OPENING QUESTIONS 1 Discuss in pairs What does this paper - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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OPENING QUESTIONS 1 Discuss in pairs What does this paper - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Aug 14, 2022 155 likes •553 views

OPENING QUESTIONS 1 Discuss in pairs What does this paper accomplish? What is the mechanism they propose? What is its output? Is it budget balanced? Why does this mechanism not require a common prior? How do results weve

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OPENING QUESTIONS

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Discuss in pairs

  • What does this paper accomplish?
  • What is the mechanism they propose?
  • What is its output?
  • Is it budget balanced?
  • Why does this mechanism not require a common prior?
  • How do results we’ve seen rely on this assumption?

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TRUTHFUL SURVEYS

Mike Ruberry & Victor Shnayder

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The story

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The story

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The story

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The story

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Hill climbing

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Hill climbing

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Payoffs:

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Hill climbing

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Q: What’s the Nash equilibrium of this game? Q: What is the expected value of the game?

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n-player Hill climbing

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Hill climbing (with a hill)

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Hill climbing (with a hill)

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Hill climbing questions:

  • Q: We have a hill, it’s common knowledge,

and now we’re asking people to report an x— what’s the equilibrium of this game?

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Hill climbing (with a hill)

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Hill climbing questions:

  • Q: Now what if instead of knowing the hill, a

trusted party (or Nature) provides you with a uniformly at random sample of the function. Is everyone reporting this sample a Nash equilibrium?

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Hill climbing questions:

  • Q: Does this method work for any

distribution?

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Hill climbing questions:

  • Q: If one hill is common knowledge or

uniformly at random sampled from, intuitively why would we expect play relative to this function instead of some arbitrary other one? Both are Nash equilibria.

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The (truthful) survey

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Implied distribution

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Hill climbing

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Hill climbing

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Two players in the survey

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The mechanism

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The mechanism

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Questions

  • How is this different from the hill climbing

game we portrayed earlier?

  • Is the equilibrium unique?
  • Given the other players in your group are

playing as expected, what’s your best response(s)?

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The trusted survey mechanism

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The trusted survey mechanism

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Trusted survey questions

  • Is reporting honestly a unique equilibrium?

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The story (again)

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The story (again)

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The story (again)

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The story (again)

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Discussion

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ERRATA

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Learning signal distribution

Signal 1 % population with at least this signal

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Learning signal distribution

Signal 1 % population with at least this signal and its derivative

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Learning signal distribution

Signal 1 Probability of receiving a signal, realized distribution compared to beliefs 1

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