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EMSEC: Embedded Security and Cryptography Responsables: Gildas Avoine, Pierre-Alain Fouque Prsentation: Stphanie Delaune (CNRS) EMSEC team Embedded Security & Cryptography 7 permanent researchers, 12 PhD students, and 2 post-docs

  1. EMSEC: Embedded Security and Cryptography Responsables: Gildas Avoine, Pierre-Alain Fouque Présentation: Stéphanie Delaune (CNRS)

  2. EMSEC team Embedded Security & Cryptography → 7 permanent researchers, 12 PhD students, and 2 post-docs − P. Derbez, G. Avoine, A. Roux-Langlois, B. Kordy, & P.-A. Fouque. → Clémentine Maurice and myself ! − EMSEC, Embedded Security and Cryptography 2

  3. Stéphanie Delaune � Since 2007: CNRS Research Scientist hosted at � ENS Cachan (2007-2016) � IRISA (Rennes) from September 2016 � 2006-2007: Post-doctoral stays at Birmingham University (UK) and University of Lorraine (FR) � 2003-2006: PhD at ENS Cachan and France Télécom R&D Formal analysis of security protocols . More information about me: � http://people.irisa.fr/Stephanie.Delaune/ EMSEC, Embedded Security and Cryptography 3

  4. Thèmes de recherche EMSEC, Embedded Security and Cryptography 4

  5. Security protocols are everywhere ! EMSEC, Embedded Security and Cryptography 5

  6. Security protocols are everywhere ! � testing their resilience against well-known attacks is not sufficient; � manual security analysis is error-prone. → Caution: Do not underestimate your opponents! − EMSEC, Embedded Security and Cryptography 5

  7. Security protocols are everywhere ! � testing their resilience against well-known attacks is not sufficient; � manual security analysis is error-prone. → Caution: Do not underestimate your opponents! − privacy issue The register - Jan. 2010 a u t h e n t i c a t i o n i s s u e Independent - Feb. 2016 EMSEC, Embedded Security and Cryptography 5

  8. How cryptographic protocols can be attacked? Proposal #1: Mise en place d’outils automatiques pour la lutte contre les attaques physiques → V. Migliore − Proposal #2: Cryptanalysis using constraint programming solvers: the case of cube attacks → S. Delaune & P. Derbez − EMSEC, Embedded Security and Cryptography 6

  9. How cryptographic protocols can be attacked? Logical attacks � can be mounted even assuming perfect cryptography, → replay attack, man-in-the middle attack, . . . ֒ � subtle and hard to detect by “eyeballing” the protocol A sucessful approach: formal symbolic verification → provides a rigorous framework and automatic tools to analyse − security protocols and find their flaws. EMSEC, Embedded Security and Cryptography 7

  10. Some proposals on formal verification Proposal #3: Verification of security protocols: are the usual encodings safe when considering equivalence-based properties? → S. Delaune − Proposal #4: Analysing security protocols based on low-entropy secrets in the symbolic model → S. Delaune & S. Kremer − Proposal #5: Security analysis of the LoRaWAN protocol using formal symbolic verification tools → S. Delaune − � more information: https://popstar.irisa.fr � contact me: stephanie.delaune@irisa.fr EMSEC, Embedded Security and Cryptography 8

  11. Some other internship proposals → contact: G. Avoine − Proposal #6: Analysis of the Proximity Check Protocol of Contactless Smartcards http://www.avoine.net/smartcards_avoine.pdf Proposal #7: Analyse du contenu de la base de données HAL. EMSEC, Embedded Security and Cryptography 9

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