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Jun 06, 2023 •213 likes •771 views

Outline Introduction Security of Tandem-DM Concluding Remarks On the Security of Tandem-DM Ewan Fleischmann, Michael Gorski, Stefan Lucks Bauhaus-University Weimar February 23, 2009 Ewan Fleischmann, Michael Gorski, Stefan Lucks On the

Outline Introduction Security of Tandem-DM Concluding Remarks On the Security of Tandem-DM Ewan Fleischmann, Michael Gorski, Stefan Lucks Bauhaus-University Weimar February 23, 2009 Ewan Fleischmann, Michael Gorski, Stefan Lucks On the Security of Tandem-DM
Outline Introduction Security of Tandem-DM Concluding Remarks Introduction 1 Blockcipher Based Hashing Examples of DBL Hash Functions Security of Tandem-DM 2 Results on Collision Resistance Results on Preimage Resistance Model for the proof Proof Details Concluding Remarks 3 Ewan Fleischmann, Michael Gorski, Stefan Lucks On the Security of Tandem-DM
Outline Introduction Blockcipher Based Hashing Security of Tandem-DM Examples of DBL Hash Functions Concluding Remarks Approaches to building a cryptographic hash function From Scratch (MD4, MD5, SHA-0/1, SHA-256/512, RIPEMD, ...) From a blockcipher (MMO, DM, MDC-2/4, Tandem-DM, Abreast-DM, ...) From number-theoretic primitives or hard problems (lattices, modular arithmetic, ...) Ewan Fleischmann, Michael Gorski, Stefan Lucks On the Security of Tandem-DM
Outline Introduction Blockcipher Based Hashing Security of Tandem-DM Examples of DBL Hash Functions Concluding Remarks Approaches to building a cryptographic hash function From Scratch (MD4, MD5, SHA-0/1, SHA-256/512, RIPEMD, ...) From a blockcipher (MMO, DM, MDC-2/4, Tandem-DM, Abreast-DM, ...) From number-theoretic primitives or hard problems (lattices, modular arithmetic, ...) Ewan Fleischmann, Michael Gorski, Stefan Lucks On the Security of Tandem-DM
Outline Introduction Blockcipher Based Hashing Security of Tandem-DM Examples of DBL Hash Functions Concluding Remarks Approaches to building a cryptographic hash function From Scratch (MD4, MD5, SHA-0/1, SHA-256/512, RIPEMD, ...) From a blockcipher (MMO, DM, MDC-2/4, Tandem-DM, Abreast-DM, ...) From number-theoretic primitives or hard problems (lattices, modular arithmetic, ...) Ewan Fleischmann, Michael Gorski, Stefan Lucks On the Security of Tandem-DM
Outline Introduction Blockcipher Based Hashing Security of Tandem-DM Examples of DBL Hash Functions Concluding Remarks Approaches to building a cryptographic hash function From Scratch (MD4, MD5, SHA-0/1, SHA-256/512, RIPEMD, ...) From a blockcipher (MMO, DM, MDC-2/4, Tandem-DM, Abreast-DM, ...) From number-theoretic primitives or hard problems (lattices, modular arithmetic, ...) Ewan Fleischmann, Michael Gorski, Stefan Lucks On the Security of Tandem-DM
Outline Introduction Blockcipher Based Hashing Security of Tandem-DM Examples of DBL Hash Functions Concluding Remarks Blockcipher Based Hashing - Why? Several attacks on MD4-type functions in recent years (MD4/5, SHA family, RIPEMED, ...) Only one primitve for encryption and hashing Low cost hardware Ewan Fleischmann, Michael Gorski, Stefan Lucks On the Security of Tandem-DM
Outline Introduction Blockcipher Based Hashing Security of Tandem-DM Examples of DBL Hash Functions Concluding Remarks Blockcipher Based Hashing - Why? Several attacks on MD4-type functions in recent years (MD4/5, SHA family, RIPEMED, ...) Only one primitve for encryption and hashing Low cost hardware Ewan Fleischmann, Michael Gorski, Stefan Lucks On the Security of Tandem-DM
Outline Introduction Blockcipher Based Hashing Security of Tandem-DM Examples of DBL Hash Functions Concluding Remarks Blockcipher Based Hashing - Why? Several attacks on MD4-type functions in recent years (MD4/5, SHA family, RIPEMED, ...) Only one primitve for encryption and hashing Low cost hardware Ewan Fleischmann, Michael Gorski, Stefan Lucks On the Security of Tandem-DM
Outline Introduction Blockcipher Based Hashing Security of Tandem-DM Examples of DBL Hash Functions Concluding Remarks Blockcipher Based Hashing - Why not? Usually slower than dedicated hash function Weaknesses not relevant for encryption (e.g. DES weak keys) Output length too short (e.g. 128 bits for AES) = ⇒ double block length constructions needed (e.g. hash output size of 256 bits for AES) Ewan Fleischmann, Michael Gorski, Stefan Lucks On the Security of Tandem-DM
Outline Introduction Blockcipher Based Hashing Security of Tandem-DM Examples of DBL Hash Functions Concluding Remarks Blockcipher Based Hashing - Why not? Usually slower than dedicated hash function Weaknesses not relevant for encryption (e.g. DES weak keys) Output length too short (e.g. 128 bits for AES) = ⇒ double block length constructions needed (e.g. hash output size of 256 bits for AES) Ewan Fleischmann, Michael Gorski, Stefan Lucks On the Security of Tandem-DM
