CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS AND IDEOLOGY IN REGARDS TO CITIZENS UNITED V. - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS AND IDEOLOGY IN REGARDS TO CITIZENS UNITED V. FEDERAL ELECTIONS COMMISSION

Amy Mailo

Approval of Congress and levels of productivity

(Dugan 2011) (Congress)

(Grandlund 2013)

Aftermath of Congressional Gridlock

• Government shutdown in 2013
• Stalling of serious reforms
• Increase of fi

filibusters used

• (Berman 2016)

(Klein 2013)

Party Polarization → Congressional Gridlock

• Extremity of polarization results in worsened gridlock (Johnstone 2013, 218; La Raja 2016, 225; Mann

2003, 28; Pildes 2011, 293)

• Urgency of reducing levels of party polarization (Berman 2016)
• Possible cause

Campaign Finance Statutes → Party Polarization

Project Goal

• To what extent, is the composite stringency of campaign fi

finance laws correlated with the levels of party polarization in regard to Citizens United?

• Hypothesis: lenient campaign fi

finance laws → more party polarization. Strength of variables will increase after Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission.

• Assumption about Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission

Roadmap

• Literature Review
• Methodology
• Findings and Discussion
• Limitations
• Conclusion

Literature Review

(Carrol and Lewis 2014)

Party Polarization and Campaign Finance

• Laws enable an idealist-centered political climate (Tarhan 2010, 10)

○ Ideological donors and campaign fi finance law (Corrado and Mann 2014, 22)

• Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission, 2010 ruling

○ Unravelling of stricter legislation (Corrado and Mann 2014, 11; Fuller 2014; La Raja and Schafffner 2016, 103) ■ Precedent?

Hole in the Body of Knowledge/Delimitations

• Campaign Finance Law and Party Polarization

○ Unexplored

• Importance of gap

○ Should be clear what can reduce the severity of these problems

• Delimitations

○ What my research specifi fically set out to fi find

Methodology

Methodology

• Background Knowledge: EBSCOHost, SAGE Publications, etc.
• Why quantitative?

○ Regression analysis: variables relationship before and after Citizens United ○ Summed dummy variable: stringency of laws (National Conference of State Legislatures 2012)

• Christopher Witko’s study in 2005 “Measuring the Stringency of State Campaign

Finance Regulation”

• Boris Shor and Nolan McCarty in 2015 “State Legislative Aggregate Ideology Data

June 2015 Update.”

Contribution Limits (7) Disclosure Requirements (8) Public Financing Provisions (7)

• i. Contribution limits on individuals

i.Aggregate expenditure reporting i.Total expenditure limit ii.Prohibition of direct corporate contributions ii.Aggregate contributions reporting ii.Check-off on tax return form for contribution to public funding iii.Prohibition of direct labor union contributions iii.Itemization (to list) of some categories of expenditures iii.Independent revenue source for public funding iv.Limits on corporate contributions (direct or PACs) iv.Itemization of some categories of contributions iv.Public financing of statewide campaigns v.Limits on labor union contributions (direct or PACs) v.Itemization of expenditures over $50 v.Public financing of state legislative campaigns vi.Limits on candidate self-financing vi.Itemization of contributions over $50 vi.Public financing of political parties vii.Limits on candidate family contributions vii.Requirement of final report within one month of an election vii.Equal distribution of public funds between candidates and/or parties viii.Requirement of reports on at least a quarterly basis

Table 1. Evaluation of Composite Stringency of Campaign Finance Laws Table, 2002 and 2012

(Witko 2005, 298-301)

Findings and Discussion

Discussion of Results

• Hypothesis vs. Results

○ Positive, not negative correlation ○ Strength of variables relationship ■ 2002-2004 value of R- 0.0697 ■ 2012-2014 value of R- 0.1187

• Unexpected Findings

○ Little evidence ○ 75% of states tested retained same score

Figure 1. Figure 2.

Discussion cont.

