RFID Hacking
Live Free or RFID Hard
24 Mar 2015 – InfoSec World 2015 – Orlando, FL Presen sented ed b by: Francis Brown & Rob Ragan Bishop Fox www.bishopfox.com
RFID Hacking Live Free or RFID Hard 24 Mar 2015 InfoSec World 2015 - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
RFID Hacking Live Free or RFID Hard 24 Mar 2015 InfoSec World 2015 Orlando, FL Presen sented ed b by: Francis Brown & Rob Ragan Bishop Fox www.bishopfox.com Agenda O V E R V I E W Qu Quic ick k Over erview ew
RFID Hacking
Live Free or RFID Hard
24 Mar 2015 – InfoSec World 2015 – Orlando, FL Presen sented ed b by: Francis Brown & Rob Ragan Bishop Fox www.bishopfox.comAgenda
2Quic ick k Over erview ew
king T g Tool
Custom S Solu lution
efens enses es
O V E R V I E W
Methodology
33 S T E P A P P R O A C H
Distance Limitations
4A $ $ G R A B B I N G M E T H O D
Existing RFID hacking tools only work when a few centimeters away from badge
Introduction/Background
5GETTING UP TO SPEED
Badge Basics
6F R E Q U E N C I E S
Legacy 125kHz
7S T I L L K I C K I N
70% t % to 80% % of all physical access control deployments in the U.S. and it will be a long time” - Stephane Ardiley, HID Global.
no security ty, the they’ y’ve b been ha n hacked, there’s no protection of data, no privacy, everything is in the clear and it’s not resistant to sniffing or common attacks.”
Opposite of Progress
8T A L K M O T I V A T I O N S
2007 2013
HID Global - Making the Leap from Prox to Contactless ID Cards https://www.hidglobal.com/blog/making-leap-prox-contactless-id-cardsHow a Card Is Read
9P O I N T S O F A T T A C K
Card Reader Controller Wiegand output Host PC Ethernet
CardBadge Types
10Badge Basics
11C A R D E L E M E N T S Card – “Formats” Decoded
Badge Formats
12HID ID ProxCar ard II II “F “Format ats”
26 – 37 bi 37 bit c car ards ds
44 bits ac actual ally o y on c n car ard
10 hex hex c char harac acters
D A T A F O R M A T S
HID Global – Understanding Card Data Formats (PDF) https://www.hidglobal.com/sites/hidglobal.com/files/hid-understanding_card_data_formats-wp-en.pdfBadge Formats
13D A T A F O R M A T S
HID Global – MaxiProx 5375 – Install Guide (PDF) http://www.hidglobal.com/sites/hidglobal.com/files/resource_files/maxiprox_ins_en.pdfRFID Other Usage
14W H E R E E L S E ?
RFID Hacking Tools
15P E N T E S T T O O L K I T
Proxmark3
16R F I D H A C K I N G T O O L S
Single button, crazy flow diagram on lone button below $399
ProxBrute
17R F I D H A C K I N G T O O L S
like data center door
RFIDiot Scripts
18R F I D H A C K I N G T O O L S
RFIDeas Tools
19R F I D H A C K I N G T O O L S
indicators of card type
$269.00
Tastic Solution
L O N G R A N G E R F I D S T E A L E R
Tastic RFID Thief
21read badges from up t p to 3 f 3 feet aw away
creds to be cloned later using T55x7 cards L O N G R A N G E R F I D S T E A L E R
Tastic RFID Thief
22L O N G R A N G E R F I D S T E A L E R
Custom PCB
23T A S T I C R F I D T H I E F Custom PCB – easy to plug into any type of RFID badge reader
Wiegand Input
24Tastic Custom PCB – reads from Wiegand output of RFID badge reader:
T A S T I C R F I D T H I E F
Wiegand Interface https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wiegand_interfaceCommercial Readers
25T A S T I C R F I D T H I E F Long-range commercial RFID readers to weaponize: 3 out of 4 HID RFID product families covered
Commercial Readers
26Indala L a Long ng-Ran ange R Reade eader 620 620
ID Max axiProx 5375 5375AGN00
T A S T I C R F I D T H I E F
~$400 - $500 on ebay ~$400 - $500 on ebay
Commercial Readers
27D iCLASS SS – R90 90 – Lon Long R g Range ge Reade eader
company is using default “Standard Security”.
