Optimal Keywork Bids in Search-Based Advertising with Stochastic Ad - - PDF document

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Optimal Keywork Bids in Search-Based Advertising with Stochastic Ad - - PDF document

Optimal Keywork Bids in Search-Based Advertising with Stochastic Ad Positions S. Cholette, . zlk and M. Parlar* *DeGroote School of Business McMaster University King Mongkut's University of Technology Thonburi 5 Singhakhom 2556 1 1


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Optimal Keywork Bids in Search-Based Advertising with Stochastic Ad Positions

  • S. Cholette, Ö. Özlük and M. Parlar*

*DeGroote School of Business McMaster University

King Mongkut's University of Technology Thonburi

5 Singhakhom 2556

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1

1 Introduction

  • Only 2.6 million internet users in 1990, but nearly

1.6 billion by 2010

  • 2.6(1 + i)20 = 1600 → i = 38% growth p.a.
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2

  • Banner ads (not our concern!) Click -> pay money
  • Keyword ads, or, search based advertising (our con-

cern!)

  • Search engine advertising is new (Google 2001)
  • We focus on Google
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3

  • Basics of SBA (Keyword ads)
  • A keyword results in,
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4 — (i) Organic search results, — (ii) Sponsored results

  • Keyword: “Bike Tours Italy”
  • Google holds an instantaneous auction (GSP) among

the advertisers bidding on that keyword: — bid + “ad quality”

  • If you click on a sponsored link,

— You are directed to the advertiser’s website, and — Google charges the advertiser for the click.

  • Downside: Huge bills -> Budget
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5 — If budget exceeded, the ad is not displayed for the rest of the day,

  • Problem: Choose the optimal bid price(s) subject

to budget

2 Literature Review

  • Rusmeivichientong and Williamson (2006): Select key-

words

  • Devanur and Hayes (2009): Sorting bids (Google’s

problem)

  • Özlük and Cholette (2007): Optimal bid (not sto-

chastic)

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6

  • Our work: (i) Stochastic model, ad position is ran-

dom, (ii) budget-related constraints

3 Preliminaries

  • Our model in Figure 1.
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7 Figure 1: A simple influence diagram for the model.

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8

3.1 Distribution of the Ad Position X

  • Bid price b is our d.v. [c

//click].

  • For a fixed b, the ad position is a r.v. X ≡ X(b)
  • Ads on the first page attract attention
  • First page as “unit” interval [0, 1]. Use beta for X

fX(x; b) = Γ(a + b) Γ(a)Γ(b)xa−1(1−x)b−1, (0 < x < 1) (1)

  • Figure 2 for beta when a = 20.
  • High values of a correspond to high competition
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9 Figure 2: Three dimensional graph of the beta density fX(x; b) when a = 20. Note that for small (large) values

  • f b, the density is left- (right)-skewed.
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10

3.2 The Expected Value E[(1 − X)m]

  • An interesting property of the beta

G(b) = E[(1 − X)m] = Γ(a + b)Γ(b + m) Γ(b)Γ(a + b + m). (2)

  • When m = 1, G(b) = b/(a + b) is increasing con-

cave

4 Factors Affecting the Expected Profit P(b)

4.1 The Expected Revenue R(b)

  • Important factors
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11 4.1.1 IPT: # Impressions Per Time (const., [impr/time])

  • How often the ad displayed per day (keyword popu-

larity) 4.1.2 CTR: Click-Thru-Rate (r.v. [click/impr])

  • “Number” (rate) of clicks per impression
  • Y ≡ CTR
  • fY (y | x) = [p(x)]y[1 − p(x)]y−1, y = 0, 1,

[Bernoulli with parameter p(x)]

  • p(x) = (1 − x)m for m ≥ 1
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12 4.1.3 CPT: # Clicks Per Time (r.v. [click/time])

  • Let Yj ≡ CTR(j): CTR for the jth impression
  • V = IPT

j=1 Yj : # of clicks per time (binomial)

  • U ≡ (V | X = x) =

IPT

j=1 Yj | X = x

  • is nor-

mal with mean µU(x) = IPT · p(x)

  • Ad positions closer to 1 have higher variability CPTs

— Variability of CPT is thru its c.o.v. cv(x) = xn where > 1 and n ≥ 1

  • Write k ≡ IPT

Proposition 1 The expected number of clicks per time is E(CPT) = E(V ) = kG(b) .

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13 4.1.4 RPC: Revenue Per Click (r.v., [c //click])

  • Mean µW (and variance σ2

W)

  • Revenue per time

— product of (i) the number of clicks per time, and (ii) the revenue per click, W R ≡

 

IPT

  • j=1

Yj

  · RPC = V · W

Proposition 2 The expected revenue is R(b) = E[R(b)] = µWkG(b) .

