+ Who Killed My Parked Car? Faculty: Kang G. Shin Grad students: - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
+ Who Killed My Parked Car? Faculty: Kang G. Shin Grad students: - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
+ Who Killed My Parked Car? Faculty: Kang G. Shin Grad students: Kyong-Tak Cho, Arun Ganesan, Daniel Chen, Mert Pese The University of Michigan + Vehicle Cyber Attacks Security Ris ks! Remote Acces s Points In-Vehicle Networks + Vehicle
+Vehicle Cyber Attacks
Security Ris ks!
Remote Acces s Points
In-Vehicle Networks
+Vehicle Cyber Attacks
Source: K. Koscher et al, “Experimental Security Analysis of a Modern Automobile”, IEEE S&P’10
+Attacks Possible/Effective on Parked
Cars?
Integrity/Authenticity/… Availability Ignition ON Ignition OFF
- Koscher et al. [S&P’10]
- Checkoway et al. [USENIX Sec’
13]
- Miller et al. [Defcon’13,
BlackHat’14, BlackHat’15]
- Cho and Shin [USENIX’15, CCS’
17]
- …
- Cho and Shin
[CCS’16]
- …
? ? ?
Is it even possible/effectiv e to attack a vehicle when its ignition is OFF?
+
“Sleep Mode” Extremely low current (u A) Can be awakened !!!
Waking up ECUs
Reference: hollisbrothersauto Reference: Lexus
+CAN Transceivers with Wake-up
+Standardized Wake-up
+Standardized Wake-up
+
Terminal 30 ECUs’ consumption in Sleep Mode: 3 0mA
- Max. # days in Sleep Mode: 41 days
“Can an attacker increase this power consumption?”
Battery life…
+Threat Model
OBD-II devices: Some have exter nal power supply, e.g., battery) Telematic Units: These are consider ed to be the most “vulnerable” one!
An adversary has remote access to CAN bus and can control
+Two Novel (Immobilization) Attacks Battery Drai n Attack Denial-of- Body contro l Attack
+
Zzzz…..
Attack 1: Battery Drain Attack Inject CAN message!
- Bus wake-up via simple signal patterns? GOO
D!
- Fast “standardized” wake-up mechanism nee
ded? EVEN BETTER!
- How can the attacker drain the vehicle batter
y?
+Battery Drain Attack
Multimeter Laptop Car Battery
Experiment on 2017 Year-model Vehicle
+Battery Drain Attack
Control Drained Current Max #days with ignition off* (None) 12.2mA 30.7 days “Parasitic Drain” threshold : 30mA Wake up HSCAN, MSCAN 40mA 12.5 days Change power mode 75mA 8.3 days Unlock/lock driver’s door 100mA 5 days Open trunk 150mA 3.3 days * 60Ah battery, Min. SoC for cold start: 50% (Worst Case), Usual So C: 70%
+Battery Drain Attack
In our 2017 year-model test vehicle, when attemptin g to wake up ECUs
+Battery Drain Attack
+Battery Drain Attack
Control Drained Current Max #days with ignition off* (None) 12.2mA 30.7 days “Parasitic Drain” threshold : 30mA Wake up ECUs 42.0mA 8.92 days Change power mode 75mA 8.3 days Unlock/lock driver’s door 100mA 5 days Open trunk 150mA 3.3 days * 60Ah battery, Min. SoC for cold start: 50% (Worst Case), Usual So C: 70%
+Battery Drain Attack
Control Drained Current Max #days with ignition off* (None) 12.2mA 30.7 days “Parasitic Drain” threshold : 30mA Wake up ECUs 42.0mA 8.92 days Change power mode 75mA 8.3 days Unlock/lock driver’s door 100mA 5 days Open trunk 150mA 3.3 days * 60Ah battery, Min. SoC for cold start: 50% (Worst Case), Usual So C: 70%
+Battery Drain Attack
Control Drained Current Max #days with ignition off* (None) 12.2mA 30.7 days “Parasitic Drain” threshold : 30mA Wake up ECUs 42.0mA 8.92 days Change power mode 74.5mA 5.02 days Unlock/lock driver’s door 100mA 5 days Open trunk 150mA 3.3 days * 60Ah battery, Min. SoC for cold start: 50% (Worst Case), Usual So C: 70%
While the ignition is off…
+Battery Drain Attack
