Professional Performance The Warren Centre Sirui Sun (M.E. Chemical - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Professional Performance The Warren Centre Sirui Sun (M.E. Chemical - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Professional Performance The Warren Centre Sirui Sun (M.E. Chemical and Biomolecular) Leying Yang (B.E. Civil (Environmental)) Joseph Kong (B.E. Mechanical) Andrew Levula (Line manager) INTRODUCTION Engineering profession already has


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Professional Performance

The Warren Centre

Sirui Sun (M.E. Chemical and Biomolecular) Leying Yang (B.E. Civil (Environmental)) Joseph Kong (B.E. Mechanical) Andrew Levula (Line manager)

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INTRODUCTION

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  • Engineering profession already has Competence and Ethics standards
  • After case studies, Engineers’ Performance is another factor affect the

engineering deliverable

Good engineering deliverable

Code of Ethic (sources: Engineers Australia)

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THREE LEGGED STOOL

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  • Performance is the missing ‘third leg of the stool’

Ethic, competency and performance (sources: PPIR)

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PPIR

4 PPIR eight elements (source: PPIR)

  • The Warren Centre introduces the Professional Performance innovation

and risk (PPIR) protocol

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Case studies of failure should be made a part of the vocabulary of every engineer so that he or she can recall or recite them when something in a new design

  • r design process is suggestive of what went wrong in

the case study. – Henry Petroski

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OBJECTIVE

6 Structure for each case study

Our Final Report outlines:

  • Identify the importance of the PPIR
  • Detailed investigation into six case studies
  • Provides analysis of failures bases on the eight elements of PPIR
  • Highlights potential outcomes using the PPIR protocol
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CIVIL ENGINEERING FAILURES

7 London bridge, Syncrude tailings dam, Opera house, London city

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Case Studies 1: Ok Tedi Tailings Dam

8 Ok Tedi Mine site

Description

  • Dumped excavation material at an unstable slope
  • On 6 January 1984, a landslide occurred
  • No people died due to this incident

Ok Tedi tailings dam location (source: Griffiths, J)

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Case Studies 1: Ok Tedi Tailings Dam

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Competence to Act

  • Many experienced and senior experts had

visited the site

  • Rechecking the aerial photographs

Aerial photograph (source: Griffiths, J) Plan view of Ok Tedi tailings dam (source: Griffiths, J)

Risk Management

  • Fast-tracking method
  • Pervious assumptions proved inaccurate
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Case Study 2: Fundão Tailings Dam

10 The village of Bento Rodrigues after the disaster (source: Wikipedia)

Description

  • 5th of November 2015, failure occurred at the left abutment of the Fundão Tailings dam
  • Destroying the ecosystem of the Doce River
  • 18 casualties
  • Direct cause: liquefaction

Mud reach Atlantic Ocean (source: Wikipedia)

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Case Study 2: Fundão Tailings Dam

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Engineering Task Management

  • The quality of drain system was unacceptable

Before incident happened (source: Investigation report) After incident happened (source: Investigation report)

Risk Management

  • Solved visible problem
  • Did not consider its impact on whole project
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MECHNANICAL ENGINEERING FAILURES

12 Piping system

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CASE STUDY 3: HMAS WESTRALIA FIRE

13 HMAS Westralia alongside HMAS Regina (source: Wikipedia)

Description

  • 5th of May 1998, a significant fuel leak was appeared at a cylinder
  • Nearby exposed hot engine ignited the fuel
  • Four casualties all from acute smoke inhalation
  • Incorrect flexible hoses was used

The area where the fire started. (source: Investigation report)

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CASE STUDY 3: HMAS WESTRALIA FIRE

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Competence to Act

  • Involved engineers have insufficient knowledge

to carry out this project

Filed supply hose on the cylinder (source: Investigation report) The indicator cocks at cylinders 8, 9 & 10. (source: Investigation report)

Relevant Parties and Other Stakeholders

  • Lack of proper approval procedure
  • Stakeholders: ADI (contractor carry out

maintenance program) and ENZED (subcontractor carry out the selection of the flexible hoses)

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CASE STUDY 4: FLIXBOROUGH EXPLOSION

15 The Fires Seen From South-west

Description

  • Occurred in a caprolactam plant
  • Leak from reactor circuit
  • Ignited by furnace
  • Killing 28 and injuring 36 inside the Plant
  • Burned for 10 days

The Flixborough Disaster Memorial

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CASE STUDY 4: FLIXBOROUGH EXPLOSION

16 Creases in Bellows Evident in a Simulation Test for 20-inch By-pass Assembly Reactor 5 Showing Crack Leading to Removal and Replacement by By-pass

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CASE STUDY 4: FLIXBOROUGH EXPLOSION

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The Engineering Task

  • Replace reactor using the by-pass
  • Aware of the task and instructions
  • Poor design without liaising with professionals

Design of 20-inch By-pass Assembly Fliborough Disaster without Quality Assurance Process

Engineering Task Management

  • No measures of Quality Assurance
  • No strength test
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CHEMICAL ENGINEERING FAILURES

18 Chemical Disaster

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CASE STUDY 5: BP TEXAS CITY REFINERY EXPLOSION

19 Placement Surrounding the ISOM Unit

Description

  • 15 deaths and 180 injured
  • Release and overheating of combustible vapour cloud
  • All fatalities were in or near office trailers
  • Occurred in start-up of isomerisation (ISOM)

Emergency of Texas City Refinery Explosion

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CASE STUDY 5: BP TEXAS CITY REFINERY EXPLOSION

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Engineering Task Management

  • Supervisor decision
  • Board Operator response
  • Night Lead Operator irresponsible attitude

Raffinate Splitter Tower Diagram BP Texas Refinery Employee

The Engineering Task

  • BP Board of Director (Assess performance)
  • Night Board Operator (Logbook)
  • Day Supervisor (Communication)
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CASE STUDY 6: TIANJIN PORT EXPLOSION

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Description

  • 165 deaths, 8 missing and 798 injured on 12 August 2015
  • Nitrocellulose self-ignition
  • Ignited other dangerous goods and exploded
  • Six severe conflagration points and couples of small burning spots
  • Equivalent to 450 tonnes of TNT

The Second Explosion in Tianjin Port Ruins in Centre of Explosion

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CASE STUDY 6: TIANJIN PORT EXPLOSION

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Statutory Requirements and public interest

  • Near communities
  • High volume of chemical goods
  • Without management system and emergency strategy

Risk Management

  • Without conducting risks
  • No professional engineer
  • Potential risk

Clean the Ruins After Explosion Investigation After Explosion

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KEY FINDINGS

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  • A need for PPIR performance protocol
  • Changes in management process
  • Risk management
  • The application involves in engineering task
  • Internationally recognised protocol
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CONCLUSION

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Engineering Project Competency and Ethical Standards PPIR Protocol Better and Safer Engineering Outcomes

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