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CS615 - Aspects of System Administration System Security Department - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

CS765 - Aspects of System Administration Slide 1 CS615 - Aspects of System Administration System Security Department of Computer Science Stevens Institute of Technology Jan Schaumann jschauma@stevens.edu


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CS765 - Aspects of System Administration Slide 1

CS615 - Aspects of System Administration System Security

Department of Computer Science Stevens Institute of Technology Jan Schaumann jschauma@stevens.edu https://www.cs.stevens.edu/~jschauma/615/

System Security April 16, 2018

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This lecture

What I won’t tell you: How to make your system ”secure”. How to break into other systems. Everything you need to know. What I will tell you: What you need to know to start looking. What concepts are critical to understand. What conceptual pitfalls you are likely to encounter. A few always and nevers.

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Where/how does ’security’ come into play?

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Where/how does ’security’ come into play?

Lecture 02 (Filesystems, Disks, Storage) storage model (DAS, NAS, SAN, Cloud) partitions / mount options filesystem features (permissions, access control lists) DoS on disk space firmware compromise on hard drives Lecture 03 (Software Installation Concepts) software package management and updates VMs, containers, etc. patch management package integrity checking

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Where/how does ’security’ come into play?

Lecture 04 (Multiuser Fundamentals) privileges and trust models authentication methods, multi-factor authentication file access controls raising privileges Lecture 05 / 06 (Networking) protocols and visibility of data on different layers tcpdump can read all packets location of attacker on network implies capabilities network censorship

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Where/how does ’security’ come into play?

Lecture 07 (DNS; HTTP) If you control the DNS, you control the domain DNS registrars as attack points use of DNS as another channel for host verification (SSHFP records) trustworthiness of DNS (DNSSEC) HTTP as the universal entry into any network code execution context (CGI vs. server-side vs. client-side) content control and inspection capabilities of e.g. CDNs

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Where/how does ’security’ come into play?

Lecture 08 (SMTP , HTTPS)

  • bservation of packets via tcpdump(1)

email as attack methods (spam, phishing) email privacy implications SMTP plain text vs. opportunistic encryption mail abuse and spam recipient and sender authentication, open relays TLS authentication PKI, Certificate Authorities protocol downgrade and MitM attacks

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Where/how does ’security’ come into play?

Lecture 09 (Writing System Tool) automation as a defensive weapon using the wrong tool for the job => writing insecure code understanding language / framework pitfalls simplicity reduces attack surface all code has bugs

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Where/how does ’security’ come into play?

Lecture 10 (Backup and Disaster Recovery, Monitoring) disasters include security breaches data loss as a risk safety of backups (encrypted backups?) incident detection via events, metrics, and context sensitive data in logs

  • utsourcing monitoring services

Lecture 11 (Configuration Management) role based access control inherent trust, full control CAP theorem may impact security controls

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How do we secure a system?

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How do we secure a system?

Rub some crypto on it - duh.

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How do we secure a system?

Rub some crypto on it - duh. It depends.

(Context required.)

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What is security?

security NOUN: Freedom from risk or danger; safety.

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What is risk?

risk NOUN: The possibility of suffering harm or loss; danger.

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Suffering harm or loss of what?

access to data

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Suffering harm or loss of what?

access to data integrity of data

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Suffering harm or loss of what?

access to data integrity of data availability of services

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Suffering harm or loss of what?

access to data integrity of data availability of services reputation

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Suffering harm or loss of what?

access to data integrity of data availability of services reputation monetary loss due to any of the above

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Suffering harm or loss of what?

access to data integrity of data availability of services reputation monetary loss due to any of the above monetary loss due to physical items of actual value

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Suffering harm or loss of what?

access to data integrity of data availability of services reputation monetary loss due to any of the above monetary loss due to physical items of actual value ...

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How to determine risk

“Risk Assessment” identify assets (that which you wish to protect, what you value)

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How to determine risk

“Risk Assessment” identify assets identify threats (possible dangers to your assets, bad things that might happen)

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How to determine risk

“Risk Assessment” identify assets identify threats identify vulnerabilities (weaknesses in a system, component, protocol, ...)