T A S T I C R F I D T H I E F
~$345 on ebay
Chaos27th-Analyzing a Modern Cryptographic RFID System-Dec2010 http://events.ccc.de/congress/2010/Fahrplan/events/4114.en.htmliCLASS Cloner
X F P G A . C O M - F R O M C H I N A
Uses: OmniKey CardMan 5321 USB - RFID Reader (13.56 Mhz) 28~$218 USD
Indala Cloning
29E X A M P L E I N P R A C T I C E
Tastic Solution: Add-ons
30M O D U L E S T O P O T E N T I A L L Y A D D
Forward Channel Attacks
31P A S S I V E E A V E S D R O P P I N G R F I D
Droppin’ Eaves
32B A D G E B R O A D C A S T S
MIT 6.857 - RFID Security and Privacy 02Nov2004 http://groups.csail.mit.edu/cis/crypto/classes/6.857/papers/rfid.ppt MIT Proximity Card Culnerabilities http://www.josephhall.org/tmp/mit_prox_vulns.pdfCloner 2.0 by Paget
33E A V E S D R O P P I N G A T T A C K
ching g 10 feet feet for this type of attack
naware of any p ny pub ublic t tools that exist for this attack currently
Black Hat 2007 - RFID for Beginners - Chris Paget https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-07/Paget/Presentation/bh-usa-07-paget.pdfRFID Card Cloning
34C A R D P R O G R A M M I N G
Programmable Cards
35Simulate data and and behav behavior of any badge type
Programmable Cards
Cloning to T55x T55x7 C Car ard using Proxmark3
and be d behavior of any badge type
Reader and Controller Attacks
37D I R E C T A P P R O A C H
Reader Attacks
38J A C K E D I N
info, and more in few seconds
the wire via Wiegand (5x faster)
Reader Attacks
39G E C K O – M I T M A T T A C K
building – record badg badge #s #s
RFI FID Th Thief ief’s P PCB could be used similiarly for MITM attack
Black Hat D.C. 2008 - Biometric and Token-Based Access Control Systems - Franken http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-08/Franken/Presentation/bh-dc-08-franken.pdfNever publicly released
Reader Attacks
40T A S T I C – M I T M A T T A C K
building – record badg badge #s #s
RFI FID Th Thief ief’s P PCB could be used similiarly for MITM attack
+
Controller Attacks
41J A C K E D I N
Shmoocon 2012 - Attacking Proximity Card Systems - Brad Antoniewicz http://www.shmoocon.org/2012/videos/Antoniewicsz-AttackingCardAccess.m4vController Attacks
42J A C K E D I N
Shmoocon 2012 - Attacking Proximity Card Systems - Brad Antoniewicz http://www.shmoocon.org/2012/videos/Antoniewicsz-AttackingCardAccess.m4v http://blog.opensecurityresearch.com/2012/12/hacking-wiegand-serial-protocol.htmlOpen en the he Badge R e Rea eader er t to Attack ck t the he Cont ntroller er D Direct ectly v via W Wieg egand nd Int Inter erface: ce:
Attacki king g the he Ver ertX C Cont ntroller O Over er the he Ne Netw twork:
RFID Reader / Controller Attack Tools – by Brad Antoniewicz
Controller Attacks
43J A C K E D I N
MAC AC Ad Address - Targetting HID Controllers Over Network
Controller Attacks
44J A C K E D I N
Port S Scanni nning ng a and nd Banner nner G Grabbing ng - Targetting HID Controllers Over Network
Backdoors and Other Fun
45L I T T L E D I F F E R E N C E S
Pwn Plug
M A I N T A I N I N G A C C E S S
46Pwn Plug
M A I N T A I N I N G A C C E S S
Raspberry Pi
48M A I N T A I N I N G A C C E S S
Raspberry Pi
49M A I N T A I N I N G A C C E S S
35) to Pwn Plug/Power Pwn
Little Extra Touches
G O A L O N G W A Y
Defenses
51A V O I D B E I N G P R O B E D
RFID Security Resources
52S L I M P I C K I N S . . .
Defenses
53R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S
system (e.g. “contactless s ss smart c t cards”) that incorporates encrypt ption
, mutual a authent hentica cation, and message replay protection.
factor authentication, using elements such as a PIN pad pad or biom iometric ic inputs.
ano nomaly d det etec ection software.
eel t tes ests” by guards to ensure badges are not fake printed badges
HID Global - Best Practices in Access Control White Paper (PDF) https://www.hidglobal.com/node/16181Defenses
54R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S
not to wea ear t thei heir b badges es i in n prominent nent v view ew when outside the company premises.
ID c card s shi hiel elds when the badge is not in use to prevent drive-by card sniffing attacks.
se security sc screws that require special tools to remove the cover and access security components.
er d det etec ect m mec echa hani nisms to prevent badge reader physical tampering. All readers and doors should be monitored by d by CCT CCTV.
HID Global - Physical Reader Security, Tamper, and Supervisor Features (PDF) http://www.hidglobal.com/physical-reader-security-tamper-and-supervisor-featuresDefenses (Broken)
55S O M E D O N ’ T . . . E X A M P L E . . .
Shmoocon 2012 - Kristin Paget - Credit Card Fraud: The Contactless Generation http://www.shmoocon.org/2012/presentations/Paget_shmoocon2012-credit-cards.pdfDefenses
56F L Y G E A R
Thank You
57Bi Bishop
Fox
for mo more info:
http://www.bishopfox.com/resources/tools/rfid-hacking/