NATO and Space Security July 6, 2018 Jana Robinson, Ph.D. Space - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

2018 NATO Summer School

NATO and Space Security July 6, 2018

Jana Robinson, Ph.D. Space Security Program Director Prague Security Studies Institute

July 6, 2018 PSSI 1

Presentation Overview

• New Space Security Landscape
• Space in Support of NATO
• Space As a Priority for NATO?
• Beyond Operations and Tactics Toward a Comprehensive Policy?
• PSSI Efforts to Strengthen Space Security

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New Space Security Landscape

• Technology and geopolitics are changing the global space security landscape
• Space is congested: active satellites (some 1800), space debris
• Space is contested: due to high reliance on space for national security,

authoritarian space competitors seem intent on testing the resiliency of satellites, ground infrastructure and links using cyber attacks, jamming/spoofing and blinding,

• rbital manoeuvers, proximity operations and high-altitude ASAT tests, to name a

few.

• Space is competitive: 12 countries have launch capabilities, more than 70

countries and governmental consortia operate in space, surge of new space companies, competition for orbital slots and satellite radio frequencies

• These developments have implications for NATO mission

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Space in Support of NATO

• NATO operations are space enabled (e.g. SATCOM, PNT, ISR, SSA, infrared

missile launch warning, weather, etc.).

• NATO does not own, or directly operates, on-orbit assets, it relies on national and

commercial capabilities

• Availability of space capability discretion of the satellite owners (countries,

commercial entities)

• NATO owns ground segments that receive SATCOM information to support its
• perations

July 6, 2018 PSSI 4

Space as a Priority for NATO?

• Space is an operational, warfighting domain
• Space-based information required for NATO planning and operations
• Space-dependent NATO will be faced with more contested space environment,

including space hybrid threats, and will have to consider their national assets’ resiliency and deterrence

• NATO will need to understand changing national and international space

frameworks, policies, and engagements.

• Allied collaboration in space represents a powerful symbol of shared values and

transatlantic unity

July 6, 2018 PSSI 5

Beyond Operations and Tactics Toward a Comprehensive Policy?

• NATO currently does not have comprehensive space framework.
• NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept warns about the deployment of technologies that

threaten allied capabilities in space.

• Increased awareness about the potential of adversaries seeking to exploit their
• wn access to space for military purposes to the detriment of the Alliance is critical

(NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations, 2016).

• Far more consideration needs to be given to China and Russia as major space

competitors (including their global E&F footprint and “space sector capture”)

• NATO can build on past efforts in this area (e.g. the NATO Space Handbook of

Dec 2013, Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations, etc.)

July 6, 2018 PSSI 6

Beyond Operations and Tactics Toward a Comprehensive Policy?

• At a strategic level:
• promote TCBMs, norms of responsible behavior and best practices
• enhance and expand space partnerships
• contribute to strengthening deterrence of allied space assets
• configure cross-domain responses to space hybrid operations and

disruptions (including possible future attacks on space assets)

• At an operational level: space needs to be fully integrated in NATO planning and

command structures.

• NATO personnel should be trained to maximize exploitation of space capabilities

and operate in a degraded space environment.

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PSSI Efforts to Strengthen Space Security

• Helping expand and deepen space partnerships, including

through its high-level Space Security Conference series

• ngoing since 2011
• Conducting original research with regard to China and

Russia’s space-related transactional footprints worldwide and their methods and incentive structures to engage in what we term “space sector capture” under the guise of benign space partnerships.

• Research on cross-domain responses to malevolent acts in

space, principally via economic and financial penalties on Earth

• Highlighting challenges related to space hybrid threats

July 6, 2018 PSSI 8