Safety Rapporteur Report George Donohue Summary Observations 7 - - PDF document

Safety Rapporteur Report

George Donohue

Summary Observations

• 7 papers: 1 European, 1 Joint, 5 US
• Need for EARLY Safety Analysis
• Historical Analysis Required for Hypothesis Confirmation
• Analysis Prioritization Methodology is Required to Proceed from

System CONOPS to Qualitative Fault Tree/Hazard Analysis to Quantitative Analysis

• Quantitative Analysis is Required to Provide System Specifications for

New Technology and Procedures

• Quantitative Analysis will Develop Validated Models that provide both

Normalization and Quantitative Safety Metrics for System Monitoring

• We have a Shortage of Trained Safety Analysts to deal with large

number of Issues to be Addressed

• Example Analysis Presented for New En-Route System Concept,

UAV’s in the NAS, Wake Vortex Encounter and Runway Incursion Severity

Safety Needs

• Recent accidents involving ATM
• Increasing traffic (capacity)
• Advanced systems (2012; 2017; 2025)
• Keep ATM safe
• Anticipate & Resolve Problems
• Learn before accidents occur

Barry Kirwan, EEC

Guiding Principles

• ATM must become a

learning organization

• ATM must have suitable

methods with which to anticipate and protect itself against risks

• Safety must be built in

at the early stages of ATM system design, right through to implementation

• ATM must improve

safety in key risk areas

• ATM must be sure that

the systems it is developing will deliver the required safety levels

• ATM must retain its

‘High Reliability’ status and its ‘safe culture’

• The above collaboration

should be achieved effectively and cost- efficiently

Barry Kirwan, EEC

Safety Methods

• Toolbox of 30+ methods (FAA + Eurocontrol + ANSPs):

– Hazard and human error identification – Representation in fault and event trees – Quantification of events & human errors; evidence from incidents/simulations – Analysis of dependence and common mode failures – Evaluation of uncertainty, sensitivity, and risk impact – Determination of safety requirements – Documentation for re-usability

• Need more Analysts Trained to use these tools

• required. Then do 3 to 5

S elect H F Issu e (e.g . “R eco ve ry fro m F ailu re”)

S elect n ext H F Is su e (e.g . “S taffin g an d O rg an isatio n ”)

• Brainstorm What Ifs
• A n alys e L ikely Im p act &

A n alyse all o th e r co lum n s fo r e ach W h at if

Barry Kirwan, EEC

Safety in Design

• EEC therefore carries out concept

exploration and preliminary design

• EEC research suggests that 50%

50%

• f accidents have their roots in the
• f accidents have their roots in the

design phase design phase

• EEC has a safety policy, and safety

plans for sector tools, traffic flow, and airport research areas

• Safety activities are ongoing for

each project in these areas

• Integrative project is ongoing to

determine safety levels for the integrated vision for 2012

Barry Kirwan, EEC

Historical Analysis for Hypothesis/Model Validation

Paramete r Description Estimate Standard Error α Intercept

• 17.00

0.57

β0 Logarithm of operations

1.97 0.09

β1 Logarithm of weather index

• 0.68

0.08

γ 2002 yearly dummy variable for 2002

• 0.08

0.03

β2 Log of Airfield/Airspace Delay

0.33 0.03

β3 Log of Arrival Delay

0.04 0.03

β4 Log of Downstream Congestion

• 0.15

0.04

γ 2001 Yearly dummy variable for 2001

0.22 0.03

Scale

0.264

∑ ∑

+ + + + =

k k k ij j j i i i

D Factor WI OP γ β β β α λ ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln(

1

Analysis of Daily OE Count: Tower OE

Mark Hansen, UC/B

Process for New WV CONOPS Analysis Prioritization

Hazard Analysis Model A Model B

. . .

Initial Scenario Ranking Quantitative Analysis Safety Metrics Not Modeled 1 2 3 n-1 n Qualitative Analysis Quantitative Modeling

. . .

Concepts of Operations

Conops Team Safety Analysis Team

John Shortle, GMU

Safety Assessment for New En-Route System Concept (AAC)

Fault Analysis Concept Definition Fault Identification Safety Calculation Fault Management Design

• Avg. duration
• f non-conformance

John Andrews, MIT/LL

1.0E-06 0.00001 0.0001 0.001 0.01 1.0 10. 100. 1000. 10000 100,000 1,000,000 10,000,000 1.0E-08 1.0E-07 0.1 100,000,000 goal

Safety Assessment

(AAC_B_03e-1)

AAC TCAS TSAFE visual Pcoll P[critical miss] Rate of fault Rate of collisions to be resolved Rate of Type k faults Rate of collisions due to specified fault type

John Andrews, MIT/LL

See-and-avoid system Aircraft dynamic model Pilot response model

Manned Aircraft

TCAS

UAV Safety Analysis Simulation Components

UAV dynamic model

UAV

TCAS Pilot response model Visual acquisition

= areas of planned growth

Comm Comm

James Kuchar, MIT/LL

WV encounter Probability Can Be Computed Using Aircraft and WV Stochastic Models

• Two Phase WV Decay and Propagation Model (2P2)

combined with Aircraft Arrival Flight Track Deviation Model (3 DOF)

• Effects of Cross Wind and Cross Wind Variance can be

evaluated

• Encounter Probability and Severity can be Computed for

any mixture of Aircraft Types

Yue Xie, GMU

Severity of Runway Incursions

• Safety Analysis is moving from just Event

Counting to Modeling Events and Assessing Severity of Events

Kim Cardosi, Volpe

Congratulations “S/V Esprit” The Best Boat Won

From the “S/V Ana G”