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GOVERNING FOR THE FUTURE: ASSESSING THE CONSTITUTIONAL, INSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY OPTIONS TO PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF FUTURE GENERATIONS? Jonathan Boston School of Government Victoria University of Wellington 17 November 2015 New Zealand


  1. GOVERNING FOR THE FUTURE: ASSESSING THE CONSTITUTIONAL, INSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY OPTIONS TO PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF FUTURE GENERATIONS? Jonathan Boston School of Government Victoria University of Wellington 17 November 2015 New Zealand Climate Change Research Institute

  2. OUTLINE 1. Background and context 2. The nature of the problem 3. The scale and scope of the problem 4. Main causes 5. Possible solutions 6. Intervention logics 7. A brief assessment of the options 8. Interim conclusions and implications for climate change mitigation

  3. SOME QUOTES By their very nature, democratic institutions are biased in favour of current voters. Bradford C. Mank When human politicians choose between the next election and the next generation, it’s clear what usually happens. Warren Buffett The future whispers while the present shouts. Al Gore The power of vision is one of many forms of power. Paula Tiihonen

  4. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT Question: How to encourage prudent long-term governance, and especially ‘ policy investments ’ – non-simultaneous exchanges 1. Policy investments common across multiple policy domains, but generate significant political challenges  Fundamental for protecting long-term interests 2. Many forms of policy investment – different types and timeframes of costs and benefits …  the funding of physical infrastructure  education funding to enhance human capital and intellectual capital  preventative measures in health, social welfare or criminal justice to reduce future fiscal and social costs  research and development funding to enhance innovation, intellectual capital, productivity growth and environmental sustainability  regulatory interventions to protect human health and environmental quality/natural capital assets  the pre-funding of future pension costs  disaster-risk mitigation  Climate change mitigation and adaptation

  5. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 1. Democratic governments often struggle to make prudent ‘policy investments’ 2. S ignificant risks if inadequate ‘investment’ – including the likelihood of severe, widespread and irreversible harm 3. The problem is variously referred to as ‘short - termism’, ‘political myopia’, ‘policy short - sightedness’, a ‘ presentist bias ’ or an inherent bias towards the short -term 4. For my research project, I refer to the ‘ presentist bias’ or the ‘long - term governance problem’ 5. My focus is on finding ways to reduce or mitigate this problem, especially within advanced democracies …  How to bring the long-term into short-term political focus How to encourage more foresight and a longer-term perspective  How to shift the temporal balance in favour of the future   How to protect the interests (needs and rights) of our future selves and future generations

  6. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 1. The presentist bias  not new  not limited to governments  not limited to democratic governments  not all-pervasive – many examples of prudent policy investments 2. Time is continuous  not a simple binary issue of present versus future  different policies have different intertemporal dimensions and varying impacts over time 3. Nature of project – comparative (advanced democracies), mainly qualitative, case studies

  7. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 1. Much debate about the nature and causes of ‘the problem’ 2. Arguments: 1. No single problem (no one problem definition)  The relevant literatures point to at least 7 different, albeit related, problems 2. T he problem is ‘wicked’ – relatively complex, no complete or definitive solutions, available partial ‘solutions’ have both advantages and disadvantages

  8. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 1. Naïve short-termism 2. Urgency-driven short-termism 3. Poor anticipatory governance 4. Complexity 5. Delay and inertia – status quo bias 6. Elder bias 7. Prioritized (or calculated) short-termism  focus on the last

  9. THE SCALE OF THE PROBLEM 1. How significant, widespread and serious is the presentist bias in advanced democracies? Possible assessment criteria:  Decline of ‘comprehensive wealth’ (aggregate assets – balance sheet approach)  Poor management of global public goods – especially global common pool resources  Unsustainable fiscal policies and high levels of gross and net public debt  Unsustainable environmental policies – putting many species and human lives at risk  Inadequate investment in new infrastructure and infrastructure maintenance  Inadequate investment in preventative interventions or early intervention programmes  Inadequate investment in early childhood education, R&D, future proofing, such as disaster preparedness and the building of resilience  Poor management of population ageing, increasing social and cultural diversity, etc. 2. N o optimal amount of ‘policy investment’  too complex and uncertain  can set broad parameters on what is too little or too much trade-offs across policy domains – room for debate about the best portfolio of  policy investments

  10. THE SCALE OF THE PROBLEM What does the evidence suggest? 1. In advanced democracies, the level of policy investment varies over time, between countries and across policy domains 2. Some democracies have a better track record than others, and some policy areas are better managed than others 3. Within the same jurisdiction some governments have a stronger long-term policy orientation than others 4. Evidence of democracies (80 cases) investing more in fixed capital formation at the beginning of electoral cycles and less later (IMF, 2015) 5. The evidence of excessive policy investments is limited (asymmetry) 6. Inadequate investment in some policy domains is serious, but not generally catastrophic

  11. THE CAUSES OF THE PROBLEM 1. Various disciplinary perspectives and approaches 2. A simple framing of the ‘causes’: there is either: 1. Excessive demand for short-term solutions – or inadequate demand long-term solutions 2. Inadequate supply of long-term thinking, policy analysis, strategies and solutions – or excessive supply of short-term thinking and solutions 3. What affects the pattern of supply and demand? 4. Three main factors noted in the literature:  motivational, epistemic and institutional determinants  but more complex than this

  12. THE CAUSES OF THE PROBLEM 1. The human condition 2. Epistemic determinants 3. Domestic political and/or institutional factors 4. Weak international institutions 5. Value conflicts and trade-offs across goods involving different systems of value 6. Inadequate conceptual, analytical, accounting, reporting and monitoring frameworks 7. Mind-sets, world views, ethical frameworks and social norms

  13. THE POLICY DIMENSIONS OF THE PRESENTIST BIAS Policy investments are most problematic when: 1. The risks of policy inaction are unclear to the public, making it difficult to frame the investment as necessary or urgent 2. There is significant uncertainty over the likely net payoffs 3. The investment delivers few near-term benefits or co- benefits 4. Substantial near-term costs will be borne by powerful groups 5. The investment involves ‘goods’ that are incommensurable Examples include climate change mitigation, investment in disaster risk mitigation, minimizing the loss of biodiversity

  14. SOLUTIONS – GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 1. The multiple causes of the long-term governance problem (or problems) suggest the need for multiple solutions 2. The nature, scope, scale, depth and durability of the problem suggests that only partial mitigation is possible; there are no silver bullets or utopian solutions 3. From the literature and interviews in four countries, I have identified at least 70 ‘solutions’ which can be grouped into 14 broad categories

  15. SOLUTIONS – GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 4. These ‘solutions’ cover a range of different kinds of interventions or approaches:  constitutional, institutional, procedural, policy-oriented, conceptual and analytical  broad, comprehensive, generic or ‘framework’ changes versus changes to policy settings in particular policy domains (fiscal, health, environmental, etc.)  most relate to things that governments can change, control or influence, either directly or indirectly 5. Evaluating the options poses various methodological and evidential challenges; 3 main criteria:  Feasibility – both technical and political – will vary across states and over time  Effectiveness  Desirability

  16. INTERVENTION LOGICS Six different intervention logics (or explanatory justifications) underpin the suggested solutions: 1. Changing the motives of decision-makers 2. Enhancing the capacity to make farsighted decisions 3. Changing the formal constraints within which decisions are made 4. Insulating decision-makers from short-term political pressures 5. Changing the political incentives facing decision- makers 6. Establishing new coordinating mechanisms

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