Women on corporate boards: Japan in a boards: Japan in a - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Women on corporate boards: Japan in a boards: Japan in a - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Dr. Anja Kirsch School of Economics and Business, Management Department Women on corporate boards: Japan in a boards: Japan in a comparative perspective Outline Women on boards across firms and countries Women on boards across firms and


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  • Dr. Anja Kirsch

School of Economics and Business, Management Department

Women on corporate boards: Japan in a boards: Japan in a comparative perspective

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Outline

Women on boards across firms and countries

  • Women on boards across firms and countries
  • Director selection and the selection of women directors
  • The influence of corporate governance on director selection
  • The case of Japan
  • Data and methods

Analysis and results

  • Analysis and results
  • Outlook: next steps

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D i ti L ki t fi Description: Looking at firms

S h lt Th b d f Some research results: There are more women on boards of…

  • Large firms
  • Small family firms

y

  • Firms with large boards
  • Established firms
  • Firms in the service sector (banking, retail…)
  • Firms in industries with high female employment and a high proportion of female managers
  • Firms with international institutional investors
  • Firms with international institutional investors

…but these results vary across countries

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See for example Hillman et al. (2007), Mínguez-Vera and Martin (2011), Nekhili and Gatfaoui (2013), Oehmichen et al. (2012)

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Description: Looking across countries Description: Looking across countries

There are more women on boards in countries…

  • with greater gender equality in public life
  • with greater gender equality in public life
  • in the economic sphere (with higher female labour force participation, greater female presence in senior

management, a lower gender pay gap) i th liti l h ( ith i li t)

  • in the political sphere (with more women in parliament)
  • in education (with higher female participation rates in tertiary education)
  • with formal and informal institutions that facilitate women’s access to boards
  • with regulation on women’s board representation (quota and disclosure regimes)
  • with national cultures that score high on gender egalitarianism
  • with less gendered welfare policies (less maternity leave but more paternity leave and parental leave, with

more childcare services)

  • With pressure for women’s representation on boards emanating from actors
  • stock exchanges, professional associations of company directors, lobbying groups, search and advisory firms

and the media

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See for example Grosvold et al. (2015), Iannotta et al. (2015), Sheridan et al. (2014), Terjesen & Singh (2008)

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Women on Boards (%) 2013 Women on Boards (%), 2013

Country Women on Boards (%) N companies Boards (%) companies A t li 11 7 270 Australia 11.7 270 Canada 11.1 241 France 27.5 96 Germany 16.9 81 Italy 17.8 49 Japan 1 4 368 Japan 1.4 368 Netherlands 17.9 37 South Korea 0.2 102 S i 14 8 46 Spain 14.8 46 Sweden 28.9 50 Switzerland 10.5 68

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United Kingdom 15.7 288 United States 15.1 877

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How are board directors selected?

Rational economic perspective:

  • Director selection attempts to meet the

Social embeddedness perspective:

  • Director selection is influenced by social
  • Director selection attempts to meet the

governance and resource needs of the firm and its shareholders, reflecting their best interests

  • Director selection is influenced by social

factors

  • Assumes that selection is affected by

best interests

  • Assumes an efficiently operating labour

market for corporate directors, views the social connections; emphasizes negotiations between CEOs and incumbent directors over filling board market for directors as a meritocracy

  • Draws on agency theory and resource

dependence theory vacancies

  • Draws on concepts of homosocial

reproduction, homosociality, homophily dependence theory reproduction, homosociality, homophily and similarity-–attraction as well as the corporate elite

6 See Withers, Hillman & Cannella 2012

In practice, director selection is carried out in a combination of these two perspectives.

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Why are women selected or excluded? Why are women selected or excluded?

Rational economic perspective: Social embeddedness perspective:

  • Appointments are based on a prospective

director’s ability to provide monitoring or resources to a firm

  • Candidates’ social capital and networks,

CEO-board dynamics, and other social dynamics play a role in the selection process

  • Women enhance a board’s monitoring

capabilities because they are more likely to be independent

  • Desire of current directors and CEO to select

candidates similar to themselves excludes women

  • Women make boards more representative
  • f external stakeholders, especially women

consumers and employees

  • Desire of directors as an elite group to

maintain social status and prestige excludes women (and other outsiders)

  • Having women directors provides legitimacy

and conforms to emerging social norms

  • Functionalist reasoning: firms that need
  • Desire of CEO to avoid directors who will

closely monitor management excludes women (due to their independence)

  • Functionalist reasoning: firms that need

more monitoring and links to certain stakeholders and legitimacy appoint women ( p )

