Positioning Relay Nodes in ISP Networks Meeyoung Cha (KAIST) Sue - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Positioning Relay Nodes in ISP Networks Meeyoung Cha (KAIST) Sue - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Positioning Relay Nodes in ISP Networks Meeyoung Cha (KAIST) Sue Moon (KAIST) Chong-Dae Park (KAIST) Aman Shaikh (AT&T Labs Research) 1 IEEE INFOCOM 2005 Poster Session Routing Instability in the Internet Network-wide changes are


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Meeyoung Cha (KAIST) Sue Moon (KAIST) Chong-Dae Park (KAIST) Aman Shaikh (AT&T Labs – Research)

Positioning Relay Nodes in ISP Networks

IEEE INFOCOM 2005 Poster Session

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Routing Instability in the Internet

  • Network-wide changes are frequent and may propagate
  • slowly. During routing instability, persistent end-to-end

connections experience packet delay, jitter, and loss.

  • How to increase reliability and robustness of

mission-critical services in the event of network

failures?

  • Use “Path Diversity”
  • ex) overlay networks
  • RON [Anderson et al., SOSP 2001]
  • Detour [Savage et al., IEEE Micro 1999]
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Path Diversity – Disjoint Overlay Path

disjoint overlay path

Destination

(egress router) d e f a u l t p a t h relays

ISP Network Intuition: Disjoint overlay path gives maximum robustness against single link or router failures! Origin

(ingress router)

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Objective of Our Work

  • Previous work was focused on selecting good relay nodes

under pre-deployed relay nodes.

  • As an ISP, consider a problem of optimal relay node

positioning; relaying packets could be value-added

service. Focus of this work is to find a minimal set of relay

nodes that offer as much path diversity as possible

to all OD pairs.

Under Assumptions:

  • Intra-domain routing [Shortest Path First (SPF) Routing]
  • ISP network topology
  • Disjoint overlay path uses only one relay
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Practice of Path Diversity in a Typical ISP Network

  • Completely disjoint overlay paths are often not possible.

ex) Equal Cost Multi-Paths (ECMPs) (AR: Access Router, BR: Border Router)

Intra-PoP AR AR BR BR BR BR AR AR Inter-PoP

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Partially Disjoint Overlay Path

Destination

(egress router)

default path relays

ISP Network

Partially disjoint

  • verlay path

Origin

(ingress router)

When completely disjoint overlay paths are not available, we allow overlapped links.

  • verlapped link
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Efficacy of disjoint paths

  • Network is resilient as long as either the default or the
  • verlay path is not affected by a failure

→ Disjoint paths are preferred → Overlapped links will diminish the efficacy of overlay paths

Path disjointness?

  • depends on the number of overlapped links
  • how do we quantify path disjointness?
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Penalty for Overlapped Links

0.5 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.125 0.125 0.875 0.125 1.0

  • d
  • Define Io,d,l (impact of a single link failure)
  • assume traffic is evenly split among shortest paths
  • Io,d,l = Pr[od fails | link l fails]
  • fraction of traffic that traverse l for od
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Disjointness between two paths

  • Define Ko,d(r) = ∑l Io,d,l (Io,r,l + Ir,d,l)

– Path disjointness between od and ord – Ko,d(r) / |E| =

Pr[od & ord fails | a single link failure]

  • r

default path

  • verlay path

d

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Selecting Relay Nodes for Overlay Path

  • Based on the intuitive notion of penalty for partially

disjoint overlay paths, we find relay nodes that incur the least amount of penalty.

  • To evaluate our algorithm, we give preliminary results on

how relay nodes selected by our algorithm increase network resiliency in a real network topology.

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Evaluation Settings

  • We use an operational tier-1 I SP backbone

and the real failures logs that spans six-month. Topology - 100 routers, 200 links, ECMP 53% Event logs - June 1~ Nov 30, 2003

  • only link and router down events considered

Hypothetical traffic matrix

  • assumes equal amount of traffic between OD pairs

Assume rerouting is done instantaneously after events

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Hypothetical Traffic Lost from Event Logs

lost 0% of traffic ( graceful shutdown ) worst cases less than 1%

  • f traffic lost

65% 77% 93%

(failure events)

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Preliminary Results

  • Network resilience to real failures increases as we

increase the number of relay nodes. However, there certainly exists a saturation point.

  • When five relay nodes are used,
  • complete protection against 75.3% of failure events
  • for 92.8% of failure events, less than 1% of

hypothetical traffic is affected

  • A small number of relay nodes is effective over the entire

course of six months.

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Conclusions

  • Propose a simple greedy algorithm for selecting the

number and positions of relay nodes in a network

run by a single AS.

  • When it is not possible to find completely disjoint paths,

we allow overlapped links btwn two paths, and introduce the measure of penalty for the overlapped links.

  • Evaluate the efficacy of our algorithm with an
  • perational tier-1 I SP network.
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Further Works

  • Implementation Issues
  • relays on VoIP gateways
  • Properties of relay nodes
  • topological insight
  • whether relays are selected on ARs or BRs
  • bandwidth / position / load-balancing of relays
  • how often should we reposition relays?
  • Lower layer path diversity
  • how to incorporate fiber map into our algorithm?

END