Roles of Remote Sensing for Influenza Roles of Remote Sensing for - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Roles of Remote Sensing for Influenza Roles of Remote Sensing for - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Roles of Remote Sensing for Influenza Roles of Remote Sensing for Influenza Risk Prediction and Early Warning Risk Prediction and Early Warning Richard Kiang, Radina Soebiyanto, Farida Adimi Richard Kiang, Radina Soebiyanto, Farida Adimi NASA
Epidemic-prone acute respiratory diseases have no borders, and can be spread rapidly around the world. Global, coordinated surveillance & control efforts are essential. Epidemic-prone acute respiratory diseases have no borders, and can be spread rapidly around the world. Global, coordinated surveillance & control efforts are essential. 2003 SARS
Spread to 37 countries in weeks
2004 H5N1 Avian Influenza
Spread to 62 countries since 2004. There are still frequent outbreaks in Indonesia, Egypt, and some Southeast Asian countries.
2009 H1N1 Pandemic
Spread to 48 countries in a month despite heightened public awareness and substantial preventive and control efforts
Cilia being invaded by flu virus Source: National Geographic Source: CDC
hemaglutinin neuraminidase
Antigenic drift
mutations in HA & NA
Antigenic shift
novel genes through reassortment
Animals to humans
jumping across species
Seasonal epidemic
new strains continue to appear
Pandemics
e.g., 1918 H1N1 Spanish Flu, 1957 H2N2 Asian Flu, 1968 H3N2 Hong Kong Flu
Pandemic potentials
H5N1 Avian Flu, 2009 H1N1 “Swine Flu” pandemic
Genetic & Antigenic Variation Among Influenza Viruses Genetic & Antigenic Variation Among Influenza Viruses
First appeared in Hong Kong in 1996- 1997, HPAI has spread to approximately 60 countries. More than 250 million poultry were lost. Worldwide the mortality rate is 53%. Co-infection of human and avian influenza in humans may produce deadly strains of viruses through genetic reassortment. On average one major pandemic
- ccurred in each century. 90 years have
passed since the 1918 pandemic (0.675M deaths in the US, and 21-50M deaths worldwide).
H5N1 AI — THE PROBLEM H5N1 AI — THE PROBLEM
richard.kiang@nasa.gov
DISTRIBUTION OF H5N1 HUMAN CASES DISTRIBUTION OF H5N1 HUMAN CASES
Source: WHO. Cases from 2003 to June 19, 2008.
richard.kiang@nasa.gov
Highly Pathogenic AI Cases Since January 2010 Highly Pathogenic AI Cases Since January 2010
FAO EMPRES FAO EMPRES
HUMANS POULTRY TRADE wild birds domestic birds ducks & geese
poultry, products, feed, waste, personnel, equipment
BIRD TRADE MIGRATORY BIRDS POULTRY
Sectors 1&2 Sectors 3&4
H5N1 TRANSMISSION PATHWAYS H5N1 TRANSMISSION PATHWAYS
LPAI spill over HPAI spill back
richard.kiang@nasa.gov
human flu virus pandemic strain reassortment
?
Asia
43% thru poultry 14% thru mig. birds
Analysis of Global Spread of H5N1 through Phylogenetic Evidence, Poultry & Bird Trades, And Bird Migration Data Analysis of Global Spread of H5N1 through Phylogenetic Evidence, Poultry & Bird Trades, And Bird Migration Data
Africa
25% thru poultry 38% thru mig. birds
Europe
87% thru mig. birds
US
Most likely thru poultry to surrounding countries first, then thru migratory birds to US mainland
Source: Kilpatrick et al., PNAS 2006.
richard.kiang@nasa.gov
Objective 4 Objective 3 Objective 2 Objective 1
OBJECTIVES OBJECTIVES
Perform empirical AI outbreak risk analyses based on outbreak history, environmental parameters, and socio-economic factors. Identify spatiotemporal risk for AI outbreaks based on wetland distributions, prevalence of bird species, flyways of migratory birds, surface characteristics, and socioeconomic factors. Model the spread of AI virus from large commercial poultry farms to small and backyard farms under typical environmental and socioeconomic conditions. Model weekly influenza-like illness cases based on observed and forecast meteorological parameters for regions in the US and other tropical countries.
richard.kiang@nasa.gov
What environmental and socio-economical factors may contribute to highly pathogenic AI outbreaks?