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How to determine risk

“Risk Assessment” identify assets identify threats identify vulnerabilities determine likelihood of damage (considering mitigating or exacerbating factors)

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How to determine risk

“Risk Assessment” identify assets identify threats identify vulnerabilities determine likelihood of damage estimate cost of recovery (including recovery of data, immediate revenue loss, replacing physical items, ...)

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How to determine risk

“Risk Assessment” identify assets identify threats identify vulnerabilities determine likelihood of damage estimate cost of recovery estimate cost of defense (objectively, without consideration of your budget; include partial defense or mitigating strategies)

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How to determine risk

“Risk Assessment” identify assets identify threats identify vulnerabilities determine likelihood of damage estimate cost of recovery estimate cost of defense A risk is the likelihood of a threat successfully exploiting a vulnerability and the estimated cost (or potential damage) both in the short and long term you may incur as a result.

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How to determine risk

Never waste resources on unspecified, vague risks or FUD. Always remember that risks are scoped and specific.

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How do we secure a system?

You can’t “secure” a system; you can only minimize specific risks by e.g. closing an attack vector, eliminating a vulnerability, reducing the attack surface, or changing the economics of the adversary.

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Threat Model

For each system/component/product/service/... identify what you’re protecting identify from whom you’re protecting it identify goals of the attacker identify motivation of the attacker identify capabilities of the attacker identify threats you cannot defend against (within this system or in general)

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Threat Model

Your adversaries are determined human actors with specific goals. Threat actors have their own risk profile,

  • tolerance, and cost/benefit calculations.

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Threat Model

https://www.netmeister.org/blog/threat-model-101.html.html

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Threat Model

https://www.netmeister.org/blog/threat-model-101.html.html

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Imperatives

Constantly seek to reduce your attack surface. Identify and eliminate attack vectors. You can’t do this alone: lead by example, seek allies.

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Imperatives

Never think you’re the only one who understands

  • r cares about security.

Always consult with subject matter experts, especially those not on your team.

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Defense in Depth

Security is like an onion: the more layers you peel away, the more it stinks.

Never assume any one protection mechanism is sufficient. Always assume the other protections you deployed can be circumvented

  • r broken.

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The biggest threat comes from the inside

Never ignore quarantine regulations.

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The biggest threat comes from the inside

http://is.gd/6sREQh https://www.netmeister.org/blog/attack-life-cycle.html

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Cryptography

Cryptography can help mitigate some of the risks sometimes.

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Cryptography

Cryptography can help mitigate some of the risks sometimes. It may provide security in the areas of: Secrecy or Confidentiality Did/could anybody else see (parts of) the message?

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Cryptography

Cryptography can help mitigate some of the risks sometimes. It may provide security in the areas of: Secrecy or Confidentiality Did/could anybody else see (parts of) the message? Accuracy or Integrity Was the message (could it have been) modified before I received it?

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Cryptography

Cryptography can help mitigate some of the risks sometimes. It may provide security in the areas of: Secrecy or Confidentiality Did/could anybody else see (parts of) the message? Accuracy or Integrity Was the message (could it have been) modified before I received it? Authenticity Is the party I’m talking to actually who I think it is / they claim they are?

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Cryptography

Note: Never write your own crypto or invent your own protocol. Authentication != Authorization cryptography does not handle authorization you generally need all three: confidentiality, integrity, authenticity cryptography cannot prevent against incorrect use – usability is hard! Know your threat model!

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Basic Security Concepts: Confidentiality

Alice and Bob agree on a way to transform plain text into ciphertext transformed data is sent over insecure channel Alice and Bob are able to reverse transformation Different approaches: secret key cryptography (example: DES) Alice and Bob share a secret key (e.g. WEP , WPAPSK, ...) public key cryptography (example: RSA) Alice has a private and a public key (e.g. TLS, SSH, PGP , ...) data encrypted with her private key can only be decrypted by her public key and vice versa public key can be shared with anybody (via insecure means)

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Threats to Confidentiality

lack of authenticity key exchange lack of key rotation key disclosure Never store secrets in code! Always use a key management system.

