WORLD WAR II BUFFET 15 OCTOBER 2020 KEY FACTORS AND ISSUES Dr. Joe Fitzharris Professor Emeritus of History The University of St. Thomas
OVERVIEW • HITLER’S DECISION TO RESCUE THE ITALIANS IN THE BALKANS AND DELAY OPERATION BARBAROSSA • GERMAN DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST US • THE US’S 90 DIVISION GAMBLE • MONTGROMERY’S ARNHEM OFFENSIVE • HITLER’S DECISION TO CONTINUE THE “FINAL SOLUTION” AT MAXIMU EFFORT
Our Questions • What happened when and by whom • Why did it happen • What was/were the expected outcome/s? • Were there alternatives ? • What was/were the actual outcome/s?
HITLER’S DECISION TO RESCUE THE ITALIANS IN THE BALKANS AND DELAY OPERATION BARBAROSSA
THE BALKANS CAMPAIGN IMPACTS BARBAROSSA • Germany wanted peace to ensure Romanian oil, raw materials, and foodstuffs flowed up the Danube to Germany • Operation SEA LION postponed (Sept 40) when Luftwaffe failed to win the “Battle of Britain” allowed shift to eastern problem • Führer Directive 21 - order for the invasion of the USSR (Dec 40) • Afrika Korps diverted resources (Feb 41- May 43) from Barbarossa
Mussolini gave Hitler a “Surprise” • October 1940 Italy aded Greece through Albania • Germany needed to protect the Danube supply line - hence aid Italy in Greece • Necessitated arrangements with Yugoslavia. Regent Prince Paul, who joined the Tripartite Pact, was overthrown in a coup d’état on 26 Mar 41 by Serbian officers. • Hitler saw this as Serbs again being problematic and chose to crush Yugoslavia at same time
OPERATION MARITA • Italians invaded in October 40 • Greeks counter-attacked successfully driving the Italians back to their start line on the Greece-Albania border in March 41 • 6 April 41 German forces invade through Bulgaria opening a second front • Small British-ANZAC force hindered advance but was forced to surrender 30 Apr • OPERATION MERKUR followed in May 41
OPERATION 25 • 10 days to prepare • Operation PUNISHMENT overwhelming air assault on Belgrade 6-10 April • Ground attacks began 6 Apr - seizure of bridges over Danube. • 12 days to completion. • Guerrilla and partisan warfare began soon after.
EXPECTED • Remove threats to Danube supply line • Protect Balkans resources • Secure southern flank (Greece and Crete) • Teach verdamnt Serbs a lesson • Secure Yugoslavia • Delay Barbarossa but “Nie Probleme!”
UNEXPECTED: IMPACT ON BARBAROSSA • Many units involved in 25 and MARITA were to join Barbarossa before the invasion began or to do so in the second wave. • Limited rail connections in the Balkans generally meant slow movement of troops, and especially mechanized and logistics units. Barbarossa was planned for mid-May, delayed to 22 June - • and the Russian winter of 1941-42 came early. As a result, the Germans only saw the spires of the Kremlin. • Tied down two or three field armies (10-12 divisions, air assets, naval units) for the rest of the war pacifying Balkans
GERMAN DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST THE US
GERMANY DECLARES WAR • NO treaty obligation to do so. • England stood alone. Europe was Hitler’s. Barbarossa going well. • Vague VERBAL commitment to assist Japan if … • Decision was made by Adolf Hitler personally.
ADDRESSING THE REICHSTAG 11 Dec 1941
Why? • Was Hitler (and his henchmen) just nuts? • Had avoided war by ignoring US provocations at sea and in economic war • US troops were stationed in Greenland and Iceland and the USN guarded convoys to Iceland • Assumed with victory in Europe, confrontation with US inevitable • Decadent, racially inferior (Blacks, Jews), “mongrel” nation dominated by pacifistic isolationists
ALTERNATIVE? • Continue to ignore USN violations and maintain “cordial animosity” • Respond with diplomatic notes and propaganda in US aimed at isolationists and pacifists (overlapping sets) • Make FDR seek war without provocation (again the isolationists and pacifists and German- and Italian- and Irish-Americans and probably Scandinavian-Americans, and most Midwesterners and Plains-states people would object strenuously
Outcomes: • Expected: • More of Same - US army inferior, aircraft too, only Navy of any worry and after Pearl Harbor, the Japanese would keep us busy • Actual: • Arsenal of the Allies, an army that learned and got enormously better, an air force that blanketed the skies, and a navy larger than all the other navies
OUTCOME: Definitely NOT a good idea! Berlin, May 1945
THE US’S 90 DIVISION GAMBLE
THE US’S 90 DIVISION GAMBLE • Purposeful decision to limit US Army to 90 combat division equivalents (does NOT include Marines or air/sea manpower) • Made by Marshall, and Stimson • Points system (for morale purposes) to bring men home - effectively demobilizing them. • Draft exempted certain classes of men. • Women were not at first considered part of the “manpower” pool.
