedures are

considered in SECTET MDS considered in SECTET MDS approach

 Architectural pattern

Define abstract security policy

refinement  Security policy model transformations

define/select abstract archietctural pattern define platform Independent policy model

transformations

  • Two artifacts are generated

 Security policy configuration

transform to platform specific policy transform to platform specific pattern generate policy configuration generate process configuration

 Security service process configuration

deploy configurations

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Model Driven Security (MDS) – Benefits

  • Integrate security concerns in the early stage of system development
  • Enrich functional models with security extensions that represent
  • Enrich functional models with security extensions that represent

abstract security policies

  • Generate declarative security policies and process configurations

Generate declarative security policies and process configurations

  • Separate tasks between: domain experts, security experts and the

system administration

  • Support multiple security patterns for each requirement
  • Enhance management and configurabilty of the architecture

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Security Enhanced Functional Models

<<domainRole>>

RadiographySepcialist

<<domainRole>>

RadiographySepcialist

<<partnerRole>>

PathologyLab

1 *

<<domainRole>>

PrimaryPhysician

<<domainRole>>

Patient RadiographySepcialist PathologyLab

<<domainRole>>

PrimaryPhysician

<<partnerRole>>

Clinic

1 *

Role Model

1 <<document>>

PatientMedicalRecord

Document Model

<<document>>

Radiography

<<document>>

Prescription

<<document>>

Referral

Interface Model

<<interface>>

MedicalSystem

+ CreatePMR + ReferToSpecialist() + ViewPMR + UpdatePMR

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Interface Model

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Abstract Security Models Layer

Abstract Authentication Policy

Security Architectural Patterns Security Policy Model Model Instant Security Policy Platform Specific Architecture

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Model Deriven Security – Architectural Patterns

Security Pattern Refinement Example: Authentication

1) Platform -independent refinem ent to security architectural pattern 2) Platform -specific refinem ent to target architecture

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Model Deriven Security – Security Policies

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Runtime Platform – Model Transformations

Security Policy Models Platform-specific Pattern architecture Source Models Transformation Templates

<bpws:process exitOnStandardFault="yes" name="NRP" > <bpws:partnerLinks> <bpws:partnerLink myRole="nro"

<wsp:Policy xmlns:wsp="http:// …. /policy" <wsp:ExactlyOne> <sp:AsymmetricBinding> <sp:InitiatorToken> <sp:X509Token sp:IncludeToken " /AlwaysToRecipient">

p p y name="localNROLink" partnerLinkType="tns:NRProcess"/> </bpws:partnerLinks> <bpws:invoke

  • peration="requestNRO"

partnerLink="remoteNROLink"

<sp:X509Token sp:IncludeToken= .../AlwaysToRecipient > <sp:WssX509V3Token10 /> </sp:InitiatorToken> <sp:RecipientToken> .. <sp:AlgorithmSuite> <sp:TripleDesRsa15 />

Generated Code

p portType="tns:NRO" inputVariable="evidenceRequest"/> <bpws:receive

  • peration="receiveNRO"

partnerLink="localNRRLink" portType="tns:NRR" variable="receiveEvidence">

... <sp:IncludeTimestamp /> </sp:SignedEncryptedSupportingTokens> <sp:SignedElements> <sp:XPath xmlns:env=".../">//env:Body/*[1]</sp:XPath> .. <sp:ContentEncryptedElements> <sp:XPath xmlns:env=" e/">//env:Body/*[1]</sp:XPath>

Slide19 p yp </bpws:sequence> </bpws:process>

<sp:XPath xmlns:env= ...e/ >//env:Body/*[1]</sp:XPath> </sp:ContentEncryptedElements> </wsp:ExactlyOne> </wsp:Policy>

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SECTET Methodology – SeAAS Reference Architecture

Ser ice E i S i

Response

Service Endpoints Enterprise Service Bus (ESB)

  • Features:

 Dedicated shared services in a security domain

SeAAS Engine

Request

SeAAS Component

security domain  Decoupled from service endpoints  SeAAS security compositions engine Out of bound protocol execution

SeAAS Engine Security Services

Policy Repository

 Out‐of‐bound protocol execution  Message oriented integration with ESB  WS based Standards

Token Validation Request Key

Primitive Security Services

Encryption Service Authentication Service Time Stamping Service Signature Service

 WS‐based Standards

  • Benefits

Token Validation Response Repository

Non Service Security Authorization Service Compliance Service Service

 Better performance  Easy deployment/management  Configurable security components

Logging Service Non Repudiation Service y Monitoring Service

Configurable security components  Security service composition  Loosely coupled components  Extendable architecture

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Extendable architecture

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Complex Security Services Executions

  • Security workflow for complex security service
  • Security WS interface for Inter‐Domain interactions

Healthcare Services

(Clinic)

Client Application

(Radiography Specialist)

(Request) Access to EHR (Response) Grant/Deny Access (Response) Grant/Deny Access

SeAAS Engine

Non-repudiation Service Monitoring Service Authorization Service Logging Service Security Non-repudiation Service Monitoring Service

SeAAS Engine

Authorization Service Logging Service

SeAAS Component (Domain 1) SeAAS Component (Domain 2)

Authentication Service Security Compliance Service Security Compliance Service WS Interface Security Token Service WS Interface Security Token Service Authentication Service

Out-of-band Authentication Process

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SECTET Methodology – SeAAS Implementation

  • The delivery of security functionality over infrastructure components

in a service oriented manner

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SECTET – An Overview

Vision „The systemic realization of security‐critical inter‐

  • rganizational cooperations based on generic, composable

Components

  • An extensible domain specific language
  • A reference architecture based on Security As a Service

( )

From Platform Independent Models

Abstract Patterns Specific Patterns Model Driven Security Process security servcies.“ (SeAAS)

  • A multi‐level transformation framework for Model Driven

Security

1

Model Driven Security Process

2a 2c

Business Messages

Security Policy

2b 4

Security Protocol Messages

… to Code Artefacts

SeAAS Infrastructure

4

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Conclusion

  • Collaborative systems based on SOA are heterogeneous, agile and

dynamically evolving

  • The best practice for SOA security is based on

 Endpoint security  Traditional MDS approach to close the business‐code gap is

  • Applied in one step
  • Inflexible and supports one security pattern

pp y p

  • Proposed SECTET framework is based on two main concepts

 SeAAS methodology for the design of the reference architecture (RA)  Enhanced MDS methodology for the configuration of security services

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Future Work

  • Investigating further security services like security monitoring, identity

management, and usage control

  • Developing the formal foundation of the refinement process and

i i i security composition

  • Deploying and testing an EHR system developed by our industrial
  • Deploying and testing an EHR system developed by our industrial

partner, ITHicoserve

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… Thank you for your attention!

  • www. sectissimo.info

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