Kevin Henry Kevin Henry Rory Rory - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

• Kevin Henry

Kevin Henry Rory Rory MacKenzie MacKenzie

• Launched in Dec 1998 as part of the Mars Surveyor

Program Program

• Objective was enter the Mars atmosphere and collect

scientific data

• Crashed on entry to atmosphere in Sep 1999
• Metric mix-up meant Orbiter entered atmosphere at wrong

altitude

• Mishap Investigation Report issued report I only six weeks

later later

• Second report followed in March 2000
• Mishap blamed on miscommunication and poor project

management

• Orbiter carried two Instruments:

– Pressure Modulator Infrared Radiometer (PMIRR) – Pressure Modulator Infrared Radiometer (PMIRR) – Mars Colour Imager (MARCI)

• Science Objectvives:

– Monitor daily weather and atmospheric conditions – Record surface changes due to wind and other effects – Determine temperature profiles – Determine temperature profiles – Monitor water vapor and dust content – Look for evidence of past climate change

• Science mission to

last 2 years, then last 2 years, then act as relay station for 5 years

• Data relay station

would be used by would be used by Mars Polar Lander and future Mars missions.

• Expected Timeline:

– 1993: Mars Surveyor Program is Launched – 1995: Mars Surveyor Project ’98 Missions are Identified – 1995: Mars Surveyor Project ’98 Missions are Identified – Dec 11, 1998: Launch – September 23, 1999: Mars Orbiter Insertion – September 27 1999: Mars Aerobraking Begins – November 10, 1999: Mars Aerobraking Ends – December 1, 1999: Transfer to Mapping Orbit – December 3, 1999: Mars Polar Lander Support – March 3, 2000: Mars Mapping Begins – March 3, 2000: Mars Mapping Begins – January 15, 2002: Mars Relay Mission Begins – December 1, 2004: End of Primary Mission

• Projected cost: $327.6 Million for MCO and MPL

• Used by Spacecraft to perform

trajectory adjustments

• 4 thruster manoeuvres planned during

the flight of the MCO the flight of the MCO

• Trajectory Correction Maneuver-4

executed as planned on Sep 15, 1999

• Mars Orbit Insertion planned for Sep

23

• Signal lost at 09:04:52, early than

expected, and never reaquired

• Software calculating trajectory models

used English units of pound-seconds rather than Metric units of Newton- rather than Metric units of Newton- seconds

• Effect of spacecraft trajectory

underestimated by factor of 4.45

• Altitude for entry was 57km instead of

220km

• Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) of California

– Lead flight centre

• Locheed Martin Astronautics (LMA) of

Denver, Colorado – Prime contractor – Design and Development of Spacecraft – Flight System Integration and testing – Supporting launch operations

• Mars Surveyor Operations Project

Mars Surveyor Operations Project

• Mars Surveyor Operations Project

Mars Surveyor Operations Project – Created by JPL Created by JPL – Responsible from MCO and MPL flight Responsible from MCO and MPL flight

• perations
• perations

• Phase I Report released Nov 10 1999
• Focuses on issues that must be resolved
• Focuses on issues that must be resolved

before Mars Polar Lander (MPL) reaches Mars Surface

• Purpose: Determine root causes and

contributing factors

• Recommendations to improve MPL
• perations
• Meetings conducted at Jet Propulsion Lab

with members of JPL and LMA.

• Failure to use metric units in the coding of

a ground software file “Small Forces” a ground software file “Small Forces”

• Angular Momentum Desaturation (AMD)

contained output data from small forces

• Trajectory modellers assumed the data

was in the correct units

• AMD events during the journey occurred

10-14 times more often than expected 10-14 times more often than expected

• Small errors introduced in trajectory

estimates over 9 months

• Discrepancies were only informally

reported

• 1)

Undetected mis-modelling of spacecraft velocity changes changes

• AMD files unused for first four months
• When files were used the underestimation was noticed

2) Navigation team unfamiliar with spacecraft

• Operations navigation team not involved in key development

stages

• Critical information passed on

3) Trajectory correction manoeuvre number 5 not performed performed

• Contingency manoeuvre plan was in place but not prepared for
• TCM-5 was discussed verbally but not executed

4) System engineering process did not adequately address transition from development to operations

• Inadequate transition from development to operations
• Navigation team unfamiliar with spacecraft design characteristics

• 5)

Inadequate communications between project elements

• Development and operations teams; project management and
• Development and operations teams; project management and

technical teams; project and technical line management

• Assumptions were made and key knowledge not passed between

project teams

6) Inadequate operations navigation team staffing

• Only 2 full time staff

7) Inadequate Training

• Unaware of reporting procedure
• Unaware of reporting procedure
• Not enough emphasis on end-to-end testing

8) Verification and validation

• Small forces file not validated

• Throughout all the project elements there

was an absence peer reviews was an absence peer reviews

• Those held were without key personnel
• Recommendations from these causes

included the obvious (checking units) and changes to project structure

• Face to face meetings between elements
• Face to face meetings between elements

and long term support to improve communications

• Launched Jan 3 1999
• Second of Mars Surveyor ’98

programme

• Expected to touch down on

programme

• Expected to touch down on

South Polar Region

• Purpose was to record

weather conditions and collect samples from surface

• Communication lost during

landing procedure on Dec 3 1999

• Software error is most likely
• Software error is most likely

reason

• Incorrectly indicated the

‘touch down’ signal and cut

• ff engines 40 metres above

surface

!"#"

• MCO mission was conducted under

MCO mission was conducted under NASA’s “Faster, better, cheaper” NASA’s “Faster, better, cheaper” NASA’s “Faster, better, cheaper” NASA’s “Faster, better, cheaper” philosophy. philosophy.

