Sand in the Chips? Evidence on Taxing Transactions in Modern Markets - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Sand in the Chips? Evidence on Taxing Transactions in Modern Markets - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Sand in the Chips? Evidence on Taxing Transactions in Modern Markets Jean-Edouard Colliard and Peter Hoffmann European Central Bank - Financial Research 10th Annual Central Bank Workshop on the Microstructure of Financial Markets - October 3rd,


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Sand in the Chips? Evidence on Taxing Transactions in Modern Markets

Jean-Edouard Colliard and Peter Hoffmann European Central Bank - Financial Research 10th Annual Central Bank Workshop on the Microstructure of Financial Markets - October 3rd, 2014

The views expressed here are the authors’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the ECB or the Eurosystem.

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Road map

Introduction Methodology and data Average impact The role of high-frequency market-making Institutional trading Conclusion

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Context

◮ Renewed interest for financial transactions taxes (FTT)

since the onset of the crisis:

◮ Budget deficits ◮ Public discontent with financial sector ◮ 11 countries committed to a European FTT

◮ “Historical” evidence rather negative, but...

◮ No micro evidence ⇒ few/no links to economic

mechanisms

◮ Poor data (no counterfactuals, emerging markets, etc.) ◮ Market structure has changed (e.g. HFT)

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UK Stamp Duty Revenue/Volume

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This paper

◮ Evidence on the French FTT (August 2012)

◮ Stamp duty on ownership transfers ◮ Exemptions for liquidity provision ◮ Tax on domestic non-MM HFT activity

◮ Diff-in-diff with other Euronext stocks ◮ (Lit) market quality

◮ Role of MM exemption ◮ Trader types (HFT, nonHFT, Mixed)

◮ Institutional trading

◮ Impact on different clienteles ◮ Transaction costs (Implementation shortfall)

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Results

◮ On average, the FTT had a negative, but muted impact

  • n market quality

◮ Drop in volume (−10%), depth, resiliency, price

efficiency

◮ No effect on bid-ask spread and volatility

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Results

◮ On average, the FTT had a negative, but muted impact

  • n market quality

◮ Drop in volume (−10%), depth, resiliency, price

efficiency

◮ No effect on bid-ask spread and volatility

◮ Is there any role for the MM exemption?

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Results

◮ On average, the FTT had a negative, but muted impact

  • n market quality

◮ Drop in volume (−10%), depth, resiliency, price

efficiency

◮ No effect on bid-ask spread and volatility

◮ Is there any role for the MM exemption?

◮ Stocks w/ HFT MM: no impact ◮ Stocks w/o HFT MM: ր vola, price impact, spreads

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Results

◮ On average, the FTT had a negative, but muted impact

  • n market quality

◮ Drop in volume (−10%), depth, resiliency, price

efficiency

◮ No effect on bid-ask spread and volatility

◮ Is there any role for the MM exemption?

◮ Stocks w/ HFT MM: no impact ◮ Stocks w/o HFT MM: ր vola, price impact, spreads

◮ relative increase in informed trading ◮ HFT MMs able to avoid being picked off

⇒ structure of liquidity provision matters for tax design

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Results

◮ To wash out the effect of HFT, we analyze institutional

trading (changes in portfolio holdings)

◮ Average impact of −20% ◮ Larger reduction in trading volume for funds with ◮ high turnover (Amihud and Mendelson (1986)) ◮ scope for asset substitution (Campbell and Froot (1994))

◮ Institutional trading costs (implementation shortfall) did

not increase significantly ⇒ confirms muted average effect on market liquidity

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Literature - Theory

◮ Keynes (1936), Tobin (1978), Stiglitz (1989), Summers

and Summers (1989), Schwert and Seguin (1993)

◮ Potential Rationales for taxing (some) trading activity:

◮ Noise traders (DeLong et al. (1990b)) ◮ Speculators (DeLong et al. (1990a), Di Maggio (2013)) ◮ Intermediaries (Menkveld and Yueshen (2013)) ◮ Short-termism (Shleifer and Vishny (1990))

◮ Net effect determined by changes in market composition

◮ Kupiec (1996), Song and Zhang (2005), Bloomfield et

  • al. (2009)

◮ Empirical challenge: need disaggregated evidence

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Literature - Empirics

◮ Empirics: Roll (1989), Umlauf (1993), Campbell and

Froot (1994), Jones and Seguin (1997), Hau (2006), Baltagi et al. (2006), Pomeranets and Weaver (2012), Liu and Zhu (2009), Deng et al. (2014), etc.

◮ Empirical challenges

◮ no disaggregated data ⇒ harder to link to theory ◮ emerging markets or pre-2000s ◮ no X-section, no control groups

◮ Other papers on French FTT confirm average impact:

Meyer et al. (2014), Haferkorn and Zimmermann (2013), Capelle-Blancard and Havrylchyk (2013), Coelho (2014), Becchetti et al. (2013).

