Demystifying the Mortgage Meltdown: What It Means for Main Street, - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Demystifying the Mortgage Meltdown: What It Means for Main Street, - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Demystifying the Mortgage Meltdown: What It Means for Main Street, Wall Street and the U.S. Financial System James R. Barth James R. Barth Glenn Yago Glenn Yago Senior Fellow Director of Capital Studies Milken Institute October 2, 2008 1


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SLIDE 1

Demystifying the Mortgage Meltdown: What It Means for Main Street, Wall Street and the U.S. Financial System

Glenn Yago James R. Barth

1

Milken Institute October 2, 2008 Glenn Yago Director of Capital Studies James R. Barth Senior Fellow

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SLIDE 2

“I have great, great confidence in our capital markets and in

  • ur financial institutions. Our financial institutions, banks

and investment banks are strong.”

2

Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson March 16, 2008 CNN

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SLIDE 3

… but just six months later…

“The financial security of all Americans … depends on our ability to restore our financial institutions to a sound footing.”

3

Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson September 19, 2008 Press release

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SLIDE 4

“Any real estate investment is a good investment … ”

4

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SLIDE 5

“Any real estate investment is a good investment … ”

5

… Really?!

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SLIDE 6

Subprime mortgage meltdown timeline

December 2006–September 2008

550 650 Dow Jones U.S. Financial Index

  • Dec. 2006:

Ownit Mortgage,

  • Apr. 2007: New

Century, a

  • Feb. 2007:

HSBC sets

  • Mar. 18, 2008:

Fed cuts discount rate to 2.4%; Fed funds rate to 2.25%.

  • Mar. 11, 2008: Fed
  • ffers troubled

banks as much as $200 billion in loans; Fed introduces Term Securities Lending Facility.

  • Mar. 16, 2008:

JP Morgan Chase offers to buy Bear Stearns; Fed introduces Primary Dealer Credit Facility.

  • Oct. 24, 2007:

Merrill announces $7.9 billion in subprime write- downs, surpassing Citi’s $6.5 billion.

  • Aug. 1,

2008: First Priority Bank closes. Feburary–March 2007: More than 25 subprime lenders declare bankruptcy.

  • Sept. 30, 2007:

NetBank goes bankrupt.

  • Aug. 16, 2007:

Countrywide gets emergency loan of $11 billion from a group of banks. July 30, 2008: President Bush signs a

  • Sept. 14, 2008:

Lehman files for bankruptcy.

  • Sept. 16, 2008:

Fed loans AIG

6

Sources: BusinessWeek, S&P, Global Insight, Milken Institute.

250 350 450

Ownit Mortgage, a subprime lender, files for bankruptcy. Century, a mortgage broker, files for bankruptcy. HSBC sets aside $10.6 billion for bad loans, including subprime. July 31, 2007: Two Bear Stearns hedge funds file for bankruptcy.

  • Aug. 17, 2007: Fed cuts

discount rate to 5.75%; Fed introduces Term Discount Window Program.

  • Jan. 11, 2008:

Bank of America agrees to buy Countrywide.

  • Jan. 30, 2008: Fed

cuts discount rate to 3.5%. June 9, 2008: Lehman announces a $2.8 billion loss. July 11, 2008: IndyMac is seized by FDIC.

  • Dec. 12, 2007:

Fed introduces Term Auction Facility.

  • Feb. 13, 2008:

President Bush introduces tax rebate stimulus program of $168 billion.

  • Aug. 6, 2007:

American Home Mortgage files for bankruptcy. Bush signs a housing rescue law.

  • Sept. 7, 2008: U.S.

seizes Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Fed loans AIG $85 billion.

  • Sept. 23, 2008:

Washington Mutual is seized by FDIC.

  • Sept. 29, 2008:

Citigroup agrees to buy Wachovia bank.

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SLIDE 7

Overview

7

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SLIDE 8

Home mortgages: Who borrows, how much has been borrowed, and who funds them?

Government- controlled 46%

Total value of housing stock = $19.3 trillion Mortgage debt $10.6 trillion Prime 91.6% Subprime 8.4% Securitized 58%

8

Note: total residential and commercial mortgages = $14.7 trillion; 5 percent = $700 billion

Private sector- controlled 54%

Equity in housing stock $8.7 trillion 91.6% Non-securitized 42%

Sources: Federal Reserve, Milken Institute.

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SLIDE 9

The mortgage problem in perspective

80 million houses 27 million are paid off 53 million have mortgages 48 million are paying on time

9

48 million are paying on time 5 million are behind

This compares to 50% seriously delinquent in the 1930s.

(9.2% of 53 million with 2.8% in foreclosure)

Sources: U.S. Treasury, Milken Institute.

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SLIDE 10
  • I. Low interest rates

and a lending boom

10 10

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SLIDE 11

Did the Fed lower interest rates too much and for too long?

Federal funds rate vs. rates on FRMs and ARMs

5 6 7 8 Percent 30-year FRM rate

11 11

1 2 3 4 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Record low from June 25, 2003, to June 30, 2004: 1% 1-year ARM rate Target federal funds rate

Sources: Federal Reserve, Mortgage Bankers Association, Moody’s Economy.com, Milken Institute.

