Rob Huebert Rhuebert@ucalgary.ca Calgary September 21, 2016 Part - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

ON CANADIAN SOVEREIGNTY The Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers Arctic Section

Calgary September 21, 2016

Rob Huebert

Rhuebert@ucalgary.ca

Part I: The Big Picture

• Increasing international and Canadian

debate as to what the Arctic will look like in the future: physical; economic; cultural; and geopolitical

• A New Arctic Security Environment is

Forming on a Global Basis – What will it look like?

• Arctic is increasingly being

connected to rest of world

• How will this impact Canada?
• What does Canada need to do?

Issue 1: NWP Issue 2: Beaufort Sea Issue 3: Continental Shelf Issue 5: Davis Strait Issue 4: Hans Island/Lincoln Sea

Issue 1: The NWP

• Canadian position – Internal Waters
• US/(EU position) – Strait used for

International Navigation

• Issue is over

Control of Trans-Polar Shipping

Crystal Serenity

The Geopolitical Dimension

• The core US position on NWP is based on

concern with precedent – Strait of Hormuz

• But US knows if Northwest Passage is an

International Strait there will be security

• utputs; also International Right of

Overflights

– Possible future security maritime threat – Freedom of Navigation – Existing Aerospace Threat

Issue 2: Beaufort Sea

• 1825 St. Petersburg Treaty – UK/Russia
• Has been “managed” by Canada and US
• Overlaps with numerous issues of

importance outside of Arctic

• Talks began between US-Canada summer

2011

• Impacts of Norway/Russia settlement

Beaufort Sea Dispute Canada - US

US Moratorium on Commercial Fishing of the Beaufort Sea- 2009 vs 1984 Western Arctic Claim Inuvialuit Agreement

Issue 3: Extended Continental Shelf

• UNCLOS article 76

– finished mid – 1970s/officially 1982

• Sovereign rights over soil and subsoil (oil

and gas)

• Russia 2007+; Canada 2013; Denmark

2014; US ?

• Must resolve differences peacefully
• Ilulissat Declaration May 2008

Maritime jurisdiction & boundaries in the Arctic

www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/resources/arctic

Issue 4: Hans Island and Lincoln Sea

• Lincoln Sea Dispute

– Technical basis – minor impact – Resolved November 28, 2012

• Hans Island

– Minor impact – Does not impact maritime Boundary – But illustrates the political and public nature of disputes – Canada and Denmark have de facto division

Hans Island Lincoln Sea

Gunboat Diplomacy and Hans Island

Issue 5: Denmark-Canada Davis Strait

• 1973 Boundary Agreement

– (Except Hans Islands)

• Discovery of geological indicators of oil

and gas

Cairn Oil Search

Geopolitical Impacts

• If oil is discovered; and if the find is

substantial; and if geological province does extend to Canadian side – what does Canada do

• Newfoundland vs Nunavut vs Federal
• Resource Development vs Conservation
• Independent Greenland
• But no oil development now

Part II: The Pressure Points

• Conflicting Core Russia and US Strategic

Interests

Increased Tension between NATO and Russia

• Russian Security Policy Core Concern –

Expansion of NATO to Russian Border Mid- 2000s

• Georgia interest in NATO and Russian War 2008
• Ukraine interest in NATO/EU and Russian War

2014

• Growing unrest in Russian population Baltic

States

• Finland
• Sweden

Russia Core Strategic Interests and Arctic

• Nuclear Stability – Maintenance of

Deterrence

– Focus on SSBN – Build-up Northern Fleet

• Limit Expansion of NATO

– Growing interest of Sweden/Finland

• Stop/Limit US ABM

– Will look to Alaska

Growing Military Assertiveness of Russia in Arctic and renewed military strength

• 1990’s Period of Extreme Reduction
• 2000’s Renewal
• Russian State Rearmament Program 2007-15
• Focus on Submarines
• 3(+3 building) new Nuclear Missile Subs
• 2(+3 building) new attack Subs

Yury Dolgoruky

US Core Strategic Interest and Arctic

• Protect against Attack on US Homeland

– North Korea Missile Threat – increase of 14 more interceptors Ft Greely AK

• Meet and Contain Rising Power of China

(Asian Pivot)

– Need to use Alaska as pivot point – China and Arctic Goverance

US Arctic Forces

• US ABM in Alaska

– 26 Interceptors (GMD –Ground-based Mid-Course Defence) Ft. Greely Alaska – 14 more to be added in Alaska after North Korean Launch 2013

• Submarine Forces:
• US – Seawolf and Los Angeles Class; Virginia Class
• ICEX March 2009 – 2 LA class SSN
• ICEX March 2011 – 1 Seawolf and 1 Virginia
• ICEX March 2011 – 1 Virginia and 1 LA
• ICEX March 2014 – 1 Virginia and 1 LA
• ICEX March 2016 – 2 LA

Chinese Navy and Arctic

• 5 PLAN vessels (People’s Liberation Army

Navy) ships off Aleutian Islands Sept 2015

• 3 PLAN vessels (Fleet 152) 1st visit to

Sweden, Denmark, Finland Oct 2015

• Will the new Subs (SSN) be arctic capable?

Source: Diplomat

PLAN Jinan

Canada-US: NORAD

• 2000s US began to perceive NORAD

importance of lessening

• Feb 2016 US Commander of NORAD links

Russian actions in Syria to Arctic

• Modernization of North Warning System
• Replacement of CF-18s
• Costs for Renewal
• Canada’s role in ABM

Canada and NATO

• Canadian Resistance to the Norwegian

Arctic Initiative

• Canada has been providing support of

NATO’s patrols of Iceland airspace

• Canada’s position if Sweden and/or Norway

apply

• Canada’s relations with independent

Greenland

Conclusion: The Emerging Arctic Security Regime

• Entire Arctic is in a point of Transformation
• Many Driving Features change coming from
• utside region –but Resource Development is

leading issue

• Circumpolar states are building up their combat

capable force for the Arctic – New Equipment – Ice and Combat Capable – New Policies – Unilateral “concern” – New Training

Conclusion

• Will continue to be a disconnect between

rhetoric of cooperation and reality of core security requirements of Russia, US and China

• Will result in continued rebuilding of Russian

arctic military capability

• Will result Canada/US modernize NORAD
• Will result in Northern focus of NATO
• You follow the ultimate logic…….