Applications of Computer Science: Game Theory and Computational - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Applications of Computer Science: Game Theory and Computational - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Applications of Computer Science: Game Theory and Computational Biology Instructor: Nihshanka Debroy Game Theory What is game theory? Study of settings where multiple parties (agents) each have different preferences different


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Applications of Computer Science:

Game Theory and Computational Biology Instructor: Nihshanka Debroy

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Game Theory

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What is game theory?

  • Study of settings where multiple parties (agents) each

have

– different preferences – different actions they can take

  • Each agent’s utility (potentially) depends on all agents’

actions

  • Game theory studies how agents can rationally form

beliefs over what other agents will do, and so, how agents should act

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Rock-paper-scissors

1, -1 0, 0

  • 1, 1

1, -1 0, 0 0, 0

  • 1, 1
  • 1, 1

1, -1

Row player (player 1) chooses a row Column player (player 2) (simultaneously) chooses a column A row or column is called an action or (pure) strategy Row player’s utility is always listed first, column player’s second Zero-sum game: the utilities in each entry sum to 0 (or a constant)

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“Chicken”

  • 5, -5
  • 1, 1

0, 0 1, -1

D S D S

S D D S

  • Two players drive cars towards each other
  • If one player goes straight, that player wins
  • If both go straight, they both die

not zero-sum

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Dominance

  • Player i’s strategy si strictly dominates si’ if

– Reward from strategy si is greater than reward from

playing si', when used against any of the other players

– Weak dominance

1, -1 0, 0 1, -1 1, -1 0, 0 0, 0

  • 1, 1
  • 1, 1
  • 1, 1

strict dominance weak dominance

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Prisoner’s Dilemma

  • 1, -1

0, -3

  • 2, -2
  • 3, 0

confess

  • Pair of criminals has been caught
  • District attorney has evidence to convict them of a minor

crime (1 year in jail); knows that they committed a major crime together (3 years in jail) but cannot prove it

  • Offers them a deal:

– If both confess to the major crime, they each get a 1 year reduction – If only one confesses, that one gets 3 years reduction

don’t confess don’t confess confess

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“Should I buy an SUV?”

  • 8, -8
  • 7, -11
  • 10, -10
  • 11, -7

cost: 5 cost: 3 cost: 5 cost: 5 cost: 5 cost: 5 cost: 8 cost: 2

purchasing cost accident cost

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Best-response strategies

  • Suppose you know your
  • pponent’s strategy

– E.g. your opponent

plays rock 50% of the time and scissors 50%

  • Best strategy for you ?
  • Rock gives .5*0 + .5*1 =

.5

  • Paper gives .5*1 + .5*(-1)

= 0

  • Scissors gives .5*(-1) +

.5*0 = -.5

  • So the best response to

this opponent strategy is to (always) play rock

1, -1 0, 0

  • 1, 1

1, -1 0, 0 0, 0

  • 1, 1
  • 1, 1

1, -1

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Nash equilibria of “chicken”

  • 5, -5
  • 1, 1

0, 0 1, -1

D S D S

S D D S

– (D, S) and (S, D) are Nash equilibria (no player can benefit by changing his or her strategy while the other players keep theirs unchanged)

  • Strict Nash equilibria: changing your strategy will make you

strictly worse off

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The presentation game

Pay attention (A) Do not pay attention (NA) Put effort into presentation (E) Do not put effort into presentation (NE)

0, 0 0, -2

  • 16, -14

4, 4

Presenter Audience

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The presentation game

Pay attention (A) Do not pay attention (NA) Put effort into presentation (E) Do not put effort into presentation (NE)

0, 0 0, -2

  • 16, -14

4, 4

Presenter Audience

  • Nash equilibria: (A, E), (NA, NE)
  • Can see that some equilibria are strictly better for both players than
  • ther equilibria, (Pareto-domination)
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What is mechanism design?

  • In mechanism design, we get to design the game (or

mechanism)

– e.g. the rules of the auction, marketplace, election, …

  • Goal is to obtain good outcomes when agents behave

strategically

  • Mechanism design often considered part of game theory
  • Sometimes called “inverse game theory”

– In game theory the game is given and we have to

figure out how to act

– In mechanism design we know how we would like the

agents to act and have to figure out the game

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Example: (single-item) auctions

  • Sealed-bid auction: every bidder submits bid in a sealed envelope
  • First-price sealed-bid auction: highest bid wins, pays amount of own

bid (does not make sense to bid your true valuation - even if you win, your utility will be 0…)

  • Second-price sealed-bid auction: highest bid wins, pays amount of

second-highest bid (always makes sense to bid your true valuation)

bid 1: $10 bid 2: $5 bid 3: $1 first-price: bid 1 wins, pays $10 second-price: bid 1 wins, pays $5

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Computational issues in mechanism design

  • Algorithmic mechanism design

– Sometimes standard mechanisms are too hard to execute computationally – Try to find mechanisms that are easy to execute computationally, together with algorithms for executing them

  • Automated mechanism design

– Given the specific setting and the objective, have a computer solve for the best mechanism for this particular setting

Two examples of mechanism design problems

  • Kidney exchange problem
  • High-school assignment problem
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Where is game theory used?

  • Economics (& business)

– Auctions, exchanges, price/quantity setting by firms, bargaining,

funding public goods, …

  • Political science

– Voting, candidate positioning, …

  • Philosophy

– Conventions, ethics, …

  • And of course… Computer science!

– Game playing programs, electronic marketplaces, networked

systems, …

– Computing the solutions that game theory prescribes

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Computational Biology

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Electrostatic Potential Map

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