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SLIDE 12

Home price bubble and credit boom Low interest rates and credit boom

Index, January 2000 = 100 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 150 200 250 US$ trillions Home

US$ trillions 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 Percent

12 12

0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2001 2003 2005 2007 50 100 Home mortgage

  • riginations

(left axis) S&P/Case-Shiller National Home Price Index (right axis)

Sources: Inside Mortgage Finance, Mortgage Bankers Association, Moody’s Economy.com, S&P/Case-Shiller, Milken Institute.

0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 2001 2003 2005 2007 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 1-Year ARM rate (right axis) Home mortgage

  • riginations

(left axis)

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SLIDE 13
  • II. Homeownership, prices,

starts and sales take off

13 13

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SLIDE 14

68 69 70 Percent

Q2 2004: 69.2% Q2 2008: 68.1%

400 500 600 700 US$ thousands

California m edian hom e price U.S. m edian California average 1987-2008

Credit boom pushes homeownership rate to historic high Home price bubble peaks in 2006 California and national home prices reach record highs

280 330 380 Index, January 1987 = 100

S&P/ Case-Shiller National Hom e Price Index

14 14

64 65 66 67 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008

Average, 1965–Q2 2008: 65.2%

100 200 300 400 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008

U.S. m edian hom e price U.S. average, 1987-2008: $121,280 1987-2008 $229,748

80 130 180 230 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008

OFHEO Hom e Price Index

Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, OFHEO, Moody’s Economy.com, S&P/Case-Shiller, California Association of Realtors, Milken Institute.

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SLIDE 15

4.2 5.6 7.0 0.9 1.2 1.5 Millions Millions

Existing hom e sales (left axis)

1.5 2.0

January 2006: 1.8 m illion

Housing units, millions

Homes for sale Homes sales reach a new high Housing starts hit a record in 2005

2 3 4 0.4 0.6 0.8 Millions

Existing homes for sale (left axis)

Millions

15 15

0.0 1.4 2.8 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 0.0 0.3 0.6

New hom e sales (right axis)

0.0 0.5 1.0 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008

July 2008: 641,000 Average starts, 1959–July 2008: 1.1 m illion

Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, OFHEO, Moody’s Economy.com, Milken Institute.

1 2 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 0.0 0.2 0.4

New homes for sale (right axis)

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SLIDE 16
  • III. Subprime borrowers and

subprime mortgages

16 16

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SLIDE 17

National FICO scores display wide distribution What goes into a FICO score?

Who is a subprime borrower?

18 27 30 40 Percentage of population Subprime = 21% Prime = 79% Payment history 35% New credit 10% Types of credit in use 10%

17 17

Sources: myFICO.com, Milken Institute.

2 5 8 12 15 18 13 10 20 up to 499 500- 549 550- 599 600- 649 650- 699 700- 749 750- 799 800+ Subprime = 21% Amounts owed 30% Length of credit history 15%

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SLIDE 18

Prime Subprime 12 16 20 Percent of total originations FICO below 620 Prime: 6.6% Subprime: 45.2% FICO above 620 Prime: 93.4% Subprime: 54.8%

Prime and subprime mortgage originations by FICO score reveal substantial overlaps

18 18

4 8

  • 4

5 9 4 6

  • 4

7 9 4 8

  • 4

9 9 5

  • 5

1 9 5 2

  • 5

3 9 5 4

  • 5

5 9 5 6

  • 5

7 9 5 8

  • 5

9 9 6

  • 6

1 9 6 2

  • 6

3 9 6 4

  • 6

5 9 6 6

  • 6

7 9 6 8

  • 6

9 9 7

  • 7

1 9 7 2

  • 7

3 9 7 4

  • 7

5 9 7 6

  • 7

7 9 7 8

  • 7

9 9 8

  • 9

FICO score

Sources: LoanPerformance, Milken Institute.

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SLIDE 19

ARMs look attractive to many borrowers

5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 Percent 30-year FRM rate

19 19

2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 1-year ARM rate

Sources: Mortgage Bankers Association, Moody’s Economy.com, Milken Institute.

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SLIDE 20

ARM share grows, following low interest rates

15 20 25 Percent of all outstanding home mortgages

20 20

Sources: Mortgage Bankers Association, Moody’s Economy.com, Milken Institute.

5 10 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

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SLIDE 21

30 40 50 60 FHA ARM Prime ARM Subprime ARM Percent of mortgage type

Largest share of ARMs go to subprime borrowers

21 21

10 20 30 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Sources: Mortgage Bankers Association, Moody’s Economy.com, Milken Institute.

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SLIDE 22

Subprimes take an increasing share

  • f all home mortgage originations

3.0 4.0 Subprime Prime US$ trillions Subprime's share: 7.8% 7.4% 8.4% 18.2% 21.3% 20.1% 7.9%

22 22

0.0 1.0 2.0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Q2 2008 7.8% 0.9%

Sources: Inside Mortgage Finance, Milken Institute.

