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PPI PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE The implications of the Coalition - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

PPI PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE The implications of the Coalition Governments public service pension reforms Pensions Policy Institute Nuffield Foundation 16 May 2013 www.pensionspolicyinstitute.org.uk PPI PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE The


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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE

Pensions Policy Institute Nuffield Foundation 16 May 2013 www.pensionspolicyinstitute.org.uk

The implications of the Coalition Government’s public service pension reforms

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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE

Niki Cleal, PPI Director Chris Curry, PPI Research Director Pensions Policy Institute Nuffield Foundation 16 May 2013 www.pensionspolicyinstitute.org.uk

The implications of the Coalition Government’s public service pension reforms

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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE
  • Objective: to provide an independent

assessment of the implications of the Coalition’s reforms to the four largest public sector schemes;

  • NHS, Teachers, Civil Service & LGPS
  • Research was funded by the Nuffield

Foundation – a charitable trust

PPI’s Research on Public Service Pension Reform

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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE
  • The Coalition Government’s Reforms to

the public service schemes

  • PPI research methodology
  • Implications of the reforms for members of

the four largest public sector schemes

  • Implication for the sustainability of public

service schemes

  • Conclusions

Public Service Pension Reform - Agenda

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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE

There are seven main public service pension schemes with around 5 million active members

Number of active members of public sector pension schemes as of 31 March 2011 (millions)

1.6 1.3 0.7 0.6 0.2 0.15 0.05 Local Government NHS Teachers' Civil Service Armed Forces Police Fire

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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE
  • Switch from Final Salary to Career

Average Revalued Earnings (CARE);

  • Linking of Normal Pension Age to State

Pension Age (except uniformed services);

  • Higher rates of contributions from scheme

members (+3.2% on average except LGPS) and tiered contributions;

  • Reforms apply to all members for future

accrual but protections for members within 10 years from their Normal Pension Age on 1 April 2012.

The Coalition’s reforms to the public service schemes

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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE

NHS Teachers’ Civil Service Local Government Normal Pension Age SPA SPA SPA SPA Basic design CARE CARE CARE CARE Revaluation CPI + 1.5% CPI + 1.6% CPI CPI Accrual rate 1/54th 1/57th 1/43rd 1/49th Member contributions (future service) 5% to 14.5% 6.4% to 8.8% 4.6% to 9% 5.5% to 12.5% Indexation of pensions paid CPI CPI CPI CPI Implementation 1 April 2015 1 April 2015 1 April 2015 1 April 2014

The largest four public sector pension schemes post reforms

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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE
  • Effective Employee Benefit Rate;
  • Factors in CARE accrual & revaluation rate,

pensions indexation to project the value of the future pension benefit payment after taking account of the member’s own contributions;

  • Discounts the value of the future pension benefit

back to a present value; (DR = CPI + 3%)

  • The EEBR is the value of the pension benefit

accrued by the member in one-year expressed as a % of the member’s salary.

  • How much extra pay that member would need

to be given by their employer to compensate for the employer closing the scheme.

PPI’s EEBR methodology

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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE

The Coalition Government’s proposed reforms reduce the value to pre 2008 entrants of the NHS Pension Scheme by more than a third

Impact of each component of the Coalition Government’s proposed reforms on average value of the pension for members who joined the NHS Pension Scheme before 1 April 2008

23% 14% 3% 3% 3%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%

Value of CPI linked pension before Coalition reforms Impact of average 3.2% increase on contributions Impact of switch to CARE scheme Impact of linking retirement to SPA Value after Coalition Government proposed reforms

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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE

The Coalition Government’s proposed reforms reduce the value to members of the Local Government Pension Scheme by more than a third

Impact of each component of the Coalition Government’s proposed reforms on average value of the pension for members of the Local Government Pension Scheme

22% 14% 0% 7% 1%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%

Value of CPI linked pension before Coalition reforms Impact of restructuring contributions Impact of switch to CARE scheme Impact of linking retirement to SPA Value after Coalition Government proposed reforms

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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE

23% 23% 22% 27% 23% 7% 23% 14% 14% 14% 17% 15%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35%

