RFID Hacking Live Free or RFID Hard 01 Aug 2013 Black Hat USA 2013 - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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RFID Hacking Live Free or RFID Hard 01 Aug 2013 Black Hat USA 2013 - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

RFID Hacking Live Free or RFID Hard 01 Aug 2013 Black Hat USA 2013 Las Vegas, NV Presen sented ed b by: Francis Brown Bishop Fox www.bishopfox.com Agenda O V E R V I E W Qu Quic ick k Over erview ew RFID badge


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SLIDE 1

RFID Hacking

Live Free or RFID Hard

01 Aug 2013 – Black Hat USA 2013 – Las Vegas, NV Presen sented ed b by: Francis Brown Bishop Fox www.bishopfox.com
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SLIDE 2

Agenda

2
  • Qu

Quic ick k Over erview ew

  • RFID badge basics
  • Hackin

king T g Tool

  • ols
  • Primary existing RFID hacking tools
  • Badge stealing, replaying, and cloning
  • Attacking badge readers and controllers directly
  • Planting Pwn Plugs and other backdoors
  • Cus

Custom S Solu lution

  • Arduino and weaponized commercial RFID readers
  • Def

efens enses es

  • Protecting badges, readers, controllers, and more

O V E R V I E W

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SLIDE 3

Introduction/Background

3

GETTING UP TO SPEED

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SLIDE 4

Badge Basics

4

Name Frequency Distance

Low Fequency (LF) 120kHz – 140kHz <3ft (Commonly under 1.5ft) High Frequency (HF) 13.56MHz 3-10 ft Ultra-High-Frequency (UHF) 860-960MHz (Regional) ~30ft

F R E Q U E N C I E S

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SLIDE 5

Legacy 125kHz

5

S T I L L K I C K I N

80%

  • “Legacy 125-kilohertz proximity technology is still in place at around

70% t % to 80% % of all physical access control deployments in the U.S. and it will be a long time” - Stephane Ardiley, HID Global.

  • “There is no

no security ty, the they’ y’ve b been ha n hacked, there’s no protection of data, no privacy, everything is in the clear and it’s not resistant to sniffing or common attacks.”

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SLIDE 6

Opposite of Progress

6

T A L K M O T I V A T I O N S

2007 2013

HID Global - Making the Leap from Prox to Contactless ID Cards https://www.hidglobal.com/blog/making-leap-prox-contactless-id-cards
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SLIDE 7

How a Card Is Read

7

P O I N T S O F A T T A C K

Card Reader Controller Wiegand output Host PC Ethernet

Card
  • Broadcasts 26-37 bit card number
Reader
  • Converts card data to “Wiegand Protocol”
for transmission to the controller
  • No access decisions are made by reader
Controller
  • Binary card data “format” is decoded
  • Makes decision to grant access (or not)
Host PC
  • Add/remove card holders, access privileges
  • Monitor system events in real time
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SLIDE 8

Badge Types

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  • The data on any access card is simpl

ply a a string of f bi binar ary nu number ers (ones and zeros) of some fixed configuration and length, used to identify the cardholder

  • HID makes di

diffe ferent t type ypes of f car ards capable of carrying this binary data including:

  • Magnetic Stripe
  • Wiegand (swipe)
  • 125 kHz Prox (HID & Indala)
  • MIFARE contactless smart cards
  • iCLASS contactless smart cards
* Multi-technology cards

H I D P R O D U C T S

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SLIDE 9

Badge Types

9
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SLIDE 10

Badge Basics

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C A R D E L E M E N T S Card – “Formats” Decoded

  • Card ID Number
  • Facility Code
  • Site Code (occasionally)
*Note: if saw printed card number on badge, could potentially brute force the 1-255 facility code (for Standard 26 bit card)
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SLIDE 11

Badge Formats

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HID ID ProxCar ard II II “F “Format ats”

  • 26

26 – 37 bi 37 bit c car ards ds

  • 44 bi

44 bits ac actual ally o y on c n car ard

  • 10

10 hex hex c char harac acters

  • Le
Leadi ading 0 g 0 usually ally dr droppe pped

D A T A F O R M A T S

HID Global – Understanding Card Data Formats (PDF) http://www.hidglobal.com/documents/understandCardDataFormats_wp_en.pdf
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SLIDE 12

Badge Formats

12

D A T A F O R M A T S

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SLIDE 13

RFID Other Usage

13

W H E R E E L S E ?