4.2 Expected Cost

  • Cost per time is a r.v. [c

//time] (Recall: V is # clicks/time) C(b) = b · (CPT) = b · (IPT · CTR) = b · V .

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14 Proposition 3 The expected cost C(b) = E[C(b)] = bkG(b) .

4.3 Expected Profit

  • Since expected profit P(b) = R(b) − C(b), we have

P(b) = kG(b)(µW − b).

  • Optimization problem with budget constraint

maxb≥0 P(b) = R(b) − C(b) s.t. C(b) ≤ B.

  • Once b is known, can find Pr{C(b) ≥ B}

Proposition 4 The expected profit P(b) unimodal in b. (Figure 3.)

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15 Figure 3: The expected profit function P(b) is unimodal in b with the (unconstrained) global maximizer at b0.

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16 Corollary 1 When budget is exhausted, we find b∗ and shadow price λ from P(b) = λC(b) , and C(b) = B .

5 The Probability of Random Cost Exceeding the Budget

  • The realized total cost may exceed the budget
  • We maximize P(b) s.t. the constraint h(b) ≡ Pr[C(b) ≥

B] ≤ θ

5.1 Probabilistic Constraint

  • Conditional cost S = (bV | X) is normal with

fS(s | x) = 1 σS √ 2π exp

  −1

2

  • s − µS(x)

σS

2   .

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17

  • The probability Pr{C(b) ≥ B} is

h(b) =

1 ∞

B

fS(s) ds

  • fX(x, b) dx.

(3)

  • Evaluate h(b) numerically

5.2 Efficient Frontier Analysis

  • Vary b over a range and generate (P(b), h(b)) ->

efficient frontier

  • See Table 1 for a summary.

6 Bid Prices for a Single Keyword

  • Now consider the four models
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18

No Budget Probabilistic Trade-off Constraints Constraint Constraint Solution

max P(b) max P(b) max P(b) (P(b), h(b)) s.t. C(b) ≤ B s.t. h(b) ≤ θ Table 1: Description of the four models considered in this paper.

6.1 No Budget Constraint

  • Special case with m = 1.
  • For this problem P(b) = kb(µW − b)/(a + b)
  • Since P(b) is strictly concave, its maximizer is

b0 =

  • a2 + aµW − a > 0.
  • Note that for mean revenue per click µW,

∂b0 ∂µW = a 2

  • a(a + µW)

> 0.

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19

6.2 Budget Constraint

  • When there is a budget constraint C(b) ≤ B we

have, for m = 1 b∗ =

      

b0 =

  • a2 + aµW − a,

if C(b0) ≤ B ˆ b = B +

  • B2 + 4kBa

2k , if C(b0) > B.

6.3 Probabilistic Constraint

  • Consider now h(b) where

h(b) =

1

  • 1

2 − 1 2 erf

  • B − µS(x)

√ 2σS(x)

  • fX(x, b) dx ≤ θ.

(4) and, µS(x) = bµU(x), and σ2

S = b2σ2 U(x),

  • When m = 1, let ˜

b = h−1(θ), and b∗ =

  

b0 =

  • a2 + aµW − a,

if h(b0) ≤ θ ˜ b = h−1(θ), if h(b0) > θ.

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6.4 Efficient Frontier Analysis and Trade-

  • ff Solutions
  • Simply evaluate (P(b), h(b)) for each feasible value
  • f b.
  • Then, choose the “ideal” combination (P(b), h(b))

and find b.

6.5 Example with a Single Keyword

Example 1 A single keyword problem with [a, k, , m, n | µW, B | θ] = [20, 500, 5, 1, 1 | 50, 3000 | 0.10]. With these data, the expected profit P(b) is a concave function in Figure 4.

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b 10 20 30 40 50 E P b 1000 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000

Figure 4: The expected profit function P(b) = E[P(b)] for the one keyword case in Example 1 reaches its uncon- strained maximum at b0 = 17.4 with P(b0) = 7583.4. Once the budget constraint C(b) ≤ B is taken into account, the constrained optimal solution is found as ˆ b = 14.3 with P(ˆ b) = 7447.3.

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b 10 20 30 40 50 h b 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7

Figure 5: The probability h(b) = Pr[C(b) ≥ B] that the actual cost will exceed the budget B in Example 1.

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E P b 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 h b 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7

E2 E1

Each point on this graph corresponds to a (P(b), h(b))-pair in Example 1 for a fixed value of bid price b which is varied from 1 to 50 in increments of 0.1.

