Quantum Position Verification in the random oracle model Dominique - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

quantum position verification in the random oracle model
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Quantum Position Verification in the random oracle model Dominique - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Quantum Position Verification in the random oracle model Dominique Unruh University of Tartu Dominique Unruh Position Verification Speed of light Position verified Quantum Position Verification 2 Dominique Unruh A generic protocol


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SLIDE 1

Dominique Unruh

Quantum Position Verification in the random oracle model

Dominique Unruh

University of Tartu

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SLIDE 2

Dominique Unruh

Position Verification

Speed of light  Position verified

2 Quantum Position Verification

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SLIDE 3

Dominique Unruh

A generic protocol

time space

x y f (x,y) g(x,y)

prover verifier 1 verifier 2

3 Quantum Position Verification

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SLIDE 4

Dominique Unruh

A generic attack

time space

x y f (x,y) g(x,y)

adv 1 verifier 1 verifier 2 adv 2

x y

4 Quantum Position Verification

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SLIDE 5

Dominique Unruh

Impossibility

  • Applies to 3D-protocols as well
  • Any number of verifiers
  • Any computational assumptions

(exception: transfer capacity limitations)

[CGMO09] Chandran, Goyal, Moriarty, Ostrovsky, Position Based Cryptography, Crypto 2009

5 Quantum Position Verification

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SLIDE 6

Dominique Unruh

Way out: quantum crypto

  • In attack: adversary copies x,y
  • If x or y quantum: No cloning!
  • Attack does not work
  • Other attacks?

– Without computational assumptions: Generic attack (exponential entanglement)

[BCF+11] Buhrman, Chandran, Fehr, Gelles, Goyal, Ostrovsky, Schafftner: Position-Based Quantum Crypto, Crypto 2011

x y

6 Quantum Position Verification

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SLIDE 7

Dominique Unruh

Quantum crypto: A secure protocol

time

|Ψ〉 Basis B

prover verifier 1 verifier 2 [TFKW13] Tomamichel, Fehr, Kaniewski, Wehner: One-Sided Device- Independent QKD and Position-Based Cryptography from Monogamy Games, Eurocrypt 2013 (and [BCF+11])

Assumption: No entangled photons Only 1D proof

7 Quantum Position Verification

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SLIDE 8

Dominique Unruh

Our protocol

time prover verifier 1 verifier 2

B := H(x1⊕x2)

  • Avoids attack
  • Provably secure (in random oracle model)

|Ψ〉

8 Quantum Position Verification

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SLIDE 9

Dominique Unruh

Right region Left region

Security proof (overview, 1D)

time verifier 1 verifier 2

|Ψ〉

x1⊕x2 not known Program H(x1⊕x2):=B

Light barrier

Measuring |Ψ〉 in 2 separated space regions for random B  Impossible [TFKW13]

9 Quantum Position Verification

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SLIDE 10

Dominique Unruh

3D case

  • 3D proof: regions overlap!
  • Need to program RO at different times in

different locations!

  • Leads to curved

“programming surface”

  • New tool:

spacetime circuits

10 Quantum Position Verification

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SLIDE 11

Dominique Unruh

Proof technique: Space-time circuits

  • How to reason about

events happening along curved space-time surfaces? Tricky!

  • Tool: Space-time circuits

– No wire leaves light cone

  • Then forget about

geometry, only connectivity

AND OR OR AND OR AND OR

11 Quantum Position Verification

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SLIDE 12

Dominique Unruh

Open problems

  • Improve error tolerance (3.7%)
  • Improve precision in 3D case
  • Security in standard model (no random oracle)?

Or even without hardness assumptions?

12 Quantum Position Verification

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SLIDE 13

Dominique Unruh

I thank for your attention

This research was supported by European Social Fund’s Doctoral Studies and Internationalisation Programme DoRa

Logo soup

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SLIDE 14

Dominique Unruh

Attack on [TFKW13]

entan- gled

  • No entanglement = strong assumption
  • Does not work in 3D (bug in [BCF+09] proof)

14 Quantum Position Verification

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SLIDE 15

Dominique Unruh

Monogamy game

Alic Alice Bo Bob Re Refer eree

ρ

Basis Basis Basis

x1 x2 x3

Pr[x1=x2=x3] small

[TFKW13]

15 Quantum Position Verification

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SLIDE 16

Dominique Unruh

Security in higher dimensions?

Programming the random oracle: When all signals reach honest P (no later!) Picture: Which space-point reaches which verifier after programming

16 Quantum Position Verification

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SLIDE 17

Dominique Unruh

Programming later?

Assume that adv is not in δ radius of P. Then achieve non-

  • verlapping

regions  apply monogamy Quality: δ = 0.38 * |V-P|

17 Quantum Position Verification

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SLIDE 18

Dominique Unruh

Multiparty Monogamy Game

A B Re Refer eree

Basis

x1

ρ

C D

commuting simultaneous x2 x3 x4 x5

Pr[all xi equal] small???

18 Quantum Position Verification

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SLIDE 19

Dominique Unruh

Security proof

19 Quantum Position Verification

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SLIDE 20

Dominique Unruh

Result:

  • Our protocol is secure if:
  • Geometric condition, e.g. honest prover in the

middle of verifier-tetrahedron Only the honest prover is at a point in spacetime such that:

– Can be reached from all verifiers – Can reach V1, V2

Because monogamy- games for two recipients only

20 Quantum Position Verification

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SLIDE 21

Dominique Unruh

Proof technique: Space-time circuits

  • How to reason about

events happening along curved space-time surfaces? Tricky!

  • Tool: Space-time circuits

– No wire leaves light cone

  • Then forget about

geometry, only connectivity

AND OR OR AND OR AND OR

21 Quantum Position Verification