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Basic Security Concepts: Integrity

In order to protect against forgery or data manipulation, provide some sort of digest or checksum (often a one-way hash). Popular choices: 5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99 (MD5) 5baa61e4c9b93f3f0682250b6cf8331b7ee68fd8 (SHA-1) 5e884898da28047151d0e56f8dc6292773603d0d6aabbdd62 a11ef721d1542d8 (SHA256) b109f3bbbc244eb82441917ed06d618b9008dd09b3befd1b5 e07394c706a8bb980b1d7785e5976ec049b46df5f1326af5a 2ea6d103fd07c95385ffab0cacbc86 (SHA512)

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Basic Security Concepts: Integrity

Examples: host based IDS, package manager signatures Some possible threats: collisions in algorithm lack of authenticity (Where did I get the checksum?) lack of integrity (Was the checksum tampered to match the (tampered) data?) “verification” with compromised tools “rainbow tables” / internet search engines allow for easy reverse lookup of un-salted hashes.

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Basic Security Concepts: Hashing Passwords

Never confuse hashing and encryption! Never encrypt your users’ passwords to store them – always hash them. Always salt your hashes. Always use adaptive or key-stretching functions such as e.g. bcrypt, PBKDF2, Argon2.

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Basic Security Concepts: Authenticity

Three general ways of proving that you are who you say you are: something you know something you have something you are

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Basic Security Concepts: Authenticity

Three general ways of proving that you are who you say you are: something you know secret handshake, password can (easily) be given to and used by somebody else something you have something you are

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Basic Security Concepts: Authenticity

NetBSD/amd64 (SERVER) (console) login: jschauma password: ********************************* NetBSD 7.0.2 (SERVER) #2: Tue Jan 24 02:33:13 EST 2017 Welcome to NetBSD! hostname$

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Basic Security Concepts: Authenticity

Three general ways of proving that you are who you say you are: something you know secret handshake, password can (easily) be given to and used by somebody else something you have physical items: smart card, RSA token, ... private keys can (easily) be given to and used by somebody else something you are

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Basic Security Concepts: Authenticity

$ ssh-keygen -l -f /dev/stdin <<<$(aws ec2 get-console-output \ i-0990f1eb069c853c4 | grep ^ecdsa) 256 19:af:35:01:0b:2a:ee:3d:30:0f:69:11:cc:55:7c:20 (ECDSA) $ ssh -i ~/.ssh/myawskey ec2-54-227-16-184.compute-1.amazonaws.com The authenticity of host ’ec2-54-227-16-184.compute-1.amazonaws.com (54.227.16.184)’ can’t be established. ECDSA key fingerprint is 19:af:35:01:0b:2a:ee:3d:30:0f:69:11:cc:55:7c:20. Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? yes NetBSD 7.0.2 (SERVER) #2: Tue Jan 24 02:33:13 EST 2017 Welcome to NetBSD! hostname$

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Basic Security Concepts: Authenticity

Three general ways of proving that you are who you say you are: something you know secret handshake, password can (easily) be given to and used by somebody else something you have physical items: smart card, RSA token, ... private keys can (easily) be given to and used by somebody else something you are physical, physiological or behavioral traits cannot (easily or at all) be given to or used by somebody else cannot (easily or at all) be changed once compromised

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Basic Security Concepts: Authenticity

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Basic Security Concepts: Authenticity

Some possible threats: lack of confidentiality lack of integrity reliance on fragile infrastructure usability conflation with authorization

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Principle of Least Privilege

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Principle of Least Privilege

Never run services as root; always use a dedicated account. Never log in as root; always use sudo(1). Never rely on implicit privileges; always grant access explicitly. Never grant permanent overly broad access; always use periodic access renewal and Role Based Access Controls (RBAC).

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It’s not just 1s and 0s

System security is not restricted to software security.

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It’s not just 1s and 0s

The thing that makes security difficult is not the software or hardware components. It’s the human component.

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It’s not just 1s and 0s

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Secure by default

Users care about usability, not about security.

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Secure by default

Users will not change their default settings.

