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26:010:557 / 26:620:557 Social Science Research Methods Dr. Peter - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

26:010:557 / 26:620:557 Social Science Research Methods Dr. Peter R. Gillett Associate Professor Department of Accounting & Information Systems Rutgers Business School Newark & New Brunswick Dr. Peter R Gillett February 16, 2006


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February 16, 2006

  • Dr. Peter R Gillett

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26:010:557 / 26:620:557 Social Science Research Methods

  • Dr. Peter R. Gillett

Associate Professor Department of Accounting & Information Systems Rutgers Business School – Newark & New Brunswick

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Overview

I Theories, Hypotheses and Models I Social Science Research I The Scientific Approach I Problems and Hypotheses I Constructs, Variables and Definitions I Theory Building I Normative, Descriptive, Prescriptive Models I Foundations of Measurement I Reliability I Questions

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Question

Chalmers, applying Kuhn says, “Much of modern sociology lacks a paradigm and consequently fails to qualify as science.” If this is so is all social science research called into question? Last semester we saw in our Strategy seminar that there are no accepted paradigms but a group of loosely connected hypotheses and proofs. What has stopped social science from developing accepted and standard paradigms?

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Vocabulary

I

Metaphysics

  • Ontology / ontological

I

Epistemology

  • Epistemic

I

a priori v. a posteriori

I

Epigenetic

I

Axiological

I

Ostensive

I

Otiose

I

Connotation

  • Denotation
  • Intension
  • Extension

I

Anomie

I

Intensionality

I

Clapham omnibus

I

Anodyne

I

Diachronic

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Question

We have covered many philosophical schools about science itself. What is their implication for methodology? Or more basically, what is methodology? What is the relationship between science and methodology?

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Question

Nothing is wrong with data mining . . . Because data mining implies no theoretical relationship between factors is predefined, is the result of data mining

  • nly identification of correlations and

nothing more?

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Theories, Hypotheses and Models

I What is a theory? I What is theory? I What are hypotheses? I What are models? I What do we test empirically? I How are they related? I What is the scientific method? I Examples of theories / models

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Social Science Research

I What is research? I What are the goals of research?

Understanding Explaining Predicting Manipulating Controlling

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Social Science Research

I What is medical research? I What are its goals? I Do accounting firms conduct research? I For what purpose? I What is (academic) business research? I What are its goals?

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Business Research

I Is the primary goal of Business Research

explanation or prediction?

I Are these the only two important choices?

If so, why? If not, what alternatives matter?

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The Scientific Approach

I Peirce’s Four Ways of Knowing:

Method of tenacity

N Repetition

Method of authority

N Bible, Professor, ….

Method of intuition

N A priori

Method of science

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The Scientific Approach

I Science versus common sense:

Use of conceptual schemes and theoretical structures Systematic empirical testing of theories and

hypotheses

Control Preoccupation with relationships Ruling out metaphysical explanations

I Note Kerlinger’s positivist attitude towards

metaphysics!

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The Scientific Approach

I Broad views of science

Static: adding to the body of facts, laws, theories,

hypotheses and principles

Dynamic: an activity with a discovery emphasis

I Functions of science

A discipline aimed at improvement The establishment of general laws and the connection

  • f our knowledge of separate known events, to make

reliable predictions of unknown events (Braithwaite)

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The Scientific Approach

I Sampson’s views

Conventional perspective

N A mirror of nature, accurate description, with

science as an objective referee

Sociohistorical

N Science as a story, with no neutral arbitrator

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The Scientific Approach

I The basic aim of science is theory I Theories are explanations of natural phenomena I “A theory is a set of interrelated constructs

(concepts), definitions, and propositions that represent a systematic view of phenomena by specifying relations among variables, with the purpose of explaining and predicting the phenomena” (K&L, p.11)

I Theories are tentative explanations, evaluated

empirically (K&L, p.13)

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The Scientific Approach

I “Scientific research is systematic, controlled,

empirical, amoral, public and critical investigation of natural phenomena. It is guided by theory and hypotheses about the presumed relations among such phenomena.” (K&L, p.14)

I What we test is not variables, but the relation

between variables.

I We do not usually test hypotheses directly – we

test deduced implications of hypotheses.

