RFID Hacking Live Free or RFID Hard 24 Mar 2015 InfoSec World 2015 - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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RFID Hacking Live Free or RFID Hard 24 Mar 2015 InfoSec World 2015 - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

RFID Hacking Live Free or RFID Hard 24 Mar 2015 InfoSec World 2015 Orlando, FL Presen sented ed b by: Francis Brown & Rob Ragan Bishop Fox www.bishopfox.com Agenda O V E R V I E W Qu Quic ick k Over erview ew


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SLIDE 1

RFID Hacking

Live Free or RFID Hard

24 Mar 2015 – InfoSec World 2015 – Orlando, FL Presen sented ed b by: Francis Brown & Rob Ragan Bishop Fox www.bishopfox.com
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SLIDE 2

Agenda

2
  • Qu

Quic ick k Over erview ew

  • RFID badge basics
  • Hackin

king T g Tool

  • ols
  • Primary existing RFID hacking tools
  • Badge stealing, replaying, and cloning
  • Attacking badge readers and controllers directly
  • Planting Pwn Plugs and other backdoors
  • Cus

Custom S Solu lution

  • Arduino and weaponized commercial RFID readers
  • Def

efens enses es

  • Protecting badges, readers, controllers, and more

O V E R V I E W

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SLIDE 3

Methodology

3

3 S T E P A P P R O A C H

  • 1. Silently steal badge info
  • 2. Create card clone
  • 3. Enter and plant backdoor
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SLIDE 4

Distance Limitations

4

A $ $ G R A B B I N G M E T H O D

Existing RFID hacking tools only work when a few centimeters away from badge

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SLIDE 5

Introduction/Background

5

GETTING UP TO SPEED

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SLIDE 6

Badge Basics

6

F R E Q U E N C I E S

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SLIDE 7

Legacy 125kHz

7

S T I L L K I C K I N

80%

  • “Legacy 125-kilohertz proximity technology is still in place at around

70% t % to 80% % of all physical access control deployments in the U.S. and it will be a long time” - Stephane Ardiley, HID Global.

  • “There is no

no security ty, the they’ y’ve b been ha n hacked, there’s no protection of data, no privacy, everything is in the clear and it’s not resistant to sniffing or common attacks.”

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SLIDE 8

Opposite of Progress

8

T A L K M O T I V A T I O N S

2007 2013

HID Global - Making the Leap from Prox to Contactless ID Cards https://www.hidglobal.com/blog/making-leap-prox-contactless-id-cards
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SLIDE 9

How a Card Is Read

9

P O I N T S O F A T T A C K

Card Reader Controller Wiegand output Host PC Ethernet

Card
  • Broadcasts 26-37 bit card number
Reader
  • Converts card data to “Wiegand Protocol”
for transmission to the controller
  • No access decisions are made by reader
Controller
  • Binary card data “format” is decoded
  • Makes decision to grant access (or not)
Host PC
  • Add/remove card holders, access privileges
  • Monitor system events in real time
HID Global – How a HID Card is “Read” (PDF) https://info.hidglobal.com/WP-How-an-HID-Card-is-Read_Request.html
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SLIDE 10

Badge Types

10
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SLIDE 11

Badge Basics

11

C A R D E L E M E N T S Card – “Formats” Decoded

  • Card ID Number
  • Facility Code
  • Site Code (occasionally)
*Note: if saw printed card number on badge, could potentially brute force the 1-255 facility code (for Standard 26 bit card)
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SLIDE 12

Badge Formats

12

HID ID ProxCar ard II II “F “Format ats”

  • 26

26 – 37 bi 37 bit c car ards ds

  • 44 bi

44 bits ac actual ally o y on c n car ard

  • 10

10 hex hex c char harac acters

  • Le
Leadi ading 0 g 0 usually ally dr droppe pped

D A T A F O R M A T S

HID Global – Understanding Card Data Formats (PDF) https://www.hidglobal.com/sites/hidglobal.com/files/hid-understanding_card_data_formats-wp-en.pdf
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SLIDE 13

Badge Formats

13

D A T A F O R M A T S

HID Global – MaxiProx 5375 – Install Guide (PDF) http://www.hidglobal.com/sites/hidglobal.com/files/resource_files/maxiprox_ins_en.pdf
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SLIDE 14

RFID Other Usage

14

W H E R E E L S E ?

