Policy Instruments for a Low-Carbon Economy CCCEP Conference on - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Policy Instruments for a Low-Carbon Economy CCCEP Conference on - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Policy Instruments for a Low-Carbon Economy CCCEP Conference on Grand Challenges 16 September 2010 Sam Fankhauser Grantham Research Institute and CCCEP London School of Economics Overview The key elements of carbon policy Putting a


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SLIDE 1

Policy Instruments for a Low-Carbon Economy

CCCEP Conference on Grand Challenges 16 September 2010

Sam Fankhauser Grantham Research Institute and CCCEP London School of Economics

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SLIDE 2

Overview

  • The key elements of carbon policy
  • Putting a price on carbon
  • Tax vs trade
  • Tax and trade
  • Hybrid instruments
  • Conclusions
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SLIDE 3

The key elements of carbon policy

Put a price

  • n carbon

Support low-carbon technology Remove barriers to energy efficiency Taxes, Cap & trade R&D policy Regulation Incentives Finance

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SLIDE 4

Taxes vs permits: the basic Weitzman result

  • Marg. Abatement Cost

Flat MB curve

  • Marg. Abatement Cost

Steep MB curve target target MAC MAC MB MB

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SLIDE 5

Taxes vs permits: the basic Weitzman result

  • Marg. Abatement Cost

Choose tax

  • Marg. Abatement Cost

Choose permits target target MAC MAC MB MB

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SLIDE 6

Applying Weitzman to Climate Change

  • For stock pollutants the marginal damage curve is flat

in the short run (Pizer, Hoel)

  • Because the atmospheric stock is large, emissions

today have the same effect as emissions tomorrow

  • Some countries have adopted (more or less) binding

carbon constraints (UK, all of Annex 1)

  • Meeting a fixed target through a price is expensive

(Fehr): their marginal benefit curve is steep

  • Political economy favours cap and trade
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SLIDE 7

Combining taxes with trade

  • Policy makers are increasingly willing to combine

taxes with trade

  • Either to underpin the price (UK, France) or create a

safety valve (US, Australia)

  • They also combine other market instruments with

trade (e.g. renewable energy support)

  • Multiple market failures justify multiple instruments
  • e.g. the case for R&D support
  • But there can be unintended consequences
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SLIDE 8

Example: UK policies parallel to the EU ETS

  • Tax and trade
  • Climate Change Levy
  • Subsidy and trade
  • Renewable heat incentive; small-scale feed in tariff
  • Trade on trade
  • CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme
  • Regulation and trade
  • Renewable energy obligation, energy performance

standards

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SLIDE 9

Combining taxes with trade: the simplest case

A tax on top of the cap reduces the carbon price by the same amount. The overall price signal (t+p) is constant, but the carbon market is undermined

price

target MAC

cap

p t quantity

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SLIDE 10

Targeted taxes or subsidies may have the same effect

The expensive mitigation action D (renewables?) is forced into the mix, reducing the price at the margin and crowding out action C

Q

abatement

Q

abatement

MAC ($)

A B F

p* Q*

C E D $s

MAC ($) p*

A B F

Q*

C E D $s

p’ Q

abatement

Q

abatement

MAC ($)

A B F

p* Q*

C E D $s

MAC ($) p*

A B F

Q*

C E D $s

p’ Q

abatement

MAC ($)

A B F

p* Q*

C E D $s

MAC ($) p*

A B F

Q*

C E D $s

p’ MAC ($) p*

A B F

Q*

C E D $s

p’

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SLIDE 11

Support of intra-marginal activities creates rent

Q

abatement

Q

abatement

MAC ($)

A

p* Q*

C E D F B $s

MAC ($)

A

p* Q*

C E D F B $s

Q

abatement

Q

abatement

MAC ($)

A

p* Q*

C E D F B $s

MAC ($)

A

p* Q*

C E D F B $s

Q

abatement

MAC ($)

A

p* Q*

C E D F B $s B $s

MAC ($)

A

p* Q*

C E D F B $s B $s

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SLIDE 12

Support of extra-marginal activities has no price effect

Q

abatement

MAC ($)

A B

p* Q*

C E D F $s

Q

abatement

MAC ($)

A B

p* Q*

C E D F $s

Q

abatement

MAC ($)

A B

p* Q*

C E D F $s F $s

Q

abatement

MAC ($)

A B

p* Q*

C E D F $s F $s

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SLIDE 13

Hybrid instruments

  • Auction reserve price
  • Underpins the carbon price
  • Safety valve
  • Curtails the carbon price
  • Cap and collar
  • Combines reserve price and safety valve
  • Contract for differences
  • Stabilises the carbon price
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SLIDE 14

Collar creates an upward sloping supply curve

price price quantity quantity

Fixed cap Collar

D’ D D’ D

p p

S = cap

q q = const

S

Reduces price fluctuation but introduces quantity uncertainty

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SLIDE 15

Conclusions

  • Price ceilings and underpins (cap and collar) may be

justified if excessive price fluctuations are undesirable

  • Support for particular technologies (renewables, CCS)

may be desirable from a long-term perspective

  • Subsidising the move down the learning curve
  • Hybrid instruments are better at stabilising the carbon

price than pure tax and trade

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SLIDE 16

Other work by the LSE Carbon Market Group

  • Linking regional cap-and-trade schemes
  • Hybrid schemes and other price containment

mechanisms

  • Understanding Carbon Price Fluctuations
  • Understanding the CDM – EUA spread
  • Impact of Carbon Regulation on Technology Uptake

and Innovation

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SLIDE 17

Policy Instruments for a Low-Carbon Economy

CCCEP Conference on Grand Challenges 16 September 2010

Sam Fankhauser Grantham Research Institute and CCCEP London School of Economics