Attachment I Evaluation of the Potential Market Problem: Screens to - - PDF document

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Attachment I Evaluation of the Potential Market Problem: Screens to - - PDF document

Attachment I Evaluation of the Potential Market Problem: Screens to Identify Potential Physical Withholding Presented to the NYISOs Market Issues Working Group on May 3, 2013 Evaluation of the Potential Market Problem: Screens to Identify


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Attachment I

Evaluation of the Potential Market Problem: Screens to Identify Potential Physical Withholding Presented to the NYISO’s Market Issues Working Group on May 3, 2013

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Evaluation of the Potential Market Problem: Screens to Identify Potential Physical Withholding

Pallas LeeVanSchaick Potomac Economics Market Monitoring Unit Market Issues Working Group May 3, 2013 y ,

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O A il 8 th NYISO id tifi d i th t it d t i d i ht

Introduction

  • On April 8, the NYISO identified an issue that it determined might

constitute a Market Problem.

The NYISO determined that the screen used to check for potential h i l ithh ldi d t d t l th tf li it i physical withholding conduct does not apply the portfolio criteria appropriately. The issue was identified following an ad hoc review of the report by MMA t ff MMA staff.

  • On April 9, the MMU was informed by the NYISO of the potential

Market Problem.

We were asked to evaluate the effects of the issue and report our findings to stakeholders.

  • This presentation describes the issue and evaluates its effects on the

market.

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MST S ti 23 3 1 1 1 1 i th NYISO t f t ti l

Description of the Incorrect Screening Criteria

  • MST Section 23.3.1.1.1.1 requires the NYISO to screen for potential

physical withholding where the unoffered amount exceeds:

100 MW or 10 percent of capability of a Generator; or 200 MW 5 t f bilit i tf li 200 MW or 5 percent of capability in a portfolio. In NYC, the MW-thresholds are 50 MW and 100 MW, respectively.

  • The generator-specific screens were performed correctly.

However, portfolio-level unoffered capacity was incorrect – based on average unoffered MWs per unit in the portfolio rather than total MWs in the portfolio; and G l l MW di 10 f l d d Generator-level MWs exceeding 10 percent were frequently deemed unlikely to be significant based on the portfolio-level criteria.

  • Consequently, potentially withheld MWs were not evaluated for some

Generators with under 100 MW (50 MW in NYC) of such capacity Generators with under 100 MW (50 MW in NYC) of such capacity.

This is most relevant for portfolios with a large amount of peaking capacity.

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Th t ti l ff t f th i i d d t th t t th t

Evaluation of Impact in the DAM & RTM

  • The potential effect of the issue is reduced to the extent that

unscreened units would have been identified by one of the following:

The NYISO’s generator-specific screens. (DAM & RTM) The NYISO’s ICAP compliance process, which confirms suppliers

  • ffer in the DAM or log outage appropriately. (DAM only)

The NYISO’s reviews generator outage logs for consistency with

  • utage scheduling rules and procedures and audits selected
  • generators. (DAM only)
  • MMU screens for unutilized economic capacity in the DAM and RTM
  • n a daily basis, identifying instances that may have significant market

impact and generators that exhibit abnormal outage patterns, considering the technology of the generator.

There is little indication of substantial market impact from the screening issue identified by the NYISO, particularly in the DAM.

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Th NYISO h i t l d RTM d t i

Evaluation of Impact in the RTM

  • The NYISO has appropriately screened some RTM conduct using:

The generator-specific screens; and The insufficient portfolio screens.

  • We are evaluating capacity that was not properly screened to assess

whether there was significant impact. The next figure summarizes the evaluation for March 2013, showing capacity on resources:

With Energy Limitations; Under a PURPA Contract; Whose Reference Level does not reflect the full cost of natural gas; Whose Reference Level does not reflect the full cost of natural gas; May not recover as-offered cost due to BPCG Rules in the real-time market; and Other Factors.

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Evaluation of Impact in the RTM Evaluation of Impact in the RTM March 2013

21,000 1,400 18,000 , 1,200 , ) Other Factors BPCG Rules 12,000 15,000 800 1,000 ad (MW) apacity (MW) BPCG Rules Reference Level Issue PURPA Contract Energy Limited Actual Load 6,000 9,000 400 600 Actual Loa T Unoffered C Actual Load 3,000 6,000 200 400 RT

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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Hour

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W f d d t il d t f t i th “ th ”

Evaluation of Impact in the RTM

  • We performed a more detailed assessment of generators in the “other”

category to determine whether they raise competitive concerns. This category includes:

91 3 GWh ( 123 MW ) id d 91.3 GWhs (~ 123 MW on average) statewide; and 22.7 GWhs (~ 31 MW on average) in New York City.

  • After excluding capacity from the “other” category that is highly

unlikely to satisfy impact thresholds, further evaluation may be necessary for:

1.6 GWhs statewide (includes eight units spread across 14 hours); ( g p ) and 141 MWhs in New York City (includes four units spread across five hours).

  • Further evaluation may identify competitive justifications for the

unoffered capacity.

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