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SLIDE 15

RFID Hacking Tools

15

P E N T E S T T O O L K I T

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SLIDE 16

Proxmark3

16

R F I D H A C K I N G T O O L S

Single button, crazy flow diagram on lone button below $399

  • RFID Hacking swiss army knife
  • Read/simulate/clone RFID cards
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SLIDE 17

ProxBrute

17

R F I D H A C K I N G T O O L S

  • Custom firmware for the Proxmark3
  • Brute-force higher privileged badges,

like data center door

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SLIDE 18

RFIDiot Scripts

18

R F I D H A C K I N G T O O L S

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SLIDE 19

RFIDeas Tools

19

R F I D H A C K I N G T O O L S

  • No software required
  • Identifies card type and data
  • Great for badges w/o visual

indicators of card type

$269.00

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SLIDE 20

Tastic Solution

L O N G R A N G E R F I D S T E A L E R

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SLIDE 21

Tastic RFID Thief

21
  • Easily hide in briefcase or messenger bag,

read badges from up t p to 3 f 3 feet aw away

  • Silent powering and stealing of RFID badge

creds to be cloned later using T55x7 cards L O N G R A N G E R F I D S T E A L E R

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SLIDE 22

Tastic RFID Thief

22
  • Designed using Fritzing
  • Exports to Extended-Gerber
  • Order PCB at www.4pcb.com
  • $33 for 1 PCB
  • Much cheaper in bulk

L O N G R A N G E R F I D S T E A L E R

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SLIDE 23

Custom PCB

23

T A S T I C R F I D T H I E F Custom PCB – easy to plug into any type of RFID badge reader

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SLIDE 24

Wiegand Input

24

Tastic Custom PCB – reads from Wiegand output of RFID badge reader:

T A S T I C R F I D T H I E F

Wiegand Interface https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wiegand_interface
  • Outputs a badge binary number by sending electrical
pulses for ‘0’ and ‘1’ on wires Data 0 and Data 1
  • Wiegand Interface consists of 3 lines: “Data 0”,
“Data 1”, “Data Return” (Ground)
  • To send a ‘0’-bit, a pulse is sent on DATA 0 (Green)
  • To send a ‘1’-bit, a pulse is sent on DATA 1 (White)
  • Every HID reader has a Wiegand output available
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SLIDE 25

Commercial Readers

25

T A S T I C R F I D T H I E F Long-range commercial RFID readers to weaponize: 3 out of 4 HID RFID product families covered

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SLIDE 26

Commercial Readers

26
  • Indal

Indala L a Long ng-Ran ange R Reade eader 620 620

  • HID

ID Max axiProx 5375 5375AGN00

T A S T I C R F I D T H I E F

~$400 - $500 on ebay ~$400 - $500 on ebay

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SLIDE 27

Commercial Readers

27
  • HID

D iCLASS SS – R90 90 – Lon Long R g Range ge Reade eader

  • Tastic PCB in R90 will pick up iCLASS card if target

company is using default “Standard Security”.

T A S T I C R F I D T H I E F

~$345 on ebay

Chaos27th-Analyzing a Modern Cryptographic RFID System-Dec2010 http://events.ccc.de/congress/2010/Fahrplan/events/4114.en.html
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SLIDE 28

iCLASS Cloner

X F P G A . C O M - F R O M C H I N A

Uses: OmniKey CardMan 5321 USB - RFID Reader (13.56 Mhz) 28

~$218 USD

  • http://www.xfpga.com/html_products/iclass-
card-cloner-en-82.html
  • Read/Write iCLASS cards using “Standard
Security” only (not “High” or “Elite”)
  • Requires older 32bit driver, and won’t let you
run in a VM (so Win32 actual install necessary)
  • Built from original ContactlessDemoVC.exe
  • USB hardware licensing dongle shipped
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SLIDE 29

Indala Cloning

29

E X A M P L E I N P R A C T I C E

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SLIDE 30

Tastic Solution: Add-ons

30

M O D U L E S T O P O T E N T I A L L Y A D D

  • Arduino NFC Shield
  • Arduino BlueTooth Modules
  • Arduino WiFly Shield (802.11b/g)
  • Arduino GSM/GPRS shields (SMS messaging)
  • WIZnet Embedded Web Server Module
  • Xbee 2.4GHz Module (802.15.4 Zigbee)
  • Parallax GPS Module PMB-648 SiRF
  • Arduino Ethernet Shield
  • Redpark - Serial-to-iPad/iPhone Cable
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SLIDE 31