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SLIDE 23

540 625 600 400 500 600 700 US$ billions US$ billions 699 973 1,200 1,240 940 895 800 1,000 1,200 1,400

Average annual growth rates 1995–2006: 14% 2006–Q1 2008: -23%

Subprime mortgages increase rapidly before big decline

Originations Outstandings

23 23

160 200 310 191 14 100 200 300 400 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Q2 2008 479 574 200 400 600 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Q1 2008

Sources: Inside Mortgage Finance, Milken Institute.

H2 2008

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SLIDE 24
  • IV. Mortgage product innovation

24 24

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SLIDE 25

Subprime and Alt-A shares quadruple between 2001 and 2006, then fall in 2007

2001, $2.2 trillion 2% 5% 7.9% 7% 2006, $3.0 trillion 33.2% 13% 14% 2.7% 2007, $2.4 trillion 11% 14% 4.9% Q1 2008, $480 billion 4% 9% 9.6% 2% 8%

25 25

FHA & VA Conventional, conforming prime Jumbo prime Jumbo prime Subprime Alt-A Home equity loans

Sources: Inside Mortgage Finance, Milken Institute.

57.1% 20% 13% 20% 16% 47.3% 8% 14% 67.2%

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SLIDE 26

ARM hybrids dominate subprime originations (2006)

Other ARM 7% Prime conventional ARM hybrids

Alt-A

Other ARM 23%

Subprime

Other ARM 4%

Fixed 9%

30-year ARM balloon

26 26

23% Fixed 70%

Fixed 31%

ARM hybrids 46%

Sources: Freddie Mac, Milken Institute.

with 40- to 50-year amortization 26% 2- and 3-year hybrids 61%

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SLIDE 27
  • V. Securitization

27 27

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SLIDE 28

The mortgage model switches from

  • riginate-to-hold to originate-to-distribute

Securitized 15.6%

Held in

Residential mortgage loans 1980: Total = $958 billion Residential mortgage loans Q2 2008: Total = $11.3 trillion

28 28

Held in portfolio 84.4%

Held in portfolio 41% Securitized 59%

Sources: Federal Reserve, Milken Institute.

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SLIDE 29

40 45 43 42 45 47 50 57 62 65 68 68 68 50 60 70 80 Percent of all subprime mortgages securitized since 1994

Securitization becomes the dominant funding source for subprime mortgages

29 29

31 29 33 40 10 20 30 40 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Q1 2008 Q2 2008

Sources: Inside Mortgage Finance, Milken Institute.

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SLIDE 30

The rise and fall of private-label securitizers

New securities issuance

21% 2% 42%

1985 Total = $110B

13% 20%

2001 Total = $1.3T

18% 4% 56%

2006 Total = $2.0T

15% 6%

First half 2008 Total = $734B

30 30

Ginnie Mae Freddie Mac Fannie Mae Private-label

Sources: Inside Mortgage Finance, Milken Institute.

35%

Total = $110B

29% 38%

Total = $1.3T

22%

Total = $2.0T

33% 46%

Total = $734B

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SLIDE 31

The rise and fall of private-label securitizers

Outstanding securities

13% 6% 55%

1985

14% 18%

2001

35% 7% 25%

2006

30% 7% 26%

First half 2008

31 31

Ginnie Mae Freddie Mac Fannie Mae Private-label

26%

Total = $390B

39% 29%

Total = $3.3T

33%

Total = $5.9T

37%

First half 2008 Total = $6.8T Sources: Inside Mortgage Finance, Milken Institute.

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SLIDE 32
  • VI. Affordability

32 32

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SLIDE 33

4.5 5.0 Median home price/ median household income 2005: 4.69

Ratio of home price to household income surges Home mortgage share of household debts reaches a new high in 2007 Debt-to-income ratio

  • f households has

increased rapidly

125 150 Home mortgage debt/disposable personal income Percent

Q4 2007: 139.5%

70 75 Percent Q2 2007: 73.7%

33 33

2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 1998 2001 2004 2007 Average, 1967–2007: 3.38 2007: 4.29

Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, OFHEO, Federal Reserve, Moody’s Economy.com, Milken Institute. 75 100 125 1998 2001 2004 2007 Average, 1957–2007: 79.7%

60 65 70 1998 2001 2004 2007 Q2 2008: 73.4% Average, 1952–2008: 64.2%

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SLIDE 34
  • VII. Collapse

34 34

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SLIDE 35

The recent run-up of home prices was extraordinary

150 200 250 World War I World War II 1970’s boom 1980’s boom Current boom Annualized growth rate of nominal home index: 3.4% Index, 2000 = 100 Great Depression

35 35

50 100 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Long-term trend line

Sources: Robert Shiller, Milken Institute.

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SLIDE 36

Home prices don’t go up forever

Change in home prices in 100 plus years

5 10 15 20 25 30 World War I Great Depression World War II 1970’s Boom 1980’s Boom Current Boom Average, 1890–2007: 3.7% Percentage change in nominal home price, year ago

36 36

  • 20
  • 15
  • 10
  • 5

5 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 +/- one standard deviation

Sources: Robert Shiller, Milken Institute.