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Problems and Hypotheses

I A problem is an interrogative sentence or

statement that asks: What relationship exists between two or more variables?

The problem should express a relation

between two or more variables

It should be expressed clearly and

unambiguously in question form

It must imply possibilities of empirical testing

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Problems and Hypotheses

I A hypothesis is a conjectural statement of the

relation between two or more variables

Hypotheses are statements about the relations

between variables

Hypotheses carry clear implications for testing the

stated relations

I Hypotheses are the working instruments of

theory

I They can be tested and shown to be probably

true or probably false

I They enable scientists to get outside themselves

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Problems and Hypotheses

I Problems and hypotheses direct investigations I They help an investigator confirm or disconfirm

theory

I A hypothesis is never really proved or disproved I Hypotheses should avoid values and

methodological problems

I They should be neither too general nor too

specific

I They are commonly multivariable (N.B. not

multivariate!)

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Problems and Hypotheses

I Hypotheses should be

Testable In harmony with existing knowledge Parsimonious Relevant to the question of interest Susceptible of quantification (?) Able to yield a large number of consequences Logically simple General in scope

(Wanda Wallace)

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Problems and Hypotheses

I Null hypothesis I Alternative hypothesis I Alpha risk: risk of Type I errors I Beta risk: risk of Type II errors I Type I errors: incorrect rejection of true null I Type II errors: incorrect acceptance of false null I Type III errors: working on the wrong problem

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Constructs, Variables and Definitions

I Concepts, Constructs and Variables

A concept expresses an abstraction formed

by generalization from particulars

A construct is a concept with the added

meaning of having been deliberately and consciously invented or adopted for a special scientific purpose

A variable is a symbol to which numerals or

values are assigned

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Constructs, Variables and Definitions

I A constitutive definition defines a construct

using other constructs

I An operational definition assigns meaning

to a construct or a variable by specifying the activities or operations necessary to measure it and evaluate the measurement

Measured Experimental (manipulated)

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Constructs, Variables and Definitions

I The objects studied in the physical sciences are typically

presented to us in nature – they are in some sense

  • bjective

I Social sciences, however, investigate theories that use

constructs we have devised ourselves; it is important that the constitutive and operational definitions of these constructs are consistent with each other, and also with the expression used to name them

I In particular, be wary of constructs defined or measured

differently in different studies that appear to be about the same things, but may not always be so

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Constructs, Variables and Definitions

I Independent variables

Presumed causes Antecedent Manipulated by the experimenter Predicted from

I Dependent variables

Presumed effects Consequent Predicted to

I Stimulus – Response I Predictor – Criterion

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Constructs, Variables and Definitions

I Active variables

Manipulated by the experimenter

I Attribute variables

Measured

I Continuous variables

Capable of taking on an ordered set of values within a

given range

I Categorical variables

Assigned to subsets based on characteristics

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Constructs, Variables and Definitions

I Latent variables

Unobserved entities presumed to underlie

  • bserved variables

N Preferable to some alternative terms N Can now be assessed via analyses of covariance

structures such as Structural Equation Modeling (using specialized software such as LISREL or EQS)

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Theory Building

I “A theorist is considered great, not because his

theories are true, but because they are interesting.” (Murray Davis, 1971)

I “Theories do not gain hegemony because they

are better than their predecessors, but because they are able to attract adherents and withstand attacks from those who hold other positions.” (Graham Astley, 1985)

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Theory Building

I Gioia & Pitre (1990) define theory as any coherent

description or explanation of observed or experienced phenomena

I Appropriate approaches to theory building depend on

the paradigmatic assumptions brought to bear on a topic

I Paradigms (based on Burrell and Morgan, 1979)

General perspective or way of thinking N Functionalist (dominant paradigm)

² Objective, maintain status quo

N Interpretivist

² Subjective, maintain status quo

N Radical Humanist

² Subjective, radically change constructed realities

N Radical Structuralist

² Objective, radically change constructed realities

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Theory Building

I “A theory is a statement of relations among concepts

within a set of boundary assumptions and constraints . . . The purpose of theoretical statements is twofold: to

  • rganize (parsimoniously) and to communicate (clearly)

. . . In more detailed terms, a theory may be viewed as a system of constructs and variables in which the constructs are related to each other by propositions and the variables are related to each other by hypotheses.” (Samuel Bacharach 1989)

