RFIDIOts!!! RFID Hacking without a Soldering Iron (... or a Patent - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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RFIDIOts!!! RFID Hacking without a Soldering Iron (... or a Patent - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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RFIDIOts!!! RFID Hacking without a Soldering Iron (... or a Patent Attorney :) Adam Laurie adam@algroup.co.uk http://www.apache-ssl.org http://trifinite.org http://rfidiot.org BlackHat Europe 2007 Amsterdam, The Netherlands What is RFID?

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SLIDE 1

RFIDIOts!!! RFID Hacking without a Soldering Iron (... or a Patent Attorney :)

Adam Laurie

adam@algroup.co.uk http://www.apache-ssl.org http://trifinite.org http://rfidiot.org

BlackHat Europe 2007 Amsterdam, The Netherlands

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SLIDE 2

What is RFID?

  • Contacless Auto-ID technology

– Radio Frequency or Magnetically Coupled chip

  • Chip is passive
  • Energy from reader activates the chip
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SLIDE 3

What is it for?

  • Simple ID only

– Door Entry Systems

  • e.g. HID
  • Smartcards

– Payment Cards

  • e.g. Oyster

– Biometrics

  • e.g. Passports
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SLIDE 4

RFID – Moo am I?

  • Animal ID
  • Hotel Keys
  • Car Immobilisers
  • Ski Passes
  • Goods Labels
  • Luggage Handling
  • Vending
  • Human Implants
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SLIDE 5

Selling the idea of Human Implants

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SLIDE 6

Human Implants

  • Military

– Access Control

  • Mental Patients

– Tracking

  • Beach Bars

– Digital Wallets

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SLIDE 7

Unique ID!!!

  • Cannot be cloned
  • Cannot be cloned
  • Cannot be cloned
  • Cannot be cloned
  • Cannot be cloned
  • Cannot be cloned
  • Cannot be cloned
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SLIDE 8

Unique ID?

  • DIY Cloning Units

– http://cq.cx/vchdiy.pl

Spot the original?

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SLIDE 9

Unique ID?

  • DIY Cloning Units

– http://cq.cx/vchdiy.pl

  • Industry Defence:

Spot the original?

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SLIDE 10

Unique ID?

  • DIY Cloning Units

– http://cq.cx/vchdiy.pl

  • Industry Defence:

“Clones do not have the same form factor and are therefore not true clones” Spot the original?

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SLIDE 11

Unique ID?

  • Readers cannot 'see'

so form factor irrelevant

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SLIDE 12

Unique ID?

  • Readers cannot 'see'

so form factor irrelevant

=

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SLIDE 13

Cloning Devices

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SLIDE 14

Cloning Devices

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SLIDE 15

Cloning Devices

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SLIDE 16

Cloning Devices

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SLIDE 17

Cloning Devices

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SLIDE 18

Cloning Devices

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SLIDE 19

Cloning Devices

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SLIDE 20

Cloning Devices

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SLIDE 21

The Challenge

  • Create a 'true' clone

– Same ID – Same Form Factor

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SLIDE 22

Understanding the ID

  • Industry standard example

– Animal Tagging – ISO-11784/5 FDX-B

  • Application flag (Animal/Non-Animal)
  • 3 Digit Country or Manufacturer code
  • National ID
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SLIDE 23

Sending the ID

  • Reader and TAG will communicate with

– Specific frequency

  • 125/134.2 kHz
  • (13.56 MHz)

– Specific data bitrate

  • RF/2 - RF/128

– Specific encoding (modulation) scheme

  • FSK, Manchester, BiPhase, PSK, NRZ

– Specific bit patterns

  • Header / Data / CRC
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SLIDE 24

Decoding the ID

Byte 7 Byte 6 Byte 5 Byte 4 Byte 3 Byte 2 Byte 1 Byte 0 National ID Country Application Code