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SLIDE 37

2005: The collapse begins

S&P/Case-Shiller 10 city OFHEO S&P/Case-Shiller national 5 10 15 20 Home price indices, percent change on a year earlier

37 37

Sources: S&P/Case-Shiller, OFHEO, Moody’s Economy.com, Milken Institute.

  • 15
  • 10
  • 5

1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008

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SLIDE 38

Forty-six states had falling prices in the fourth quarter 2007

United States: - 9.3% (fourth-quarter annualized growth)

38 38

Source: Freddie Mac.

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SLIDE 39

48.4 48.0 28.2 27.9 26.8 26.3 26.3 26.0 24.4 22.9

Seattle Portland Washington New York Phoenix Los Angeles Tampa Miami Las Vegas Charlotte

One year ago… Five years ago…

If you bought your house…

  • 1.0
  • 3.2
  • 4.7
  • 5.2
  • 5.8
  • 7.1
  • 7.3
  • 7.3
  • 8.1
  • 9.5
  • 13.9

Charlotte Dallas Denver Boston Portland Seattle New York Cleveland Atlanta Chicago Minneapolis 39 39 20.5 18.6 14.3 9.1 6.6 6.5 6.1 5.9 4.8

  • 0.7
  • 3.8
  • 21.3

Composite 10 Composite 20 Chicago San Francisco Atlanta Dallas San Diego Boston Denver Minneapolis Cleveland Detroit

% change in price, June 07-08 % change in price, June 03-08

Sources: S&P/Case-Shiller, Milken Institute.

  • 13.9
  • 15.7
  • 15.9
  • 16.3
  • 17.0
  • 20.1
  • 23.7
  • 24.2
  • 25.3
  • 27.9
  • 28.3
  • 28.6

Minneapolis Washington Composite 20 Detroit Composite 10 Tampa San Francisco San Diego Los Angeles Phoenix Miami Las Vegas

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SLIDE 40

Housing starts sharply decline Homes sit longer

  • n the market …

… as home appreciation slows

  • 15

15 30 Percent change, year ago

8 10 12 Number of months that homes sit on the market Existing homes

10 20 2 4

Percentage change from year ago in m edian hom e sales price (left axis)

Percent Months

40 40

Note: Shaded area represents fluctuation within one standard deviation from mean (1.28%) Sources: Mortgage Bankers Association, OFHEO, Moody’s Economy.com, Milken Institute.

  • 60
  • 45
  • 30
  • 15

1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 June 2008: -41.9% July 2008: -39.2%

2 4 6 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 New homes

  • 20
  • 10

1999 2001 2003 2006 2008 6 8 10 12

Num ber of m onths hom es stay on m arket (right axis)

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SLIDE 41
  • VIII. Delinquencies and foreclosures

41 41

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SLIDE 42

1,150 1,400 1,650 1,900 2,150 Thousands of foreclosures per year Average 661,362 annual foreclosures from Q2 1999 to Q2 2006

Foreclosures are nothing new, but …

42 42

400 650 900 1,150 Q 2 1 9 9 9 Q 4 1 9 9 9 Q 2 2 Q 4 2 Q 2 2 1 Q 4 2 1 Q 2 2 2 Q 4 2 2 Q 2 2 3 Q 4 2 3 Q 2 2 4 Q 4 2 4 Q 2 2 5 Q 4 2 5 Q 2 2 6 Q 4 2 6 Q 2 2 7 Q 4 2 7 Q 2 2 8 Average 661,362 annual foreclosures from Q2 1999 to Q2 2006

Sources: Mortgage Bankers Association, Milken Institute.

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SLIDE 43

… their numbers have doubled

1,150 1,400 1,650 1,900 2,150 Thousands of foreclosures per year Average 1,316,220 annual forclosures from Q3 2006 to Q2 2008

43 43

Sources: Mortgage Bankers Association, Milken Institute.

400 650 900 1,150 Q 2 1 9 9 9 Q 4 1 9 9 9 Q 2 2 Q 4 2 Q 2 2 1 Q 4 2 1 Q 2 2 2 Q 4 2 2 Q 2 2 3 Q 4 2 3 Q 2 2 4 Q 4 2 4 Q 2 2 5 Q 4 2 5 Q 2 2 6 Q 4 2 6 Q 2 2 7 Q 4 2 7 Q 2 2 8 Average 661,362 annual foreclosures from Q2 1999 to Q2 2006

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SLIDE 44

Subprime mortgages accounted for half

  • r more of foreclosures since 2006

1,200 1,600 2,000 Subprime FHA and VA Prime (includes Alt-A) Subprime: 12% of mortgages serviced (March 2008) 54% Number of home mortgage foreclosures started (annualized, in thousands) 50%

44 44

400 800

  • Dec. 2003

June 2004

  • Dec. 2004

June 2005

  • Dec. 2005

June 2006

  • Dec. 2006

June 2007

  • Dec. 2007

March 2008 37% 29% 34% 36% 29% 35% 37% 29% 34% 44% 22% 34% 47% 20% 33% 52% 17% 31% 55% 13% 32% 56% 11% 33% 9% 37% 8% 42%

Sources: Inside Mortgage Finance, Milken Institute.