NHS Pension Scheme Teachers' Pension Scheme Local Government Pension Scheme Principal Civil Service Pension Scheme Average Four Main Public Service Schemes Average Private Sector Defined Contribution Average Private Sector CPI-linked Defined Benefit

Value before Coalition reforms Value after Coalition reforms

The Coalition Government’s proposed reforms reduce the average value of the public service pension schemes by more than a third

Average value of the four main public service pension schemes as a percentage of the scheme member’s salary before and after the Coalition Government’s proposed reforms for all scheme members (CPI linked)

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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE

29% 15% 11% 15%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% NHS Pension Scheme under Final Salary with CPI increases NHS Pension Scheme under Coalition Government proposed reforms

High-flyer Low-flyer

High-flyers and low-flyers have a pension benefit worth the same percentage of their salary under the Coalition Government’s proposed reforms

Value of the NHS Pension Scheme to members joining before 1 April 2008 who are: a high flying 40 year old man compared with low flying 40 year old man who both start at the median earning level at age 40

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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE

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The impact on the affordability of public service pension schemes

Unfunded schemes:

  • Net Government expenditure on the NHS, Teachers,

Civil Service and uniformed services schemes

  • Reflects how much cash the Government spends

every year to run the schemes, deducting members’ contributions. LGPS:

  • Gap between pension payments made by the LGPS

and employee contributions received.

  • Illustrates the level of strain on employer

contributions and investment returns to fill the gap.

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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE

Government expenditure on the unfunded public service pension schemes will increase in the short term and decrease in the long term

Net government expenditure on unfunded public service pension schemes, as % of GDP

0.0% 0.2% 0.4% 0.6% 0.8% 1.0% 1.2% 1.4% 1.6% 1.8% 2.0% 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060 2065

Pre-reform CPI, pre-reform member contributions Pre-reform CPI, post-reform member contributions Post-reform, post-reform member contributions

1.1% 1.0% 0.8% 14

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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE

Government expenditure on unfunded public service schemes could depend on employee opt-out rates

Net government expenditure on unfunded public service schemes, as a percentage of GDP

0.0% 0.2% 0.4% 0.6% 0.8% 1.0% 1.2% 1.4% 1.6% 1.8% 2.0% 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060 2065

Baseline opt-out Higher opt-out Lower opt-out

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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE

The gap between benefit payments and member contributions in the LGPS will decrease following the Coalition Government’s reforms

LGPS benefit payments minus employee contributions, as a percentage of GDP

0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060 2065 Pre-reform Post-reform

0.4% 0.3% 16

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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE

A change in employee opt-out rate will affect the gap between pensions in payment and employee contributions in the LGPS

LGPS benefit payments minus employee contributions, as a percentage of GDP

0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060 2065

Baseline opt-out Higher opt-out Lower opt-out

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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE
  • The Coalition Government’s reforms to the

public service schemes reduce the value of the four largest schemes by more than a third

  • Some public sector members will be affected to a

greater extent, others to a lesser extent

  • Public service schemes remain more valuable

than most private sector DC schemes

  • The reforms reduce government expenditure in

the unfunded schemes and reduce the pressure

  • n investment returns and employer

contributions in the LGPS. However, this will depend on employee opt-out rates

Conclusions

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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE

Richard Brown, Deputy Director, Workforce, Pay and Pensions, HM Treasury Pensions Policy Institute Nuffield Foundation 16 May 2013 www.pensionspolicyinstitute.org.uk

The implications of the Coalition Government’s public service pension reforms

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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE

Craig Berry, Pensions Policy Officer, Trades Union Congress Pensions Policy Institute Nuffield Foundation 16 May 2013 www.pensionspolicyinstitute.org.uk

The implications of the Coalition Government’s public service pension reforms

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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE

Mike Taylor, Chief Executive, London Pensions Fund Authority Pensions Policy Institute Nuffield Foundation 16 May 2013 www.pensionspolicyinstitute.org.uk

The implications of the Coalition Government’s public service pension reforms

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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE

Questions for discussion

  • Do the reforms achieve a balance between

fairness and long-term sustainability?

  • Is a career average scheme the most

proper design for public service pensions?

  • What would be an adequate level for

public service pensions?