- Dr. Anja Kirsch
School of Economics and Business, Management Department
Women on corporate boards: Japan in a boards: Japan in a - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Dr. Anja Kirsch School of Economics and Business, Management Department Women on corporate boards: Japan in a boards: Japan in a comparative perspective Outline Women on boards across firms and countries Women on boards across firms and
School of Economics and Business, Management Department
2
S h lt Th b d f Some research results: There are more women on boards of…
y
…but these results vary across countries
3
See for example Hillman et al. (2007), Mínguez-Vera and Martin (2011), Nekhili and Gatfaoui (2013), Oehmichen et al. (2012)
management, a lower gender pay gap) i th liti l h ( ith i li t)
more childcare services)
and the media
4
See for example Grosvold et al. (2015), Iannotta et al. (2015), Sheridan et al. (2014), Terjesen & Singh (2008)
5
governance and resource needs of the firm and its shareholders, reflecting their best interests
factors
best interests
market for corporate directors, views the social connections; emphasizes negotiations between CEOs and incumbent directors over filling board market for directors as a meritocracy
dependence theory vacancies
reproduction, homosociality, homophily dependence theory reproduction, homosociality, homophily and similarity-–attraction as well as the corporate elite
6 See Withers, Hillman & Cannella 2012
In practice, director selection is carried out in a combination of these two perspectives.
director’s ability to provide monitoring or resources to a firm
CEO-board dynamics, and other social dynamics play a role in the selection process
capabilities because they are more likely to be independent
candidates similar to themselves excludes women
consumers and employees
maintain social status and prestige excludes women (and other outsiders)
and conforms to emerging social norms
closely monitor management excludes women (due to their independence)
more monitoring and links to certain stakeholders and legitimacy appoint women ( p )
directors and where access to the elite is
7
à-vis directors and shareholders appoint women
director selection than CEO and have power in negotiations with CEO
access to the corporate elite
preferences in director selection (Withers et al. 2012) p ( )
appointments; foreign owners may introduce HR practices in line with those in their home country or with global “best practices” (Oehmichen et al 2012; Olcott & Oliver home country or with global “best practices” (Oehmichen et al. 2012; Olcott & Oliver 2014)
8
preferences in director selection (Withers et al. 2012)
9
Are the firms that have engaged in corporate governance reform / have corporate governance mechanisms in line with the reforms the ones in which women have gained access to boards? Do firms with
have more women on their boards than other firms?
10
11
12
W b d (Y/N) Odd R ti P b hi2 0 00 Women on board (Y/N) Odds Ratio Non-executive board members 1.05*** (0 01) Prob > chi2 0.00 sigma_u 4.70 rho 0.87 (0.01) US-style board 21.42*** (19.19) Number of
2609 Number of 381 Board size 1.04 (0.05) Sector 1.00 Number of firms 381 (0.00) Employees (log) 1.49* (0.33) ROA 34.54 (87.86) cons 2.90e-06
13
_ (6.61e-06)
14
15
Women on boards (%) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Non-executive Non executive board members US-style board Board size Board size Sector Employees (log) ROA _cons R-sq sigma_u sigma_e rho Number of obs
16
Number of obs Number of firms
Women
Y/N Non- executive board members US-style board Board size Sector Employees (log) ROA members Women on board Y/N Non- executive board members US-style board Board size Board size Sector Employees (log)
17
ROA
18