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SLIDE 45

Subprime ARMs have the worst default record

Home mortgages delinquent or in foreclosure (percent of number) 15 20 25 30 35 Q2 2008, Subprime ARM: 33.4% Subprime FRM: 11.8% Prime FRM: 3.0% FHA and VA: 5.8%

45 45

5 10 15 Q2 1998 Q1 1999 Q4 1999 Q3 2000 Q2 2001 Q1 2002 Q4 2002 Q3 2003 Q2 2004 Q1 2005 Q4 2005 Q3 2006 Q2 2007 Q1 2008

Sources: Mortgage Bankers Association, Milken Institute.

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SLIDE 46

Percentage of homes purchased in Q2 2008 that now have negative equity

46 46

< 20% >= 20% and < 35% >= 35% and < 50% >= 50%

Sources: Zillow.com, Milken Institute.

United States = 44.8%

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SLIDE 47

Percentage of homes sold for a loss (Q2 2008)

47 47

< 15% >= 15% and < 30% >= 30% and < 45% >= 45%

Sources: Zillow.com, Milken Institute.

United States = 32.7%

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SLIDE 48

Percentage of homes sold that were in foreclosure (Q2 2008)

48 48

< 1% >= 1% and < 25% >= 25% and < 40% >= 40%

Sources: Zillow.com, Milken Institute.

United States = 18.6%

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SLIDE 49
  • IX. Damages scorecard

49 49

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SLIDE 50

Losses/write-downs, capital raised, and jobs cut by financial institutions worldwide

120 160 200 36,000 48,000 60,000 US$ billions Capital raised (left axis) Jobs cut (right axis) Number of jobs cut

50 50

Note: Q3 data are through September 25, 2008. Sources: Bloomberg, Milken Institute.

40 80 Prior quarters Q3 2007 Q4 2007 Q1 2008 Q2 2008 Q3 2008 (through 12,000 24,000 Losses/write-downs (left axis) (left axis)

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SLIDE 51

What is the cumulative damage?

Cumulative losses/write-downs, capital raised, and jobs cut by financial institutions worldwide

400 500 600 80,000 100,000 120,000 140,000 Number of jobs cut US$ billions Capital raised (left axis) Jobs cut (right axis)

51 51

Note: Q3 data are through September 25, 2008. Sources: Bloomberg, Milken Institute.

100 200 300 Prior quarters Q3 2007 Q4 2007 Q1 2008 Q2 2008 Q3 2008 (through 20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 Losses/write-downs (left axis) Capital raised (left axis)

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SLIDE 52

Recent losses/write-downs and capital raised by selected financial institutions

US$ billions, through September 25, 2008 Losses /write-downs Capital raised Citigroup, United States 55.1 49.1 Merrill Lynch, United States 52.2 29.9 UBS, Switzerland 44.2 28.2 HSBC, United Kingdom 27.4 5.1 Wachovia, United States 22.7 11.0

52 52

Wachovia, United States 22.7 11.0 Bank of America, United States 21.2 20.7 Morgan Stanley, United States 15.7 5.6 IKB Deutsche, Germany 15.0 12.3 Washington Mutual, United States 14.8 12.1 Royal Bank of Scotland, United Kingdom 14.4 23.5 World total 521.9 379.2

Sources: Bloomberg, Milken Institute.

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SLIDE 53

Financial stock prices take big hits

  • 99.8
  • 99.7
  • 97.5
  • 97.4
  • 95.4
  • 94.3
  • 93.9

Washington Mutual Lehman Brothers Freddie Mac Fannie Mae AIG Bear Stearns* Wachovia Percentage change in stock price, December 2006–September 2008

53 53

Note: * Bear Stearns stock price is to May 2008. ** Countrywide stock price is to June 2008. Sources: Bloomberg, Milken Institute.

  • 93.9
  • 90.0
  • 72.8
  • 66.0
  • 65.6
  • 35.8
  • 34.4
  • 3.3

5.5 Wachovia Countrywide** Merrill Lynch Morgan Stanley UBS Equity Goldman Sachs Bank of America JP Morgan & Chase Wells Fargo

slide-54
SLIDE 54
  • 142
  • 101
  • 80
  • 74
  • 60
  • 50
  • 44

AIG Wachovia Bank of America UBS Equity Morgan Stanley Fannie Mae Merrill Lynch Total loss in market value: $728 billion, December 2006–September 2008

Financial market capitalization takes big hit

54 54

  • 44
  • 43
  • 42
  • 41
  • 28
  • 24
  • 21

4 17 Merrill Lynch Washington Mutual Freddie Mac Lehman Brothers Goldman Sachs Countrywide** Bear Stearns* Wells Fargo JP Morgan & Chase

Note: * Bear Stearns stock price is to May 2008. ** Countrywide stock price is to June 2008. Sources: Bloomberg, Milken Institute.

US$ billions

slide-55
SLIDE 55
  • X. Credit crunch and liquidity freeze

55 55

slide-56
SLIDE 56

Tightened standards for real estate loans

40 60 80 100 Net percentage of domestic respondents tightening standards for commercial real estate loans LTCM Dotcom The end of S&L crisis Subprime

56 56

Sources: Federal Reserve, Milken Institute.

