Ecosystem Services? Priya Shyamsundar South Asian Network for - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

South Asian Network for Development and Environmental Economic

Value, Monetize and Incentivize – An Effective Path to Conserving Ecosystem Services?

Priya Shyamsundar

Wealth Estimates (World Bank)

0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5

Natural Capital - % of Total

1995 2000 2005

2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000

Bhutan Nepal India

Wealth Per Capita

1995 2000 2005

What about Ecosystems as Natural Capital?

Lessons from Reviews

• Provisioning versus Regulating Services
• Limited links to trade-offs & human impacts
• Distribution un-even
• Valuation disconnected from policies
• Limited evidence of impacts of PES
• Should payments be equity neutral?

Creating win-wins from trade-offs? Ecosystem services for human well-being: A meta-analysis of ecosystem service trade-offs and synergies in the real world, Global Environmental Change, Vol 28, 2014, 263-275

Case Studies

Payments for Storing Carbon, Bishnu Sharma Payments to reduce Black Carbon emissions, Krishna Pant

Residue Burning across South Asia

Black carbon

• 2nd biggest

contributor to global warming

• Health threat
• 40% of global

levels from India and China

• 24% from open

field burning in India

K.P. Pant

Crop Residue Practices across South Asia

Fully Burnt 57% Partial Burnt 16% Used 27%

India - Combine (% land)

Fully Burnt 58% Partial Burnt 12% Used 30%

Pakistan (% land)

Fully Burnt 96% Other 4%

Nepal (% households)

Fully Burnt 3% Partial Burnt 39% Used 58%

Bangladesh (% plots)

• Z. Haider, R. Gupta, Ahmed and Ahmad, K.P.

Pant, SANDEE Working papers

Can we compensate farmers to reduce a public bad?

Combine H. ban in-effective

Plow Easy 63% Fertilit y 21% Work Easy 13% Other 3%

20 mil tons of crop residue

KP Pant. Monetary Incentives to Reduce Open-Field Rice-Straw Burning in the Plains of Nepal. Res and Env Econ 2014

Reverse Auction – Accept Payments to Conserve

• Baseline (n=317)
• Bidding
• Agreements (53%)
• Recording Plots
• Monitoring and

Verification

• Payments (86%)

Incorpo rated 41% Compo st 28% Top as Feed 31% Post Agreement (% farmers)

Lessons to Solutions

Incentives Work

Median payment $78/ha 86 % Compliant

Payments Necessary

Private Rights and Costs Reduce Public Bad

Possible Solutions

Will Payments with Local Monitoring Work?

• Deforestation and

degradation ~ 17% of GHG emissions

• REDD+ -- market

based, quick, cheap

• Will carbon

sequestration through community forests be effective, cost efficient, equitable?

Sharma, B, M. Nepal, S. Pattanayak, B. P.Shyamsundar, B. Karki 2014

Bishnu Sharma

ICIMOD - FECOFUN - ANSAB Pilot

• National Trust Fund
• Payments = f

(Carbon+ Δ in Carbon + % Indigenous, Dalits, Women, Poor)

• Guidelines on forest

and livelihood enhancement

• MRV

Three Landscapes

Strategy to Assess Impacts

Forest / Carbon Socio- Economic Institutional Impact Indicators

Comm unity Forests Matched Controls REDD+

Baseline End line

DID

Change in Forest Indicators

Ecological variables Impacts Forest fire (-)*** Grass cover (%) (+)** FW collect signs (+)** Timber extract (-)** Encroachments (-)*** Wildlife signs (+)***

221 249. 225 254

50 100 150 200 250

CONTROL REDD+ Base line End line Base line End line

Carbon Per Hectare (All Districts)

REDD+ -- No Harm to Local Communities Forest Product Extraction (load) Impact

Firewood (~) Fodder-grass (~) Leaf-litter (~)

5 -6% increase in Biogas Use

Bishnu Sharma

Learning from the REDD+ Pilot

Carbon neutral Trade-offs among services can be limited Shift to alternate fuels important

Observations

• Incentives work
• Connect the Δ in dots – services

(measures), welfare (value), institutions and policy

• Institutional costs matter
• Integrating ecosystems into national

accounts?

Acknowledgements and References

• Ahmed, T. and Ahmad, B. ( 2013) .Why do farmers burn residue? : Examining

farmers’ choices in Punjab, Pakistan . South Asian Network for Development and Environmental Economics (SANDEE), Working Paper, 76–13

• Ferraro, P.J. & K. Lawlor & K. L. Mullan & S. K. Pattanayak. Forest Figures:

Ecosystem Services, Valuation and Policy Evaluation in Developing Countries, Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 2012.

• Gupta, R.(2012). Causes of emissions from agricultural burning in North-West

India: Evaluation of a technology policy response. SANDEE, Working Paper, 66-12

• Haider, M. Z. (2013). Determinants of rice residue burning in the field. Journal
• f environmental management, 128, 15-21
• C. Howe, H. Suich, B. Vira, G.M. Mace. Creating win-wins from trade-offs?

Ecosystem services for human well-being: A meta-analysis of ecosystem service trade-offs and synergies in the real world, Global Environmental Change, 2014.

• A. P. Kinzig, C. Perrings, F. S. Chapin III, S. Polasky, V. K. Smith, D. Tilman, B.
• L. Turner II . Paying for Ecosystem Services: Promise and Peril, Science,

Policy Forum, 2012.

• S. Lele, O. Springate-Baginski, R. Lakerveld, D. Deb, P. Dash Ecosystem

Services: Origins, Contributions, Pitfalls, and Alternatives, Conservation and Society, 2013

• MOEF, 2012. Economics of Ecosystem Services and Biodiversity: India, Initial

Assessment and Scoping Report, MOEF Report, GoI

• Pant, K. P. (2014). Uniform-Price Reverse Auction for Estimating the Costs of

Reducing Open-Field Burning of Rice Residue in Nepal. Environmental and Resource Economics, 1-15.

Thanks to: Rucha Ghate Anu Kafley Mani Nepal Krishna Pant Rajesh Rai Bishnu Sharma Jamuna Shreshta

Value, Monetize and Incentivize

• Valuation first step toward conservation

– Supply, Use, Institutional framework – Choice of method

• Ecosystem services

– Measurement w/o welfare changes of limited use – Transactions costs significant in design/implementation

• National Ecosystem Accounts