Control Drained Current Max #days with ignition off* (None) 12.2mA 30.7 days “Parasitic Drain” threshold : 30mA Wake up ECUs 42.0mA 8.92 days Change power mode 74.5mA 5.02 days Unlock/lock driver’s door 100mA 5 days Open trunk 150mA 3.3 days * 60Ah battery, Min. SoC for cold start: 50% (Worst Case), Usual So C: 70%
+Battery Drain Attack
Control Drained Current Max #days with ignition off* (None) 12.2mA 30.7 days “Parasitic Drain” threshold : 30mA Wake up ECUs 42.0mA 8.92 days Change power mode 74.5mA 5.02 days Unlock/lock driver’s door 101.1mA 3.7 days Open trunk 150mA 3.3 days * 60Ah battery, Min. SoC for cold start: 50% (Worst Case), Usual So C: 70%
+Battery Drain Attack
Control Drained Current Max #days with ignition off* (None) 12.2mA 30.7 days “Parasitic Drain” threshold : 30mA Wake up ECUs 42.0mA 8.92 days Change power mode 74.5mA 5.02 days Unlock/lock driver’s door 101.1mA 3.7 days Open trunk 153.3mA 2.44 days * 60Ah battery, Min. SoC for cold start: 50% (Worst Case), Usual So C: 70%
+
What do people normally do before starting their car ? Probably… 1) Open the door 2) Start the car (change in power mode…) 3) Or perhaps… open the trunk!
Driver-context-based Reverse Engineering
- Q. How do we know which message ID to use in
- rder to control such functions?
=> Driver-Context-Based Reverse Engineering
+Driver-context-based Reverse
Engineering
- Q. How do we know which message ID to use in
- rder to control such functions?
=> Driver-Context-Based Reverse Engineering [Ignition OFF] CAN traffic (~30 msgs) [Ignition ON] CAN traffic (~60 msgs)
Compare traffic!
+Battery Drain Attack
In other vehicles…
2008–2017 model-year (compact and mid-size) sedans , coupe, crossover, PHEV (Plug-in Hybrid Electric Veh icle), SUVs, truck, and an electric vehicle
+Some Example Vehicles
+Attack 2: Denial-of-Body control
Attack
RFA BCM
“Remote Keyless Entr y (RKE) System”
+CAN Protocol : Error Handling
Error Active Error P assive
Bus Off
TEC > 127 (or) REC > 1 27 TEC > 255 Reset
(Auto/Manual)
TEC ≤ 127 (and) REC ≤ 127
- Disconnection from bus
- Shutdown of entire system
+CAN Protocol : Error Handling ISO 11898
"A node can start the recovery from bus-off state only upon a user request.” Depends on the Software Config.
+Denial-of-Body control (BoD)
Attack
One simple procedure (of many others…)
- 1. Wait for all ECUs to go to sleep after ignition is OFF
- 2. Wake up ECUs
- 3. Change bit rate (e.g., 500kbps 250 kbps)
Consequence
- 1. All awakened ECUs on the bus continuously experience
and incur errors
- 2. All enter the bus-off state, i.e., shut-down
- 3. Depending on the software configuration, some ECUs
recover from the bus-off state
whereas some don’t…
+Denial-of-Body control
(BoD)Attack
In our 2017 year-model test vehicle, RCM (Remote Control Module) did not recov er from the bus-off, i.e., remained shut down most probably due to its distinct recovery polic y configuration (perhaps for anti-theft/engine-i mmobilizer purposes).
+Denial-of-Body control
(BoD)Attack
Symptoms
1)
Remote key does not work (even attempting with its RFID)
2)
Door cannot be opened
3)
Trunk does not open/close
Problems…
1)
Vehicle owners won’t even know what happened
2)
They cannot even start the car
3)
Maybe, the car has to be towed
4)
Order a new key fob
+Denial-of-Body Attack
The key was with us inside the c ar! Not even injecting any msg right no w…
+Conclusion
Wake-up function is there for the attacker
to use which is too easy/simple…
Vehicle ECUs can not only be “awakened”
but also be “controlled/attacked”, while the ignition is off…
State-of-the-art defense schemes do not
consider such a possibility
Possibility of “immobilizing” or shutting