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No Budget Probabilistic Trade-off Constraints Constraint Constraint Solution

b 17.4 14.3 4.97 7.0 P(b) 7583.4 7447.3 4482.1 5574.1 C(b) 4053.5 3000 494.6 907.4 h(b) 0.53 0.49 0.10 0.25 Table 2: Numerical solution for the four problems with a single keyword and with parameter values [a, k, , m, n | µW, B | θ] = [20, 500, 5, 1, 1 | 50, 3000 | 0.10]. For the constrained budget case (BC), the shadow price is found as λ = 0.28.

  • Shadow price λ = 0.28 (for each cent increase in

budget, the profit increases by approx. 0.28, or rev- enue by 1.28).

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7 Analysis with Multiple Keywords

  • In reality, many potential keywords to utilize (14,000?)
  • When we consider multiple keywords,

T R(b) =

N

  • j=1

kjµWjGj(bj) T C(b) =

N

  • j=1

kjbjGj(bj)

  • If there is no budget constraint, and m = 1,

T P(b) =

N

  • j=1

kjbj(µWj − bj) aj + bj . b0

j =

  • a2

j + ajµWj − aj > 0,

j = 1, 2, . . . , N. (5)

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  • If there is a budget constraint T C(b) ≤ B and

T C(b0) > B, then solve maxb≥0 T P(b) s.t. T C(b) = B (6)

  • Shadow price λ for the budget constraint from the

Lagrangian L(b, λ) = P(b) − λ[C(b) − B] ∇bL(b, λ) = 0, and ∂L(b, λ) ∂λ = 0 , (7)

  • Probability of exceeding the budget

h(b) =

1

0 · · ·

1 ∞

B

fS(s) ds

  • fX(x, b) dx.

(8)

  • If the solution of problem (6) results in an unaccept-

ably high value for h(b), then we would solve the new problem maxb≥0 T P(b) s.t. h(b) = Pr[TC(b) ≥ B] ≤ θ.

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27

  • A menu of (P(b), h(b)) values which can be used

to pick a trade-off solution.

7.1 Example with Two Keywords

Example 2 Re-consider Example 1 with B = 3000, but allow for a second keyword. We use [a, k, , m, n | µW, B | θ] = [(20, 30), (500, 250), (5, 4), (1, 1), (1, 1) | (50, 30), 3000 | 0.10]. This KW #2 is less risky (lower CPT variance) but yields less return.

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28 Surface of the total expected profit function T P(b) with two KWs in Example 2.

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29 The probability h(b) = Pr[TC(b) > B] that the actual cost will exceed budget B with two KWs in Example 2.

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E TP b 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 h b 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8

E1 E2

Each point on this graph corresponds to a (T P(b), h(b))-pair in Example 2 for a fixed value of bid prices b = (b1, b2).

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No Budget Probabilistic Trade-off Constraints Constraint Constraint Solution

b

(17.4, 12.4) (12.8, 8.8) (4.6, 5.0) (10, 5) T P(b) 8870.2 8462.3 5163.8 7559 T C(b) 4963.4 3000 615.4 1845 h(b) 0.56 0.49 0.10 0.41 Table 3: Numerical solution for the four problems with two keywords and parame- ter values [a, k, , m, n |

µW, B

| θ] = [(20, 30), (500, 250), (5, 4), (1, 1), (1, 1) | (50, 30), 3000 | 0.10]. For the constrained budget case (BC), the shadow price is found as λ = 0.48.

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  • Sensitivity of the solution to θ; see below
  • Sharp decrease in expected profit for small θ
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q 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 E TP b * 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000

The change in maximum expected profit T P(b∗) = E[TP(b∗)] as θ varies.

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  • Sensitivity of the difference b∗

1 − b∗ 2 to θ; see below

  • Very small θ, bid more on the less risky keyword
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q 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 b1

* K b2 *

1 1 2 3 4 5

The change in the difference in optimal bid prices b∗

1 − b∗ 2 as θ varies.

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36

7.2 Three or More Keywords

  • Problems 1 and 2 are easy for any N (even thou-

sands!)

  • Problem 3: With N ≥ 3, solution involving h(b) is

difficult: — A quadruple integral for N = 4: 204 = 160000 computations in numerical integration.

8 Summary and Conclusions

  • We maximized expected profit s.t. budget
  • Shadow price for budget.
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37

  • Extensions:

— Collecting actual data — Max Pr{TP(b) ≥ Target Level} s.t. budget constraint — Efficient methods for Problem 3 — Game- theory issues?