  • 40
  • 20

20 40 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008

slide-57
SLIDE 57

Widening spreads between mortgage-backed and high-yield bonds

1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600 1,800 Basis points, spread over 10-year Treasury bond Merrill Lynch Mortgage-Backed Securities Index Merrill Lynch High-Yield Bond Index Maximum spread: 08/29/2008: 955.8 bps

57 57

200 400 600 800 01/2004 07/2004 01/2005 07/2005 01/2006 07/2006 01/2007 07/2007 01/2008 07/2008 Merrill Lynch High-Yield Bond Index

Sources: Merrill Lynch, Bloomberg, Milken Institute.

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SLIDE 58

Liquidity freeze

100 120 140

Septem ber 19, 2008: 127.5 bps

Basis points

Average since

Spread between 3-month LIBOR and

  • vernight index swap rate

Spread between 3-month LIBOR and T-bill rate

250 300 350

August 20, 2007: 240 bps

Basis points

Septem ber 18, 2008: 313 bps

58 58

20 40 60 80 2006 2007 2008

Average since Decem ber 2001: 21.1 bps August 2007: 69.8 bps

Sources: Bloomberg, Milken Institute.

50 100 150 200 2006 2007 2008

Average since 1985: 76 bps Average since August 2007: 130 bps

slide-59
SLIDE 59

Counterparty risk increases

300 400 500 Basis points Government announces support for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Lehman Brother files for bankruptcy and Merrill Lynch acquired AIG rescued

Average CDS spread, basis points

59 59

Note: Counterparty Risk index averages the market spreads of the credit default swaps (CDS) of fifteen major credit derivatives dealers, including ABN Amro, Bank of America, BNP Paribas, Barclays Bank, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs Group, HSBC, Lehman Brothers, JPMorgan Chase, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, UBS, and Wachovia. Sources: Datastream, Milken Institute.

100 200 07/2007 09/2007 11/2007 01/2008 03/2008 05/2008 07/2008 09/2008 Bear Stearns acquired

slide-60
SLIDE 60

Commercial paper issuance dries up

50 100 150 Quarterly change in outstanding amount, US$ billions

60 60

Sources: Federal Reserve, Milken Institute.

  • 200
  • 150
  • 100
  • 50

Q1 2006 Q2 2006 Q3 2006 Q4 2006 Q1 2007 Q2 2007 Q3 2007 Q4 2007 Q1 2008 Q2 2008 Issuers of asset-backed securities Other issuers

slide-61
SLIDE 61

Federal Reserve responds by cutting Fed funds rate, but mortgage rates remain relatively flat

5 6 7 8 9 10 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 Freddie Mac 30-year fixed mortgage rate (left axis) Percent Percent 30-year FRM rate (left axis)

61 61

1 2 3 4 5 01/2007 03/2007 06/2007 09/2007 12/2007 02/2008 05/2008 08/2008 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 Federal funds rate (left axis)

Spread (right axis)

Sources: Freddie Mac, Federal Reserve, Moody’s Economy.com, Milken Institute.

slide-62
SLIDE 62

Congress and White House responses

HOPE NOW The Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 Conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

62 62

Temporary guaranty program for money market funds Temporary ban on short selling in selected

companies

Bailout package?

slide-63
SLIDE 63
  • XI. When will we hit bottom?

63 63

slide-64
SLIDE 64

Looking for a bottom?

Economists say the economy isn’t at its low point yet, and house prices likely won’t get there until 2009

Does this feel like the bottom to a downturn? Yes 27% When will home prices hit bottom? 6% 2nd half 1st half 2010

64 64

No 73% 4% 17% 38% 29% 1st half 2008 2nd half 2008 1st half 2009 2nd half 2009

Source: Wall Street Journal.

slide-65
SLIDE 65

How far do home prices have to fall?

5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 Q2 1971: 6.08% Annual rents as percent of home prices

65 65

Sources: Davisa, Lehnertb, Martin (2007), Milken Institute.

3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Q4 2006: 3.48% Q1 2008: 3.93% Average, 1960–Q1 2008: 5.04% Average, 2000–Q1 2008: 4.06%

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SLIDE 66

Combinations of rental price growth rates and rent-to-price ratios to get home prices back to their Q4 2006 value

Annual home price decline

  • 2.0%
  • 5.0%
  • 10.0%
  • 15.0%
  • 20.0%

3.80% 2010 Q3 2008 Q4 2008 Q2 2008 Q2 2008 Q2 ratio

Annual home price decline required

66 66

4.00% 2013 Q1 2009 Q4 2008 Q3 2008 Q2 2008 Q2 5.00% 2024 Q1 2014 Q1 2010 Q4 2009 Q3 2009 Q1 5.04% average 2024 Q3 2014 Q2 2010 Q4 2009 Q3 2009 Q1 Rent-to-price rat 6.00% 2026 Q4 2017 Q3 2012 Q3 2010 Q4 2009 Q4

Sources: Davisa, Lehnertb, Martin (2007), Milken Institute.

slide-67
SLIDE 67

2,500 3,000 3,500 4,000 US$/month

Payment with 100% LTV Payment with 90% LTV Payment with 80% LTV Mortgage payment assumptions: Every month, a home is purchased at median price, buyer takes out a 30-year conforming, fixed-rate loan with 80%

  • LTV. Payment also includes 1% property tax per year, 0.1% property

insurance.

