Auction-based Model of BitTorrent Seminar in Distributed Computing - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

auction based model of bittorrent
SMART_READER_LITE
LIVE PREVIEW

Auction-based Model of BitTorrent Seminar in Distributed Computing - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Auction-based Model of BitTorrent Seminar in Distributed Computing 2010 ETH Zurich Yu Li What is BitTorrent How to download using BitTorrent STEP 1: Select Torrent File STEP 1: Select STEP 1: Select STEP 1: Select Torrent File Torrent


slide-1
SLIDE 1

Auction-based Model of BitTorrent

Seminar in Distributed Computing 2010 ETH Zurich Yu Li

slide-2
SLIDE 2

What is BitTorrent

slide-3
SLIDE 3

How to download using BitTorrent

STEP 1: Select STEP 1: Select STEP 1: Select STEP 1: Select Torrent File Torrent File Torrent File Torrent File STEP 2: Download Torrent STEP 2: Download Torrent STEP 2: Download Torrent STEP 2: Download Torrent

slide-4
SLIDE 4

How to download using BitTorrent

STEP 3: Configuration STEP 3: Configuration STEP 3: Configuration STEP 3: Configuration STEP 4: Download File STEP 4: Download File STEP 4: Download File STEP 4: Download File

slide-5
SLIDE 5

Downloading procedure

  • Individuals View

– Seed – Leecher

slide-6
SLIDE 6

Downloading procedure

  • System View

– I upload and download at the same time

… … Me

slide-7
SLIDE 7

Auction-based Model

[D. Levin, K. LaCurts, 2008] "BitTorrent is an Auction: Analyzing and Improving BitTorrent’s Incentives"

(Q1) Do I upload to everyone?

… … Me … … Me

slide-8
SLIDE 8

Auction-based Model

(Q2) Do I treat every peer equally?

… … Me (6Mbps) … … Me (6Mbps) 2 1 4 2 6 3 2 2 4 2 6 2

slide-9
SLIDE 9

Auction-based Model

(Q3) Do I ignore others?

… … Me (6Mbps) … … Me (6Mbps) 2 2 4 2 6 2 2

1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5

0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2

1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5

slide-10
SLIDE 10

Auction-based Model

  • Bids are uploads of round n-1
  • Auction clearing

Me (Bandwidth W) 18 12 3 2 1 Round n-1 Round n

18 18 18 18

Me (Bandwidth W)

12 12 12 12

3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 W/S Highest S-1 1 random peer W/S W/S Select S peers (S=4) W/S

slide-11
SLIDE 11

Sybil Attack

  • Normal Bidder

3 3 3 3

12 12 12 12 18 18 18 18

1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 18Mbps 18Mbps 18Mbps 18Mbps Auctioneer (Me) provides 72Mbps bandwidth in total “Red” bidder gets 18Mbps n-1 round n round

slide-12
SLIDE 12

Sybil Attack

  • Selfish Bidder

3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4

18 18 18 18

1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4

12 12 12 12

“Red” bidder sybil gets 2×18Mbps n-1 round n round 18Mbps 18Mbps 18Mbps 18Mbps Auctioneer (Me) provides 72Mbps bandwidth in total

slide-13
SLIDE 13

Review of Question 2

  • (Q2) Do I treat every peer equally?

… … Me (6Mbps) … … Me (6Mbps) 2 1 4 2 6 3 2 2 4 2 6 2

slide-14
SLIDE 14

Countermeasure: Proportional share auction

  • Proportional share

3 3 3 3

12 12 12 12 18 18 18 18

1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 36Mbps 24Mbps

6

4 2 n-1 round n round “Red” bidder gets 24Mbps

slide-15
SLIDE 15

Countermeasure: Proportional share auction

  • Sybil attack resilient

36Mbps

8Mbps 8Mbps 8Mbps 8Mbps

6

4 2 n-1 round n round 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4

18 18 18 18

1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4

12 12 12 12

8Mbps 8Mbps 8Mbps 8Mbps 8Mbps 8Mbps 8Mbps 8Mbps

“Red” bidder sybil gets 3×8=24Mbps

slide-16
SLIDE 16

Comparison of Auction-based &Propshare

24 Mbps 24 Mbps Propshare 2×18 Mbps 18 Mbps Standard Bittorrent Selfish client (using sybil) Normal client

  • Propshare is Sybil proof
slide-17
SLIDE 17
  • Which one is better for me?

Under-reporting

Me A

X Y

B

X Y X Y

Me A

X Y

B

X Y X Y

Me A

X Y

B

X Y X Y

Me A

X Y

B

X Y X Y

Me A

X Y

B

X Y X Y

X X X X X X X X

Under- reporting

slide-18
SLIDE 18

Under-reporting

  • Under-reporting algorithm

– Run algr. when peer is about to lose interest. – Determine the most common piece among available

X Y Z X Y Z X Y Z X Y Z Tom Peer 1 Peer 2 Peer 3 X Y Z Alice X Y Z X Y Z X Y Z Peer 1 Peer 2 Peer 3 X Y Z Tom X Y Z Alice

slide-19
SLIDE 19

Under-reporting

slide-20
SLIDE 20

Countermeasure: Gossiping

Me

X X X X Y Y Y Y Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z

X X X X Y Y Y Y Z Z Z Z

Costs overhead

B A

slide-21
SLIDE 21

Countermeasure: TrInc

[D.Levin, J.R. Douceur 2009] "TrInc: Small Trusted Hardware for Large Distributed Systems"

  • TrInc (Trusted Incrementer)

– Prevents lying – Decreases overhead

  • TPM (Trusted Platform

Module) by Intel

slide-22
SLIDE 22

Countermeasure: TrInc

  • System equipped with TrInc
slide-23
SLIDE 23

Countermeasure: TrInc

  • Individual equipped with TrInc
slide-24
SLIDE 24

Countermeasure: TrInc

  • How does TrInc work?

Old Old Old Old Counter Counter Counter Counter Value Value Value Value New New New New Counter Counter Counter Counter Value Value Value Value New Counter Value New Counter Value New Counter Value New Counter Value

Encryption Encryption Encryption Encryption

BitField BitField BitField BitField BitField BitField BitField BitField + New Counter Value + Old Counter Value + New Counter Value + Old Counter Value + New Counter Value + Old Counter Value + New Counter Value + Old Counter Value

slide-25
SLIDE 25

Countermeasure: TrInc

  • Input

– New Counter Value – BitField

  • Output

– Attestation

  • Sample Output

B′

A B C

… … … …

D Y Z

B

A B C

… … … …

D Y Z

  • B′

A B C D E F G

34

slide-26
SLIDE 26

Countermeasure

Me

X X X X Y Y Y Y Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z

X X X X Y Y Y Y Z Z Z Z

B A

slide-27
SLIDE 27

Countermeasure: TrInc

X

2 3

Y Z T X

1 2

Y Z T X

0 1

Y Z T

X Y Z

X

0 1

Y Z T X

1 2

Y Z T X

2 3

Y Z T

Bitfield Request Piece Providing Piece Providing Piece Providing Nonce

X

2 3

Y Z T

3 3 Nonce 3 3 Nonce Me A B C D

slide-28
SLIDE 28

Countermeasure: TrInc

  • Individual equipped with TrInc
slide-29
SLIDE 29
  • Auction-based Model
  • TrInc
  • Q & A