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Road map

Introduction Methodology and data Average impact The role of high-frequency market-making Institutional trading Conclusion

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The policy experiment

◮ France introduced an FTT on August 1st, 2012 ◮ Restricted to French stocks with market cap ≥ 1 bln e ◮ Purchases are taxed at 0.2% (ownership transfers) ◮ Several exemptions (market making, primary market) ◮ Additional tax on HFT (traders residing in France) ◮ HFT defined as activity below a threshold of 0.5 seconds

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Identification strategy

◮ Standard diff-in-diff ◮ Control group: non-French stocks traded on Euronext ◮ Identification assumption: common trends ◮ Standard checks: placebo DiD, visual inspection ◮ Allow for differences in short-/long-run impacts

E(yi,t | i, t) = αi + γt + βAugDAug

i,t

+ βSep/OctDSep/Oct

i,t ◮ We focus on Sep/Oct (August “polluted” by seasonality)

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Identification: FTT and HFT Tax

29 stocks 85 stocks 18 stocks 32 stocks 1 bln. EUR French Dutch FTT+HFT Tax HFT Tax only FTT only

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Data

◮ Sample period: Jun 1st - Oct 31st (109 days) ◮ Stocks traded on Euronext with “sufficient liquidity” ◮ Drop: Banks (Crisis), PT (Crisis), BE (change in local

FTT)

◮ 117 above 1 bln EUR (85 vs. 32), 47 below 1 bln EUR

(29 vs. 18)

◮ Trades, quotes, LOB changes (TRTH) ◮ Trader group IDs (only FR): HFT, nonHFT, Mixed

and MM/Prop/Agency/Other (Source: AMF)

◮ Institutional Portfolios (Factset)

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Road map

Introduction Methodology and data Average impact The role of high-frequency market-making Institutional trading Conclusion

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Intraday price range minus pre-tax average - 2012

Mar 1 May 1 Jul 1 Aug 1 Sep 1

0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0

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Trading volume (log) minus pre-tax average

9.9 33.

June 1 July 2 August 1 September 3 October 1

0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.2

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Regression results - June/July vs. Sep/Oct

Variable/Group French > 1 bln French < 1 bln Volume

  • 0.104**

0.040 (-2.46) (0.45) Volatility 0.365 1.854 (0.41) (1.14) Effective Spread 0.029 0.243 (0.16) (0.30) Price Impact 0.201

  • 0.365

(1.28) (-0.77) Depth

  • 10.761***
  • 4.805

(-2.85) (-1.45) Resiliency

  • 0.018*

0.021** (-1.90) (2.08) AR 0.007**

  • 0.004

(2.09) (-0.74)

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Discussion

◮ Overall, the FTT’s impact is rather muted

◮ Spreads and volatility are unchanged ◮ Economically small reductions in resiliency and price

efficiency

◮ Result on depth potentially driven by reduced demand for

liquidity (e.g. Parlour and Seppi (2003))

◮ Consistent with a positive role of safeguarding liquidity

provision

◮ Market making exemption ◮ Ownership transfers

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Road map

Introduction Methodology and data Average impact The role of high-frequency market-making Institutional trading Conclusion

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Two groups of stocks

◮ It turns out that HFT market making is heavily

concentrated in the most active French stocks

◮ Idea: Split sample into groups with and without HFT MM

% of trading volume by each category:

Trader/Group MMGroup Non-MM Group Client 18.4 30.5 Proprietary 44.7 65.0 MM 32.5 HFT 27.5 17.0 Mixed 56.4 55.8 NonHFT 16.0 27.2

  • Nb. stocks

49 36

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◮ AEX25 and Dutch stocks with low cancelation times

control for MM stocks

◮ Few control stocks without HFT MM > 1 bln EUR

⇒ stocks < 1 bln EUR as control for non MM stocks

29 stocks, No MM 36 stocks, No MM 49 stocks, MM 28 stocks, No MM 22 stocks, MM French Dutch FTT×MM FTT×No MM FTT×No MM

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Four groups of stocks

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Impact of the FTT on MM and non MM stocks

Variable/Group MM Stocks Non MM Stocks Volume

  • 0.079*
  • 0.187***

(-1.70) (-3.01) Range

  • 0.157

0.279** (-1.29) (2.27) Effective spread 0.093 0.866* (0.79) (1.92) Price impact 0.142 1.556*** (0.96) (5.17) Depth

  • 15.023***
  • 1.966

(-2.79) (-1.15) Resiliency

  • 0.015
  • 0.027***

(-1.35) (-2.93) AR 0.008* 0.008 (1.91) (1.56)