Alternative measures of the affordability of mortgage debt for California

67 67

500 1,000 1,500 2,000 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 Maximum affortablility limit is 38% of median household

insurance.

Sources: Moody’s Economy.com, Milken Institute.

slide-68
SLIDE 68
  • XII. What went wrong

68 68

slide-69
SLIDE 69

2,443 879 1,410 2,067 944 886 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 US$ billions

The importance of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

69 69

500 1,000 Fannie Mae: total assets Fannie Mae: total MBS

  • utstanding

Freddie Mac: total assets Freddie Mac: total MBS

  • utstanding

Commercial banks: total residential real estate assets Savings institutions: total residential real estate assets

Sources: Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, FDIC, Milken Institute.

slide-70
SLIDE 70

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Too big with too little capital?

1,301 1,778 2,443 1,410 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 US$ billions Total assets Total MBS outstanding

70 70

Sources: Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, Milken Institute.

133 41 1,022 803 844 805 886 879 288 316 1,301 752 1,123 500 1,000 1,500 Fannie Mae 1990 Freddie Mac 1990 Fannie Mae 2003 Freddie Mac 2003 Fannie Mae 2006 Freddie Mac 2006 Fannie Mae 2Q 2008 Freddie Mac 2Q 2008

slide-71
SLIDE 71

167x 244x 150 200 250 300 Mortgage book of business over capital measures Fannie Mae Freddie Mac

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are highly leveraged

71 71

60x 56x 48x 55x 60x 58x 52x 57x 64x 81x 56x 65x 59x 50 100 150 Core capital Fair value Core capital Fair value 2005 2006 2007 2008Q2

  • 393x

Sources: Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, FDIC, Milken Institute.

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SLIDE 72

Freddie Mac’s and Fannie Mae's retained private-label portfolios

Freddie Mac, 2007 Freddie Mac, 2006 Subprime Alt-A All others 57.4% 13.1% 29.5% 61.2% 25.0% 13.8% $122.2 billion $76.1 billion

72 72

Sources: Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, FDIC, Milken Institute.

Fannie Mae, 2007 Fannie Mae, 2006 Fannie Mae, 2005 33.8% 4.3% 32.0% 46.4% 36.1% 17.5% 32.1% 37.4% 30.5% 57.4% 13.1% 29.5% $86.9 billion $97.3 billion $94.8 billion

slide-73
SLIDE 73

23.7 21.5 67.9 Federal Home Loan Banks Fannie Mae Freddie Mac Leverage ratio, total assets/common equtity

Leverage ratios of different types

  • f financial firms (June 2008)

73 73

9.1 9.8 9.4 31.6 Credit unions Commercial banks Savings institutions Brokers/hedge funds

Sources: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, National Credit Union Administration, Bloomberg, Google Finance, Milken Institute.

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SLIDE 74

Too much dependence on debt?

Leverage ratios at biggest investment banks

28 19 22 26 27 19 31 24 23 34 32 33 31 22 28 30 24 22 25 30 35 40 2000 2005 2007 June 2008 Total assets/total shareholder equity

74 74

Sources: Bloomberg, FDIC, Milken Institute.

19 18 19 n.a. 5 10 15 20 Bear Stearns Merrill Lynch Morgan Stanley Lehman Brothers Goldman Sachs

slide-75
SLIDE 75

AAA AA+ AA AA- A+ A A- BBB+

1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 Number of securities rated 4,090, or 51%, of new securities rated by S&P were rated AAA

Most new securities issued in 2007 were rated AAA by S&P

S&P Total Downgraded Downgraded / Total AAA 1,032 156 15.1% AA(+/-) 3,495 1,330 38.1% A(+/-) 2,983 1,886 63.2%

56 percent of MBS issued from 2005 to 2007 were eventually downgraded

75 75

BBB+ BBB BBB- BB+ BB BB- B+ B B- CCC+ CCC+ CCC- CC C D

S&P were rated AAA A(+/-) 2,983 1,886 63.2% BBB(+/-) 2,954 2,248 76.1% BB(+/-) 789 683 86.6% B(+/-) 8 7 87.5% Total 11,261 6,310 56.0%

Sources: Bloomberg, Inside Mortgage Finance, Milken Institute.

Note: A bond is considered investment grade if its credit rating is BBB- or higher by S&P

slide-76
SLIDE 76

When is a AAA not a AAA?

Multilayered mortgage products

Origination of mortgage loans High-grade CDO Senior AAA 88% Junior AAA 5% Pool of mortgage AA 3% loans: prime or subprime A 2% BBB 1% Unrated 1%

76 76

Sources: International Monetary Fund, Milken Institute.