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SLIDE 14

RFID Hacking Tools

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P E N T E S T T O O L K I T

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SLIDE 15

Methodology

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3 S T E P A P P R O A C H

  • 1. Silently steal badge info
  • 2. Create card clone
  • 3. Enter and plant backdoor
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SLIDE 16

Distance Limitations

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A $ $ G R A B B I N G M E T H O D

Existing RFID hacking tools only work when a few centimeters away from badge

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SLIDE 17

Proxmark3

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R F I D H A C K I N G T O O L S

Single button, crazy flow diagram on lone button below $399

  • RFID Hacking swiss army knife
  • Read/simulate/clone RFID cards
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SLIDE 18

ProxBrute

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R F I D H A C K I N G T O O L S

  • Custom firmware for the Proxmark3
  • Brute-force higher privileged badges,

like data center door

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SLIDE 19

RFIDiot Scripts

19

R F I D H A C K I N G T O O L S

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SLIDE 20

RFIDeas Tools

20

R F I D H A C K I N G T O O L S

  • No software required
  • Identifies card type and data
  • Great for badges w/o visual

indicators of card type

$269.00

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SLIDE 21

Tastic Solution

L O N G R A N G E R F I D S T E A L E R

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SLIDE 22

Tastic RFID Thief

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  • Easily hide in briefcase or messenger bag,

read badges from up t p to 3 f 3 feet aw away

  • Silent powering and stealing of RFID badge

creds to be cloned later using T55x7 cards L O N G R A N G E R F I D S T E A L E R

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SLIDE 23

Tastic RFID Thief

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  • Designed using Fritzing
  • Exports to Extended-Gerber
  • Order PCB at www.4pcb.com
  • $33 for 1 PCB
  • Much cheaper in bulk

L O N G R A N G E R F I D S T E A L E R

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SLIDE 24

Custom PCB

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T A S T I C R F I D T H I E F Custom PCB – easy to plug into any type of RFID badge reader

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SLIDE 25

Wiegand Input

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Custom PCB – reads from Wiegand output of reader T A S T I C R F I D T H I E F

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SLIDE 26

Commercial Readers

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  • Indal

Indala L a Long ng-Ran ange R Reade eader 620 620

  • HID

ID Max axiProx 5375 5375AGN00

T A S T I C R F I D T H I E F

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SLIDE 27

Indala Cloning

27

E X A M P L E I N P R A C T I C E

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SLIDE 28

Tastic Solution: Add-ons

28

M O D U L E S T O P O T E N T I A L L Y A D D

  • Arduino NFC Shield
  • Arduino BlueTooth Modules
  • Arduino WiFly Shield (802.11b/g)
  • Arduino GSM/GPRS shields (SMS messaging)
  • WIZnet Embedded Web Server Module
  • Xbee 2.4GHz Module (802.15.4 Zigbee)
  • Parallax GPS Module PMB-648 SiRF
  • Arduino Ethernet Shield
  • Redpark - Serial-to-iPad/iPhone Cable
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SLIDE 29

Forward Channel Attacks

29

E A V E S D R O P P I N G R F I D

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SLIDE 30

Droppin’ Eaves

30

B A D G E B R O A D C A S T S

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SLIDE 31

Cloner 2.0 by Paget

31

E A V E S D R O P P I N G A T T A C K

  • Chris Paget talked of his tool reach

ching g 10 feet feet for this type of attack

  • Tool never actually released, unfortunately
  • Una

naware of any p ny pub ublic t tools that exist for this attack currently

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SLIDE 32

RFID Card Cloning

32

C A R D P R O G R A M M I N G

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SLIDE 33

Programmable Cards

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Simulate data and and behav behavior of any badge type

  • T55x7 Cards
  • Q5 cards (T5555)
Emu Emulat lating: g: HID 26bi 26bit car card
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SLIDE 34

Programmable Cards

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Cloning to T55x7 Card using Proxmark3

