Introduction to Human Computer Interaction Course on NPTEL, Spring - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Introduction to Human Computer Interaction Course on NPTEL, Spring - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Introduction to Human Computer Interaction Course on NPTEL, Spring 2018 Week 7 Usable Security Ponnurangam Kumaraguru (PK) Associate Professor ACM Distinguished & TEDx Speaker Linkedin/in/ponguru/ 1 fb/ponnurangam.kumaraguru,


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Introduction to Human Computer Interaction

Course on NPTEL, Spring 2018

Week 7 Usable Security

Ponnurangam Kumaraguru (“PK”)

Associate Professor ACM Distinguished & TEDx Speaker Linkedin/in/ponguru/ fb/ponnurangam.kumaraguru, @ponguru

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Usability and Security

  • Why should we study this?
  • Why is it important?
  • Any experience / relationship?

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Everyday Security Problems

Setting File Permissions

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Secure, but usable?

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Unusable security frustrates users

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Usable Privacy and Security

“Give end-users security controls they can understand and privacy they can control for the dynamic, pervasive computing environments of the future.”

  • Grand Challenges in Information Security & Assurance

Computing Research Association (2003)

More research needed on how “cultural and social influences can affect how people use computers and electronic information in ways that increase the risk of cybersecurity breaches.”

  • Grand Challenges for Engineering

National Academy of Engineering (2008)

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Humans are weakest link

  • Most security breaches attributed to “human error”
  • Social engineering attacks proliferate

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How can we make secure systems more usable?

  • Make it “just work”
  • Invisible security
  • Make security/privacy understandable
  • Make it visible
  • Make it intuitive
  • Use metaphors that users can relate to
  • Train the user

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Concerns may not be aligned

Security Expert User

Keep the bad guys out Don’t lock me

  • ut!
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Grey

  • Smartphone based

access-control system

  • Used to open doors in the

Carnegie Mellon CIC building

  • Allows users to grant access to

their doors remotely

  • L. Bauer, L.F. Cranor, R.W. Reeder, M.K. Reiter, and K. Vaniea. A User Study of Policy Creation in a Flexible Access-Control System.

CHI 2008. http://www.robreeder.com/pubs/greyCHI2008.pdf

  • L. Bauer, L. F. Cranor, M. K. Reiter, and K. Vaniea. Lessons Learned from the Deployment of a Smartphone-Based Access-Control
  • System. SOUPS 2007. http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/soups/2007/proceedings/p64_bauer.pdf
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Data collection

  • Year long interview study
  • Recorded 30 hours of

interviews with Grey users

  • System was actively used: 29

users x 12 access per week

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Users complained about speed

  • Users said Grey was slow
  • But Grey was as fast as keys
  • Videotaped a door to better

understand how doors are

  • pened differently with

Grey and keys

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“I find myself standing outside and everybody inside is looking at me standing outside while I am trying to futz with my phone and open the stupid door.”

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Train the user

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Why do humans fall for phish?

  • Not motivated to pay attention to training
  • “Security is not my problem”
  • Mental models inconsistent with reality
  • “If site looks professional it must be legitimate”
  • Need actionable advice they can understand
  • Difficult to be alert if you don’t know what you’re looking for
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How do we get people trained? Learning science principles + Teachable moments + Fun

  • P. Kumaraguru, S. Sheng, A. Acquisti, L. Cranor, and J. Hong. Teaching Johnny Not to Fall for Phish. ACM Trans. Internet
  • Technol. 10, 2 (May 2010), 1-31.
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PhishGuru embedded training

  • Send email that look like phish
  • If recipient falls for it, train in succinct and engaging format
  • Study demonstrated effectiveness of PhishGuru and found that same training was

not effective sent as regular email Learning science principles + Teachable moments + Fun

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Design rationale

  • Paper and HTML prototypes
  • One page constraint
  • Analyzed instructions from most popular websites
  • Present the training materials when users click on the link
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Applies learning-by-doing and immediate feedback principles

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Applies story-based agent principle

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Applies contiguity principle Presents procedural knowledge

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Applies personalization principle Presents conceptual knowledge

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Iterations

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First intervention

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Intervention: eBay

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Focus group studies

  • One with age group 18 – 55 and another with age group greater than

65

  • All age groups will read the interventions
  • Everybody liked the gold fish and the comic script format
  • Participants did not like the phisher character
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First lab study results

  • Security notices are an

ineffective medium for training users

  • Users educated with

embedded training make better decisions than those sent security notices

Kumaraguru, P., Rhee, Y., Acquisti, A., Cranor, L. F., Hong, J., and Nunge, E. Protecting people from phishing: the design and evaluation of an embedded training email system. CHI ’07, pp. 905-914.

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Second lab study results

  • Users educated with PhishGuru retained knowledge

after seven days

  • Users trained with embedded did better than users

trained with non-embedded

Kumaraguru, P., Rhee, Y., Sheng, S., Hasan, S., Acquisti, A., Cranor, L. F., and Hong, J. Getting users to pay attention to anti-phishing education: Evaluation of retention and transfer. e-Crime Researchers Summit, Anti-Phishing Working Group (2007).