  • 8 Byte raw ID from 'dumb' reader

– Reverse MSB/LSB – Reverse each Nibble – Right shift (x2) – Convert to Decimal

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SLIDE 25

Decoding the ID

70 91 53 12 EA 6F 00 01

  • 8 Byte raw ID

– Reverse MSB/LSB – Reverse each Nibble

10 00 F6 AE 21 35 19 07 80 00 F6 57 48 CA 89 0E

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SLIDE 26

Decoding the ID

  • 8 Byte raw ID

– Country F65 rightshifted: 3D9 == '985' decimal

  • icar.org: 'Destron Fearing / Digital Angel Corporation'

– National ID 748CA890E == '31286003982'

80 00 F6 57 48 CA 89 0E Application ID 8000 Country F65 National ID 748CA890E

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SLIDE 27

Encoding the ID

  • Reverse the decoding process
  • Add Header / CRC to raw binary ID

– Fixed bits embedded in ID prevent header being

duplicated in datastream

  • Now we have 128 bits of raw bit-level ID

– How do we deliver it?

ID Header B CRC ID B ID B ID B ID B ID B ID B ID B 64 Bit ID

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SLIDE 28

Multi-Format Transponders

  • Why make 10 transponder types when you can

make 1?

– Lower manufacturing costs – Lower stocking/distribution costs – Convenience

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SLIDE 29

Multi-Format Transponders

  • Independently configurable parameters

– Q5

  • Configuration for Bit Rate, Modulation etc.
  • 224 Bits user programmable memory
  • Dump <n> data blocks on wakeup
  • Multiple 'personalities'

– Hitag2

  • Configuration for 'Public Modes'
  • 256 Bit user programmable memory
  • Dump <n> data blocks on wakeup as per Mode setting
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SLIDE 30

Sending the ID

  • Take a redundant Door Entry tag

– Re-Set configuration as appropriate

  • Bit Rate
  • Modulation
  • Inversion
  • Number of blocks to dump on 'wakeup'

– Program data blocks with raw ID

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SLIDE 31

Demonstration

  • Clone Trovan 'Unique' TAG

– Access Control System

  • Clone ISO 11784 'Animal' TAG (FDX-B)

– Cow Implant – VeriChip paperweight

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SLIDE 32

RFID implanted chip threats

  • Track individuals
  • Target individuals
  • Impersonate individuals

– Gain access to restricted areas – Provide alibi for accomplice!

  • 'Smart' Bombs

– Device only goes off if target of sufficient rank is in

range.

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SLIDE 33

Encryption is your friend

  • RFID Enabled

'Biometric' passports

  • 48 Items of Data

– Fingerprint – Facial Image – Birth Certificate – Home Address – Phone Numbers – Profession

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SLIDE 34

Keys to your kingdom

  • Pseudo random UID

– Cannot determine

presence of specific passport without logging in

  • Strong Authentication

– Basic Access Control

  • 3DES
  • Content Encryption

– Extended Access

Control

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SLIDE 35

Deriving the Keys

  • MRZ

– Machine Readable

Zone

  • Key

– Document Number – Date of Birth – Expiry Date

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SLIDE 36

ePassport Demonstration

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SLIDE 37

ePassport threats

  • Key data may be obtained through other

channels

  • Passport profiling

– Determine country of origin without logging in – Implementation errors:

  • Australian passport ID does not start with '08' on select
  • Australian passport does not require Basic Auth on 'File

Select', only on 'File Read'.

  • Target specific passport holders

– Bomb that detonates for Australians only...

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SLIDE 38

RFIDIOt

  • Open Source Python library
  • Hardware independent

– ACG – Frosch – OpenPCD coming soon

  • Low cost reader/writers now available

http://rfidiot.org

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SLIDE 39

ACG reaction to RFIDIOt

“Unfortunately your companies activities seem to be counter to ACG's interests so we will not be able to support you any further.”

Email - 3rd January, 2007

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SLIDE 40

Questions?

http://rfidiot.org adam@algroup.co.uk