• Role of Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission

○ Relationship grew stronger from Figure 1 to 2 by +0.049

• Correlation does not mean causation

○ Other factors/variables unaccounted for ○ This study explored a causal relationship between two variables

Corresponds Challenges

Campaign fi finance laws reform slowly

(Berman 2016; Corrado and Mann 2014; La Raja 2016, 225)

Stricter campaign fi finance laws equates to less party polarization, right (La Raja and Schafffner 2016) Campaign fi finance laws don’t infl fluence

• much. Example: corruption levels (Cordis

and Milyo 2013, 13)

Stricter contribution limits lead to more competition (Flavin 2015, 77; Hogan 2000, 941-946)

Limitations

Major Limitations

• Methodology

○ Summed Dummy Variable Approach and its value of items

■ Same evaluation table: new laws adapting to technology ■ Mitigation: pragmatic choice among method options

• Expertise

○ Lack of knowledge

■ Mitigation: aid of consultants

Conclusion

Conclusion

• Implications

○ Refuted hypothesis ○ Campaign fi finance laws are insignifi ficant in regards to polarization

• Future Directions

○ Survey voting citizens and political scientist experts on major cause of party polarization

References

Berman, Russell. 2016. “What’s the Solution to Political Polarization in the U.S.?” The Atlantic, (accessed December 23, 2016). Carrol, Royce and Jeff Lewis. In Congress as well as Public, the Center Increasingly Cannot Hold. 2014. Voteview.com

• Congress. Public laws passes per session of Congress, 1948-2012. n.d.

http://www.gallup.com/poll/172859/congressional-approval-rating-languishes-low-level.aspx Cordis, Adriana and Jeff Milyo (2013). “Do State Campaign Finance Reforms Reduce Public Corruption?” Journal of Public Economics, no. 13-09. Research Papers in Economics (accessed November 12, 2016). Corrado, Anthony and Thomas E. Mann. 2014. “Party Polarization and Campaign Finance.” Center for Effective Public Management at Brookings, no :01-23 (accessed October 4, 2016). Dugan, Andrew. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Congress is handling its job? 2011. http://www.gallup.com/poll/172859/congressional-approval-rating-languishes-low-level.aspxCar Flavin, Patrick. 2015. "Campaign Finance Laws, Policy Outcomes, and Political Equality in the American States." Political Research Quarterly 68, no. 1: 77-88. America: History & Life, EBSCOhost (accessed October 11, 2016). Fuller, Jamie. 2014. “From George Washington to Shaun McCutcheon: A brief-ish history of campaign finance reform.” The Washington Post (accessed December 17, 2016). Grandlund, Dave. Congressional Gridlock. 2013. http://www.jenniferbraceras.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Color-Congress-gridlock.jpg

References cont.

Hogan, Robert E. 2000. "The Costs of Representation in State Legislatures: Explaining Variations in Campaign Spending." Social Science Quarterly (University Of Texas Press) 81, no. 4: 941-956.America: History & Life, EBSCOhost (accessed October 15, 2016). Johnstone, Anthony. 2013. "Recalibrating Campaign Finance Law." Yale Law & Policy Review 32, no. 1: 217-237. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed October 15, 2016). Klein, Ezra. The rise of the filibuster. 2013. http://www.vox.com/cards/congressional-dysfunction/what-is-the-filibuster La Raja, Raymond J. 2014. "Campaign Finance and Partisan Polarization in the United States Congress." Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy 9, no.1: 224-258. La Raja, Raymond J., and Brian F. Schaffner. 2016. Campaign Finance and Political Polarization : When Purists Prevail. Ann Arbor, US: University of Michigan

• Press. ProQuest ebrary. (accessed September 26, 2016).

Mann, Thomas E. 2003. "The Battle Over Campaign Finance." Brookings Review 21, no. 4: 28-32. Business Source Elite, EBSCOhost (accessed October 15, 2016). National Conference of State Legislatures. 2012. “Campaign Finance Legislation Database | 1999-2013.” (accessed January 2, 2016). Pildes, Richard H. 2011. "Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America." California Law Review 99, no. 2: 273-333. Business Source Elite, EBSCOhost (accessed October 11, 2016).

References cont.

Shor, Boris and Nolan McCarty. 2015. “State Legislative Aggregate Ideology Data June 2015 Update.” American Legislatures (accessed October 31, 2016). Tarhan, Simge. 2010. “Campaign Contributions and Political Polarization.” Munich Personal RePEc Archive, 1–24. (accessed August 21, 2016). Witko, Christopher. 2005. “Measuring the Stringency of State Campaign Finance Regulation.” SAGE Journals (University of Illinois) 5, no. 3: 295-310. State Politics and Policy Quarterly (accessed October 28, 2016).

Questions?