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Secure by default

Users will not change their default settings.

(Unless a less secure option is available.)

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Hooray! 5 Minute Break

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Classes of Vulnerabilities

memory management use of uninitialized memory buffer overflow / stack smashing use-after-free / dangling pointer input validation code and command injections format attacks Little Bobby Tables (https://www.xkcd.com/327/) race contitions non-atomic TOCTOU symlink attacks

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Classes of Vulnerabilities

privilege escalation and confusion XSS, CSRF setuid with untrusted environment social engineering phishing watering hole attacks brute-force attacks namespace iteration denial of service information disclosure MitM insufficient permissions lack of encryption, authN, authZ

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Security Fallacies and Pitfalls

Security by Obscurity

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Security Fallacies and Pitfalls

Know what you’re doing.

Never blindly apply nor dismiss a security mechanism. Always know which threat you’re mitigating.

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Security Fallacies and Pitfalls

Perfect is the Enemy of the Good

(Differentiate between futile efforts and raising the bar.)

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Security Fallacies and Pitfalls

One in a million is next Tuesday.

http://is.gd/Isb20K

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Security Fallacies and Pitfalls

“Any person can invent a security system so clever that she or he can’t think of how to break it.”

Schneier’s Law http://is.gd/hW82dt

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Security Fallacies and Pitfalls

Don’t invent your own crypto.

(Seriously, don’t.)

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Security Fallacies and Pitfalls

Complexity is the worst enemy of security.

(The more secure you make something, the less secure it becomes.)

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Whom do you trust?

Reflections on Trusting Trust

https://is.gd/RUX4zY

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Outsourcing Services

you trust the provider/vendor to honor the agreement you “hope” they won’t change their agreement (once invested, changing back is hard) you trust the provider/vendor to keep their infrastructure safe you trust the provider/vendor’s employees you are ok with the traffic going across the public internet

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Outsourcing Services

you trust the provider/vendor to honor the agreement you “hope” they won’t change their agreement (once invested, changing back is hard) you trust the provider/vendor to keep their infrastructure safe you trust the provider/vendor’s employees you are ok with the traffic going across the public internet Bottom-line: are you increasing or decreasing your attack surface? Always make a conscious decision; never blindly follow the promises without understanding the trade-offs.

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Embrace Automation

Vulnerabilities are dense. Eliminate classes of attacks, not individual flaws.

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Build Robust Infrastructures and Service

Your endpoint security model should assume the network is compromised; your network security model should assume the endpoint is. Both in fact are.

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Toning down the Paranoia

Proving a Negative

(Evidence of Absences vs. Absence of Evidence)

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Toning down the Paranoia

Never attribute to malice that which can be adequately explained by stupidity.

Hanlon’s Razor

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Toning down the Paranoia

Know which threat you’re facing. Know which mechanisms can help you. Don’t dismiss those.

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Sysadmin ∩ Infosec

https://www.netmeister.org/blog/infosec-basics.html

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Sysadmin ∩ Infosec

Nothing is always absolutely so.

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Two Questions

https://www.netmeister.org/blog/two-questions.html

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Last Words of Advice

keep your asset inventory accurate don’t shell out; parametrize arguments and exec(3) don’t trust the environment use multi-factor authentication use a password manager use a key management system rotate your secrets frequently curl -k is a (contagious) symptom don’t MitM your own users disable Flash; use an ad-blocker sign your software, configs; verify all signatures ensure secure defaults (e.g. umask, shell history, ...)

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Infosec Foundation

Don’t be lazy.

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Final Project

Group project: Capture the Flag https://www.cs.stevens.edu/~jschauma/615/ctf.html

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Additional Reading

https://www.slideshare.net/zanelackey/attackdriven-defense https://www.netmeister.org/blog/moving-the-needle.html https://www.netmeister.org/blog/attack-life-cycle.html https://www.netmeister.org/blog/threat-model-101.html https://twitter.com/jschauma/status/713118376550404096 https://t.co/DRHbEKXod8 https://danielmiessler.com/study/security_and_obscurity/ https://is.gd/sGnRVL

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