RFID Hacking
Live Free or RFID Hard
01 Aug 2013 – Black Hat USA 2013 – Las Vegas, NV Presen sented ed b by: Francis Brown Bishop Fox www.bishopfox.com
RFID Hacking Live Free or RFID Hard 01 Aug 2013 Black Hat USA 2013 - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
RFID Hacking Live Free or RFID Hard 01 Aug 2013 Black Hat USA 2013 Las Vegas, NV Presen sented ed b by: Francis Brown Bishop Fox www.bishopfox.com Agenda O V E R V I E W Qu Quic ick k Over erview ew RFID badge
RFID Hacking
Live Free or RFID Hard
01 Aug 2013 – Black Hat USA 2013 – Las Vegas, NV Presen sented ed b by: Francis Brown Bishop Fox www.bishopfox.comAgenda
2Quic ick k Over erview ew
king T g Tool
Custom S Solu lution
efens enses es
O V E R V I E W
Introduction/Background
3GETTING UP TO SPEED
Badge Basics
4Name Frequency Distance
Low Fequency (LF) 120kHz – 140kHz <3ft (Commonly under 1.5ft) High Frequency (HF) 13.56MHz 3-10 ft Ultra-High-Frequency (UHF) 860-960MHz (Regional) ~30ftF R E Q U E N C I E S
Legacy 125kHz
5S T I L L K I C K I N
70% t % to 80% % of all physical access control deployments in the U.S. and it will be a long time” - Stephane Ardiley, HID Global.
no security ty, the they’ y’ve b been ha n hacked, there’s no protection of data, no privacy, everything is in the clear and it’s not resistant to sniffing or common attacks.”
Opposite of Progress
6T A L K M O T I V A T I O N S
2007 2013
HID Global - Making the Leap from Prox to Contactless ID Cards https://www.hidglobal.com/blog/making-leap-prox-contactless-id-cardsHow a Card Is Read
7P O I N T S O F A T T A C K
Card Reader Controller Wiegand output Host PC Ethernet
CardBadge Types
8ply a a string of f bi binar ary nu number ers (ones and zeros) of some fixed configuration and length, used to identify the cardholder
diffe ferent t type ypes of f car ards capable of carrying this binary data including:
H I D P R O D U C T S
Badge Types
9Badge Basics
10C A R D E L E M E N T S Card – “Formats” Decoded
Badge Formats
11HID ID ProxCar ard II II “F “Format ats”
26 – 37 bi 37 bit c car ards ds
44 bits ac actual ally o y on c n car ard
10 hex hex c char harac acters
D A T A F O R M A T S
HID Global – Understanding Card Data Formats (PDF) http://www.hidglobal.com/documents/understandCardDataFormats_wp_en.pdfBadge Formats
12D A T A F O R M A T S
RFID Other Usage
13W H E R E E L S E ?
RFID Hacking Tools
14P E N T E S T T O O L K I T
Methodology
153 S T E P A P P R O A C H
Distance Limitations
16A $ $ G R A B B I N G M E T H O D
Existing RFID hacking tools only work when a few centimeters away from badge
Proxmark3
17R F I D H A C K I N G T O O L S
Single button, crazy flow diagram on lone button below $399
ProxBrute
18R F I D H A C K I N G T O O L S
like data center door
RFIDiot Scripts
19R F I D H A C K I N G T O O L S
RFIDeas Tools
20R F I D H A C K I N G T O O L S
indicators of card type
$269.00
Tastic Solution
L O N G R A N G E R F I D S T E A L E R
Tastic RFID Thief
22read badges from up t p to 3 f 3 feet aw away
creds to be cloned later using T55x7 cards L O N G R A N G E R F I D S T E A L E R
Tastic RFID Thief
23L O N G R A N G E R F I D S T E A L E R
Custom PCB
24T A S T I C R F I D T H I E F Custom PCB – easy to plug into any type of RFID badge reader
Wiegand Input
25Custom PCB – reads from Wiegand output of reader T A S T I C R F I D T H I E F
Commercial Readers
26Indala L a Long ng-Ran ange R Reade eader 620 620
ID Max axiProx 5375 5375AGN00
T A S T I C R F I D T H I E F
Indala Cloning
27E X A M P L E I N P R A C T I C E
Tastic Solution: Add-ons
28M O D U L E S T O P O T E N T I A L L Y A D D
Forward Channel Attacks
29E A V E S D R O P P I N G R F I D
Droppin’ Eaves
30B A D G E B R O A D C A S T S
Cloner 2.0 by Paget
31E A V E S D R O P P I N G A T T A C K
ching g 10 feet feet for this type of attack
naware of any p ny pub ublic t tools that exist for this attack currently
RFID Card Cloning
32C A R D P R O G R A M M I N G
Programmable Cards
33Simulate data and and behav behavior of any badge type
Programmable Cards
34Cloning to T55x7 Card using Proxmark3
Reader and Controller Attacks
35D I R E C T A P P R O A C H
Reader Attacks
36J A C K E D I N
info, and more in few seconds
Reader Attacks
37G E C K O – M I T M A T T A C K
building – record badg badge #s #s
RFI FID Th Thief ief’s P PCB could be used similiarly for MITM attack
Controller Attacks
38J A C K E D I N
Shmoocon 2012 - Attacking Proximity Card Systems - Brad Antoniewicz http://www.shmoocon.org/2012/videos/Antoniewicsz-AttackingCardAccess.m4vBackdoors and Other Fun
39L I T T L E D I F F E R E N C E S
Pwn Plug
M A I N T A I N I N G A C C E S S
40Pwn Plug
M A I N T A I N I N G A C C E S S
Raspberry Pi
42M A I N T A I N I N G A C C E S S
Raspberry Pi
43M A I N T A I N I N G A C C E S S
35) to Pwn Plug/Power Pwn
Little Extra Touches
44G O A L O N G W A Y
Defenses
45A V O I D B E I N G P R O B E D
RFID Security Resources
46S L I M P I C K I N S . . .
Defenses
47R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S
system (e.g. “contactless s ss smart c t cards”) that incorporates encrypt ption
, mutual a authent hentica cation, and message replay protection.
factor authentication, using elements such as a PIN pad pad
iometric ic inputs.
and ano nomaly d det etec ection software.
HID Global - Best Practices in Access Control White Paper (PDF) https://www.hidglobal.com/node/16181Defenses
48R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S
not to wea ear t thei heir b badges es i in n prominent nent v view ew when outside the company premises.
ID c card s shi hiel elds when the badge is not in use to prevent drive-by card sniffing attacks.
se security sc screws that require special tools to remove the cover and access security components.
er d det etec ect m mec echa hani nisms to prevent badge reader physical tampering. All readers and doors should be monitored by d by CCT CCTV.
Defenses (Broken)
49S O M E D O N ’ T . . . E X A M P L E . . . USA - Green Card Sleeve
Thank You
50 Bi Bisho hop F Fox – see f ee for