  • HID Prox Cloning – example:
  • Indala Prox Cloning – example:
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SLIDE 35

Reader and Controller Attacks

35

D I R E C T A P P R O A C H

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SLIDE 36

Reader Attacks

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J A C K E D I N

  • Dump private keys, valid badge

info, and more in few seconds

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SLIDE 37

Reader Attacks

37

G E C K O – M I T M A T T A C K

  • Insert in door reader of target

building – record badg badge #s #s

  • Tastic R

RFI FID Th Thief ief’s P PCB could be used similiarly for MITM attack

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SLIDE 38

Controller Attacks

38

J A C K E D I N

Shmoocon 2012 - Attacking Proximity Card Systems - Brad Antoniewicz http://www.shmoocon.org/2012/videos/Antoniewicsz-AttackingCardAccess.m4v
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SLIDE 39

Backdoors and Other Fun

39

L I T T L E D I F F E R E N C E S

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SLIDE 40

Pwn Plug

M A I N T A I N I N G A C C E S S

40
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SLIDE 41

Pwn Plug

M A I N T A I N I N G A C C E S S

  • Pwn Plug Elite: $995.00
  • Power Pwn: $1,495.00
41
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SLIDE 42

Raspberry Pi

42

M A I N T A I N I N G A C C E S S

  • Raspberry Pi - credit card sized, single-board computer – cheap $35
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SLIDE 43

Raspberry Pi

43

M A I N T A I N I N G A C C E S S

  • Raspberry Pi – cheap alternative (~$35

35) to Pwn Plug/Power Pwn

  • Pwnie Express – Raspberry Pwn
  • Rogue Pi – RPi Pentesting Dropbox
  • Pwn Pi v3.0
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SLIDE 44

Little Extra Touches

44

G O A L O N G W A Y

  • Fake polo shirts for target company
  • Get logo from target website
  • Fargo DTC515 Full Color ID Card ID Badge Printer
  • ~$500 on Amazon
  • Badge accessories
  • HD PenCam - Mini 720p Video Camera
  • Lock pick gun/set
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SLIDE 45

Defenses

45

A V O I D B E I N G P R O B E D

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SLIDE 46

RFID Security Resources

46

S L I M P I C K I N S . . .

  • RFID Security by Syngress
  • Not updated since July 2005
  • NIST SP 800-98 – Securing RFID
  • Not updated since April 2007
  • Hackin9 Magazine – Aug 2011
  • RFID Hacking, pretty decent
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SLIDE 47

Defenses

47

R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S

  • Consider implementing a more secure, active RFID

system (e.g. “contactless s ss smart c t cards”) that incorporates encrypt ption

  • n,

, mutual a authent hentica cation, and message replay protection.

  • Consider systems that also support 2-fac

factor authentication, using elements such as a PIN pad pad

  • r biom

iometric ic inputs.

  • Consider implementing physical security intrusion

and ano nomaly d det etec ection software.

HID Global - Best Practices in Access Control White Paper (PDF) https://www.hidglobal.com/node/16181
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SLIDE 48

Defenses

48

R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S

  • Instruct employees no

not to wea ear t thei heir b badges es i in n prominent nent v view ew when outside the company premises.

  • Utilize RFID

ID c card s shi hiel elds when the badge is not in use to prevent drive-by card sniffing attacks.

  • Physically protect the RFID badge readers by using

se security sc screws that require special tools to remove the cover and access security components.

  • Employ the tamper

er d det etec ect m mec echa hani nisms to prevent badge reader physical tampering. All readers and doors should be monitored by d by CCT CCTV.

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SLIDE 49

Defenses (Broken)

49

S O M E D O N ’ T . . . E X A M P L E . . . USA - Green Card Sleeve

  • Since May 11, 2010, new Green
Cards contain an RFID chip
  • Tested Carl’s “protec
  • tecti
tive s sleev eeve”, doesn’t block anything.
  • False sense of security
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SLIDE 50

Thank You

50 Bi Bisho hop F Fox – see f ee for
  • r mor
  • re i
e info:
  • :
http://www.bishopfox.com/resources/tools/rfid-hacking/