Poultry Outbreaks, Human Cases, Wet Markets, And Distribution Centers Poultry Outbreaks, Human Cases, Wet Markets, And Distribution Centers
January – February 2006
Based on Media & Publicly Available Information
January – February 2006
Based on Media & Publicly Available Information
richard.kiang@nasa.gov
Histograms of Distance from Neighborhoods With/without Outbreaks to Other Locations Histograms of Distance from Neighborhoods With/without Outbreaks to Other Locations Log (N+1) Log (N+1)
meters
What areas around wetlands may have higher risks for AI outbreaks?
NAMRU-2 Bird Surveillance Sites on Java
NAMRU-2 Bird Surveillance Study NAMRU-2 Bird Surveillance Study
The role of migratory birds in the spread of H5N1 remains under considerable debates. In Indonesia, migratory pathways are only known for shorebirds (East Asian-Australasian flyway) and migratory ducks and geese (East Asian & Central Asian flyways). 4067 birds comprising of 98 species and 23 genera were collected in 2006-2007. Most common birds: striated heron, common sandpiper, and domestic chicken.
6% 3% 14%
(continued) (continued) RNA was extracted from swabs; RT-PCR was conducted for H5N1 genes; antibodies was detected using hemagglutination inhibition and
- ther tests.
Species with the highest seropostive rates in each category are Muschovy duck (captive), striated heron (non-migratory) and Pacific golden plover (migratory). 16% of the captive birds (duck, swan, pigeon, etc.) showed H5N1 antibody. Infected captive birds can be asymptomatic. In Indonesia, the role of migratory birds in H5N1 transmission is limited.
ASTER False-Color, Google Earth And Land Use Maps Around Indramayu ASTER False-Color, Google Earth And Land Use Maps Around Indramayu
Supervised Classification Supervised Classification
EU’s & UK’s Practice: 3 km protection zone 10 km surveillance zone larger restricted zone
Buffer zones can be established to limit the spread
- f H5N1 around wetlands and the nearby farmlands
Buffer zones can be established to limit the spread
- f H5N1 around wetlands and the nearby farmlands
How do AI viruses spread on and off farms, within and across poultry sectors, and into the environment?
Densely Populated Sector I Poultry Production Area
Google Earth image
Detection of H5N1 Infection on a Poultry Farm Detection of H5N1 Infection on a Poultry Farm
Highly pathogenic AI infection on a poultry farm cannot be detected immediately. Some infected poultry may not look very sick. In a poultry house with 20,000 chickens, an infection of <1% may not be detected in a walkthrough. Using a SEIR model, it can be shown that it may take 4-5 days to detect an outbreak. Before an infection is detected, viruses continue to spread on farm and off farm, through service personnel, equipment, materials, and the poultry that have been shipped out.
richard.kiang@nasa.gov
On-Farm and Off-Farm Spread of H5N1 On-Farm and Off-Farm Spread of H5N1
richard.kiang@nasa.gov
Within and Across-Sector Spread of H5N1 Within and Across-Sector Spread of H5N1
richard.kiang@nasa.gov
How does seasonality vary geographically? How is influenza transmission influenced by the environment? How can this be used for forecasting and pandemic early warning?
- Latitudinal variability in
influenza transmission pattern
- Experimental findings
- n the effect of
meteorological factors in influenza transmission, virus survivorship and host susceptibility
Viboud et al. (2006). PLoS Med 3(4):e89
Empirical Evidences of Environmental Influences On Influenza Transmissions Empirical Evidences of Environmental Influences On Influenza Transmissions
Hong Kong Hong Kong
Land surface temperature Air temperature Rainfall Relative humidity Dew point Evaporation Pressure Solar irradiance Sunshine hours Windspeed
Time series for environmental parameters and weekly seasonal influenza cases
Hong Kong Hong Kong
Training Prediction
Maricopa County, Arizona Maricopa County, Arizona
Land surface temperature Air temperature Rainfall Relative humidity Dew point Pressure Solar irradiance Windspeed
Time series for environmental parameters and weekly seasonal influenza cases
Maricopa County, Arizona Maricopa County, Arizona
Training Prediction
Time series for environmental parameters and weekly seasonal influenza cases
New York City New York City
Training Prediction
Epidemic-prone acute respiratory diseases have no borders, and can be spread rapidly around the world. Internationally coordinated surveillance & control efforts are
- essential. Better understanding of the influenza
seasonality and the environmental effects on transmission will help the global surveillance and control efforts. Epidemic-prone acute respiratory diseases have no borders, and can be spread rapidly around the world. Internationally coordinated surveillance & control efforts are
- essential. Better understanding of the influenza
seasonality and the environmental effects on transmission will help the global surveillance and control efforts.
Thank You!
richard.kiang@nasa.gov