Ministerial Leadership in the 21st Century Daiwa House 20 February - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Understanding Prime Ministerial Leadership in the 21st Century

Daiwa House 20 February 2020

Fathoming Fragility and Seeking Stability: Understanding Prime Ministerial Leadership in the 21st Century

We are exploring the phenomenon that the prime minister is becoming stronger in Japan at the same time that the UK prime minister seems to be weakening. Traditionally the Japanese prime minister was regarded as a transient, weak, compromise figure but this has changed in recent years. In the UK intra-party and executive-legislative dynamics have shifted in a way that has weakened the prime minister.

Summit venue and year UK PM Japanese PM Rambouillet 1975 Wilson Miki San Juan 1976 Callaghan London 1977 Fukuda Bonn 1978 Tokyo 1979 Thatcher Ohira Venice 1980 Absent Ottawa 1981 Suzuki Versailles 1982 Williamsburg 1983 Nakasone London 1984 Bonn 1985 Tokyo 1986 Venice 1987 Toronto 1988 Takeshita Paris 1989 Thatcher Uno Houston 1990 Kaifu London 1991 Major Munich 1992 Miyazawa Tokyo 1993 Naples 1994 Murayama Halifax 1995 Lyon 1996 Hashimoto Denver 1997 Blair Birmingham 1998 Cologne 1999 Obuchi Okinawa 2000 Mori Genoa 2001 Koizumi Kananaskis 2002 Evian 2003 Sea Island 2004 Gleneagles 2005 St Petersburg 2006 Heiligendamm 2007 Abe

UK and Japanese leaders’ participation in G7/8 Summits, 1975-2019

Toyako 2008 Brown Fukuda L’Aquila 2009 Aso Huntsville 2010 Cameron Kan Deauville 2011 Camp David 2012 Noda Lough Erne 2013 Abe Brussels 2014 Schloss Elmau 2015 Ise Shima 2016 Taormina 2017 May Charlevoix 2018 Biarritz 2019 Johnson

Understanding Prime Ministerial Leadership: Existing Perspectives

Perspective Focus References Executive Politics Approaches Constitutional infrastructure Prime Ministerial versus Cabinet Government leading to core- executive studies Mackintosh, Jones, Smith, Rhodes, etc. Party Leadership Party System dynamics Intra-party dynamics, vulnerability and resilience Heffernan, Webb, Cowley, Quinn, Heppell, etc Skills and Style Individual Talent Performative skills and styles and how they relate to governing competence Theakston, Norton, Gill, Denver, Garnett, etc. Modelling approaches Presidentialism, predominance, personalisation, celebrity politics Foley, Poguntke, Webb, King, Heffernan, Bennister, etc.

A Multi-layered Approach to Understanding Prime Ministerial Leadership

Contextual Executive Politics Party Leadership Skills and Style Psychological

A Multi-layered Approach to Understanding Prime Ministerial Leadership

Micro ⇠⇢ Meso ⇠⇢ Macro

PERSPECTIVE FOCUS REFERENCES Contextual Approaches Socio-Political Change Inequality, changing nature of work, inter- generational tensions, new social dynamics, anti- political sentiment, post-democracy, populism, change and continuity in anchorage points Many but possibly not targeted on PM

• leadership. Keane,

Mounk, Dalton, Crouch, etc Executive Politics Approaches Constitutional infrastructure Prime Ministerial versus Cabinet Government leading to core-executive studies Mackintosh, Jones, Smith, Rhodes, etc. Party Leadership Approaches Party System dynamics Intra-party dynamics, vulnerability and resilience Heffernan, Webb, Cowley, Quinn, Heppell, etc Skills and Style Approaches Individual Talent Performative skills and styles and how they relate to governing competence - Presidentialism, predominance, personalisation, celebrity politics Theakston, Norton, Gill, Denver, Garnett, etc. Psychological Profile Cognitive Ability/Frailty Hubris syndrome, emotional intelligence, empathy, etc. Owen, Weinberg, Flinders, etc.

Comparing Recent UK Prime Ministers: A Multi-layered Approach

Prime Minister Term Context Executive Politics Party Dynamics Skills and Style Psychological David Cameron May 2010 to July 2016 Post-Financial Crisis Brexit No Majority. Coalition government. Weak power base. Divided party. Referendum fractured system Had to govern through

• coalition. Could not

cope with Brexiteers. Wanted to be liked Wanted to be liked and regarded as a regular guy Theresa May July 2016 to July 2019 Brexit Populism Promised ‘strong leadership’ but could not deliver. Called 2017 election but adopted a presidential campaign that backfired Lost her legislative

• majority. Dependent
• n Democratic

Unionists. Could not heal a divided party. LINO

• Maybot. Lack of

emotional intelligence. Not comfortable with the public or even with

• colleagues. No small
• talk. Possibly a good PM

in more calmer ‘normal’ times. Poor with the media.

• Introverted. Christian.
• Conformist. Cold.

Robotic. Unable to make tough decisions. Kept changing mind. Questions about how she coped with the pressure Boris Johnson July 2019

• present

Brexit Populism Appointed by party members not MPs. Not liked, not trusted,

• divisive. Clear populist

‘them and us’ rhetoric Viewed by party as ‘high risk’ – this was apparently ‘priced in’ to his appointment – prorogued parliament to widespread anger Charismatic, buffoon, unconventional and chaotic, widely viewed as the British Trump. No emotional intelligence or

• sensitivity. Presidential

style (?) Visionary (?) Very Good with the media Self-interested, non- conformist, ‘heroic’ leader, no ethical foundations, dysfunctional. Arguably the only politician able/willing to break the Brexit deadlock. ‘Crisis leader’

Comparing Recent Japanese Prime Ministers: A Multi-layered Approach

Prime Minister Term Context Executive Politics Party Dynamics Skills and Style Psychological Abe Shinzo September 2006 to September 2007 Changing nature

• f work and

unequal society (kakusa shakai). Continuing ‘war

• n terror’.

Tensions with China. Cabinet reflected LDP factions. Ministerial scandals and loss of control of Upper House Natural successor to

• Koizumi. Member of

leading LDP faction. Synonymous with North Korean abduction issue. Youngest postwar prime

• minister. Can’t read the

mood (kuki ga yomenai). Ill health Member of Japanese political elite – father and grandfathers. Patriot Kan Naoto January 2010 to September 2011 Triple disasters of 3/11. Continuing fallout from Financial Crisis. Cabinet dominated by own appointments ignoring DPJ factions. Tense relationship with bureaucracy Divided party. Won leadership election but faced leadership challenge from Ozawa Ichiro and vote of no

• confidence. Survives by

promising to resign. No majority in Upper House. Legal training and background in grassroots civil society. Willing to challenge the government as seen in HIV blood product

• scandal. Short-tempered

(ira-Kan) Campaigner and activist. Impulsive. Reputational damage from extra-marital and pension scandals Abe Shinzo December 2012 to present Abenomics. Rise of China. Threat of North Korea. Tokyo Olympics. Strong core

• executive. National

Security Council. Landslide electoral

• victories. Super-

majority in coalition. Survives scandals Wins three terms as LDP President (fourth?). No

• bvious successor

‘Japan is Back’ – strong and stable in face of fractured opposition and hostile external

• environment. Manages

media closely and uses celebrity A rare second attempt as prime minister – redemption? Patriot