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Impact on price range - MM stocks

0.16 0.18

June 1 July 2 August 1 September 3 October 1

1.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0

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Impact on price range - Non MM stocks

0.28 0.058

June 1 July 2 August 1 September 3 October 1

1.0 0.5 0.0 0.5

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Wrap-up

◮ More adverse impact on stocks without HFT MM ◮ Volume: tax-exempt market-making activity

clouds impact on volume

◮ Liquidity: higher adverse selection ◮ Two potential mechanisms

◮ Change in trading population, informed/uninformed ◮ Change in behavior or trading strategy

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Trader types

Category/Variable

Non MM Group MM Group

limit/total

  • p. impact

limit/total

  • p. impact

HFT 12.0 6.0 50.3 3.2 Mixed 58.7 5.1 49.2 2.9 Non HFT 57.2 4.1 53.7 1.7

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Impact of the FTT on non MM stocks

Category/Variable Trading volume Price impact Effective spread HFT 0.083 1.767***

  • 0.000

(0.29) (3.66) (-0.00) Mixed

  • 0.219***

1.961*** 0.899* (-2.63) (5.54) (1.87) Non HFT

  • 0.008

2.309*** 1.637** (-0.08) (4.73) (2.34)

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HFT Volume

8.6 15.

June 1 July 2 August 1 September 3 October 1

2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.5

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Mixed Volume

20. 27.

June 1 July 2 August 1 September 3 October 1

0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.2

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Non HFT Volume

0.77 22.

June 1 July 2 August 1 September 3 October 1

0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.2

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Discussion

◮ Support for both mechanisms

◮ HFTs and Non HFTs less impacted ⇒ ambiguous ◮ All trader types focus on more informed trades

(more short-term?)

◮ Evidence consistent both with:

◮ FTT (relatively) encouraging short-run/more informed

strategies

◮ HFT MM seem able to mitigate adverse consequences

◮ Additional evidence on composition effects

⇒ data on institutional trades

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Road map

Introduction Methodology and data Average impact The role of high-frequency market-making Institutional trading Conclusion

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Impact on long-term investors

◮ Aggregate market activity clouds the impact on end

investors

◮ Large chunk of volume is short-term and tax-exempt ◮ Difficult to filter out the impact on the taxpayer

= end investor

◮ Use trading volume estimated from changes in portfolio

holdings (Factset) Volumef

i,t = |xf i,t − xf i,t−1| × pi,t

◮ evaluate the average effect on institutional trading

activity

◮ investigate differences across investor types (clienteles)

◮ DID: Q4 2012 vs. Q2 2012

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Trading volume Q4-2012 - Q2-2012

Fund/Model (1) (2) (3) Constant

  • 0.204***
  • 0.204**

Low Turnover

  • 0.137***

Medium Turnover

  • 0.292***
  • 0.187**

High Turnover

  • 0.339***
  • 0.237*

Euro 0.014 International

  • 0.175**
  • Norm. Log Size
  • 0.034*

ETF

  • 0.114

Other 0.161* GARP 0.232** Value 0.316** Index

  • 0.042

Yield 0.205*

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Impact on end investors

◮ Other proxies for end investor trading activity

◮ Call auctions (open & close) ◮ Dark pools ◮ Over-the-counter (MIFiD reporting)

Trading mechanism/Coefficient βSep/Oct T-Stat Euronext LOB

  • 0.107**

(-2.52) Auction

  • 0.167***

(-3.81) OTC

  • 0.566***

(-6.49) Dark

  • 0.496***

(-2.85)

◮ Overall, results are consistent with a considerable effect

  • n end investors

◮ Large variation: technical trades (e.g. Dividends)

+ different clienteles

◮ Same evidence as before, but more indirect

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Discussion

◮ Consistent with viewing funds as “liquidity traders”

(from a short-term microstructure perspective)

◮ Long-term change in market composition, less trading by:

◮ high turnover funds (Amihud and Mendelson (1986)) ◮ funds with scope for asset substitution (Campbell and

Froot (1994))

⇒ impact on the informed/uninformed ratio (Bloomfield et al. (2009))

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Road map

Introduction Methodology and data Average impact The role of high-frequency market-making Institutional trading Conclusion

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Conclusion

◮ Overall, the FTT’s average impact is relatively muted ◮ Significant discrepancy across stocks: ◮ Adverse selection increases for less liquid stocks

◮ Stamp duty relatively discourages long-horizon

investment strategies

◮ Stocks with HFT MMs more protected against this effect

◮ Underlines the role of the MM exemption

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Implications for the European FTT