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Real world study: Portuguese ISP

  • PhishGuru is effective in training people in the real

world

  • Trained participants retained knowledge after 7 days
  • f training

Kumaraguru, P., Sheng, S., Acquisti, A., Cranor, L. F., and Hong, J. Lessons from a real world evaluation of anti-phishing training. e-Crime Researchers Summit, 2008

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Real world study: CMU

  • Evaluate effectiveness of PhishGuru training in the real world
  • Investigate retention after 1 week, 2 weeks, and 4 weeks
  • Compare effectiveness of 2 training messages with effectiveness of 1

training message

  • P. Kumaraguru, J. Cranshaw, A. Acquisti, L. Cranor, J. Hong, M. A. Blair, and T. Pham. School
  • f Phish: A Real-World Evaluation of Anti-Phishing Training. 2009. Under review.
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Study design

  • Sent email to all CMU students, faculty and staff to recruit

participants to opt-in to study

  • 515 participants in three conditions
  • Control
  • One training message
  • Two training messages
  • Emails sent over 28 day period
  • 7 simulated spear-phishing messages
  • 3 legitimate messages from ISO (cyber security

scavenger hunt)

  • Exit survey
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What study design?

  • For 2 different solutions – PhishGuru & PhishX

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Comparing Two Alternatives

  • Between groups experiment
  • two groups of test users
  • each group uses only 1 of the systems
  • Within groups experiment
  • one group of test users
  • each person uses both systems,

randomized ordering

  • can’t use the same tasks or order (learning)
  • Between groups requires many more

participants than within groups

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Implementation

  • Unique hash in the URL for each participant
  • Demographic and department/status data linked to each hash
  • Form does not POST login details
  • Campus help desks and all spoofed departments were notified before

messages were sent

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Study schedule

Day of the study Control One training message Two training messages Day 0 Test and real Train and real Train and real Day 2 Test Day 7 Test and real Day 14 Test Test Train Day 16 Test Day 21 Test Day 28 Test and real Day 35 Post-study survey

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Simulated spear phishing message

URL is not hidden Plain text email without graphics

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Simulated phishing website

http://andrewwebmail.org/password/change.htm?ID=9009

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Simulated phishing website

http://andrewwebmail.org/password/thankyou.html?ID=9009

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PhishGuru intervention

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Effect of PhishGuru

Condition N % who clicked on Day 0 % who clicked on Day 28 Control 172 52.3 44.2 Trained 343 48.4 24.5

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Results conditioned on participants who clicked on day 0

Trained participants less likely to fall for phish

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Results conditioned on participants who clicked on day 0

Trained participants less likely to fall for phish Trained participants remember what they learned 28 days later

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Results conditioned on participants who clicked on day 0 and day 14

Two-train participants less likely than one-train participants to click on days 16 and 21

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Results conditioned on participants who clicked on day 0 and day 14

Two-train participants less likely than one-train participants to click on days 16 and 21 Two-train participants less likely than one-train participants to provide information on day 28

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Legitimate emails

Condition N Day 0 Day 7 Day 28 Clicked % Clicked % Clicked % Control 90 50.0 41.1 38.9 One-train 89 39.3 42.7 32.3 Two-train 77 48.1 44.2 35.1

No difference between the three conditions on day 0, 7, and 28

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Legitimate emails

No difference between the three conditions on day 0, 7, and 28 No difference within the three conditions for the three emails

Condition N Day 0 Day 7 Day 28 Clicked % Clicked % Clicked % Control 90 50.0 41.1 38.9 One-train 89 39.3 42.7 32.3 Two-train 77 48.1 44.2 35.1

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Most participants liked training, wanted more

  • 280 complete post study responses
  • 80% recommended that CMU continue PhishGuru training
  • “I really liked the idea of sending CMU students fake phishing

emails and then saying to them, essentially, HEY! You could've just gotten scammed! You should be more careful - here's how....”

  • “I think the idea of using something fun, like a cartoon, to teach

people about a serious subject is awesome!”

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Summary from this study

  • People trained with PhishGuru were less likely to click on phishing

links than those not trained

  • People retained their training for 28 days
  • Two training messages are better than one
  • PhishGuru training does not make people less likely to click on

legitimate links

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Summary of studies

Studies Results Lab study I

  • Security notices are ineffective
  • Users educated with PhishGuru made better decisions

Lab study II

  • Users in embedded condition retain and transfer

knowledge more effectively than other conditions even after 7 days Real-worl d study I

  • PhishGuru is effective in training people in the real world
  • Trained participants retained knowledge after 7 days of

training Real-worl d study II

  • People trained with PhishGuru were less likely to click on

phishing links than those not trained

  • People retained their training for 28 days
  • Two training messages are better than one
  • PhishGuru training does not make people less likely to

click on legitimate links

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Training games: Anti-phishing Phil

Learning science principles + Teachable moments + Fun

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Takeaways

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⚫Becoming an important problem to study ⚫Large number of projects are getting funded into this area ⚫Less number of expertise available

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Ponnurangam Kumaraguru (“PK”) Associate Professor Indraprastha Institute of Information Technology New Delhi – 110078 pk@iiitd.ac.in precog.iiitd.edu.in