Outline Introduction Blockcipher Based Hashing Security of Tandem-DM Examples of DBL Hash Functions Concluding Remarks Blockcipher Based Hashing - Why not? Usually slower than dedicated hash function Weaknesses not relevant for encryption (e.g. DES weak keys) Output length too short (e.g. 128 bits for AES) = ⇒ double block length constructions needed (e.g. hash output size of 256 bits for AES) Ewan Fleischmann, Michael Gorski, Stefan Lucks On the Security of Tandem-DM
Outline Introduction Blockcipher Based Hashing Security of Tandem-DM Examples of DBL Hash Functions Concluding Remarks Blockcipher Based Hashing - Why not? Usually slower than dedicated hash function Weaknesses not relevant for encryption (e.g. DES weak keys) Output length too short (e.g. 128 bits for AES) = ⇒ double block length constructions needed (e.g. hash output size of 256 bits for AES) Ewan Fleischmann, Michael Gorski, Stefan Lucks On the Security of Tandem-DM
Outline Introduction Blockcipher Based Hashing Security of Tandem-DM Examples of DBL Hash Functions Concluding Remarks Blockcipher Based Hashing - The Goal ’Secure’ (ideal cipher model) e.g. birthday type collision resistance Long hash output (e.g. >> 128 bits = blocksize) Efficient: efficiency = size of message input number of blockcipher calls needed to process this input Ewan Fleischmann, Michael Gorski, Stefan Lucks On the Security of Tandem-DM
Outline Introduction Blockcipher Based Hashing Security of Tandem-DM Examples of DBL Hash Functions Concluding Remarks Blockcipher Based Hashing - The Goal ’Secure’ (ideal cipher model) e.g. birthday type collision resistance Long hash output (e.g. >> 128 bits = blocksize) Efficient: efficiency = size of message input number of blockcipher calls needed to process this input Ewan Fleischmann, Michael Gorski, Stefan Lucks On the Security of Tandem-DM
Outline Introduction Blockcipher Based Hashing Security of Tandem-DM Examples of DBL Hash Functions Concluding Remarks Blockcipher Based Hashing - The Goal ’Secure’ (ideal cipher model) e.g. birthday type collision resistance Long hash output (e.g. >> 128 bits = blocksize) Efficient: efficiency = size of message input number of blockcipher calls needed to process this input Ewan Fleischmann, Michael Gorski, Stefan Lucks On the Security of Tandem-DM
Outline Introduction Blockcipher Based Hashing Security of Tandem-DM Examples of DBL Hash Functions Concluding Remarks Blockcipher Based Hashing - The Goal ’Secure’ (ideal cipher model) e.g. birthday type collision resistance Long hash output (e.g. >> 128 bits = blocksize) Efficient: efficiency = size of message input number of blockcipher calls needed to process this input Ewan Fleischmann, Michael Gorski, Stefan Lucks On the Security of Tandem-DM
Outline Introduction Blockcipher Based Hashing Security of Tandem-DM Examples of DBL Hash Functions Concluding Remarks Example: Hirose’s FSE’06 proposal H i − 1 E H i G i − 1 M i const G i E Rate 1/2, Output size: 2n (i.e. AES-256 256 bits) Collision Resistance: > 2 124 . 5 for CF ( n , 2 n )-blockchiffre, n-bit cipher/plaintext, 2n-bit key Ewan Fleischmann, Michael Gorski, Stefan Lucks On the Security of Tandem-DM
Outline Introduction Blockcipher Based Hashing Security of Tandem-DM Examples of DBL Hash Functions Concluding Remarks Example: Hirose’s FSE’06 proposal H i − 1 E H i G i − 1 M i const G i E Rate 1/2, Output size: 2n (i.e. AES-256 256 bits) Collision Resistance: > 2 124 . 5 for CF ( n , 2 n )-blockchiffre, n-bit cipher/plaintext, 2n-bit key Ewan Fleischmann, Michael Gorski, Stefan Lucks On the Security of Tandem-DM
Outline Introduction Blockcipher Based Hashing Security of Tandem-DM Examples of DBL Hash Functions Concluding Remarks Example: Hirose’s FSE’06 proposal H i − 1 E H i G i − 1 M i const G i E Rate 1/2, Output size: 2n (i.e. AES-256 256 bits) Collision Resistance: > 2 124 . 5 for CF ( n , 2 n )-blockchiffre, n-bit cipher/plaintext, 2n-bit key Ewan Fleischmann, Michael Gorski, Stefan Lucks On the Security of Tandem-DM
Outline Introduction Blockcipher Based Hashing Security of Tandem-DM Examples of DBL Hash Functions Concluding Remarks Tandem-DM - a DBL hash function E H i − 1 H i M i G i − 1 G i E Rate 1 / 2, Output: 2 n (i.e. AES-256: 2 n = 256-bit) Proof of Collision Resistance: this presentation/paper ( n , 2 n )-blockchiffre, n-bit cipher/plaintext, 2n-bit key Ewan Fleischmann, Michael Gorski, Stefan Lucks On the Security of Tandem-DM

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