PURPOSES • Preserve home front manpower for economic production (our primary responsibility) • 1940 estimates indicated this was about the size army we could created, deploy, and support in the field. • Induction quotas for Selective Service System were set accordingly, varying as conditions changed, but based on this basic assumption.
ALTERNATIVE(S)? • Given the US role as primary producer of the materiel of war and food for the Allies • Take more men early (fewer exemptions) and keep them (no points system) and risk morale issues • Take fewer men (more exemptions) and have serious manpower problems either in the logistics tail or in the combat teeth
OUTCOMES • Manpower shortages in Europe - During the Battles of the Hurtgen Forrest and of the Bulge in particular • Expected manpower needs for the Invasion of Japan (entered the manpower calculations in 1945) exacerbated the problem • The “points” for going home - effectively demobilization - made the problem worse by removing combat experienced troops and experienced medical personnel.
MONTGOMERY’S ARNHEM OFFENSIVE
MONTGOMERY’S ARNHEM OFFENSIVE, “MARKET–GARDEN” • Allied advanced far faster and further than planners expected, outrunning logistical infrastructure. • POL pipelines and the “Red Ball Express” could not deliver enough gas. • Ike had decided on broad front advance (contra Monty - relieved as Allied GFC) but allocated resources to this gamble • US Twelfth Army group advance halted, short of gas (given to 21st Army group)
WHY MARKET – GARDEN? • Allied Airborne army seeking use planned COMET • MARKET with double airborne forces teamed with GARDEN ground assault to open North German Plain • Provide crossing of Rhine • Neutralize Industrial heartland in the Ruhr • Estimates of German strength in region greatly understated, making venture look reasonable
WHAT HAPPENED • Montgomery was audacious - uncharacteristically, ignored intelligence and topography and Dutch resistance • FM Montgomery’s 21st Army Group launched 1st Allied Airborne Army (MARKET) at bridges across the Rhine at Zon and Eindhoven (101 AB), Grave, Nijmegan and the Mass- Waal Canal (82 AB), and at Arnhem (1 BR AB) • Ground forces (GARDEN) to link up and use the bridgeheads so they could advance on Berlin, encircle the Ruhr, etc. • 101st and 82nd AB achieved objectives quickly - used all intell
ALTERNATIVES • √ Clear Scheldt Estuary approaches to Antwerp (Port taken by Brits in Sept) - make Port usable - a 15 mi advance! • √ Give Patton (US Third Army) gas and let him race east, perhaps Metz would have fallen quickly • √ Give gas to Hodges (US First Army) to try advancing on the Rhine 3 √
EXPECTED • Gain Crossing of the Rhine • By-pass Scheldt Estuary, cutting off Germans holding it • Shorten the war • (Monty in competition with Bradley’s (US First and Third Armies) and Dever’s (Seventh Army) Army Groups to get the bragging rights to the first crossing (honors go to CCB, 9 AD, FIRST Army at Remagen on 7 March)
ACTUAL RESULTS • Attack failed miserably • 1st BR AB and 1st Polish Airborne Brigade heavy losses • No crossing of the Rhine in 1944 • Weakend Allied build-up in north- east (21st AG) • No end of the war inEurope in 1944 • Dutch people suffered famine in winter as Dutch RR workers struck and Germans forbade movement of food - 20+k died
HITER’S DECISION TO CONTINUE THE “FINAL SOLUTION” AT MAXIMUM EFFORT
HITLER CONTINUES THE “FINAL SOLUTION” TO THE BITTER END • SS/Gestapo/local collaborator police rounding up Jews, etc. • Einsatzgruppen on eastern front • Guards for transportees, planning staff for movements • Railroad personnel and equipment for movement • Materiel for camp construction and operation, guards for camps, etc. • Putting down of Warsaw Ghetto Uprising
Concentration Camps in Greater Germany, 1944
Major European Rail Lines, 1939
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