Managing Potential Conflicts Between Vehicle Safety and - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Managing Potential Conflicts Between Vehicle Safety and - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Managing Potential Conflicts Between Vehicle Safety and Cybersecurity Andy Davis, Transport Cybersecurity Practice Director Agenda What do we mean by Safety - critical and Cybersecurity - critical? Potential conflict areas


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Managing Potential Conflicts Between Vehicle Safety and Cybersecurity

Andy Davis, Transport Cybersecurity Practice Director

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Agenda

  • What do we mean by “Safety-critical” and “Cybersecurity-critical”?
  • Potential conflict areas
  • Reducing the risks
  • Q&A
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Some definitions

Safety and Cybersecurity

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Vehicle safety (from SAE J3061)

  • System safety (beyond regulatory requirements) is the state of a

system that does not cause harm to life, property, or the environment.

  • A safety-critical system is a system that may cause harm to life,

property, or the environment if the system does not behave as intended or desired.

  • All safety-critical systems are Cybersecurity-critical since a cyber-

attack either directly or indirectly on a safety-critical system could lead to potential safety losses

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Vehicle Cybersecurity (from SAE J3061)

  • System Cybersecurity is the state of a system that does not allow

exploitation of vulnerabilities to lead to losses, such as financial,

  • perational, privacy, or safety losses.
  • A Cybersecurity-critical system is a system that may lead to financial,
  • perational, privacy, or safety losses if the system is compromised

through a vulnerability that may exist in the system.

  • Not all Cybersecurity-critical systems are safety-critical since cyber-

attacks on Cybersecurity-critical systems can result in losses other than safety losses; namely, privacy, operational, or financial

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Safety and Cybersecurity

Potential conflicts

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Confidentiality: Remote map updates vs PII/PCI data access

Images: motoringexposure.com, mazdahandsfree.com, engadget.com

Remote map updates are important for safety: Malicious map updates can provide unauthorised access to PII and potentially payment card data:

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Integrity: Head Unit Integration vs System segregation

Integrated dashboards can reduce driver distraction: Infotainment is the most likely vehicle system to be attacked – if ADAS features are integrated, attackers can directly control them:

Images: youtube.com

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Availability: Laser Fog Lights vs Camera Systems

Laser fog lights can improve vehicle visibility in poor weather conditions: Lasers can render front-facing camera systems useless:

Images: youtube.com, naimark.net

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Increasingly complex safety systems = increased attack surface

Image: deusm.com

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Reducing the risks

Striking the right balance between Safety and Cybersecurity

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Reducing the risks: What can be done?

  • An awareness of the risks needs to be raised with the right stakeholders
  • Techniques such as threat modelling would likely identify many of these

potential conflict areas

  • Vehicle manufacturers and their whole supply chain need to develop-in security

from day one (Secure Development Lifecycle) – bolt-on solutions are never as effective and often very costly

  • Automotive technology must be independently security assessed to ensure

that vulnerabilities haven’t been introduced during development or integration,

  • r as a result of introducing well-intentioned safety features
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Automotive Secure Development Lifecycle

The ASDL should be considered a framework, rather than as a solution that replaces any existing standards Training

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ASDL Standards mapping

SAE J3061 ISO 26262 MISRA C CERT C NIST FIPS 199 TVRA EVITA HEAVENS (cyber-physical focused) (safety focused) (functional safety focused) ISO 12207 ISO 27001 (information security management) (systems and software engineering) (software architecture design threats) (security focused) (risk assessment – telecomms network focussed) (risk assessment – aligned with ISO 26262) (risk assessment – designed By US DoD for healthcare security) STRIDE (threat modelling) Auto Alliance

Consumer Privacy Protection Principles

OCTAVE (risk assessment - electrical systems focused) NIST FIPS 140-2 (Security requirements for cryptographic modules) (privacy focused)

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Q&A

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Contact us

Europe

  • Manchester - Head Office
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0161 209 5200 AutomotiveSecurity@nccgroup.trust www.nccgroup.trust

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