SLIDE 1 HE DATA KRAKEN is an ancient oracle of wisdom and knowledge. It was requested by people from all over the world and shared its knowledge. Bu But t th the e or
acle le became hungry for information…
http://www.fubiz.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/the-kraken-existence2.jpg
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The Katzenpost Mix Network System
David Stainton
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Grant Agreement No 653497, Privacy and Accountability in Networks via Optimized Randomized Mix-nets (Panoramix)”.
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“we kill people based on metadata” –Michael Hayden (Ex-NSA and Ex-CIA Director)
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David Chaum. Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms, Comm. ACM, 24, 2 (Feb. 1981)
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See: Claudia Diaz & Andrei Serjantov. Generalising Mixes. PETS 2003
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n-1 Attacks
From a Trickle to a Flood: Active Attacks on Several Mix Types by Andrei Serjantov and Roger Dingledine and, Paul Syverson
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Ania Piotrowska, Jamie Hayes, Tariq Elahi, Sebastian Meiser, and George Danezis. The Loopix Anonymity System Usenix 26, 2017.
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λM
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Heartbeat Traffic to Counter (n-1) Attacks by George Danezis and Len Sassaman λM
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Impact of Network Topology on Anonymity and Overhead in Low-Latency Anonymity Networks by Claudia Diaz, Stephen Murdoch and, Carmela Troncoso PETS 2010
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Epistemic Attacks
Route Fingerprinting in Anonymous Communications by George Danezis and Richard Clayton
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Statistical Disclosure Attacks
Statistical Disclosure or Intersection Attacks on Anonymity Systems by George Danezis and Andrei Serjantov Attacks do not always converge on success; depends on how repetitive and predictable client behavior is.
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Sphinx: A Compact and Provably Secure Mix Format by George Danezis and Ian Goldberg IEEE Security and Privacy 2009
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Compulsion Attacks
◮ legal action ◮ police raid ◮ pwn
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Compulsion Attacks Defenses via Mix Key Erasure
“Forward Secure Mixes” by George Danezis, Proceedings of 7th Nordic Workshop on Secure IT Systems, 2002 “Xolotl: A request-and-forward mixnet format with selective statefulness for forward secure and hybrid post-quantum anonymity” by Jeffrey Burdges and Christian Grothoff
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Other Defenses for Compulsion Attacks
”Compulsion Resistant Anonymous Communications” by George Danezis and Jolyon Clulow, Proceedings of Information Hiding Workshop, June 2005
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“No right to ramain silent: Isolating Malicious Mixes” by Hemi Leibowitz, Ania Piotrowska, George Danezis and Amir Herzberg “Two Cents for Strong Anonymity: The Anonymous Post-office Protocol” by Nethanel Gelernter, Amir Herzberg, and Hemi Leibowitz
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“Anonymity Trilemma” by Das, Meiser, Mohammadi, Kate (2017) Anonymity cannot scale better than |cover traffic| · |latency| Take aways: Tor’s situation: |cover traffic| ∗ 0 = 0
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λP λL λD
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λD
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λL
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λP
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The Katzenpost Free Software Project
Website: https://katzenpost.mixnetworks.org/ Github: https://github.com/katzenpost/ IRC: #katzenpost on OFTC Contact me:
◮ E-mail: dawuud@riseup.net ◮ Twitter: @david415