  • Hence: Boards with diversity among male

directors and where access to the elite is

  • pening up and where CEO power is low vis-

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  • pening up and where CEO power is low vis-

à-vis directors and shareholders appoint women

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Director selection and corporate governance

R h di t l ti h ld id h th h i Research on director selection should consider how other governance mechanisms influence the director selection process (Withers, Hillman & Cannella 2012, p. 267):

  • Independence: independent/non executive directors may have different preferences for
  • Independence: independent/non-executive directors may have different preferences for

director selection than CEO and have power in negotiations with CEO

  • Corporate governance reform: changes in governance mechanisms may facilitate

access to the corporate elite

  • Ownership concentration: owners with large shareholdings have power to enforce their

preferences in director selection (Withers et al. 2012) p ( )

  • Foreign holdings: foreign blockholders have an interest in transparency in board

appointments; foreign owners may introduce HR practices in line with those in their home country or with global “best practices” (Oehmichen et al 2012; Olcott & Oliver home country or with global “best practices” (Oehmichen et al. 2012; Olcott & Oliver 2014)

  • CEO influence: CEO equity compensation and CEO duality may influence his/her

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preferences in director selection (Withers et al. 2012)

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The case of Japan

  • Extremely low percentage of women on boards
  • Pressures for increasing women’s access to leadership positions
  • Pressures for changing corporate governance

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Ch i t d Changing corporate governance and women on Japanese boards

Are the firms that have engaged in corporate governance reform / have corporate governance mechanisms in line with the reforms the ones in which women have gained access to boards? Do firms with

  • more non-executive directors / independent directors
  • a US-style one-tier board structure
  • smaller board size

have more women on their boards than other firms?

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Data

Listed firms 90% of market capitalization

  • Listed firms, 90% of market capitalization
  • Total of 381 Japanese listed firms
  • 2007-2014
  • Data on corporate governance from Thomson Reuters ASSET4
  • Data on profitability, sector and size from Thomson Reuters Datastream

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Variables

Dependent variable: Dependent variable:

  • 1 or more women on board (yes/no)
  • (Percentage of women on boards)

Independent variables:

  • Non-executive board members (%) or independent board members (%)

Non-executive board members (%) or independent board members (%)

  • Board structure (Japanese corporate auditor system or US-style one-tier structure)
  • Board size (number of members)

Control variables

  • Firm size (log employees)
  • Firm size (log employees)
  • Firm profitability (ROA)
  • Sector

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R lt Results

W b d (Y/N) Odd R ti P b hi2 0 00 Women on board (Y/N) Odds Ratio Non-executive board members 1.05*** (0 01) Prob > chi2 0.00 sigma_u 4.70 rho 0.87 (0.01) US-style board 21.42*** (19.19) Number of

  • bservations

2609 Number of 381 Board size 1.04 (0.05) Sector 1.00 Number of firms 381 (0.00) Employees (log) 1.49* (0.33) ROA 34.54 (87.86) cons 2.90e-06

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_ (6.61e-06)

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Results

  • Board independence (%) or non-executive board members (%): as the

percentage of non-executive board members increases, so do the odds of having

  • ne or more women on the board – albeit a small effect
  • ne or more women on the board

albeit a small effect

  • Board structure: firms with a US-style one tier board structure are 21 times more

likely to have one or more women on their board than firms with the Japanese y p corporate auditor system

  • Board size: not significant

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Outlook: Next steps

  • Include data on foreign holdings and on ownership concentration
  • How to measure CEO influence?
  • How to measure legitimacy of the board?
  • Interviews with board directors: Search for reasons why we find a clustering of

women on boards in those firms that have reformed their corporate governance: Does corporate governance reform facilitate women‘s access to b d ? Wh d h d h i i fl ’ boards? Why and how do governance mechanisms influence women’s access to boards?

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Results Results

Women on boards (%) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Non-executive Non executive board members US-style board Board size Board size Sector Employees (log) ROA _cons R-sq sigma_u sigma_e rho Number of obs

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Number of obs Number of firms

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Correlations

Women

  • n board

Y/N Non- executive board members US-style board Board size Sector Employees (log) ROA members Women on board Y/N Non- executive board members US-style board Board size Board size Sector Employees (log)

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ROA

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Sectors

599 Oil, Gas & Basic Resouces 1300 Chemicals 1300 Chemicals 2300 Construction & Materials 3300 Automobiles & Parts 3500 Food & Beverage 3700 Personal & Household Goods 4500 H lth C 4500 Health Care 5300 Retail 5500 Media 5500 Media 5700 Travel & Leisure 6500 Telecommunications 7500 Utilities 8099 Banks, Insurance, Real Estate & Financial Services

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Services 9500 Technology