EMSEC: Embedded Security and Cryptography Responsables: Gildas - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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EMSEC: Embedded Security and Cryptography Responsables: Gildas - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Feb 20, 2023 184 likes •308 views

EMSEC: Embedded Security and Cryptography Responsables: Gildas Avoine, Pierre-Alain Fouque Prsentation: Stphanie Delaune (CNRS) EMSEC team Embedded Security & Cryptography 7 permanent researchers, 12 PhD students, and 2 post-docs

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EMSEC: Embedded Security and Cryptography

Responsables: Gildas Avoine, Pierre-Alain Fouque Présentation: Stéphanie Delaune (CNRS)

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EMSEC team

Embedded Security & Cryptography − → 7 permanent researchers, 12 PhD students, and 2 post-docs

  • P. Derbez, G. Avoine, A. Roux-Langlois, B. Kordy, & P.-A. Fouque.

− → Clémentine Maurice and myself !

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Stéphanie Delaune

Since 2007: CNRS Research Scientist hosted at ENS Cachan (2007-2016) IRISA (Rennes) from September 2016 2006-2007: Post-doctoral stays at Birmingham University (UK)

and University of Lorraine (FR)

2003-2006: PhD at ENS Cachan and France Télécom R&D

Formal analysis of security protocols.

More information about me:

http://people.irisa.fr/Stephanie.Delaune/ EMSEC, Embedded Security and Cryptography 3

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Thèmes de recherche

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Security protocols are everywhere !

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Security protocols are everywhere !

testing their resilience against well-known

attacks is not sufficient;

manual security analysis is error-prone.

− → Caution: Do not underestimate your opponents!

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Security protocols are everywhere !

testing their resilience against well-known

attacks is not sufficient;

manual security analysis is error-prone.

− → Caution: Do not underestimate your opponents! privacy issue a u t h e n t i c a t i

  • n

i s s u e

The register - Jan. 2010 Independent - Feb. 2016

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How cryptographic protocols can be attacked?

Proposal #1: Mise en place d’outils automatiques pour la lutte contre les attaques physiques − →V. Migliore Proposal #2: Cryptanalysis using constraint programming solvers: the case of cube attacks − → S. Delaune & P. Derbez

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How cryptographic protocols can be attacked?

Logical attacks

can be mounted even assuming perfect

cryptography, ֒ → replay attack, man-in-the middle attack, . . .

subtle and hard to detect by “eyeballing” the

protocol A sucessful approach: formal symbolic verification − → provides a rigorous framework and automatic tools to analyse security protocols and find their flaws.

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Some proposals on formal verification

Proposal #3: Verification of security protocols: are the usual encodings safe when considering equivalence-based properties? − → S. Delaune Proposal #4: Analysing security protocols based on low-entropy secrets in the symbolic model − → S. Delaune & S. Kremer Proposal #5: Security analysis of the LoRaWAN protocol using formal symbolic verification tools − → S. Delaune

more information: https://popstar.irisa.fr contact me: stephanie.delaune@irisa.fr EMSEC, Embedded Security and Cryptography 8

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Some other internship proposals

− → contact: G. Avoine Proposal #6: Analysis of the Proximity Check Protocol of Contactless Smartcards http://www.avoine.net/smartcards_avoine.pdf Proposal #7: Analyse du contenu de la base de données HAL.

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