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Theory Building

Construct Construct Variable Variable Propositions Boundary assumptions about values, time and space Operationalization Operationalization Deduced Hypotheses

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Theory Building

I “The two primary criteria upon which any

theory may be evaluated are (a) falsifiability and (b) utility.” (Bacharach)

I Brief and Dukerich argue against the

usefulness criterion

I Qualitative v. quantitative research

Naturalistic inquiry

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The Hypothetico-Deductive Method

Observations

  • f the

real world Explanatory theories Predictions about the real world Induction Deduction Verification

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Normative, Descriptive, Prescriptive Models

I Models

A model is “a representation of reality to

explain the behavior of some aspect of it” (Montgomery & Urban, 1969)

Some researchers use ‘model’ and ‘theory’

interchangeably

Some researchers distinguish

N Theoretical models (causal models) N Descriptive models based on studying behavior

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Normative, Descriptive, Prescriptive Models

I Models

Representations of particular aspects of some

domain problem based on specifying

N Relations between constructs derived from theory

(theoretical models)

N Relations between measured variables

² As a result of operationalizing theoretical models ² Derived from studies of observations (descriptive models)

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Normative, Descriptive, Prescriptive Models

I Normative theories specify relations that should exist

between constructs

Thus, for subjective Bayesians, Bayes Rule’ is normative for

belief revision

I Descriptive theories specify relations discovered to exist

between constructs

Thus, Einhorn & Hogarth’s is a descriptive model of belief

revision

I Prescriptive theories specify relations required to exist

between variables

Many audit firms adopted implementations of the Audit Risk

Model that staff were required to apply during audit planning

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Operationalization

I Recall that operationalization involves specifying

procedures for

Measurement

  • r

Experimentation

I We will evaluate two features of measurement

Reliability (this week) Validity (next week)

I Over next two weeks we will also study

experimentation

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Foundations of Measurement

I Measurement

The assignment of numerals to objects or events

according to rules

I Number

A numeral that has been assigned quantitative

meaning

I Assigned

A mapping – a rule of correspondence

I Meaningful measurement

Requires rules that are isomorphic to reality

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Foundations of Measurement

I Isomorphism

Identical form 1-1 correspondence X and Y are isomorphic iff

N Each member of X corresponds to exactly one

member of Y

N Each member of Y corresponds to exactly one

member of X

Of course, if X is ‘unobserved’ reality, it may

be hard to know!

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Foundations of Measurement

I In fact, all we can measure is indicants of the

properties of objects

I Indicants are specified by operational definitions I Our starting point is to define the objects of the

universe of discourse

I Measurement requires that this universe be

broken down into at least two subsets – this is classification, which may be:

Dichotomous Polychotomous

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References

I Astley, W.G. 1985. “Administrative science as socially

constructed truth”. Administrative Science Quarterly (30), pp. 497 – 513.

I Bacharach, S.B. 1989. “Organizational theories: Some criteria

for evaluation”. Academy of Management Review (14), 496 – 515.

I Brief, A.P. and J.M. Dukerich. 1991. “Theory in organization

behavior: Can it be useful?”. Research in Organizational Behavior (13), pp. 327 – 352.

I Davis, M.S. 1971. “That’s interesting!”. Philosophy of the

Social Sciences (1), pp. 309 – 344.

I Gioia, D.A. and E. Pitre. 1990. “Multiparadigm perspectives

  • n theory building”. Academy of Management Review (15),
  • pp. 584 – 602.
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References

I Ghiselli, E.E., J.P. Campbell and S.

Zedeck.1981. Measurement Theory for the Behavioral Sciences. W.H. Freeman and Company.

I Allen, M.J. and W.M. Yen. 2002. Introduction to

Measurement Theory. Waveland Press, Inc.

I Nunally, J.C. and I.H. Bernstein. 1990.

Psychometric Theory. McGraw Hill.

I Pedhazur, E.J. and L. Pedhazur Schmelkin.

  • 1991. Measurement, Design and Analysis.

Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

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References

I For web sites of academics with strong

personal views on the inadequacy of the ‘standard views’ on science and theory building, you might enjoy visiting:

I http://www.dharma-haven.org/science/