Forward Channel Attacks

31

P A S S I V E E A V E S D R O P P I N G R F I D

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SLIDE 32

Droppin’ Eaves

32

B A D G E B R O A D C A S T S

MIT 6.857 - RFID Security and Privacy 02Nov2004 http://groups.csail.mit.edu/cis/crypto/classes/6.857/papers/rfid.ppt MIT Proximity Card Culnerabilities http://www.josephhall.org/tmp/mit_prox_vulns.pdf
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SLIDE 33

Cloner 2.0 by Paget

33

E A V E S D R O P P I N G A T T A C K

  • Chris Paget talked of his tool reach

ching g 10 feet feet for this type of attack

  • Tool never actually released, unfortunately
  • Una

naware of any p ny pub ublic t tools that exist for this attack currently

Black Hat 2007 - RFID for Beginners - Chris Paget https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-07/Paget/Presentation/bh-usa-07-paget.pdf
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SLIDE 34

RFID Card Cloning

34

C A R D P R O G R A M M I N G

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SLIDE 35

Programmable Cards

35

Simulate data and and behav behavior of any badge type

  • T55x7 Cards
  • Q5 cards (T5555)
Emu Emulat lating: g: HID 26bi 26bit car card
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SLIDE 36

Programmable Cards

  • T55x
55x7 7 Car ards ds
  • Q5 car
5 cards ds (T5555 5555) 36

Cloning to T55x T55x7 C Car ard using Proxmark3

  • Simulate data an

and be d behavior of any badge type

  • HID Prox Cloning – example:
  • Indala Prox Cloning – example:
  • ioProx Cloning – example:
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SLIDE 37

Reader and Controller Attacks

37

D I R E C T A P P R O A C H

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SLIDE 38

Reader Attacks

38

J A C K E D I N

  • Dump private keys, valid badge

info, and more in few seconds

  • Plant backdoor devices in reader
  • Brute-force badge numbers over

the wire via Wiegand (5x faster)

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SLIDE 39

Reader Attacks

39

G E C K O – M I T M A T T A C K

  • Insert in door reader of target

building – record badg badge #s #s

  • Tastic R

RFI FID Th Thief ief’s P PCB could be used similiarly for MITM attack

Black Hat D.C. 2008 - Biometric and Token-Based Access Control Systems - Franken http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-08/Franken/Presentation/bh-dc-08-franken.pdf

Never publicly released

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SLIDE 40

Reader Attacks

40

T A S T I C – M I T M A T T A C K

  • Insert in door reader of target

building – record badg badge #s #s

  • Tastic R

RFI FID Th Thief ief’s P PCB could be used similiarly for MITM attack

+

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SLIDE 41

Controller Attacks

41

J A C K E D I N

Shmoocon 2012 - Attacking Proximity Card Systems - Brad Antoniewicz http://www.shmoocon.org/2012/videos/Antoniewicsz-AttackingCardAccess.m4v
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SLIDE 42

Controller Attacks

42

J A C K E D I N

Shmoocon 2012 - Attacking Proximity Card Systems - Brad Antoniewicz http://www.shmoocon.org/2012/videos/Antoniewicsz-AttackingCardAccess.m4v http://blog.opensecurityresearch.com/2012/12/hacking-wiegand-serial-protocol.html

Open en the he Badge R e Rea eader er t to Attack ck t the he Cont ntroller er D Direct ectly v via W Wieg egand nd Int Inter erface: ce:

  • Arduino Wiegand BruteForcer – Arduino_VertX_Wiegand_BruteForce.ino
  • 5 IDs pe
per Second nd Brute-force Badge Guessing
  • Arduino Wiegand Skimmer and Emulator - Arduino_Vertx_ProxPoint_Skimmer.ino
  • Arduino Wiegand Fuzzer - Arduino_VertX_Wiegand_Fuzzer.ino

Attacki king g the he Ver ertX C Cont ntroller O Over er the he Ne Netw twork:

  • VertX_Query.py – HID VertX Controller Discovery and Query Tool
  • VertX_WebOpen.py – Physically Open Door via HTTP GET Request to the WebUI
  • VertX_CacheTool.c – HID VertX V2000 Cache Dump and Insertion Tool

RFID Reader / Controller Attack Tools – by Brad Antoniewicz

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SLIDE 43

Controller Attacks

43

J A C K E D I N

  • HID Global – MAC Address OUI: 00:0
:06:8E:* :*:* :*:* :*
  • Scan network for MAC Addresses starting with 00:06:
06:8E 8E: directly, or use HID’s c con
  • ntrol
  • ller d
discov
  • very G
GUI t tool
  • ol:
  • https://www.hidglobal.com/drivers/15654