• Failure to instil sufficient rigor in risk

Failure to instil sufficient rigor in risk management throughout the mission management throughout the mission lifecycle. lifecycle. lifecycle. lifecycle.

• Increased risk to an unacceptable level.

Increased risk to an unacceptable level.

• Cuts in money and resources available to

Cuts in money and resources available to support MCO mission. support MCO mission.

• Roles and responsibilities of team members on

Roles and responsibilities of team members on MCO mission were not clearly defined. MCO mission were not clearly defined. MCO mission were not clearly defined. MCO mission were not clearly defined.

• Authority and accountability an issue

Authority and accountability an issue

– Who is in charge? Who is in charge? – Who is the mission manager? Who is the mission manager?

• Project plan did not provide a careful handover

Project plan did not provide a careful handover from the development project to the operations from the development project to the operations project. project.

• Inadequate training

Inadequate training

• Inadequate training

Inadequate training

• “The board found that the project management

“The board found that the project management team appeared more focused on meeting mission team appeared more focused on meeting mission cost and schedule objectives and did not cost and schedule objectives and did not adequately focus on mission risk.” adequately focus on mission risk.”

$$

• Outlines lack of peer reviews over majority of NASA

Outlines lack of peer reviews over majority of NASA projects projects

• Poor risk management

Poor risk management

• Inadequate testing and quality control

Inadequate testing and quality control

• Poor intercommunication between teams

Poor intercommunication between teams

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• Processes used to develop, validate and

Processes used to develop, validate and

• perate the spacecraft were not sufficient to
• perate the spacecraft were not sufficient to
• perate the spacecraft were not sufficient to
• perate the spacecraft were not sufficient to

minimise the risks introduced by these cuts. minimise the risks introduced by these cuts.

– – This risk compromised the mission to the point of mission failure. This risk compromised the mission to the point of mission failure.

• Mission deemed a success up until right

Mission deemed a success up until right before Mars orbit insertion. before Mars orbit insertion.

• Processes should be in place to catch

Processes should be in place to catch

• Processes should be in place to catch

Processes should be in place to catch mistakes before they become detrimental to mistakes before they become detrimental to mission success. mission success.

• Led to NASA to define a new philosophy for

Led to NASA to define a new philosophy for further projects further projects – – “MISSION SUCCESS “MISSION SUCCESS FIRST” FIRST”

##!#&'##(#

• Mission success must become the highest

Mission success must become the highest priority at all levels of the project and the priority at all levels of the project and the priority at all levels of the project and the priority at all levels of the project and the

• rganisation.
• rganisation.
• New philosophy focuses on 4 primary

New philosophy focuses on 4 primary concerns: concerns:

– People People – People People – Process Process – Execution Execution – Technology Technology

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• Under Mission Success First teams take full

Under Mission Success First teams take full

• wnership of the development.
• wnership of the development.
• wnership of the development.
• wnership of the development.

– Have to understand, document and communicate Have to understand, document and communicate limitations of the system. limitations of the system. – Continuous reviews, internally and externally. Continuous reviews, internally and externally.

• “Test, test and test some more.”

“Test, test and test some more.” – – Philosophy Philosophy “Know what you “Know what you build, build, Test what you build, Test what you build, Test what you fly, Test what you fly, Test like you fly.” Test like you fly.”

#(%

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• “Our inability to recognise and correct this simple

“Our inability to recognise and correct this simple error has had major implications” error has had major implications” – Edward Stone, Edward Stone, error has had major implications” error has had major implications” – Edward Stone, Edward Stone, Director of Jet Propulsion Laboratory Director of Jet Propulsion Laboratory

• “The problem here was not the error, it was the

“The problem here was not the error, it was the failure of NASA’s systems engineering, and the failure of NASA’s systems engineering, and the checks and balances in our processes, to detect checks and balances in our processes, to detect the error. That’s why we lost the spacecraft.” the error. That’s why we lost the spacecraft.” – Edward Weiler, NASA associate administrator for Edward Weiler, NASA associate administrator for space science space science space science space science

• “A single error should not bring down a $125

“A single error should not bring down a $125 million mission.” million mission.” – – Thomas Gavin, Deputy director Thomas Gavin, Deputy director for space and earth science at NASA’s Jet for space and earth science at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory Propulsion Laboratory

• Poor communication between teams

Poor communication between teams

• Formal error reporting not followed

Formal error reporting not followed

• Formal error reporting not followed

Formal error reporting not followed

• Poor training of staff

Poor training of staff

• Cost

Cost-cuts resulting in less staff and cuts resulting in less staff and resources resources

• Prove it doesn’t work, instead of proving it

Prove it doesn’t work, instead of proving it

• Prove it doesn’t work, instead of proving it

Prove it doesn’t work, instead of proving it does work does work

$ *+

• Delayed launch of Mars Science

Delayed launch of Mars Science Laboratory Rover Mission was due to fly Laboratory Rover Mission was due to fly 2009, now 2011 2009, now 2011

– Mission dogged by testing and hardware Mission dogged by testing and hardware problems problems problems problems – Will cost an extra $400m Will cost an extra $400m – "Trying for '09 would require us to assume too "Trying for '09 would require us to assume too much risk, more than I think is appropriate for much risk, more than I think is appropriate for a flagship mission,” a flagship mission,” – – NASA administrator NASA administrator Michael Griffin Michael Griffin