PET PhD Course 2012 SWITS The Smart Grid and Anonymous - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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PET PhD Course 2012 SWITS The Smart Grid and Anonymous - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

PET PhD Course 2012 SWITS The Smart Grid and Anonymous Communication Mechanisms Leonardo Martucci Security and Networks Group, ADIT Department of Computer and Information Science About me EE Degree (95-00) + Master in EE (00-02)


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PET PhD Course 2012 SWITS The Smart Grid and Anonymous Communication Mechanisms

Leonardo Martucci

Security and Networks Group, ADIT Department of Computer and Information Science

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About me

EE Degree (95-00) + Master in EE (00-02)

University of São Paulo

PhD in CS (04-09)

Karlstad University

Postdoc (09-12)

Center for Advanced Security Research

Technische Universität Darmstadt

Postdoc (12- )

Linköping University

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The Smart Grid: What we already know

We already know: What the Smart Grid is How the Smart Grid is organized Why privacy is a concern in the Smart Grid Standards for the Smart Grid That there are already PET proposals for it

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A Sudden Interest

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About this presentation

Based on the paper: “Analysis of Privacy-Enhancing Protocols Based on Anonymity Networks ”

  • F. Borges, L. Martucci and M. Mühlhäuser

to appear SmartGridComm 2012 with some bits from:

“A Survey on Privacy-Enhancing Technologies for the Smart Grid ”

  • F. Borges and L. Martucci

under submission

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In this presentation

General Research Question on Privacy in the Smart Grid

A theoretical PET for the Smart Grid and PET categories

General Anonymous Communication Networks

Computational performance against a general homomorphic encryption solution

* we that work on privacy

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How NIST sees the Smart Grid

* National Institute of Standards and Technology

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How we* see the Smart Grid

information

* we that work on privacy

produces information collects information Personal Identifiable Information SP & O

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How we* see the Smart Grid

information

* we that work on privacy

produces information collects information Personal Identifiable Information customer SP & O

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The Information Flow in the Smart Grid

Two information flows with different natures

real-time control data billing data SP & O customer

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Real-Time Control Data

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Real-Time Control Data

(Nonintrusive Appliance Load Monitoring)

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General Research Question

Personal Identifiable Information BUT

allow billing according to a given pricing scheme

allow real-time control over the electricity network

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Recalling

Two information flows with different natures

SP & O real-time control data billing data customer

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Testing a theoretical PET

Assuming a method M that eliminates the source from real-time control data and direct communication between customer and SP&O IF M THEN there is no M that protects privacy

customer control data SP & O billing data differentiate sources, but not identify them

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Considering other options

Modify the control data

Solutions based on data aggregation, batteries and micro-generation

customer f (control data) SP & O

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Considering other options

NO direct communication between customers and SP&O

  • TTP-based solutions
  • Use partial identities and distinct communication channels

according to the nature of the information flow

Real-time control data

Billing data customer 2 Partial identities pseudonym customer ID

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PET Categories for the Smart Grid

The 6 different strategies

A.

Symmetric Data Aggregation

B.

Asymmetric Data Aggregation

C.

Anonymous Communication Networks

D.

Schemes based on Trusted Third Parties

E.

Batteries and Local Generation Schemes

F.

(Hybrid Schemes)

* from “A Survey in Privacy-Enhancing Technologies for the Smart Grid” 18/32

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Designing PETs for the Smart Grid

information SP & O customer

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Today we address

The 6 different strategies

A.

Symmetric Data Aggregation

B.

Asymmetric Data Aggregation

C.

Anonymous Communication Networks

D.

Schemes based on Trusted Third Parties

E.

Batteries and Local Generation Schemes

F.

(Hybrid Schemes)

* from “A Survey in Privacy-Enhancing Technologies for the Smart Grid” 20/32

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Anonymous Communication Networks and the Smart Grid

Established concept + new application scenario

The objective: sender anonymity towards the SP&O Secure Session

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The General Solution: Partial Identities and Anonymous Communication

Group ID is used for geographical reasons group ID customer ID SP & O begin secure session end secure session

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The relation between sets of customers, IDs, pseudonyms and secure sessions

group ID customer ID secure sessions

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How many messages per session?

  • ne secure session only

privacy tends to zero

1 pseudonym for all messages

  • ne secure session = one key agreement

  • ne secure session per message

maximum privacy

1 pseudonym per message

n messages = n key agreements

maximum computational cost (!)

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Simulation: Measurements and Sessions

Processing time and measurements per session (obviously)

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Analysis: Establishing Secure Sessions

We analyze and compare the computational performance of

a general solution based on homorphic encryption (HF) customer: 2.i.E + i.M sp&o: (i-1).M

a solution based on a Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement (IK) for customer: 4.j.E sp&o: 4.j.E i = number of measurements j = number of secure sessions E = exponential cost M = multiplication cost

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Analysis: Performance HF and IK (i = j)

Homorphic functions perform better for i = j (maximum privacy)

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Analysis: more measurements / sessions

Defining an inequality assuming constant costs for M and E we have i.e. 4 messages / secure session for similar performance

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Simulation: measurements / sessions

exponention cost is not constant for the chosen bit-lenghts

10-bit message, 1024-bit for all other HF parameters 1024-bit for DH parameters (modulo 2048 bits)

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Conclusions

There are different PET strategies for the Smart Grid

One are the anonymous communication networks.

it is about their core (how messages are forwarded) but also about their end-nodes (computational costs)

We compared the computational cost for end nodes in:

building secure sessions for a general anon. comm. net. and compared against a general homomorphic encr. solution

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A final note (again!)

Based on the paper: “Analysis of Privacy-Enhancing Protocols Based on Anonymity Networks ”

  • F. Borges, L. Martucci and M. Mühlhäuser

to appear SmartGridComm 2012 with some bits from:

“A Survey on Privacy-Enhancing Technologies for the Smart Grid ”

  • F. Borges and L. Martucci

under submission

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leonardo.martucci@liu.se

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