◮ European FTT has much wider scope

◮ Other asset classes (bonds, derivatives...) ◮ No exemptions, all transactions

◮ Protecting liquidity provision seems important ◮ The EC expects to raise 4.8 to 6.5 bln EUR for equities ◮ We estimate that extending the French implementation to

EU-27 would raise 3.4 bln EUR

◮ A more cautious implementation need not forego too

much revenue

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References I

Amihud, Y., and H. Mendelson (1986): “Asset pricing and the bid-ask spread,” Journal of Financial Economics, 17(2), 223 – 249. Baltagi, B., D. Li, and Q. Li (2006): “Transaction tax and stock market behavior: evidence from an emerging market,” Empirical Economics, 31, 393–408. Bloomfield, R., M. O’Hara, and G. Saar (2009): “How Noise Trading Affects Markets: An Experimental Analysis,” Review of Financial Studies, 22(6), 2275–2302. Campbell, J. Y., and K. A. Froot (1994): “International Experiences with Securities Transaction Taxes,” in The Internationalization of Equity Markets, NBER Chapters, pp. 277–308. National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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References II

Capelle-Blancard, G., and O. Havrylchyk (2013): “The Impact of the French Securities Transaction Tax on Market Liquidity and Volatility,” Working paper. Coelho, M. (2014): “Dodging Robin Hood: Responses to France and Italy’s Financial Transaction Taxes,” Discussion paper. De Long, J. B., A. Shleifer, L. H. Summers, and R. J. Waldmann (1990a): “Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets,” Journal of Political Economy, 98(4), 703–38. De Long, J. B., A. Shleifer, L. H. Summers, and R. J. Waldmann (1990b): “Positive Feedback Investment Strategies and Destabilizing Rational Speculation,” The Journal of Finance, 45(2), pp. 379–395. Deng, Y., X. Liu, and S.-J. Wei (2014): “One Fundamental and Two Taxes: When Does a Tobin Tax Reduce Financial Price Volatility?,” Working Paper 19974, National Bureau of Economic Research.

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References III

Di Maggio, M. (2013): “Market Turmoil and Destabilizing Speculation,” Working paper. Haferkorn, M., and K. Zimmermann (2013): “Securities Transaction Tax and Market Quality - The Case of France,” Working paper. Hau, H. (2006): “The Role of Transaction Costs for Financial Volatility: Evidence from the Paris Bourse,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 4(4), 862–890. Jones, C. M., and P. J. Seguin (1997): “Transaction Costs and Price Volatility: Evidence from Commission Deregulation,” The American Economic Review, 87(4), pp. 728–737. Keynes, J. M. (1936): The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money. Palgrave MacMillan.

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References IV

Kupiec, P. (1996): “Noise traders, excess volatility, and a securities transactions tax,” Journal of Financial Services Research, 10, 115–129. Liu, S., and Z. Zhu (2009): “Transaction Costs and Price Volatility: New Evidence from the Tokyo Stock Exchange,” Journal of Financial Services Research, 36, 65–83. Menkveld, A., and B. Yueshen (2013): “Middlemen Interaction and Its Effect on Market Quality,” Working paper. Meyer, S., M. Wagener, and C. Weinhardt (2014): “Politically Motivated Taxes in Financial Markets: The Case of the French Financial Transaction Tax,” Journal of Financial Services Research. Parlour, C. A., and D. J. Seppi (2003): “Liquidity-Based Competition for Order Flow,” Review of Financial Studies, 16(2), 301–343.

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References V

Pomeranets, A., and D. Weaver (2012): “Security transaction taxes and market quality,” Working paper 2011-26, Bank of Canada. Roll, R. (1989): “Price volatility, international market links, and their implications for regulatory policies,” Journal of Financial Services Research, 3, 211–246. Schwert, G. W., and P. J. Seguin (1993): “Securities Transaction Taxes: An Overview of Costs, Benefits and Unresolved Questions,” Financial Analysts Journal, 49(5), pp. 27–35. Shleifer, A., and R. W. Vishny (1990): “Equilibrium Short Horizons of Investors and Firms,” American Economic Review, 80(2), 148–53. Song, F. M., and J. Zhang (2005): “Securities Transaction Tax and Market Volatility,” The Economic Journal, 115(506), 1103–1120.

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References VI

Stiglitz, J. (1989): “Using tax policy to curb speculative short-term trading,” Journal of Financial Services Research, 3, 101–115. Summers, L., and V. Summers (1989): “When financial markets work too well: A cautious case for a securities transactions tax,” Journal of Financial Services Research, 3, 261–286. Tobin, J. (1978): “A Proposal for International Monetary Reform,” Eastern Economic Journal, 4(3-4), 153–159. Umlauf, S. R. (1993): “Transaction taxes and the behavior of the Swedish stock market,” Journal of Financial Economics, 33(2), 227–240.