MAC AC Ad Address - Targetting HID Controllers Over Network

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SLIDE 44

Controller Attacks

44

J A C K E D I N

  • HID VertX Controller – Default Open Ports:
  • FTP (21), Telnet (23), HTTP (80)
  • HID VertX Controller – Connect via FTP / Telnet /
HTTP with Default Admin Creds: root/pass
  • Banne
ner g grabbing ing for HID VertX controller discovery
  • Can also find using SH
SHOD ODAN search engine

Port S Scanni nning ng a and nd Banner nner G Grabbing ng - Targetting HID Controllers Over Network

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SLIDE 45

Backdoors and Other Fun

45

L I T T L E D I F F E R E N C E S

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SLIDE 46

Pwn Plug

M A I N T A I N I N G A C C E S S

46
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SLIDE 47

Pwn Plug

M A I N T A I N I N G A C C E S S

  • Pwn Plug Elite: $995.00
  • Power Pwn: $1,495.00
47
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SLIDE 48

Raspberry Pi

48

M A I N T A I N I N G A C C E S S

  • Raspberry Pi - credit card sized, single-board computer – cheap $35
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SLIDE 49

Raspberry Pi

49

M A I N T A I N I N G A C C E S S

  • Raspberry Pi – cheap alternative (~$35

35) to Pwn Plug/Power Pwn

  • Pwnie Express – Raspberry Pwn
  • Rogue Pi – RPi Pentesting Dropbox
  • Pwn Pi v3.0
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SLIDE 50 USB Rubber Ducky Delux 50 Fake polo shirts for target company (get logo from target website) Fargo DTC515 Full Color ID Card ID Badge Printer Label Printer and Badge Accessories HD PenCam - Mini 720p Video Lock picks and pick guns

Little Extra Touches

G O A L O N G W A Y

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SLIDE 51

Defenses

51

A V O I D B E I N G P R O B E D

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SLIDE 52

RFID Security Resources

52

S L I M P I C K I N S . . .

  • RFID Security by Syngress
  • Not updated since July 2005
  • NIST SP 800-98 – Securing RFID
  • Not updated since April 2007
  • Hackin9 Magazine – Aug 2011
  • RFID Hacking, pretty decent
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SLIDE 53

Defenses

53

R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S

  • Consider implementing a more secure, active RFID

system (e.g. “contactless s ss smart c t cards”) that incorporates encrypt ption

  • n,

, mutual a authent hentica cation, and message replay protection.

  • Consider systems that also support 2-fac

factor authentication, using elements such as a PIN pad pad or biom iometric ic inputs.

  • Consider implementing physical security intrusion and

ano nomaly d det etec ection software.

  • Implement “feel

eel t tes ests” by guards to ensure badges are not fake printed badges

HID Global - Best Practices in Access Control White Paper (PDF) https://www.hidglobal.com/node/16181
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SLIDE 54

Defenses

54

R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S

  • Instruct employees no

not to wea ear t thei heir b badges es i in n prominent nent v view ew when outside the company premises.

  • Utilize RFID

ID c card s shi hiel elds when the badge is not in use to prevent drive-by card sniffing attacks.

  • Physically protect the RFID badge readers by using

se security sc screws that require special tools to remove the cover and access security components.

  • Employ the tamper

er d det etec ect m mec echa hani nisms to prevent badge reader physical tampering. All readers and doors should be monitored by d by CCT CCTV.

HID Global - Physical Reader Security, Tamper, and Supervisor Features (PDF) http://www.hidglobal.com/physical-reader-security-tamper-and-supervisor-features
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SLIDE 55

Defenses (Broken)

55

S O M E D O N ’ T . . . E X A M P L E . . .

Shmoocon 2012 - Kristin Paget - Credit Card Fraud: The Contactless Generation http://www.shmoocon.org/2012/presentations/Paget_shmoocon2012-credit-cards.pdf
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SLIDE 56

Defenses

56

F L Y G E A R

  • RFID Blocking Skinny Jeans
  • RFID Blocking Vests and Clothes
  • RFID Blocking Bags and Backpacks
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SLIDE 57

Thank You

57

Bi Bishop

  • p F

Fox

  • x – see f

for mo more info:

http://www.bishopfox.com/resources/tools/rfid-hacking/