Mortgage bonds AAA 80% AA 11% A 4% Mezzanine CDO BBB 3% CDO-squared BB-unrated 2% Senior AAA 62% Junior AAA 14% Senior AAA 60% AA 8% Junior AAA 27% A 6% AA 4% CDO-cubed… BBB 6% A 3% Unrated 4% BBB 3% Unrated 2%

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SLIDE 77

Dollar losses in reported cases of mortgage fraud

US$ millions 1,014 946 813 800 1,000 1,200

Mortgage loan fraud surges

37.3 52.9 40 50 60 Number of cases reported, thousands 37.3 52.9 40 50 60 Number of cases reported, thousands

77 77

293 225 429 200 400 600 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Sources: Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Milken Institute.

1. 7 2.3 2.9 3.5 4.7 5.4 9.5 18.4 26.0 10 20 30 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 1. 7 2.3 2.9 3.5 4.7 5.4 9.5 18.4 26.0 10 20 30 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007

slide-78
SLIDE 78

Is adequate information disclosed to consumers?

51 68 74 79 84 87 95 Loan amount Presence of prepayment penalty for refinance in two years Presence of charges for optional credit insurance Reason why the interest rate and APR sometimes differ Property tax and homeowner’s insurance cost amount Total up-front cost amount Prepayment penalty amount

Percent of respondents who could not correctly identify various loan costs using current disclosure forms

78 78

Sources: Federal Trade Commission, Milken Institute.

20 20 21 23 30 32 33 37 51 APR amount Cash due at closing amount Monthly payment (including whether it includes taxes and insurance) Settlement charges amount Balloon payment (presence and amount) Interest rate amount Whether loan amount included finances settlement charges Which loan was less expensive Loan amount

slide-79
SLIDE 79

Drivers of foreclosures: Strong appreciation or weak economies?

15 20 25 Detroit Bakersfield Riverside Fort Lauderdale Las Vegas Stockton Sacramento Toledo Cleveland Weak economies Housing bubbles Foreclosures per 1,000 homes

79 79

Sources: U.S. Treasury Department, RealtyTrac, Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, Milken Institute.

5 10

  • 20

20 40 60 80 100 120 140 Five-year price gain, Q3 2002–Q3 2007 (percent) Miami Bakersfield Fresno Fort Lauderdale Orlando Phoenix Palm Beach Tampa San Diego Oakland Sacramento Atlanta Memphis Columbus Indianapolis Toledo Dayton Denver Cleveland Akron Warren National average

slide-80
SLIDE 80

After housing bubble burst in 2007: Foreclosures highest for areas with biggest price declines

25 30 35 40 45 Weak economies strengthen Stockton Bakersfield Riverside Las Vegas Fort Lauderdale Sacramento Oakland Denver Foreclosures per 1,000 homes National average Collaping housing bubbles

80 80

Sources: RealtyTrac, Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, Milken Institute.

5 10 15 20 25

  • 30
  • 25
  • 20
  • 15
  • 10
  • 5

5 Price change, 2007–June 2008 (percent, annualized) Miami Orlando Phoenix Fresno Sacramento San Diego Detroit Warren Cleveland Dayton Columbus Indianapolis Palm Beach Tampa Toledo Akron Atlanta Memphis

slide-81
SLIDE 81
  • XIII. Where do we go from here?

81 81

slide-82
SLIDE 82

The U.S. regulatory regime: In need of reform?

National banks State commercial and savings banks Federal savings banks Insurance companies Securities brokers/dealers Other financial companies, including mortgage companies and brokers

  • Fed
  • OTS

Fed is the umbrella or consolidated regulator

  • Federal Housing Finance

Agency

Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Federal Home Loan Banks Financial, bank and thrift holding companies

82 82

  • OCC
  • FDIC
  • State bank

regulators

  • FDIC
  • Fed--state member

commerical banks

  • OTS
  • FDIC
  • 50 State insurance

regulators plus District of Columbia and Puerto Rico

  • FINRA
  • SEC
  • CFTC
  • State securities

regulators

  • Fed
  • State licensing

(if needed)

  • U.S. Treasury

for some products

  • OCC
  • Host county

regulator

  • Fed
  • Host county

regulator

  • OTS
  • Host county

regulator Federal branch Foreign branch Limited foreign branch Primary/ secondary functional regulator

Notes: Justice Department: Assesses effects of mergers and acquisitions on competition Federal Courts: Ultimate decider of banking, securities, and insurance products CFTC: Commodity Futures Trading Commission FDIC: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Fed: Federal Reserve FINRA: Financial Industry Regulatory Authority GSEs: Government Sponsored Enterprises OCC: Comptroller of the Currency OTS: Office of Thrift Supervision SEC: Securities and Exchange Commission

Sources: Financial Services Roundtable (2007), Milken Institute.

slide-83
SLIDE 83

Many different options and innovations…

Covered Bonds Covered Bonds Alternative Mortgage Products Alternative Mortgage Products Shared Equity Mortgages Shared Equity Mortgages

83 83

Real Estate Derivatives Real Estate Derivatives Classical Insurance Products Classical Insurance Products Others Others

slide-84
SLIDE 84

Demystifying the Mortgage Meltdown: What It Means for Main Street, Wall Street and the U.S. Financial System

Glenn Yago James R. Barth

84 84

Milken Institute October 2, 2008 Glenn Yago Director of Capital Studies James R. Barth Senior Fellow